FIRST  AND 


FUNDAMENTAL,.  TRUTHS 


WSSAVjWA%^fffnf^^ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


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^^pcftologp- 

BY 

JAMES   M 
THE 

cCOSH,  D.D.,  LL.  D.,  Litt.  D. 

COGNITIVE    POWERS. 

I  vol.  i2mo,  $1.50. 

THE 

MOTIVE    POWERS. 

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FIRST  AND  FUNDAMENTAL 
TRUTHS 


BEING   A  TREATISE  ON 


METAPHYSICS 


BY 

JAMES  McCOSH,  D.D.,  LL.  D.,  Litt.  D. 

ex-president  of  princeton  college,  author  of  "  method  of  divine 

government,"  "  laws  of  discursive  thought,"  "psychology 

of  the  cognitive  powers,"  psychology  of  the 

motive  powers  "  "  realistic 

philosophy" 


NEW   YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1889 


Copyright,  1889, 
By  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge: 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  0.  Uoughton  &  Co. 


^ 


1-^  \3  - 


PREFACE. 


Every  thinking  mind  has  occasion  at  times  to  refer 
to  first  principles.  In  this  work  I  have  set  myself  ear- 
nestly to  inquire  what  these  are  ;  to  determine  their  na- 
ture, and  to  classify  and  arrange  them  into  a  science. 

In  pursuing  this  end  I  have  reached  a  Realistic  Phi- 
losophy, opposed  ahke  to  the  Sceptical  Philosophy,  which 
has  proceeded  from  Hume,  in  England,  and  the  Idealistic 
Philosophy,  which  has  ramified  from  Kant,  in  Germany ; 
;^  while  I  have  also  departed  from  the  Scottish  and  higher 
French  Schools,  as  I  hold  resolutely  that  the  mind,  in  its 
intelligent  acts,  begins  with,  and  proceeds  throughout, 
on  a  cognition  of  things. 

If  the  mind  does  not  assume  and  start  with  things,  it 
jj  I     can  never  reach  realities  by  any  process  of  reasoning  or 
f^    induction. 

This  work  contains  the  results  of  my  teaching  of  very 
large  classes  in  Queen's  College,  Belfast,  Ireland,  and  in 
^  Princeton  College,  America,  and  may  be  regai'ded  as  the 
cope-stone  of  what  I  have  been  able  to  do  in  philosophy. 
I  have  expounded  my  philosophy  in  the  text,  and  put 
the  historical  and  critical  disquisitions  in  smaller  print ; 
to  be  read  continuously  as  carrying  on  the  discussion,  or 
to  be  reserved  for  reference  —  as  my  readers  may  find 
it  best  suited  to  accomplish  the  end  they  have  in  view. 

Princeton,  N.  J.,  February,  1889. 


,16f'''7-14. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

Definition  of  the  Science.     The  Jive  Mental  Sciences         ,        .      1 

PART   FIRST. 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

CHAPTER   I. 

Nature  of  First  Truths.     Meaning  of  the  terms  "philosophy" 

and  "philosophical " 5 

CHAPTER  II. 
Threefold  Aspects  of  Intuitive  Truths.    Innate  Ideas        .      12 

CHAPTER   III. 

Tests  of  Intuitive  Truths.     Views  of  Aristotle,  Leibnitz,  Kant, 

Locke,  Scottish  School,  Scheliing,  Hegel 16 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Spontaneous  and  Reflex  Use  of  Intuition.    Kant's  view      .      19 

CHAPTER  V. 
Sources  of  Error  in  Metaphysical  Speculation  .        .      22 

CHAPTER   VI. 
Erroneous  Views  of  Intuition.     Locke  and  Kant      ...      27 

CHAPTER  VII.' 
Legitimate  Use  of  First  Principles.     The  Soj^hists        .        ,      31 


VI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VIII.  —  (Supplementary.) 

Brief  Critical  Review  of   Opinions   in   regard   to   Intui- 
tive Truths 34 

PART   SECOND. 

PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION  OF   PRIMITIVE  TRUTHS. 

BOOK  I. 
Primitive  Cognitions. 

CHAPTER   I. 
v''  The  Mind  begins  its  Intelligent  Acts  with  Knowledge  .      58 

CHAPTER  II. 
Our  Intuition  of  Body  by  the    Senses.     Account  by  Midler. 
Cheselden   case.      Review  of  Berkeley,  Kant,  Hamilton,  Fichte, 
Ferrier,  Saisset,  Locke,  Spencer 62 

CHAPTER  III. 

Distinctions  to  be  attended  to  in  our  Cognition  of  Body. 

Difficulties  in  sense  of  sight.  Apparent  deception  of  the  senses. 
Views,  of  Eleatics,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Stoics.  Epicureans  and  Aca- 
demics, Augustine,  Anselm,  Kant,  Hamilton.  Sensational  School 
and  Brown .75 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Apparent  Deception  op  the  Senses 83 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Essential  Qualities  of  Matter.    Descartes  and  Leibnitz 

as  to  Space  and  Force   .........       85 

CHAPTER  VI. 

V  Our  Intuitive  Knowledge  of  Self  or  Spirit.  Critical  re- 
view of  views  of  Descartes,  Locke,  Buffier,  The  Scottish  School, 
Kant,  The  German  Pantheists,  Hamilton,  Mansel  ...       88 

CHAPTER   VII. 

Substance.     Critical  review  of  opinions  of  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Locke, 

Berkeley,  Hamilton 1 00 


CONTENTS.  Vll 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Mode,  Quality,  Property,  Essence.     View  of  Locke  .        .110 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Being 118 

CHAPTER  X. 
Extension.    Views  of  Bain,  31  Oiler 121 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Number.     Views  of  Aristotle,  Locke,  and  Buffier        .        ,        ,        .124 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Motion.     Views  of  Aristotle,  Descartes,  Locke,  Franz  case  .        .126 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Power.     Mill's  definition  of  Matter  and  Mind  criticised    .        .         .128 

BOOK   11. 

Primitive  Beliefs. 

CHAPTER  I. 
/Their  General  Nature.     Presentative  and  Representative  knowl- 
edge.     Views  of  Augustine,  Anselm,  Abelard,  High  Church  Divines. 
Puritans,  Charnock,  Kant,  Jacobi,  Hamilton  .         .         .         .130 

CHAPTER  II. 

Space  and  Time.     Lucretius,  Brown,  Stewart,  Trendelenburg,  Ham- 
ilton, Herschel,  Leibnitz,  Clarke,  Kant    141 

CHAPTER  III. 
The  Infinite.     Hobbes,  Locke,  Hamilton,  Mansel,  Howe,  Leibnitz    .     154 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Extent,  Tests,  and  Power  of  our  Native  Beliefs       •        .176 

BOOK   III. 
Primitive  Judgments. 

CHAPTER   I. 

Their  General  Nature  and  a  Classification  of  them.    Views 

of  J.  S.  Mill,  Locke,  Kant,  Hamilton,  Bain 181 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   II. 

Relations  Intuitively  observed  by  the  Mind.  Identity, 
Comprehension,  Resemblance,  Space,  Ti.me,  Quantity, 
Active  Property,  Cause  and  Effect.  Leibnitz  and  Kant, 
as  to  Identity.    Analytic  Judgments  rerjulaling  Logic       .         .         .     191 

CHAPTER  III. 

Particular  Examination  of  Cause  and  Effect.    Kant.    Uni- 
formity of  Nature.     Criticism  of  Mill.     Miracles         .        .         ,     207 

BOOK   IV. 
Our  Intuitive  Moral  Convictions. 

CHAPTER   I. 
Their  General  Nature 217 

CHAPTER  n. 

Virtue  with  its  Attached  Obligations.  Sinith,  Brown,  Mack- 
intosh.    Examination  of  Mill's  Utilitarianism       .         ,         .         .219 

CHAPTER    III. 
Error  and  Sin 227 

CHAPTER  IV. 
The  Will,  Prisiitive  Truth  in.     Kant's  view    ....     2.33 

CHAPTER  V. 

Relation  of  Moral  Good  and  Happiness 239 

PART   THIRD. 

INTUITIVE  PRINCIPLES  AND  THE  SCIENCES. 

BOOK   I. 

Metaphysics. 

CHAPTER   I. 

The  Science  Defined 244 

CHAPTER  II. 
Fundamental  Truth  and  Evolution 249 


CONTENTS.  IX 

BOOK  11. 

Gnosiologt. 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Origin  of  our  Knowledge  and  Ideas.    Statement  and 

criticism  of  Locke's  views 256 

CHAPTER  II. 
Limits  to  our  Knowledge,  Ideas,  and  Beliefs       .        .        .    265 

CHAPTER  III. 
Relation  of  Intuition  and  Experience 271 

CHAPTER  IV. 
"y^^THE  Necessity  attached  to  our  Primary  Convictions         .    278 

CHAPTER  v.— (Supplementary.) 

Criticism  of  Distinctions  as   to  the  Relation  of  Intuitive  Reason  and 

Experience 285 

BOOK  III. 

Ontology. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Knowing  and  Being 293 

CHAPTER  II. 

Idealism 299 

CHAPTER  III. 
;/   Scepticism  and  Agnosticism.    M.  Morel,  Ferrier,  Hamilton         .    309 

CHAPTER  IV.  —  (Supplementary.) 
The  Conditioned  and  Unconditioned      . 321 

CHAPTER  v.  — (Supplementary.) 
The  Antinomies  of  Kant 324 

CHAPTER  VI.  —  (Supplementary.) 
The  Relativity  of  Knowledge 326 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    Vn.  — (SUPPLEMENTABY.) 

Examination  of  Mill's  Metaphysical  system 328 

CHAPTER    VIII.  —  (SUPPLEMENTAKT.) 

The  Nescience  theory  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 332 

BOOK   IV. 

Metaphysical  Pkinciples  involved  in  the  Sciences. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Metaphysics  in  the  Practical  Affairs  of  Life    .        .        .    337 

CHAPTER  II. 
Metaphysics  of  Physics.     Wkewell 339 

CHAPTER  m. 

Metaphysics  op  Mathematics.    Criticism  of  Kant,  Mansel,  Stew- 
art, and  Mill 343 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Metaphysics  of  Formal  Logic 350 

CHAPTER  V. 
Metaphysics  of  Ethics.    Locke 352 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Metaphysics  of  Theology 355 


FIRST  AND  FUNDAMENTAL  TRUTHS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

In  popular  apprehension  Metaphysics  is  the  most  con- 
fused and  confusing  of  all  branches  of  inquiry.  I  claim 
that  under  one  aspect  it  is  the  most  certain  of  all  de- 
partments of  knowledge  ;  it  is  so  in  its  principles,  which 
are  fundamental.  Under  another  aspect  it  is  the  most 
perplexed,  as  it  is  difficult  to  determine  these  principles, 
they  are  so  involved  in  the  varied  and  complicated  opera- 
tions of  the  mind. 

The  phrase  has  been  made  to  cover  all  sorts  of  specu- 
lation, attainable  and  unattainable,  possible  and  impos- 
sible. Of  all  things,  it  is  important  at  the  present  stage 
of  the  history  of  philosophy  that  it  should  be  carefully 
defined,  that  a  distinct  province  be  allotted  to  it,  and  that 
it  should  not  be  allowed  to  trespass  upon  the  territory 
^of  its  neighbors. 

The  term  points  to  a  branch  of  investigation  beyond 
(^fiera)  Physics.  The  profound  thinkers  of  the  world 
have  all  believed  in  something  in  the  mind  deeper  and 
higher  than  the  fleeting  phenomena  of  the  senses.  I  am 
convinced  that  there  are  powers  working  which  underlie 
and  support  all  its  intelligent  exercises.  If  this  be  so, 
it  is  surely  of  vast  moment  to  determine  what  these  are. 
This  is  the  field  to  be  allotted  to  Metaphysics. 

Aristotle  has  remarked  that  Metaphysics,  or  what  he 
calls  First  Philosophy,  while  the  first  of  the  sciences  in 
the  order  of  things,  will  be  the  last  to  be  constructed. 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

The  reason,  is,  that  these  principles  at  the  basis  of  all  the 
higher  operations  of  the  mind  are  so  mixed  up  with 
them  that  it  is  difficult  to  separate  them  and  make  them 
stand  out  distinctly  to  the  view.  But  I  believe  that  the 
associated  mental  exercises  have  now  been  so  far  exam- 
ined and  ascertained  that  it  is  possible  to  discover  and 
express  the  nature  of  the  fundamental  laws  on  which 
they  stand.  Since  the  days  of  Aristotle  we  know  what 
are  the  laws  of  reasoning  and  of  discursive  thought  gen- 
erally. Butler  and  Kant  have  thrown  much  light  on  the 
moral  powers  of  man's  nature.  Important  discoveries 
have  been  made  as  to  sense-perception  by  physical  and 
physiological  research,  I  believe  we  can  now  furnish  an 
approximately  correct  analysis  of  the  varied  elements 
in  our  emotions.  With  so  many  parts  of  the  country 
separated  and  so  far  settled,  we  may  allocate  its  place  to 
the  frontier  province  which  guards  the  whole. 

I  define  Metaphysics  as  The  Science  op  First  and 
Fundamental  Truths.  I  cherish  the  conviction  that 
it  may  be  made  as  clear  and  satisfactory  as  Logic,  the 
science  of  discursive  truth,  has  been,  since  the  days  of 
Aristotle  (a).  It  shows  us  what  we  are  entitled  to 
assume  and  what  we  are  not  entitled  to  assume  without 
mediate  proof.  It  does  so  by  opening  to  our  view  those 
primitive  truths  which  at  once  claim  our  assent  and 
furnish  a  sure  foundation  to  all  our  knowledge  ;  which, 
like  the  primitive  granite  rocks,  go  down  the  deepest 
and  mount  the  highest  (5). 

(a)  Five  mental  sciences  have  emerged  :  (1.)  Psychology, 
which  observes  the  operations  of  the  mind  generally,  with  the  view 
of  discovering  their  laws.  (2.)  Logic,  the  science  of  Discursive 
Thought,  in  which  we  proceed  from  what  is  given  or  allowed  to 
what  is  drawn  from  it.  (3.)  Ethics,  the  science  of  our  Moral 
Nature.     (4.)  iEsTUEXics,  which  treats  of  the  feelings  raised  hy  the 


INTRODUCTION.  6 

Beautiful,  the  Picturesque,  the  Ludicrous,  and  the  Sublime.  (5.) 
Metaphysics,  the  science  of  First  Truths.  This  gives  a  determi- 
nate (a  phrase  of  Locke's)  place  to  Metaphysics. 

(6)  I  am  so  old  as  to  remember  how  much  service  was  done  to 
Formal  Logic  among  English-speaking  people  when  Whately,  and 
Hamilton  who  searchingly  examined  him,  insisted  on  keeping  the 
science  within  a  definite  field,  instead  of  allowing  it  to  wander  among 
all  sorts  of  topics,  practical  and  unpractical,  bearing  on  thinking.  A 
like  benefit  may  be  conferred  on  Metaphysics  by  confining  it  within 
rigid  boundaries,  instead  of  attempting  to  settle  (often  only  to  un- 
settle) all  questions  regarding  God,  the  World,  and  the  Soul. 


PART  FIRST. 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURE  OF   FIRST   TRUTHS. 

L 

There  are  Objects,  there  are  Truths,  which  are  per- 
ceiyed  Directly  and  Immediately ;  this  is  not  the  case 
with  the  great  body  of  our  knowledge.  Most  of  what 
we  know  is  acquired  by  a  process  of  induction,  that  is 
gathered  observation,  or  of  reasoning,  /it  is  not  by  di- 
rect observation,  but  by  testimony,  that  those  of  us  who 
have  not  been  in  China  believe  that  there  is  such  a 
country.  It  is  not  by  immediate  perception,  but  by  rea- 
soning, that  we  know  that  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  to- 
gether equal  to  two  right  angles.  ,  But  there  are  truths 
which  are  seen  at  once  on  the  bare  inspection  of  the 
objects.  We  know  ourselves  directly  as  existing  in  pleas- 
ure or  in  pain,  as  thinking  or  feeling.  We  know  that 
the  self  of  to-day  in  joy  is  the  same  as  the  self  of  yes- 
terday in  sorrow.  On  the  bare  contemplation  of  these 
two  straight  lines  we  perceive  that  they  cannot  enclose 
a  space,  and  on  a  surface  being  presented  to  us,  that  the 
shortest  distance  between  these  two  points  in  it  is  a 
straight  line.  In  order  to  convince  us  of  these  and  in- 
numerable such  truths,  we  need  no  gathered  experience* 
and  we  make  no  use  of  inference. 


6  GENERAL   VIEW  OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

^  The  power,  or  rather  the  powers,  for  they  are  many 

and  varied,  which  are  percipient  of  these  objects  and 
truths  are  called  Intuitive.  The  truths  thus  discovered 
are  Primitive;  they  are  perceived  at  once.  They  are 
also  Fundamental ;  other  truths  are  built  upon  them, 
and  to  us,  however  they  may  stand  to  other  intelligences, 
they  need  nothing  extraneous  to  sustain  them.  The  body 
of  such  truths  constitutes  Metaphysics,  or  what  may  be 
called  Metaphysical  Philosophy,  which  is  the  deepest  of 
all  Philosophy. 

n. 

Our  Intuitions  look  to  "Things"  and  the  Relations 
of  Things.  They  are  regarded  by  us  as  Real,'  These 
phrases  need  no  definition ;  we  know  their  meaning  at 
once.  Knowledge  implies  things  known.  We  assume 
them  as  existences.  We  proceed  upon  them.  We  may 
not  know  the  full  nature  of  the  things,  but  we  know  so 
much  of  them.  We  know  ourselves  as  thinking,  or  in 
a  state  of  feeling.  We  know  that  body  as  spreading  out 
an  extended  surface  before  us,  or  as  resisting  our  energy. 

We  farther  on  decide  as  to  these  two  straight  lines, 
that  if  they  proceed  one  inch  without  coming  nearer  one 
another,  they  will  not,  however  far  prolonged,  approach 
each  other  more  closely.  '...We  discover  relations  between 
these  and  other  truths,  i  Proceeding  on  these  as  prem- 
ises, we  draw  conclusions  from  them.  The  original  ob- 
jects being  real,  all  that  is  drawn  from  them  by  logical 
inference  is  also  real.  Beginning  with  a  world  of  reali- 
ties, we  may  continue  in  it  all  along,  wandering  at  times, 
as  fancy  leads  us,  into  an  ideal  world,  but  knowing  it  all 
the  while  to  be  ideal,  and  ever  ready  to  return  to  the 
real  world  to  stay  and  stablish  ourselves. 

The  philosophy  which  assumes  and  proceeds  upon  the 
reality  of  things  may  be  called  a  Realistic  Philoso- 


NATURE   OF   FIRST   TRUTHS.  7 

PHY.  I  am  convinced  that  in  the  end  this  will  be 
acknowledged  as  the  true  philosophy,  and  will  set  aside 
the  Sceptical  Philosophy,  which  denies  the  reality  of 
things,  and  the  Agnostic  Philosophy,  which  affirms  (as 
the  only  thing  it  knows)  that  we  cannot  know  things, 
and  the  Idealistic  Philosophy,  which  adds  to  things  out  of 
the  stores  of  the  mind,  with  the  view  of  improving  them. 
In  a  crude,  uncritical  shape,  this  was  the  first  philosophy; 
and  when  duly  constructed,  with  the  help  of  the  necessary 
"rejections  and  exclusions,"  it  will  be  the  final  philoso- 
phy. It  will  be  found,  as  we  advance,  that  Metaphysical 
Philosophy  has  two  offices  to  discharge:  one  to  consider 
our  Intuitions,  and  the  other  the  things  at  which  intui- 
tion looks. 

III. 
Our  Intuitions  look  to  Single  Objects,  and  not  to  ab- 
stract or  general  notions.  A  very  different  account  is 
often  given,  if  not  formally,  at  least  implicitly,  of  intu- 
ition or  of  intuitive  reason,  by  those  who  believe  in  it. 
Man  is  represented  as  gazing  immediately  on  the  true, 
the  beautiful,  the  good,  meaning  in  the  abstract  or  in 
the  general.  It  is  admitted  that  there  must  be  some 
sort  of  experience,  some  individual  object  presented  as 
the  occasion  ;  but  the  mind,  being  thus  roused  into  ac- 
tivity, is  represented  as  contemplating,  by  direct  vision, 
siuch  things  as  space  and  time,  substance  and  quality, 
cause  and  effect,  the  infinite  and  moral  good.  I  hope 
to  be  able  to  show  that  this  theory  is  altogether  mis- 
taken. Our  appeal  on  this  subject  must  be  to  the  con- 
sciousness and  the  memory,  and  these  give  a  very  dif- 
ferent account  of  the  process  which  passes  through  the 
mind  when  it  is  employed  about  such  objects.  Intui- 
tively the  mind  contemplates  a  particular  body  as  occu- 
pying space  and  being  in  space,  and  it  is  by  a  subsequent 


8  GENERAL   VIEW   OF  PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

intellectual  process,  in  which  abstraction  acts  an  impor- 
tant part,  that  the  idea  of  space  is  formed.  Intuitively 
the  mind  contemplates  an  event  as  happening  in  time, 
and  then  by  a  further  process  arrives  at  the  notion  of 
time.  The  mind  has  not  intuitively  an  idea  of  cause  or 
causation  in  the  abstract,  but  discovering  a  given  effect, 
it  looks  for  a  specific  cause.  It  does  not  form  some  sort 
of  a  vague  notion  of  a  general  infinite,  but  fixing  its 
attention  on  some  individual  thing,  —  such  as  space,  or 
time,  or  God,  —  it  is  constrained  to  believe  it  to  be 
infinite.  The  child  has  not  formed  to  itself  a  refined 
idea  of  moral  good,  but  contemplating  a  given  action,  it 
proclaims  it  to  be  good  or  evil. 

IV. 

We  can  Generalize  our  Intuitions,  and  thus  form  Phil- 
osophic Principles.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  the 
action  of  our  Intuitions,  that  we  should  study  their  na- 
ture as  metaphysicians  do.  Like  the  physiological  pro- 
cesses of  the  body,  say  in  breathing  and  digestion,  they 
act  best  when  we  take  no  notice  of  them.  An  officious 
intermeddling  with  them  may  tend  rather  to  disturb 
their  action.  But  the  physiologist  in  constructing  his 
science  has  carefully  to  observe  the  action  of  our  frame 
when  we  are  looking  at  objects,  or  when  we  breathe. 
So  the  metaphysician  has  carefully  to  watch  the  actions 
of  our  various  intuitions,  in  order  to  discover  their  na- 
ture and  their  laws. 

The  native  principles  of  the  mind  act,  as  physical  laws 
do,  at  all  times,  and  whether  we  observe  them  or  not. 
The  laws  of  the  material  world  are  discovered  by  the 
observation  and  generalization  of  their  individual  opera, 
tions.  It  is  in  much  the  same  way  that  we  find  out  the 
laws  of   our  original  and  native  convictions.     I  boldly 


NATURE   OF   FIRST   TRUTHS.  9 

affirm  that  it  is  as  impossible  to  determine  these  as  it  is 
to  ascertain  the  laws  of  the  external  universe,  by  a  priori 
cogitation  or  logical  inference.  As  they  cannot  be  elabo- 
rated by  speculation  on  the  one  hand,  so  they  do  not, 
on  the  other,  as  regulative  principles,  fall  under  the  im- 
,  mediate  notice  of  consciousness;  all  that  we  are  conscious 
of  are  the  individual  exercises.  But  examining  carefully 
the  nature  of  the  acts,  we  generalize  them,  and  thus  find 
the  precise  law  of  the  principle,  and  embody  it  in  a  ver- 
bal expression. 

The  principle  thus  discovered  is  a  philosophic  one ;  it 
is  a  truth  above  sense,  a  truth  of  mind,  a  truth  of  rea- 
son. It  is  different  in  its  origin  and  authority  from  the 
general  laws  reached  by  experience,  such  as  the  laws  of 
gravitation  or  chemical  affinity.  These  latter  are  the 
mere  generalizations  of  our  experience,  which  are  neces- 
sarily limited;  they  hold  merely  to  the  extent  of  our 
experience,  and  as  experience  cannot  reach  all  possible 
cases  we  can  never  say  that  there  may  not  be  excep- 
tions. Laws  of  the  former  kind  are  of  a  higher  and 
deeper  nature;  they  are  generalizations  of  intuitive  con- 
victions, carrying  necessity  and  consequent  universality 
in  their  nature.  They  are  truths  of  our  original  nature, 
having  the  sanction  of  Him  who  hath  given  us  our  con- 
stitution and  graven  them  there  with  his  own  finger. 
These  general  maxims  constitute  metaphysics.  All  pro- 
posed metaphysical  philosophy  should  aim  at  being  the 
expression  of  our  intuitions  in  the  form  of  genei'al  laws. 
We  shall  see  that  the  generalizations  may  be  inaccu- 
rately made,  and  almost  all  the  numerous  errors  of  the 
common  metaphysics  proceed  from  this  cause;  they  are 
to  be  corrected  by  properly  drawing  the  law  out  of  the 
individual  operations.  When  this  is  done,  we  have  meta- 
physical philosophy. 


10  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

The  term  '*  Philosophy  "  has  not  had  a  very  distinct  meaning  for 
the  last  two  or  three  ages.  It  should  always  be  carefully  distin- 
guished from  Science,  which  generalizes  the  scattered  operations  of 
nature  into  laws.  Peihaps  it  may  most  appropriately  be  defined  as 
the  inquiry  into  the  first  principles  of  things,  and  then  the  philoso- 
pher will  be  one  who  conducts  the  inquiry.  The  adjective  "  philo- 
sophical "  may  be  applied  to  all  branches  which  inquire  into  the  first 
principles  of  the  department  discussed.  Metaphysical  Philosophy, 
or  simply  Metaphysics,  has  a  clear  and  distinct  province  allowed 
when  it  is  understood  as  being  a  search  for  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  our  mental  operations. 

V. 

Induction,  by  which  is  meant  a  Gathered  and  Sys- 
tematic Observation,  has  a  place  in  Metapliysics.  This 
will  seem  to  many  an  extraordinary  position.  It  will 
be  regarded  by  them  as  stripping  philosophy  of  its 
crown  and  sceptre  which  place  it  above  all  the  ordinary 
sciences.  It  seems  to  make  our  deeper  thinking  to  have 
no  other  foundation  than  human  observation,  which 
must  necessarily  be  limited.  Now,  I  wish  it  to  be  under- 
stood that  I  do  not  propose  to  rest  fundamental  truths 
upon  our  taking  notice  of  them.  These  exist  whether 
we  observe  them  or  not.  My  eye  does  not  create  that 
mountain  as  it  looks  upon  it.  The  mountain  stands 
there  on  its  own  foundation,  and  all  that  my  eye  does 
is  to  discover  it.  So  it  is  with  primitive  truth :  it  rests 
on  its  own  basis;  it  has  its  authority  within  itself;  all 
that  our  observation  has  to  do  is  to  discern  it,  and  find 
out  what  is  its  nature. 

If  we  would  find  what  intuition  is,  we  must  carefully 
inspect  it;  not,  indeed,  by  the  external  senses,  which 
cannot  perceive  it,  but  by  the  internal  sense,  that  is 
self-consciousness.  Not  only  so,  but  we  must  seek  in  a 
scientific  manner  to  find  out  the  objects  which  it  looks 
at  and  makes  known  to  us.     In  short,  we  have  to  con- 


NATURE   OF   FIRST   TRUTHS.  11 

struct  the  science  of  metaphj^sics  by  a  process  of  induc- 
tive observation  suited  to  the  nature  of  the  mental 
phenomena  which  are  observed.  Witliout  such  a  care- 
ful inspection  our  metaphysics  would  certainly  fall  into 
error,  being  sometimes  extravagant,  at  other  times  de- 
fective, and  at  all  times  confused.  But  as  we  proceed 
by  internal  observation,  we  shall  discover  truths  which 
go  down  deeper  and  rise  higher  than  those  of  physics. 
As  we  advance,  we  shall  see  that  there  is  a  fundamen- 
tal difference  between  the  generalizations  of  our  intui- 
tive convictions  and  those  of  the  ordinary  facts  of  expe- 
rience. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THBEEFOLD   ASPECTS   OF   INTUITIVE    TRUTHS. 


They  are  Perceptions  looking  directly  at  Things. 
We  perceive  body  within  our  frame,  or  beyond  it,  by 
the  senses.  We  perceive  self  or  mind  in  its  present 
state,  whatever  that  happens  to  be,  by  self-consciousness. 
We  find  each  of  two  sticks  to  be  equal  to  a  third  stick, 
and  we  at  once  decide  that  they  are  equal  one  to  the 
other  without  measuring  them.  We  are  told  of  a  boy 
telling  the  truth  when  it  might  have  saved  him  from 
punishment  to  tell  a  lie,  and  we  declare  the  act  to  be 
good. 

Under  this  aspect  the  intuitions  are  before  the  con- 
sciousness. We  feel  them  working.  We  know  what 
the  operations  are.  In  this  view  they  are  called  intui- 
tions, primitive  perceptions,  native  convictions,  and, 
more  looselj'^,  innate  ideas,  beliefs,  and  judgments. 

11. 

They  are  Regulative  Laws  or  Principles  guiding  the 
mind.  Under  this  aspect  they  are  not  before  the  con- 
sciousness till  they  come  into  exercise  as  perceptions.  But 
perceptions  come  forth  so  constantly  and  are  so  uniform 
in  their  nature  that  they  imply  a  law  or  power  in  the 
mind  from  which  they  proceed.  This  lies  deep  down  in 
the  mind,  is  indeed  of  the  very  essence  of  the  mind,  and 
is  abiding;  it  abides  as  long  as  the  mind  abides,  and  is 
ever  ready  to  act  on  the  objects  to  which  it  refers  pre- 
senting themselves. 


THREEFOLD   ASPECTS  OF   INTUITIVE   TRUTHS.  13 

To  illustrate  this :  The  senses  do  not  perceive  the 
law  of  gravitation,  they  only  see  its  acts ;  but  the  power 
is  there  in  all  body,  and  is  ever  acting.  So  it  is  with 
our  intuitions:  we  are  not  conscious  of  them  as  prin- 
ciples. We  are  conscious  of  their  exercises,  and  argue 
that  there  must  be  internal  laws  which  regulate  them. 
Under  this  aspect  they  may  be  compared  to  seeds  send- 
ing unseen  roots  downwards,  and  bearing  branches 
and  branchlets,  leaves  and  fruit,  upwards.  They  are 
often  spoken  of  as  latent,  but  ready  to  appear.  The 
full  truth  was  enunciated  by  Aristotle  (i>e  Anim.  III.  4), 
Plato  had  spoken  of  the  soul  as  vo7?r6s  toVos,  —  the  place 
of  intelligence.  Adopting  this  view,  Aristotle  calls  the 
soul  the  depository  of  principles  which  are  not  in  action, 
but    m    capacity,    ovrc   €VT€\€;;^eta  dXXa  Swd/xet    TO,    €tSi/.      In 

this  view  they  are  in  all  men.  It  may  be  no  easy  work 
to  enunciate  them,  but  they  are  ruling  in  the  mind.  It 
has  been  found  very  difficult  to  state  precisely  the  law 
of  cause  and  effect,  but  all  human  beings,  including 
children  and  savages,  act  upon  it. 

So  considered,  our  intuitions  are  properly  characterized 
as  first  principles,  fundamental  laws  of  thought  and  be- 
lief, innate  truths,  a  priori  truths. 

in. 

They  may  take  the  form  of  Maxims  or  Axioms.  So 
viewed,  they  are  formed  from  our  primitive  perceptions, 
by  a  process  of  abstraction  and  generalization.  We  have 
the  best  examples  of  this  in  the  axioms  (^Koival  ewoLaL")  of 
Euclid,  and  in  the  commandments  of  the  moral  law,  such 
as  the  Decalogue  and  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount. 

In  this  form  they  are  not  known  by  all  men.  Of  the 
millions  of  people  on  the  earth,  including  infants,  chil- 
dren, savages,   and   the  uneducated   masses,  there   are 


14  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

compaiatively  few  who  fashion  or  employ  such  general- 
ized principles.  We  do  not  need  them  to  be  so  formu- 
lated in  order  to  act  upon  them.  Every  human  being, 
if  he  sees  an  object  before  him,  say  a  house,  will  i-efuse 
his  assent  to  the  assertion  that  it  does  not  exist;  but 
how  few  beyond  the  limited  circle  of  professed  meta- 
physicians and  logicians  have  consciously  before  them 
the  principle  that  "  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing 
to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time  !  " 

Under  this  aspect  they  are  properly  designated  as 
KOivat    'ivvotat,  irpwrai   eVvotat,  Trpaira  fiorjfxaTa,    naturee   judicia, 

maxims  and  axioms. 

IV. 

These  are  only  diverse  aspects  of  the  fundamental 
powers  of  human  intelligence.  They  constitute  a  phil- 
osophic trinity,  one  in  three  and  three  in  one.  They 
appear  first  in  consciousness  as  primary  perceptions 
which  look  immediately  on  things.  These  imply  princi- 
ples which  lead  to  the  perceptions.  The  perceptions 
may  be  generalized  and  enunciated  as  laws.  Till  this  is 
done  they  cannot  be  used  in  metaphysics  considered  as  a 
science,  or  as  philosophic  principles.  Under  the  second 
aspect  they  are  in  all  men  at  all  times,  but  they  are  not 
immediately  perceived  by  the  internal  sense,  and  their 
nature  cannot  be  made  known  to  us  except  by  careful 
observation  of  the  acts,  followed  by  abstraction  and  gen- 
eralization. As  generalized  maxims  they  may  be  used 
as  philosophic  principles,  but  as  such  they  are  known 
only  to  a  few,  and  they  can  be  employed  in  discussion 
only  when  their  law  has  been  gathered  by  induction  and 
properly  expressed.  While  there  should  be  no  disputes 
as  to  the  immediate  convictions,  there  may  be  legitimate 
discussion  as  to  whether  they  have  been  correctly  gener- 
alized into  axioms. 


THREEFOLD    ASPECTS   OF   INTUITIVE   TRUTHS.  15 

In  order  to  avoid  confusion  and  the  mistakes  which 
proceed  from  confusion,  it  is  essential  that  we  go  around 
these  three  sides  of  the  shield,  that  we  carefully  distin- 
guish them  and  read  the  inscription  on  each.  Any  one 
neglecting  to  do  this  will  be  liable  to  affirm  of  intuition 
under  one  aspect  what  is  true  of  it  only  under  another, 
and  to  turn  the  wrong  side  towards  the  weapons  of  the 
assailant  and  keep  the  wrong  side  towards  himself.  It 
could  be  shown  that  many  of  the  errors  in  metaphysics, 
both  in  its  affirmations  and  denials,  arise  from  looking 
at  one  or  at  only  two  of  these  aspects  instead  of  looking 
at  the  whole.  Most  authors  have  not  carefully  noticed 
the  difference  between  primitive  perceptions  which  are 
singular  and  maxims  which  are  universal.  Locke  looked 
upon  them  as  ideas  or  perceptions  in  consciousness,  and 
easily  showed  that  they  are  not  innate. 

The  grand  philosophic  question  discussed  in  the  ages  of  Descartes, 
1599-1G50,  and  Locke,  1632-1704,  was,  Are  there  innate  ideas? 
Descartes  (and  Herbert  of  Cherbury,  1581  - 1618)  affirmed  and 
Locke  denied  the  existence  of  such  ideas.  The  discussion  was  a 
confused  one  owing  to  the  use  of  the  word  idea.  Certain  negative 
principles  may  be  laid  down.  There  are  no  innate  ideas  in  the 
sense  L  of  images  or  phantasms,  say  of  a  good  God  or  a  good  man; 
nor  IL  of  an  abstract  or  general  notion,  such  as  goodness  or  the  good; 
nor  in.  of  forms  imposed  on  things  by  the  mind,  as  was  maintained 
by  Kant.  See  the  subject  discussed  in  "  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,"  Part 
First,  Book  I.  Chap.  I.  It  is  the  aim  of  this  treatise  to  show  in 
what  sense  or  senses  there  are  intuitions  in  the  mind. 


CHAPTER  III. 

TESTS   OF   INTUITIVE  TRUTHS. 

I. 

The  truths  discovered  at  once  by  looking  at  things 
are  called  Intuitive.  But  how  are  we  to  know  such 
truths,  and  distinguish  them  from  other  truths  of  obser- 
vation or  inference,  or  from  propositions  which  are  false? 
Are  we  entitled  to  appeal  when  we  please,  and  as  we 
please,  to  supposed  infallible  principles?  Have  we  the 
privilege,  when  we  are  determined  to  adhere  to  a  favorite 
opinion,  to  declare  that  we  see  it,  that  we  feel  it,  to  be 
true,  and  thus  get  rid  of  all  objections,  and  even  of  the 
necessity  of  instituting  an  examination?  When  hard 
pressed  in  argument,  may  we  fall  back  on  an  original 
conviction  which  we  assume  without  evidence,  and  de- 
clare to  be  beyond  the  power  of  refutation  ?  I  believe 
we  can  furnish  decisive  tests  of  fundamental  truths. 

11. 

Self-evidence  is  the  Primary  Mark  of  intuitive  truth. 
It  is  evident  on  the  bare  inspection  of  the  object.  We 
perceive  it  to  be  so  and  so ;  we  see  it  to  be  so  at 
once  without  requiring  any  foreign  evidence  or  mediate 
proof.  That  the  planet  Mars  is  inhabited,  or  that  it  is 
not,  is  not  a  first  truth,  is  not  a  primitive  truth,  for  it 
is  not  evident  on  the  bare  contemplation  of  the  planet. 
That  the  isle  of  Madagascar  is  inhabited,  though  a  truth, 
is  not  a  primary  truth ;  we  believe  it  on  secondary  tes- 
timony.    Nay,  that  the  three   angles  of  a  triangle   are 


TESTS   OF   INTUITIVE   TRUTHS.  17 

together  equal  to  two  right  angles  is  not  seen  to  be  true 
at  once ;  it  needs  other  truths  coming  between  to  prove 
it.  But  that  there  is  an  extended  object  before  me  when 
I  look  at  a  wall  or  a  table ;  that  I  who  look  at  the  object 
exist ;  that  two  marbles  added  to  two  marbles  here  are 
equal  in  number  to  two  marbles  added  to  two  marbles 
there,  —  these  are  truths  seen  to  be  true  on  the  bare 
contemplation  of  the  things,  and  need  no  extraneous  con- 
sideration to  establish  them. 

III. 

Necessity  is  a  Secondary  Mark.  I  must  give  my 
assent  to  the  proposition,  if  I  understand  it.  I  cannot 
be  made  to  believe  the  opposite.  When  a  proposition  is 
self-evident,  necessity  always  attaches  to  our  conviction 
regarding  it.  I  am  not  inclined  to  fix  on  this  as  the 
original  or  essential  characteristic.  I  shrink  from  main- 
taining that  a  proposition  is  true  because  it  must  be 
believed.  A  proposition  is  true  as  being  true,  and  cer- 
tain truths  are  seen  by  us  to  be  self  evidently  true.  I 
would  not  ground  the  evidence  on  the  necessity  of  the 
belief :  I  would  ascribe  the  irresistibility  of  the  convic- 
tion to  the  self-evidence. 

IV. 

Catholicity,  or  universality  of  belief,  is  a  Tertiary 
Test,  that  is,  the  conviction  is  entertained  by  all  men 
when  the  objects  are  presented  to  the  mind  and  appre- 
hended. I  am  not  disposed  to  use  this,  which  has  often 
been  done,  as  the  primary  test.  For  in  the  first  place  it 
is  not  easy  to  determine  in  every  case  what  propositions 
may  claim  the  common  consent  of  humanity.  Even 
though  this  could  be  determined,  it  might  be  urged  in 
the  second  place  that  this  proves,  not  that  the  truth  is 


18  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

necessary,  but  simply  that  it  is  native.  Catholicity  con- 
joined with  necessity  may  settle  very  readily  and  au- 
thoritatively whether  a  truth  is  fundamental. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  explain  that  these  tests  apply 
directly  to  intuitions  only  under  the  aspect  of  Perceptions. 
As  the  Regulative  principles  are  not  under  the  view 
of  consciousness,  it  is  only  by  noticing  and  generalizing 
our  peiceptions  that  we  can  know  what  these  Regulative 
principles  are.  Again,  there  is  a  process  of  generaliza- 
tion implied  in  all  axioms,  and  this  process  is  not  intui- 
tive. The  tests  apply  to  the  regulative  principles,  and 
the  axioms  only  so  far  as  they  have  been  properly  drawn 
from  the  perceptions,  which,  I  may  remark,  is  the  most 
important  and  difficult  task  which  Metaphysics  has  to 
undertake.  We  are  beginning  to  get  a  glimpse  of  the 
way  in  which  errors,  as  they  so  often  do,  enter  into 
philosophic  speculation. 

Aristotle  fixes  on  each  of  these  three  tests,  and  puts  them  in  vari- 
ous forms,  but  does  not  systematically  arrange  them  as  I  have  tried 
to  do.  He  fixes  on  self-evidence  and  independence  as  marks  of 
what  he  calls  first  truths  and  principles.  He  speaks  of  their  being 
necessary  principles,  and  of  these  being  inherent  in  things.  He 
appeals  to  Catholic  consent,  adding  that  they  who  reject  this  faith 
will  find  nothing  more  trustworthy.  Leibnitz  dwells  on  Necessity  as 
the  test.  Kant  joined  to  this  universality.  Locke  allows  us  no  in- 
tuition of  things,  but  gives  us  an  intuition  of  the  relation  of  ideas, 
and  the  test  of  this  is  self-evidence.  The  Scottish  School  of  Reid 
and  Stewart  appeals  constantly  to  the  principles  above  enunciated, 
but  they  do  not  enunciate  them  definitely,  or  distinguish  between 
them.  Scliclling's  appeal  is  to  intuition  (Anschauung).  Hegel's  is 
to  reason.  (See  Supplementary  Chapter  appended  to  Part  L  of 
this  work.) 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  SPONTANEOUS   AND   KEFLEX   USE   OP   INTUITION. 

From  the  account  which  has  been  given  of  the  Intui- 
tions, it  appears  that  they  may  operate  —  indeed,  they 
are  ever  operating — of  their  own  accord,  and  without 
our  prompting  them  into  exercise  by  any  voluntary  act; 
and  it  appears,  too,  that  we  may  generalize  the  indi- 
vidual actings,  discover  the  rule  of  their  operation,  and 
then  proceed  to  use  them  in  deduction  and  in  specula- 
tion. The  former  of  these  may  be  called  the  Spontane- 
ous Action,  and  the  latter  the  Reflex  Application  of  the 
Intuitions.  In  their  spontaneous  exercise  they  are  reg- 
ulating principles,  regulating  thought  and  belief,  and 
operating  whether  we  observe  them  or  no.  But  in  this 
operation  our  convictions  all  relate  to  singulars,  and  so 
cannot  be  directly  used  in  philosophic  speculation.  In 
order  to  their  scientific  application,  there  is  need  of  care- 
ful reflex  observation  and  generalization. 

The  intuition  in  its  reflex  abstract  or  general  form  is 
derived  from  and  is  best  tested  by  the  concrete  spontane- 
ous conviction.  In  order  to  the  formation  of  the  defini- 
tion or  axiom,  we  must  have  objects  or  examples  before 
us.  In  all  circumstances  the  most  decisive  means  of 
testing  logical  and  metaphysical  principle  is  by  the  appli- 
cation of  it  to  actual  cases,  which  should  be  as  numerous 
and  varied  as  possible.  It  is  when  appropriate  examples 
are  before  us  that  we  are  able  to  appreciate  the  meaning 
of  the  general  formulae  (a).  It  is  only  when  we  have 
considered  them  in  their  application  to  a  number  of 
diversified  instances  that  we  are  in  circumstances  to  pro- 


20  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

nounce   them   to   be   probably,  approximately,  or  alto- 
gether correct. 

In  their  spontaneous  action  the  intuitions  never  err, 
properly  speaking  ;  but  there  may  be  manifold  mistakes 
lurking  in  their  reflex  form  and  application.  I  have  used 
the  qualified  language  that,  properly  speaking,  they  do  not 
err  in  their  original  impulses;  but  even  here  they  may 
carry  error  with  them.  They  look  to  a  representation 
given  them,  and  this  representation  may  be  erroneous, 
and  error  will  appear  in  the  result.  The  mind  intui- 
tively declares  that  on  a  real  quality  presenting  itself,  it 
must  imply  a  substance  ;  but  what  is  not  truly  a  quality 
may  be  represented  as  a  quality,  and  then  it  is  declared 
that  this  quality  implies  a  substance.  Thus  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  and  Dr.  S.  Clarke  represented  time  and  space  as 
qualities  (which  I  regard  as  a  mistake),  and  then  repre- 
sented reason  as  guaranteeing  that  these  qualities  im- 
plied a  substance  in  which  they  inhere,  which  is  God. 
But  the  error  in  such  cases  cannot  legitimately  be 
charged  on  the  intuition,  which  is  exercised  simply  in 
regard  to  the  presentation  or  representation  made  to  it. 
But  there  is  room  for  innumerable  errors  creeping  into 
the  abstract  or  general  enunciation,  and  the  scientific 
application  of  it.  For  we  may  have  made  a  most  defec- 
tive, or  exaggerated,  or  totally  inaccurate  abstraction  or 
generalization  of  the  formula  out  of  the  individual  exer- 
cises, or  we  may  employ  it  in  cases  to  which  it  has  no 
legitimate  reference.  From  such  causes  as  these  have 
sprung  those  oversights,^  exaggerations,  and  not  unfre- 
quently  glaring  and  pernicious  ei'rors,  which  have  ap- 
peared in  every  form  of  metaphysical  speculation. 

(a)  Kant  has  laid  down  a  very  different  maxim,  declaring  that  ex- 
amples only  injure  the  understanding  in  respect  of  the  correctness 
and  precision  of  the  apprehension.     Speaking  of  examples  :  "  Denn 


THE  SPONTANEOUS  AND  REFLEX  USE  OF  INTUITION.   21 

was  die  Richtigkeit  und  Pracision  der  Verstandeseinsicht  betrifft,  so 
thun  sie  derselben  vielmehr  genieiniglich  einigen  Abbruch,  weil  sie 
nur  selten  die  Bedingung  der  Kegel  adaquat  erfiillen  (als  casus  in 
terminis),  und  iiberdies  diejenige  Anstrengung  des  Verstandes  oft- 
mals  schwatlien,  Regeln  im  Allgemeinen,  und  unabh'angig  von  dea 
besonderen  Umstanden  der  Erfabrung,  nacb  ihrer  Zulanglicbkeit, 
einzusehen,  und  sie  daber  zuletzt  mebr  wie  Formeln,  als  Grundsatze, 
zu  gebrauchen  angewobnen  "  (Krit.  d.  r.  V.  Trans.  Log.  p.  119; 
Rosen.).  Tbis  sbows  tbat  Kant  bad  no  correct  idea  of  the  way  in 
wbich  the  general  rule  is  reached.  The  same  view  is  evidently 
taken  by  many  of  the  formal  logicians  of  our  day. 


CHAPTER  V. 

SOURCES   OF   ERROR    IN    METAPHYSICAL   SPECULATION. 

All  proposed  metaphysical  principles  are  attempted 
expressions  of  the  intuitions  in  the  form  of  a  general  law. 
Now,  error  may  at  times  spring  from  the  assumption 
of  a  principle  which  has  no  existence  whatever  in  the 
human  mind.  I  am  persuaded,  however,  that  the  mis- 
takes thus  originated  are  comparatively  few,  and  are 
seldom  followed  by  serious  consequences.  In  regard  to 
the  assumption  of  totally  imaginary  principles,  I  am 
convinced  that  there  have  been  fewer  blunders  in  meta- 
physical than  in  physical  science.  As  the  intuitions  of 
the  mind  are  working  in  every  man's  bosom,  it  will 
seldom  happen  that  the  speculator  can  set  out  with  a, 
principle  which  has  no  existence  whatever ;  and  should 
he  so  venture,  he  would  certainly  meet  with  little  re- 
sponse. It  is  possible  also  for  error  to  arise  from  a  chain 
of  erroneous  deduction  from  principles  which  are  gen- 
uine in  themselves  and  soundly  interpreted.  The  mis- 
takes springing  from  this  quarter  are  likewise,  I  believe, 
few  and  trifling,  the  more  so  that  those  who  draw  such 
inferences  are  generally  men  of  powerful  logical  mind, 
and  not  likely  to  commit  errors  in  reasoning ;  and  if  they 
do,  those  who  have  ability  to  follow  them  would  be 
sure  to  detect  them.  By  far  the  most  copious  source  of 
aberration  in  philosophic  speculation  is  to  be  found  in 
the  imperfect,  or  exaggerated,  or  mutilated  expression  of 
principles  which  really  have  a  place  in  our  constitution. 
In  such  cases  the  presence  of  the  real  metal  gives  cur- 
rency to  the  dross  which  is  mixed  with  it. 


SOURCES   OF   ERROR  IN  METAPHYSICAL   SPECULATION.      23 

In  regard  to  many  of  our  intuitions,  the  gathering  of 
the  common  quality  out  of  the  concrete  and  individual 
manifestations  is  as  subtle  a  work  as  the  human  under- 
standhig  can  be  engaged  in.  This  arises  from  the  recon- 
dite, the  complicated,  and  fugitive  nature  of  the  mental 
states  from  which  they  must  be  drawn.  But  from  the 
very  commencement  of  speculation  and  the  breaking  out 
of  discussion,  attempts  have  been  made  to  give  a  body 
and  a  form  to  the  native  convictions.  It  is  seldom  that 
the  account  is  altogether  illusory  ;  most  commonly  there 
is  a  basis  of  fact  to  set  off  the  fiction.  But  the  princi- 
ple is  seen  and  represented  only  under  one  aspect,  while 
others  are  left  out  of  sight.  It  often  happens  that  those 
whose  intuitions  are  the  strongest  and  the  liveliest  are  of 
all  men  the  least  qualified  to  examine  and  generalize 
them,  and  should  they  be  tempted  to  embody  them  in 
propositions,  they  will  be  sure  to  take  distorted,  perhaps 
erroneous,  forms.  In  all  departments  of  speculation,  met- 
aphysical, ethical,  and  theological,  we  meet  with  persons 
whose  faith  is  strong,  whose  sentiments  are  fervent,  and 
whose  very  reason  is  far-seeing,  but  whose  creed  —  that 
is,  formalized  doctrine  —  is  extravagant,  or  even  peri- 
lously wrong.  In  other  cases  the  conviction,  genuine  in 
itself,  is  put  forth  in  a  mutilated  shape  by  prejudiced 
men  to  support  a  favorite  doctrine,  or  by  party  men  to 
get  rid  of  a  formidable  objection. 

The  human  mind  is  impelled  by  an  intellectual  crav- 
ing, and  by  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  placed,  to 
be  ever  generalizing,  and  this  in  respect  both  of  material 
and  mental  phenomena.  But  the  earliest  classes  and 
systems,  even  those  of  them  made  for  scientific  pur- 
poses, are  commonly  of  a  very  crude  character.  Such 
laws  as  these  have  been  laid  down :  "  Nature  abhors  a 
vacuum ; "  "  Some  bodies  are  naturally  light,  and  others 


24  GENERAL  VIEW   OF  PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

heavy  ; "  "  Combustible  bodies  are  chemically  composed 
of  a  base  with  phlogiston  combined ;  "  "  The  organs  of 
the  flower  are  transformed  leaves." 

These  are  examples  from  physical  science.  Meta- 
physical science,  from  the  subtle  and  intertwined  nature 
of  the  phenomena,  can  furnish  far  more  numerous  in- 
stances. In  mental  philosophy  the  general  statements 
have  commonly  a  genuine  fact,  but  mixed  with  this 
there  is  often  an  alloy.  The  error  may  not  influence 
the  spontaneous  action  of  the  primitive  principle,  but  it 
may  tell  disastrously  or  ludicrously  in  the  reflex  applica- 
tion. It  may  not  even  exercise  any  prejudicial  influence 
in  certain  departments  of  investigation,  but  in  other 
walks  it  may  work  endless  confusion,  or  land  in  conse- 
quences fitted  to  sap  the  very  foundations  of  morality 
and  religion.  Take  the  distinction  drawn,  in  some  form, 
by  most  civilized  languages  between  the  head  and  the 
heart.  The  distinction  embodies  a  great  truth,  and 
when  used  in  conversation  or  popular  discourse  it  can 
conduct  to  no  evil.  But  it  cannot  be  carried  out  psy- 
chologically. For  in  each  a  number  of  very  distinct 
faculties  are  included.  Under  the  phrase  "heart,"  in 
particular,  are  covered  powers  with  wide  diversities  of 
function,  such  as  the  conscience,  the  emotions,  and  the 
will.  The  question  agitated  in  this  century,  whether 
religion  be  an  affair  of  the  head  or  the  heart,  has  come 
to  be  a  hopelessly  perplexed  one,  because  the  offices  of 
the  powers  embraced  under  each  are  diverse,  and  run 
into  each  other ;  and  certain  of  the  positions  taken  up 
are,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  perilous :  as  when  it  is  said 
that  religion  resides  exclusively  in  the  heart,  and  persons 
understand  that  it  is  a  matter  of  mere  emotion,  omitting 
understanding,  will,  and  conscience,  which  have  equally 
a  part  to  play.     Of  the  same  description  is  the  distinc- 


SOURCES  OF  ERROR   IN   METAPHYSICAL   SPECULATION.      26 

tion  between  tlie  reason  and  the  understanding.  It 
points  to  a  reality.  There  is  a  distinction  between  rea- 
son in  its  primary,  and  reason  in  its  secondary,  or  logical, 
exercises,  and  the  mind  can  rise,  always,  however,  by  a 
process  in  which  the  logical  understanding  is  employed, 
to  the  discovery  of  universal  and  necessary  truth.  But 
each  of  the  divisions,  the  reason  and  the  understanding, 
comprises  powers  which  run  into  the  other.  This  dis- 
tinction is  at  the  best  confusing,  and  it  is  often  so  stated 
as  to  imply  that  the  reason,  without  the  use  of  the 
understanding  processes  of  abstraction  and  generaliza- 
tion, can  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  the  true,  the  beau- 
tiful, and  the  good.  Almost  all  metaphysical  errors 
have  proceeded  from  the  improper  formalization  of  prin- 
ciples which  are  real  laws  of  our  constitution.  When 
presented  in  a  mutilated  shape,  even  truth  may  lead  to 
hideous  consequences.  Suppose  that  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect  be  put  in  the  form  that  "  every  thing  has  a 
cause,"  it  will  issue  logically  in  the  conclusion  that  God 
himself  must  have  a  cause.  This  consequence  can  be 
avoided  only  by  the  proper  enunciation  of  the  law  that 
"  every  thing  that  begins  to  be  has  a  cause." 

•  There  is  another  circumstance  to  be  taken  into  ac- 
count by  those  who  would  unfold  the  theory  of  the 
metaphysician's  extravagances;  he  is  not  restrained,  as 
the  physical  investigator  is,  by  stubborn  facts,  nor 
checked,  as  the  commercial  man  is,  by  stern  realities, 
which  he  dare  not  despise.  He  has  only  to  mount  into 
a  region  of  pure  (or  rather,  I  should  say,  cloudy)  specu- 
lation, to  find  himself  in  cii'cumstances  to  cleave  his  way 
without  meeting  with  any  felt  barrier.  At  the  same  time 
one  might  have  reasonably  expected  that  when  such 
speculators  as  Spinoza,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel 
felt   themselves  rushing   headlong  against  all  acknowl- 


26  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

edged  truth,  they  would  have  suspected  that  there  was 
something  wrong  in  the  assumptions  with  which  they  set 
out  and  in  the  method  which  they  followed.  Whenever 
metaphysical  assumptions  or  speculations  run  counter 
to  the  established  truths  of  physical  science  ;  whenever 
they  lead  to  the  denial  of  the  distinction  between  good 
and  evil,  or  the  personality  of  the  soul,  or  of  the  exist- 
ence, of  the  personality,  and  continual  providence  of  God, 
it  is  time  to  review  the  process  by  which  they  have  been 
gained,  for  they  are  running  counter  to  truths  which 
have  too  deep  a  foundation  to  be  moved  by  doubtful 
speculations.  The  remark  of  Bacon  as  to  physical,  may 
be  applied  to  metaphysical,  speculation,  that  doctrine  is 
to  be  tried  (not  valued,  however)  by  fruits  :  "  Of  all 
signs  there  is  none  more  certain  or  worthy  than  that  of 
the  fruits  produced  ;  for  the  fruits  and  effects  are  sure- 
ties and  vouchers,  as  it  were,  for  philosophy."  "  In  the 
same  manner  as  we  are  cautioned  by  religion  to  show 
our  faith  by  our  works,  we  may  freely  apply  the  prin- 
ciple to  philosophy,  and  judge  of  it  by  its  works,  ac- 
counting that  to  be  futile  which  is  unproductive,  and 
still  more,  if  instead  of  grapes  and  olives  it  yield  but  the 
thistles  and  thorns  of  dispute  and  contention." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EREONEOUS   VIEWS  OF   INTUITION. 


They  are  spoken  of  as  Instincts.  By  instinct  animals 
perform  acts  of  the  meaning  of  which  they  are  ignorant. 
Some  of  them  lay  up  food  in  summer  for  nourishment 
in  winter,  of  which  they  can  have  only  an  imperfect 
idea.  Our  intuitive  perceptions  are  sometimes  supposed 
to  be  much  of  the  same  character.  And  no  doubt  they 
are  so,  inasmuch  as  both  are  native  and  original.  But 
they  differ  in  a  most  essential  point.  Instincts  are  blind, 
not  perceiving  the  signification  of  the  acts  which  they 
perform.  On  the  other  hand,  intuitions  are  cognitive, 
furnishing  the  deepest,  the  most  certain,  and  properly 
understood,  the  clearest  of  all  our  knowledge. 

II. 

They  are  regarded  as  of  the  nature  of  Loose  Beliefs 
which  we  have  no  decisive  evidence  to  support,  very 
much  like  the  persuasion  we  are  apt  to  cherish  that  the 
planets  are  inhabited.  Under  this  view  they  would  be 
a  weakness  rather  than  a  strength  in  our  constitution. 
It  is  true  that  the  mind  is  capable,  as  we  shall  see,  of 
entertaining  primitive  beliefs ;  but  of  these  we  shall 
show  that  we  have  tests  which  are  clear  and  certain, 
which  make  them  entirely  different  from  fondled  fan- 
cies. Our  intuitions,  whether  cognitions  or  beliefs,  have 
the  strongest  of  all  evidence  in  their  behalf.  The  evi- 
dence  is  in  the  objects,  which  we  perceive  as  we  gaze 


28  GENERAL  VIEW  OF   PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

upon  them :  it  is  thus  that  we  know  body  as  extended 
and  mind  as  thinking,  and  believe  that  we  cannot  move 
from  one  place  to  another  without  passing  through  all 
the  intermediate  points. 

III. 
We  are  not  to  regard  the  mind  as  possessing  a  power 
of  Reason  looking  directly  on  general  Principles  and 
Axioms.  No  doubt  God  could  have  so  fashioned  us  as 
to  enable  us  to  do  this.  Had  he  so  chosen  he  could  have 
made  us  capable  of  perceiving  directly  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation, and  other  powers  in  nature,  but  he  has  seen  fit 
instead  to  give  us  the  power  of  observing  the  individual 
operations,  say  the  fall  of  an  apple,  and  thence  to  rise  to 
the  discovery  of  the  law.  So  in  metaphysics  we  have 
only  the  power  of  individual  intuition,  and  it  is  by  induc- 
tion of  the  single  operations  that  we  rise  to  the  discovery 
of  the  necessary  truth. 

IV. 

It  is  important  at  this  early  stage  to  announce  that  I 
mean  to  prove  as  we  advance  that  our  intuitions  are  not 
of  the  nature  of  Forms  imposed  on  things  by  the  mind. 
This  is  the  view  taken  by  that  powerful  thinker  Im- 
manuel  Kant,  who  for  the  last  century  has  so  powerfully 
swayed  philosophic  thought,  not  only  in  Germany,  but 
wherever  in  Europe  or  America  there  are  reflecting 
minds.  When  we  look  on  external  objects  we  view 
them  as  in  space  and  occupying  space,  which  space  is 
supposed  to  be  superinduced  upon  them  by  the  mind. 
In  opposition  I  hold  that  we  are  so  constituted  as  to 
behold  things  as  they  are :  we  behold  bodies  in  space, 
both  the  bodies  and  the  space  being  realities  (a). 

(a)  An  age  ago  it  was  of  all  things  the   most  important  to  point 
out  the  errors  of  Locke.  '  Throughout  this  treatise  I  am  opposing 


ERRONEOUS   VIEWS   OF   INTUITION.  29 

his  view  that  all  truth  is  gained  by  a  gathered  experience.  In  this 
awe  it  is  more  important  to  point  out  the  errors  of  Kant.  In  both 
cases  there  should  be  an  acknowledgment  of  the  great  truths  which 
these  two  profound  thinkers  have  established.  Kant  errs,  I.,  in 
proceeding  in  the  Critical  instead  of  the  Inductive  method.  He  errs, 
II.,  in  holding  that  we  know  merely  Phenomena  in  the  sense  of  Ap- 
pearances and  not  Things.  He  errs,  III.,  in  maintaining  that  the 
mind  knows  things,  not  as  they  are,  but  under  Forms  which  we  im- 
pose upon  them. 

V. 
It  is  of  special  importance  in  the  present  day  to  show- 
that  it  is  wrong  to  represent  self-evident  truths  as  being 
truths  merely  to  the  individual,  or  truths  merely  to  man, 
or  beino-s  constituted  like  man.  There  are  some  who 
speak  and  write  as  if  what  is  truth  to  one  man  might 
not  be  truth  to  another  man,  as  if  what  is  truth  to  man  / 
might  not  be  truth  to  other  intelligent  beings.  This 
account  might  be  correct  if  the  intuitive  convictions 
were  mere  creatures  of  the  mind,  or  borne  in  upon  it  by 
a  blind  natural  impulse.  But  I  have  been  laboring  to 
show  that  our  intuitions  are  intuitions  or  cognitions  of 
things.  They  must  be  the  same  in  all  beings  who  know 
the  tliino's.  In  this  view  truth  is  immutable  and  eternal. 
It  is  a  truth  whether  I  perceive  it  or  not,  whether  other 
intelligences  perceive  it  or  not.  It  is  a  truth  to  me  be- 
cause I  am  so  constituted  as  to  know  things.  It  is  a 
truth  not  merely  to  me  or  to  you,  but  to  all  men  :  not 
only  to  all  men,  but  to  all  intelligences  capable  of  know- 
ing the  things.  That  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a 
space  is  a  truth  at  all  times  and  in  all  places,  in  the 
planet  Mars  as  well  as  in  the  planet  Earth.  That  in- 
gratitude is  morally  evil  must  hold  true  in  all  other 
worlds  as  in  this  world  of  ours,  where  sin  so  much 
abounds. 


30  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

It  is  thus  that  we  meet  those  who,  like  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, assuming  that  our  intuitions  are  developed,  argue 
that  their  authority  is  thereby  undermined.  We  show 
that  however  produced,  they  are  intuitions  of  things. 
This  is  shown  at  the  close  of  this  volume. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LEGITIMATE  USE   OF  FIItST   PRINCIPLES. 

I. 

The  grand  aim  of  Metaphysics  should  be  to  construct 
a  science  of  First  Principles,  that  is,  principles  prior  to 
experience,  by  the  method  of  induction  with  self-con- 
sciousness as  the  agent  of  observation.  In  conducting 
this  work  it  should  first  seek  out  these  principles  from 
amidst  the  other  operations  of  the  mind,  separate  them 
from  these,  and  then  determine  precisely  their  modes 
of  operation,  and  their  laws.  Throughout  it  should 
show  what  is  the  right  application  of  these  principles, 
and  thus  determine  the  use  of  Metaphysics. 

There  is  only  one  rule  as  to  the  spontaneous  employ- 
ment of  first  principles,  and  this  is  to  determine  to  have 
no  other  end  in  view  than  to  discover  the  truth,  and  then 
we  are  sure  that  the  intuitions  will  act  aright.  But 
there  may  be  anxious  questions  as  to  their  reflex  use  in 
philosophic  investigation. 

II. 

When  we  employ  them  we  should  show  by  a  careful 
inspection  and  the  appropriate  tests  that  they  are  first 
truths.  Unless  we  do  so  we  may  be  tempted  to  use  the 
limited  laws  of  experience  as  if  they  were  necessary  and 
universal  truths.  One  man  will  say,  I  am  sure  the  earth 
does  not  move;  I  feel  it  to  be  stable.  Another  will  tell 
you  that  he  is  not  so  silly  as  to  believe  in  antipodes 
in  which  people  stand  with  their  heads  downwards.     A 


32  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

third  emphatically  aflBrms,  I  cannot  believe  that  God 
will  inflict  everlasting  punishment  on  any  man,  however 
wicked  ;  my  whole  nature  shrinks  from  it.  Now  we  have 
only  to  apply  the  tests  of  intuition  to  such  assertions  to 
find  that  we  are  not  entitled  to  assume  them. 

III. 

In  employing  first  truths  we  should  let  it  be  known 
that  we  are  doing  so,  and  we  should  enunciate  them 
accurately,  at  least  so  far  as  to  show  that  we  are  not 
making  an  illegitimate  application  of  them.  Without 
this  we  may  be  employing  an  incongruous  mixture  of 
necessary  and  experiential  truth,  and  using  the  first  to 
.impart  a  certainty  to  the  other. 

IV. 

This  science  of  Metaphysics  should  furnish  what  Kant 
says  was  the  end  he  had  in  view  in  his  great  work,  the 
"  Kritik  of  Pure  Reason,"  an  inventory  of  what  he  called 
the  a  priori  truths  of  the  mind.  It  should  seek  to  classify 
them  judiciously,  and  put  them  under  convenient  heads, 
logically  constructed.  It  would  certainly  be  of  immense 
use  to  have  a  carefully  prepared  summary  of  the  various 
truths  which  can  stand  the  tests  of  intuition,  and  which 
may  therefore  be  employed  in  every  department  of  in- 
quiry without  the  necessity  of  continually  stopping  to 
explain  and  defend  them  in  the  midst  of  a  very  different 
investigation  or  discussion.  This  is  what  is  attempted 
in  the  Second  Part  of  this  treatise. 

It  will  be  shown  that  primitive  truths  are  involved 
even  in  the  practical  affairs  of  life,  and  in  all  the  deeper 
sciences.  Metaphysics  should  show  how  they  ai'e  to  be 
applied  to  the  various  branches  of  investigation.  This 
is  attempted  in  Part  Third. 


LEGITIMATE   USE   OF   FIRST   PRINCIPLES.  33 

The  author  is  aware  that  he  is  only  beginning  this 
important  work.  What  he  enunciates  may  be  truth 
only  provisionally.  He  feels  deeply  that  it  may  admit 
of  correction  and  improvement.  What  he  has  com- 
menced in  good  faith  he  hopes  may  be  completed  by 
others,  to  the  great  advantage  not  only  of  Metaphysics, 
but  of  all  branches  of  science. 

The  intuitions  are 

INTELLECTUAL  AND   MORAL, 
each  subdivided  into 

PHIMITIVE   COGNITIONS,    BELIEFS,    AND   JUDGMENTS. 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  the  precise  philosophy  of  the  Sophists, 
if  indeed  they  had  a  philosophy.  The  doctrine  of  Heracleitus  was 
that  all  is  and  is  not  ;  that  while  it  does  come  into  being,  it  forth- 
with ceases  to  be.  Protafjoras,  proceeding  on  this  doctrine,  declared, 
4>7j(Ti  yap  irov  iravTwv  xPVf^<^''''^>'  [xerpov  &vQpa)icov  dvai,  rwv  jxev  ovrwv,  ws 
effTj,  raiv  Se  /ur;  ovtwv,  iy  ouk  tffTiu.  This  Socrates  expounds  as  mean- 
ing us  oTa  fxev  eKacrra  f/jiol  ^aiverat,  rotavTa  fieu  eVrtc  ifiol,  oTa  Se  (Tol 
(Plato,  Thecetettis,  24:  Bekker).  Aristotle  represents  Protagoras  as 
maintaining  that  ri  SoKovvra  TtdvTa  icrrh  a\r)67j  koI  to.  (paivb/xeya  {Melnph. 
Lib.  III.  Chap,  v.:  Bonitz).  Again,  Lib.  x.  Chap,  vi.,  this  koL  yitp 
iKe7yos  f<pri  ■nd.vrwv  xpTj^oraj;/  elvai  fjLeTpov  dvOpcoirov,  ovdev  eTepop  \iywv  ^  rh 
SoKovv  fKacTTtv  TovTo  Kol  fhol  irajioos.  It  will  be  observed  that  in  these 
accounts  there  is  an  interpretation  put  on  the  language  of  Protagoras. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Plato,  and  Aristotle  too,  labored 
each  in  his  own  way  to  show,  in  opposition  to  these  views,  that  there 
was  a  reality  and  a  truth  independent  of  the  individual  and  of  ap- 
pearance. It  is  an  instructive  circumstance  that  the  Sensationalist 
school  have  reached  in  our  day  the  very  position  of  the  Sophists, 
and  regard  it  as  impossible  to  reach  independent  and  necessary 
truth,  if  indeed  any  such  truth  exists.  We  might  expect  that 
these  men  would  seek  to  justify  the  Sophists,  and  disparage  the 
high  arguments  of  Plato.  Cudworth,  speaking  of  the  theoretical 
universal  propositions  in  geometry  and  metaphj'sics,  has  finely 
remarked  that  it  is  true  of  every  one  of  them  whenever  "  it  is 
rightly  understood  by  any  particular  mind,  whatsoever  and  where- 
soever it  be ;  the  truth  of  it  is  no  private  thing,  nor  relative  to  that 


84  GENERAL   VIEW  OF  PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

particular  mind  only,  but  is  aKridis  kuOoXikSv,  '  a  catholic  and  univer- 
sal truth,'  as  the  Stoics  speak,  throughout  the  whole  world;  nay,  it 
would  not  fail  to  be  a  truth  throughout  infinite  worlds,  if  there  were 
80  many,  to  all  such  minds  as  would  rightly  understand  it."  (7m- 
mutoMe  Morality,  Book  iv.  Chap,  v.) 


CHAPTER  VII. 

(supplementary.) 
brief  critical  review  of  opinions  in  regard  to  intuitive 

TRUTHS. 

I.  The  Pre-Socratic  Schools  of  Greece.  —  The  Greek  phi- 
losophers who  flourished  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries  before 
Christ,  if  they  did  not  exactly  discuss,  did,  at  least,  start  the  ques- 
tion of  man's  native  power  of  intuition.  The  Ionian  School,  founded 
by  Thales,  and  continued  by  Anaximander,  Anaximenes,  and  others, 
dwelling  amonw  material  elements,  found  only  the  mutable  and  the 
fleeting;  till  at  length  it  was  laid  down  systematically  by  Heracleitus, 
that  all  things  are  in  a  state  of  perpetual  flux,  under  the  power  of 
an  ever-kindling  and  ever-extinguishing  fire.  Running  to  the  op- 
posite extreme,  the  Eleatic  School,  of  which  Xenophanes,  Par- 
menides,  and  Zeno  were  the  most  illustrious  masters,  appealed  al- 
together from  sense  (ai(T6r](Tis)  and  opinion  {S6^a)  to  reason  (\6yos)- 
fixed  its  attention  on  this  abiding  nature  of  things  beneath  all  mu- 
tation ;  dived  into  profound,  but  over-subtle,  and  often  confused  and 
quibbling  disquisitions  regarding  Being  ;  and  ended  by  making  all 
things  so  fixed  that  change  and  motion  became  impossible.  It  was 
in  the  very  midst  of  the  collision  of  these  sects  that  Socrates  was 
reared.  Professing  to  have  only  a  practical  aim  in  view,  he  yet,  in 
putting  down  the  opposition  to  that  end,  indulged  in  all  the  subtlety 
of  a  Greek  intellect,  and  thus  stimulated  the  dialectic  spirit  of  his 
pupil  Plato,  who  sought  to  harmonize  the  fleeting  and  the  fixed. 

II.  Plato.  —  It  would  be  altogether  a  mistake  to  suppose,  as 
some  have  done,  that  Plato  is  forever  inquiring  into  the  origin  of 
ideas  in  the  mind,  like  the  metaphysicians  who  came  after  Descartes 
and  Locke.     His  aim  was  of  a  character  loftier  and  wider,  but  more 


CRITICAL  REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  35 

unattainable  by  the  cogitation  of  one  thinker,  or  indeed  by  cogita- 
tion at  all.  Nor  was  it  his  object  to  discover  the  absolute,  as  if  he 
had  been  reared  in  the  schools  of  Schelling  or  Hegel.  His  grand 
aim  was  to  discover  the  real  (rh  6v)  and  the  abiding,  amidst  the  illu- 
sions of  sense  and  the  mutations  of  things.  And  in  following  this 
end  he  sought  prematurely  to  determine  questions  which  can  be 
settled  only  by  a  long  course  of  patient  induction,  carried  on  by  a 
succession  of  observers  of  the  world  without  and  the  world  within. 
But  in  the  search  he  started  many  deep  views  of  God,  of  man,  and 
of  the  world,  which  have  been  established  by  the  Bible,  and  by  in- 
ductive mental  and  physical  science.  1.  He  everywhere  proceeds 
on  the  doctrine  that  man  is  possessed  of  a  power  of  reason  (\6yos, 
or  vovs,  or  voTjais)  above  sense,  or  faith,  or  understanding  (Sidvoia). 
2.  This  reason  contemplates  ideas  QSeai,  or  efSij)  supra-sensible,  im- 
mutable, eternal,  which  ideas  are  realities.  3.  He  sees  that  there  is 
a  process  of  thought,  especially  of  abstraction,  in  order  to  the  mind 
rising  to  these  ideas:  t^  oc  is  represented  as  vo'fiaei  fxeTa\6yovirepi' 
\i]irThv  (71m.  29).  4.  The  discovery  of  these  ideas  should  be  the 
special  aim  of  the  philosopher,  and  the  gazing  on  them  the  highest 
exercise  of  wisdom.  But  Plato  moves  above  our  earth  like  the  sun, 
with  so  dazzling  a  light  that  we  feel  unable,  or  unwilling,  to  look  too 
narrowly  into  the  exact  body  of  truth  which  sheds  such  a  lustre.  1. 
He  has  given  a  wrong  account  of  the  reality  in  those  eternal  ideas, 
making  them  the  only  realities;  denying  reality  to  the  objects  of 
sense,  except  in  so  far  as  they  partake  of  them,  and  seeming  to  make 
them  independent  even  of  the  Divine  Mind.  2.  Under  the  one 
phrase  "idea"  he  gathers  an  aggregate  of  things  which  require  to 
be  distinguished,  —  such  as  the  true,  the  beautiful,  the  good,  unity 
and  being,  natural  law  and  moral  law,  the  forms  of  objects,  and 
even  the  universals  fashioned  arbitrarily  by  the  mind.  By  heaping 
together  and  confounding  all  these  things  which  should  be  carefully 
distinguished,  he  has  given  a  grandeur  to  his  views,  but  at  the  ex- 
pense of  clearness  and  accuracy.  3.  He  does  not  see  that  ideas 
exist  naturally  in  the  mind  merely  in  the  form  of  laws  or  rules.  To 
account  for  them  he  is  obliged  to  suppose  that  the  soul  preexisted, 
and  that  the  calling  up  of  the  ideas  is  a  sort  of  reminiscence.  4.  He 
does  not  see  how  the  mind  reaches  them  in  their  abstract,  general, 
or  philosophic  form.  He  does  not  observe  that  the  mind  begins  with 
the  knowledge  of  particular  objects,  and  must  thence  rise  by  induc- 
tion to  generals.  He  thus  lays  himself  open  to  the  assaults,  always 
acute,  often  just,  at  times  captious,  of  Aristotle,  who  saw  that  the 


36  GENERAL   VIEW   OF  PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

general  exists  in  the  individuals,  and  that  it  is  from  the  singulars 
that  man  rises  to  the  universals  (Metapk.  i.  9).  5.  He  attaches  an 
extravagant  value  to  the  contemplation  of  these  ideas  in  their  ab- 
stract and  general  form.  Overlooking  the  other  purposes  served  by- 
ideas,  and  their  indissoluble  connection  with  sino;ulars, — forgetting 
that  philosophy  consists  in  viewing  law  in  relation  to  its  objects,  — 
he  represents  the  mind  as  in  its  highest  exercise  when  it  is  gazing 
upon  them  in  their  essence,  formless  and  colorless:  'H  yap  axpiifj.aT6s 
re  Kol  dtrxTj/UCtTicTTOS  Kol  avatp^s  ovaia  ovrais  ovaa  ^vxv^  Kv^epvriTTi,  fjiovcfi 
QeaT^  v({j  XPVT"''-'  ■"■epi  ^v  rb  rrjs  a\T]dovs  eViffT^yUj/s  yevos  tovtov  ex^'  '''^^ 
tSitov  {Phoedrus,  58).  He  thus  prepared  the  way  for  the  extrava- 
gances of  the  Neoplatonist  School  of  Plotinus  and  Proclus,  who  reck- 
oned the  mind  as  in  its  loftiest  state  when  under  intuition  or  ecstasy 
which  looks  on  the  One  and  the  Good,  and  who  found,  I  believe,  the 
gazing  idle  and  unprofitable  enough. 

in.  Aristotle.  —  His  views,  if  not  so  grand  as  those  of  Plato, 
are  much  more  sober  and  definite.  He  has  specified  most  of  the 
separate  characteristics  of  intuition,  but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find 
how  he  reconciles  his  several  statements.  1.  He  has  a  power,  or 
faculty,  called  Hovs,  which  he  represents  as  concerned  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  thought  and  being :  'O  voOs  icrrl  irepl  ras  apxas  rwv  vortrmv 
Ka\  Twv  ovToov  (^Mag.  Mor.  i.  35).  Elsewhere  he  shows  that  it  cannot 
be  <j>p6vr}(Tis,  nor  aocpia,  nor  iinin^fj.y),  but  vovs,  which  has  to  do  with 
the  principles  of  science;  \eiTrerai  vovv  elvanuv  apx<iiv  {Elh.  Nic.  vi. 
6;  ed.  Michelet).  2.  He  fixes  on  self-evidence  and  independence  as 
tests  of  what  he  calls  first  truths  and  principles.  First  truths  are 
those  whose  credit  is  not  through  others,  but  of  themselves:  Eo-tj  S" 
a\ri6ri  ixev  koI  irpwra  to,  /xrj  St  krepwv  aAA.o  5»  aiiTwv  ex"''''"'''  '''^•'  '"■'(ttij/*  ov 
Set  yap  iv  Ta7s  eTnffTri/j,ouiKa7s  apxa7s  (Tri^riTe'ia'doi  rh  5ia  ti,  aW'  eKacTTTiv 
rwv  a.px<>iv  avrjjv  Kaff  iavrr)v  elvai  iriarT)V  (^Top.  i.  1  ;  ed.  Waitz.)  3.  He 
fixes  on  necessity  as  a  test.  Thus  he  speaks  of  necessary  principles, 
and  of  their  being  inherent  in  things:  Ef  oZv  icrr]^  t]  airoSfiKriK^  iincnriixT) 
e|  avayKatwv  apxoi>v  (d  yap  iiriffraTai,  ov  Svvarhv &W<tis  6X*"')>  raSe  Kad'  aura 
virapxovra  avaynaia  ro7s  irpaynaaiv,  k.  r.  A.  (^Anal.  Post.  i.  6).  To  e| 
avayKrjs  uvra  airXois  alSio,  -Kavra  ra  5'  atSia  ayevijra  koI  a.<p0apra  (^Eth.  Nic. 
vi.  3).  4.  In  which  passage  eternity  is  spoken  of  as  a  characteristic 
of  necessary  truth.  5.  It  is  a  favorite  maxim  with  him  that  every- 
thing cannot  be  proven.  He  says  that  all  science  is  not  demon- 
strative, that  the  science  of  tilings  immediate  is  undemonstrable;  for 
as  all  demonstration  is  from  things  priov,  we  must,  at  last,  arrive  at 
things  immediate  which  are  not  demonstrable:  'H^eis  Se  <pafj.ep,  otire 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  37 

iraffav  eiritrT^^rji'  a-iro5nKTiKi]v  eluai,  iWa  t4\v  tvv  a/Mfacov  avair6SeiKT0v  Kal 
Tovd'  (in  avayKotov,  (payep6y  e«  yap  avayKT)  fjLiv  iTTitnaaQai  ra,  npArfpa  Kal  e| 
i>v  ri  anoSfi^iS,  'lararai  5e  Trore  Ttt  6.fiiaa,  ravr'  avaTr65eiKTa  avayKT}  tlvai 
(Anal.  Post.  i.  3);  see  also  i.  22,  where  he  says  there  must  be  prin- 
ciples of  demonstration  :  twv  airoSef^euv  '6tl  avayKif  apxas  eTj/oi.  He 
speaks  of  science  and  demonstration  carrying  us  to  intuition,  i/oOs 
(lb.  i.  23);  see  also  ii.  19,  where  povs  is  said  to  give  principles:  voOs 
&v  iir)  tSiv  apx^v.  He  blames  those  who  seek  for  a  reason  of  those 
things  of  which  there  is  no  reason :  x^yov  yap  Qi)tov(tiv  wv  ovk  tan  x6yos 
(Metaph.  iii.  6).  6.  He  appeals  to  catholic  consent,  adding  that  those 
who  reject  this  faith  will  find  nothing  more  trustworthy:  '6  yap -naff i 
SoKeT,  tout'  elval  <{>afj.ev  6  S'  avaipaiy  touttjv  t^j/  vlffTiv  ov  irdvv  iricrTt^Tepa 
epei  (Eth.  Nic.  X.  2).  7.  He  draws  the  distinction  between  two 
classes  of  truths.  We  believe  all  things,  either  through  syllogism  or 
from  induction :  aTravra  yap  ■KicrTevofj.fv  ij  5ia  avWoyicTfiov  ^  e|  e'lraYwyTJ j 
(Anal.  Prior,  ii.  23).  To  nature,  the  syllogism  is  the  prior  and  the 
more  known  ;  but  to  us,  that  which  is  through  induction  is  the  more 
palpable:  *r<rei  /aiv  ovr  irp6Tipos  Ka\  yvuipifxirepos  6  5ia  rov  fieaov  ffvWo^ 
yi(Tfj.6s,  rifxTv  i'  ivapytffTepos  d  5id  ttjs  eTrayotyrj}  (lb.;  conipai'e  Eth.  Nic. 
vi.  3).  In  explaining  this,  he  says  that  he  calls  "  things  prior  and 
more  knowable  to  us  "  those  which  are  nearer  to  sense,  and  "things 
prior  and  more  knowable  simply  "  those  which  are  more  remote;  but 
those  things  which  are  universal  belong  to  the  most  remote,  and 
those  which  are  singular,  to  the  nearest:  Ae^w  Se  irphs  vfias  //.hv  irpSrepa 
Kal  yvupificiTepa  ra  eyyvrepov  rrfs  aiffOi^aews,  oTrAaJs  5e  irpSrepa  Kal  yvccpi- 
fiwTfpa  TO,  TToppdrepov  etrri  Se  -KoppWTiTW  filv  to  Kad6\ov  (jLaMcrra,  iyyvraro) 
8e  ra  KaQ"  tKaara  (Anal.  Posl.  i.  2).  But  the  question  is  started,  How 
does  the  human  mind,  which  must  begin  with  the  singulars,  as  better 
known  to  it,  reach  the  universal  ?  He  seems  to  say,  in  the  follow- 
ing passage,  we  reach  universal  truth  through  induction:  Mavddvofiev 
fl  i-naywyfi  ?)  dTroSei|€i"  effTi  S'  ^  fjiiv  d7r(iS6i|ij  eK  twv  Kad6\ov,  rj  S'  £^070)7^ 
€/c  Tuu  Kara  /j.epos-  a^vvarov  S^  rh  Ka06\ov  detupriaai  fxi]  5i'  e'irayajYTis,  i-rel 
Kal  TO  e|  a(paip4ff€ais  \fy6ixfva  ecTTat  5i'  enaytoyvs  yvwpif^a  note7v,  Sri 
inrdpxfi  fKaarr)  YtVei  evia,  Kal  d  n^i  X'^P"'"''«  eOTiv,  ^  toiovS'  eKaffTOv" 
firax^TJvai  Se  /j.)]  exouras  aXadr^aiv  aSvvarov  tHov  yap  KaB"  eKacrroi/  t]  atad-qais' 
oh  yap  eVSexEToi  \a^(lv  avrwv  tt]u  i'Ki.aTi\ixi)v'  otn  yap  in  tuiv  Ka66\ov  duev 
evayuyTJs,  ovre  Si  iiraytuyris  &yev  ttjs  alaO-nffeics  (lb.  i.  18;  cf.  Eth.  Nic. 
vi.  3).  All  these  are  important  princij)les.  But  how  does  he  recon- 
cile them  ?  How  in  particular  does  he  reconcile  his  doctrine  that 
universals  are  gained  by  induction  with  his  statement  as  to  the  mind 
having  a  vovs  which  looks  at  principles  ?  There  are  passages  in  his 
Metaphysics  which  show  that  such  questions  had  been  before  his 


169744 


38  GENERAL  VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

mind.  The  question  is  put  whether  first  principles  are  universal,  or 
as  singulars  of  things ;  and  the  further  and  most  important  question, 
whether  they  subsist  in  capacity  or  in  energy,  that  is,  whether  they 
exist  virtually  or  in  act:  TloTepov  at  apxa^  Ka66\ov  eialu  f)  ws  tA  Kaff 
fKaara  twv  irpayndrwv,  Kal  Bvv(ifj.ei  tj  ivepyeia  (^Meiaph.  ii.  1 ;  ed.  Bonitz). 
I  have  already  quoted  (on  page  35)  his  declaration  that  the  soul  is 
the  place  of  forms,  not  in  readiness  for  action,  but  in  capacity:  oijTe 
evreKex^ia  aWa  Bwd/Mei  ra  eiSr].  In  another  passage  he  seems  to  an- 
swer, that  those  things  which  are  predicated  of  individuals  are  first 
principles  rather  than  the  genera,  but  adds  that  it  would  not  be  easy 
to  express  how  one  should  conceive  these  first  principles:  'E/c  /mIv  oZv 
rovTuiv  fiaXKov  (paiverai  ra  enl  twv  arSfiwy  KaTTjyopovneva  apxal  eluai  rwf 
yeyuv  iroAti/  Se  ttws  av  Sel  Tairas  apx^i'S  {nro\afie7i'  ov  pdZiov  itireiv.  For  this 
statement  he  o-ives  reasons  which  lead  him  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  universals  which  are  predicated  of  individuals  are  principles  in 
the  ratio  of  their  universality,  and  that  the  very  highest  generaliza- 
tions must  be  emphatically  principles:  T^v  fiev  yap  apxh"  Se?  koI  tV 
aiTlav  elvai  irapa  ra  irpdyfj.ara  Siv  apx'fl,  xal  SwaaOai  elvai  x^P^C^f^^*^^ 
axiTuiv  fxowvTOv  Se  ti  Trapa  rb  KaO'  tKaCTOV  eJvai  5ta  t(  av  tis  inro\dfioi,  ttA.tjj' 
8t,  Ka66\ov  KaTi}yopilTai  Ka\  Kara  TtdvTwv  ;  dWa  fi-fju,  ft  Sid  tovto,  ra  ixdWoy 
Ka66\ov  fxdWov  Oereov  dpxds-  Siare  dpxa\  to  trpwT'  Uv  ei-qaav  y4vri  (_Ib.  ii. 
3).  There  are  points  of  connection  not  brought  out  in  this  state- 
ment. But  we  are  not  rashly  to  charge  Aristotle  with  an  inconsis- 
tency. I  believe  that  his  statement  as  to  first  truths  and  syllogism 
and  his  statement  as  to  the  universality  of  induction  are  both  true. 
But  he  has  not  drawn  the  distinction  between  first  principles  as 
forms  in  the  mind,  and  as  individual  convictions,  and  as  laws  got  by 
induction;  nor  has  he  seen  how  the  self-evidence  and  necessity, 
being  in  the  singulars,  goes  up  into  the  universals  when  (but  only 
when)  the  induction  is  properly  formed. 

IV.  The  Stoics  were  the  first,  so  far  as  is  known,  to  lay  down 
the  principle  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  intellect  which  was  not  pre- 
viously in  the  senses  (see  Origen,  contra  Celsum,  Book  vii.).  But 
those  who  quote  this  statement  often  forget  that  the  Stoics  placed  in 
the  mind  a  ruling  principle  {jiyinoviKhv),  and  maintained  that  we  have 
innate  4vvolai  and  irpoX^xl/fis.  According  to  Cicero,  Topica,  they  held 
by  a  notion,  "  insitam  et  ante  perceptam  cujusque  formae  cognitionem 
enodatione  indigentem."  Diogenes  Laertius  represents  them  as 
maintaining  etrn  8'  ^  irp6\r}\l/is  tvviva  (pvaiK))  twv  kuOSKov.  These  two 
doctrines  of  the  Stoics  are  not  inconsistent.  The  supposition  that 
they  must  be  so  led  to  Brucker's  criticism  in  Historia   Critica  de 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  39 

Zenone,  of  Lipsius'  account  in  Manuductio  ad  Stoicam  Philosophiam. 
It  is  quite  conceivable  that  there  may  be  a  ruHng  principle  and  an 
anticipative  notion  in  the  mind,  and  yet  that  all  our  notions  may 
arise  from  sense ;  only  it  is  not  true,  as  Locke  has  shown,  that  all 
our  ideas  come  from  sense,  for  many  of  them  are  derived  from  the 
inward  sense  or  reflection.  The  Stoics  represented  the  notions  as 
"  obscuras  et  inchoatas,  adunibratas,  complicatas,  involutas  "  (Cicero, 
De  Legibus ;  see  Lipsius,  Manud.  ii.  II).  In  Epictetus,  vii.  22,  we 
have  examples  of  the  Stoic  preconception  as  that  good  is  advan- 
tao-eous,  eligible,  and  to  be  pursued,  and  that  justice  is  fair  and  be- 
coming. 

V.  The  Epicureans  are  usually  represented  as  denying  every- 
thing innate.  But  it  is  quite  certain  that  they  held  by  a  irpJATjif^iy, 
as  implied  in  all  intelligence,  investigation,  and  discussion:  "  Id  est, 
anteceptam  animo  rei  quandam  informationem,  sine  qua  nee  intelligi 
quidquam,  nee  quaeri,  nee  disputari  potest."  This  prolepsis  gives 
a  prenotion  of  the  gods  which  is  innate,  and  has  in  its  behalf  univer- 
sal consent:  "  Cum  enini  non  instituto  aliquo,  aut  more,  aut  lege,  sit 
opinio  const ituta,  maneatque  ad  unum  omnium  firma  consensio; 
intelligi  uecesse  est,  esse  deos,  quoniam  insitas  eorum,  vel  potius 
innatas,  cognitiones  habemus.  De  quo  autem  omnium  natura  con- 
sentit,  id  verum  esse  necesse  est  "  (Cicero,  De  Nat.  Deorum,  i.  17). 

VI.  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  is  an  original  but  by  no 
means  a  clear  thinker;  he  is  certainly  not  a  graceful  writer.  In  his 
treatise  De  Veritate,  he  maintains  that  truth  is  discoverable  in  conse- 
quence of  there  being  an  analogy  of  things  to  our  minds.  He  finds 
in  the  soul  four  faculties  :  1.  Natural  Instinct, —  "  sive  sensus  qui 
ex  facultatibus  communes  notitias  confirmantibus  oritur."  2.  The 
Internal  Sense.  3.  The  External  Sense;  and  4.  The  Discursive 
Power.  Whatever  is  not  revealed  through  these  faculties  cannot  be 
known  by  man,  but  he  insists  that  what  is  known  is  in  the  things, 
and  that  man  can  know  realities.  Under  Natural  Instinct  he  treats 
of  Common  Notions,  Koival  ivvolal,  and  specifies  six  marks  :  1. 
Their  priority,  the  natural  instinct  being  the  first  to  act,  and  the 
discursive  faculty  the  last.  2.  Their  independence,  that  is,  of  every 
other.  3.  Their  universality,  giving  universal  consent.  4.  Their 
certainty,  which  allows  not  of  doubt.  5.  Their  necessity,  which  he 
explains  as  their  tendency  towards  the  preservation  of  men  (a  very 
unsatisfactory  account  of  this  characteristic).  6.  The  immediacy  of 
their  operation.  His  exposition  of  the  Internal  Sense  is  not  very 
clear;  but  under  it  he  treats  of  the  conscience  which  he  describes  as 


40  GENERAL   VIEW   OF  PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

"  sensus  communis  sensuum  internorum,"  and  as  discoverinof  what  is 
good  and  evil,  and  what  ought  to  be  done.  Passing  over  his  account 
of  the  External  Senses  and  the  Discursive  Power,  we  may  mention 
his  Common  Notions  about  religion.  They  are,  that  there  is  a  Su- 
preme Deity;  that  he  ought  to  be  worshipped;  that  virtue  with  piety 
should  be  main  part  of  the  worship  ;  that  there  is  in  the  mind  a 
horror  of  crime  which  should  lead  to  repentance  ;  and  that  there  are 
rewards  and  punishments  in  another  life.  Under  this  system  I 
would  remark:  a,  that  Herbert  does  not  see  that  Natural  Instinct 
runs  through  all  the  faculties  ;  b,  he  does  not  accurately  distinguish 
between  Natural  Instinct  and  the  Common  Notions,  nor  see  that  in 
the  formation  of  the  latter  there  is  an  exercise  of  the  Discursive 
Power  ;  c,  while  he  has  caught  a  vague  view  of  the  more  important 
characteristics  of  our  intuitions,  he  has  not  apprehended  them 
closely,  and  he  fails  in  the  application  of  his  own  tests. 

VII.  The  English  Divines  of  the  Seventeenth  Century, 
both  High  Church  and  Puritan,  often  discuss  the  question  as  be- 
tween Aristotle  and  Plato  (not  as  between  Locke  and  Descartes), 
as  to  the  nature  of  ideas,  and  throw  out  views  in  which  there  is 
much  truth,  but  also  much  confusion.  They  held  that  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  mind,  and  born  with  it,  which  is  deeper  than  sense  and 
experience.  Thus  Dr.  Jackson,  in  A  Treatise  concerning  the  Original 
of  Unbelief,  Misbelief,  or  Mispersuasion  concerning  the  Veritie,  Unitie, 
and  Attributes  of  the  Deity  (1625),  inquires  what  truth  there  is  in  the 
Platonic  theory  of  ideas  and  reminiscence,  and  cannot  just  agree 
with  those  who  maintain  that  there  are  notions  in  the  soul  like 
letters  written  with  the  juice  of  onions,  and  ready  to  come  forth  on 
certain  applications  being  made  to  them.  His  doctrine  is,  "  The 
soul  of  man  being  created  after  the  image  of  God  (in  whom  are  all 
things),  though  of  an  indivisible  and  immortal  nature,  hath  notwith- 
standing such  a  virtual  similitude  of  all  things  as  the  eye  hath  of 
colors,  the  ear  of  sounds,  or  the  common  sense  of  these  and  other 
sensibles,  woven  by  the  finger  of  God  in  its  essential  constitution  or 
intimate  indissoluble  temper."  The  Cambridge  Platonists  all  main- 
tained that  there  was  something  in  the  soul  prior  to  sense,  but  requir- 
ing sense  to  call  it  forth,  and  were  fond  of  describing  this  as 
"connate  "  or  "  connatural."  H.  More  states  the  question,  "  Whe- 
ther the  soul  of  man  be  a  rasa  tabula,  or  whether  she  have  innate 
notions  and  ideas  in  herself?  "  He  answers,  "  For  so  it  is  that  she 
having  first  occasion  of  thinking  from  external  objects,  it  has  so 
imposed  on  some  men's  judgments,  that  they  have  conceited  that  the 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  41 

soul  has  no  knowledge  nor  notion,  but  what  is  in  a  passive  way  im- 
pressed or  delineated  upon  her  from  the  objects  of  sense;  they  not 
warily  enough  distinguishing  between  extrinsical  occasions  and  the 
adequate  or  principal  causes  of  things."  "Nor  will  that  prove  any- 
thing to  the  purpose  when  it  shall  be  alleged  that  this  notion  is  not 
80  connatural  and  essential  to  the  soul  because  she  framed  it  from 
some  occasions  from  without."  In  modification  he  allows,  "I  do  not 
mean  that  there  is  a  certain  number  of  ideas  as  glaring  and  shining 
to  the  animadversive  faculty,  like  so  many  torches  or  stars  in  the 
firmament  to  our  outward  sight,  or  that  there  are  any  figures  that 
take  their  distinct  places,  and  are  legibly  writ  there  like  the  red 
letters  or  astronomical  characters  in  an  almanac"  (Antidote  against 
Atheism).  Culverwel  says,  "You  must  not,  nor  cannot,  think  that 
nature's  law  is  confined  and  contracted  within  the  compass  of  two  or 
three  common  notions,  but  reason,  as  with  one  foot  it  fixes  a  centre, 
so  with  the  other  it  measures  and  spreads  out  a  circumference;  it 
draws  several  conclusions,  which  do  all  meet  and  crowd  into  these 
first  and  central  principles.  As  in  those  noble  mathematical  sciences 
there  are  not  only  some  first  alT-fifiaTa  which  are  granted  as  soon  as 
they  are  asked,  if  not  before,  but  there  are  also  whole  heaps  of  firm 
and  immovable  demonstrations  that  are  built  upon  them."  He  talks 
of  a  "  connate  "  notion  of  a  Deity,  but  then  he  shows  that  there  is 
a  process  of  the  understanding  in  it,  "so  that  no  other  innate  light 
but  only  the  power  of  knowing  and  reasoning  is  the  '  candle  of  the 
Lord'  "  (Lir/ht  of  Nature,  pp.  82,  127,  128.  Edition  by  Brown  and 
Cairns).  Cudworth  stands  up  for  an  immutal)le  morality  discovered 
by  reason,  and  distinguishes,  like  More,  between  occasion  and  cause 
(see  infra,  Part  in.  Book  i.  Chap.  ii.  sect.  vi.).  The  Puritans  gen- 
erally appealed  to  first  principles,  intellectual  and  moral.  Thus 
Baxter  says  {Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion,  p.  1),  "  And  if  I 
could  not  answer  a  sceptic  who  denied  the  certainty  of  my  judgment 
by  sensation  and  reflexive  intuition  [how  near  to  Locke],  yet  nature 
would  not  suffer  me  to  doubt."  "By  my  actions  I  know  that  I  am; 
and  that  I  am  a  sentient,  intelligent,  thinking,  willing,  and  operative 
beinof."  "  It  is  true  that  there  is  in  the  nature  of  man's  soul  a  cer- 
tain  aptitude  to  understand  certain  truths  as  soon  as  they  are  re- 
vealed, that  is,  as  soon  as  the  very  natura  rerum  is  observed.  And 
it  is  true  that  this  disposition  is  brought  to  actual  knowledge  as  soon 
as  the  mind  comes  to  the  actual  consideration  of  things.  But  it  is 
not  true  that  there  is  any  actual  knowledge  of  any  principle  born  in 
man."     It  is  wrong  to  "  make  it  consist  in  certain  axioms  (as  some 


42  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

say)  born  in  us,  or  written  in  our  hearts  from  our  birth  (as  others 
say),  dispositively  there."  These  distinctions  do  not  exhaust  the 
subject,  but  they  contain  important  truth;  and  if  Locke  had  attended 
to  them  he  wuuld  have  been  saved  from  extravajrant  statements. 
Owen,  in  his  Dissertation  on  Divine  Justice,  appeals,  in  proving  the 
existence  of  justice,  (1)  to  the  "common  opinion  "  and  innate  con- 
ceptions of  all;  (2)  to  the  consciences  of  all  mankind;  (3)  to  the 
public  consent  of  all  nations.  Howe,  in  his  Living  Temple,  appeals 
to  "  the  relics  of  common  notions,  the  lively  points  of  some  unilefaced 
truth,  the  fair  ideas  of  things,  the  yet  legible  precepts  that  relate  to 
practice." 

VIII.  Descartes  lays  hold  of  a  large  body  of  important  truth  in 
regard  to  innate  ideas.  1,  He  sees  that  they  are  of  the  nature  of 
powers  or  faculties  ready  to  operate,  but  needing  to  be  called 
forth.  "  Lorsque  je  dis  que  quelque  id^e  est  nee  avec  nous,  ou 
qu'elle  est  naturellement  euipreinte  en  nos  ames,  je  n'entends  pas 
quelle  se  prdsente  toujours  k  notre  pensde,  car  ainsi  il  n'y  en  aurait 
aucune  ;  mais  j'entends  seulement  que  nous  avons  en  nous-memes 
la  faculte  de  la  produire  "  (Trois  Ohjec.  Rep.  Ohj.  10).  See  other 
passages  to  the  same  effect,  quoted  by  Mr.  Veitch,  Trans,  of  Med. 
etc.,  pp.  207,  208.  2.  He  has  glimpses,  but  confused,  of  the  test  of 
self -evidence,  which  he  unhappily  represents  as  clearness.  "  Toutes 
les  choses  que  nous  concevons  clairement  et  distinctement  sont 
vraies  de  la  fa9on  dont  nous  les  concevons  "  (Med.  Abrege).  He 
thus  explains  clearness  and  distinctness  :  "  J'appelle  claire  celle  qui 
est  presente  et  manifeste  h  un  i  sprit  attentif ;  de  meme  que  nous 
disons  voir  clairement  les  objets,  lorsqu'etant  presents  h  nos 
yeux  ils  agissent  assez  fort  sur  eux,  et  qu'ils  sont  disposes  k  les 
regarder ;  et  distincte,  celle  qui  est  tellement  precise  et  diffdrente 
de  toutes  les  autres,  qu'elle  ne  comprend  en  soi  que  ce  qui  paroit 
manifestement  h  celui  qui  la  considfere  comme  il  faut  "  (Prin,  Phil.  i. 
45).  3.  He  sees  that  they  assume  the  shape  of  couunon  notions.  4. 
These  are  represented  as  eternal  truths  of  intelligence:  "Lorsque 
nous  pensons  qu'on  ne  sauroit  faire  quelque  chose  de  rien,  nous  ne 
croyons  point  que  cette  proposition  soit  une  chose  qui  existe  ou  la 
propridte  de  quelque  chose,  mais  nous  la  prenons  pour  une  certaine 
verite  dternelle  qui  a  son  sidge  en  notre  pensee,  et  que  Ton  nomme 
une  notion  commune  ou  une  maxime ;  tout  de  meme  quand  on  dit 
qu'il  est  impossible  qu'une  meme  chose  soit  et  ne  soit  pas  en  meme 
temps,  que  ce  qui  a  dte  fait  ne  peut  n'etre  pas  fait,  que  celui  qui 
pense  ne  peut  manquer  d'etre  ou  d'exister  pendant  qu'il  pense,  et 


•  CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  43 

quantite  d'autre  semblables,  ce  sont  seulement  des  v^rit^s,  et  non 
pas  des  choses  qui  soient  hors  d^  notre  pensde,  et  il  y  en  a  un  si 
•^rand  noiubre  de  telles  qu'il  seroit  malaisd  de  les  ddnombrer  "  (Prin. 
Phil.  i.  49).  5.  He  discovers  that  they  come  forth  into  consciousness; 
hence  he  calls  them  innate  ideas,  and  defines  idea  :  "  Cette  forme  de 
chacune  de  nos  pensdes  par  la  perception  innnediate  de  laquelle  nous 
avons  connaissance  de  ces  memes  pensdes  "  {Rep.  mix  Deux  Object.). 
But  there  is  confusion  throughout  in  the  view  which  he  takes,  and 
in  his  mode  of  expression.  1.  He  gives  no  account  of  the  relation 
between  the  faculty  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  idea  or  common 
notion  on  the  other.  He  does  not  see  that  abstraction  and  generali- 
zation are  necessary  in  order  to  reach  the  abstract  and  general  idea. 
2.  The  test  of  self-evidence  is  not  well  expressed ;  in  this  respect  he 
is  inferior  to  Locke.  The  clearness  and  distinctness  of  an  idea  is, 
to  say  the  least  of  it,  a  very  ambiguous  phrase,  for  in  some  senses 
of  the  word  we  may  have  a  very  clear  idea  of  an  imaginary  object, 
or  a  distinct  idea  of  a  falsehood.  3.  That  there  is  confusion  in  this 
view  is  evident  from  the  circumstance  that  he  often  states  that  these 
truths  are  not  equally  admitted  by  all,  because  they  are  opposed  to 
the  prejudices  of  some.  He  speaks  of  persons  "qui  ont  imprim(5  de 
longue  main  des  opinions  en  leur  crdance,  qui  ^tait  contraires  k 
quelques-unes  de  ces  vdritds  "  (Pnn.  i.  50).  4.  He  expects  far  too 
much  from  a  bare  contemplation  of  the  principles  or  causes  of 
things  :  "  Mais  I'ordre  que  j'ai  tenu  en  ceci  a  dtd  tel  :  premiere- 
ment,  j'ai  tach^  de  trouver  en  g^ndral  les  principes  ou  premieres 
causes  de  tout  ce  qui  est  ou  qui  peut  etre  dans  le  monde,  sans  rien 
considerer  pour  cet  effet  que  Dieu  seul  qui  la  cree,  ni  les  tirer 
d'ailleurs  que  de  certaines  semences  de  vdi-itt^s  qui  sont  naturelle- 
ment  en  nos  ames.  Apres  cela,  j'ai  examine  quels  dtaient  les 
premiers  et  les  plus  ordinaires  effets  qu'on  pouvait  ddduire  de  ces 
causes ;  et  il  me  semble  que  par  \h,  j'ai  trouve  des  cieux,  des  astres, 
une  terre,  et  meme  sur  la  terre  de  I'eau,  de  I'air,"  etc.  (jMelh. 
Part.  VI.) 

IX.  Locke  has,  in  his  account  of  the  Human  Understanding, 
both  a  sensational,  or  rather  an  experiential,  element,  and  a  rational 
element.  Eagerly  bent  on  establishing  his  favorite  position  that  all 
our  ideas  are  derived  from  sensation  and  reflection,  he  has  not 
blended  these  elements  very  successfully,  nor  been  at  much  pains  to 
show  their  consistency.  In  France  they  took  the  sensational  element 
and  overlooked  the  other.  The  Arians  and  Socinians  of  Britain 
seized  eagerly  on  the  rational  element.      In  his  unmeasured  coa- 


44  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

demnation  of  innate  ideas  in  the  First  Book  of  his  Essay,  he  seems 
to  deny  truths  which  he  openly  defends  or  incidentally  allows  in 
other  parts  of  the  work.  1.  He  gives  a  high  place  to  reason.  Thus, 
in  replying  to  Stillingfleet,  he  says:  "Reason,  as  standing  for  true 
and  clear  principles,  and  also  as  standing  for  clear  and  fair  deductions 
from  those  principles,  I  have  not  wholly  omitted,  as  it  is  manifest 
from  what  I  have  said  of  self-evident  propositions,  intuitive  knowl- 
edge, and  demonstration,  in  other  parts  of  my  Essay."  Speaking 
of  self-evident  propositions  :  "  Whether  they  come  in  view  of  the 
mind  earlier  or  later,  this  is  true  of  them,  that  they  are  all  known 
by  their  native  evidence,  are  wholly  independent,  receive  no  light, 
nor  are  capable  of  any  proof  one  from  another  "  (see  Rogers'  Essays, 
Locke,  p.  47).  2.  He  gives  an  important  place  to  intuition  in  Book 
IV.  3.  He  fixes  on  self-evidence  as  the  mark  of  intuition.  "  Some- 
times the  mind  perceives  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas 
immediately  by  themselves,  without  the  intervention  of  any  other, 
and  this  I  think  we  may  call  intuitive  knowledge.  From  this  the 
mind  is  at  no  pains  of  proving  or  examining,  but  perceives  the  truth, 
as  the  eye  doth  light,  only  by  being  directed  towards  it."  "  This  kind 
of  knowledge  is  the  clearest  and  most  certain  that  human  frailty  is 
capable  of.  This  part  of  knowledge  is  irresistible,  and  like  bright 
sunshine,  forces  itself  immediately  to  be  perceived  as  soon  as  ever 
the  mind  turns  its  view  that  way,  and  leaves  no  room  for  hesitation, 
doubt,  or  examination,  but  the  mind  is  presently  filled  with  the  clear 
light  of  it."  "  He  that  demands  a  greater  certainty  than  this 
demands  he  knows  not  what,  and  shows  only  that  he  has  a  mind  to 
be  a  sceptic  without  being  able  to  be  so  "{Essay,  Book  iv.  Chap.  ii. 
sect.  i. ;  see,  also.  Book  iv.  Chap.  xvii.  sect.  iv.).  Among  truths 
known  intuitively  "we  have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own 
existence"  (Book  iv.  Chap.  iii.  sect,  xxi.)  ;  and  "  man  knows  by 
an  intuitive  certainty  that  bare  nothing  can  no  more  produce 
any  real  being  than  it  can  be  equal  to  two  right  angles"  (Book 
IV.  Chap.  X.  sect.  iii.).  4.  He  is  obliged  at  times  to  appeal  to 
necessity  of  conception.  Thus,  in  arguing  with  Stillingfleet  :  "  The 
idea  of  beginning  to  be  is  necessarily  connected  with  the  idea 
of  some  operation  ;  and  the  idea  of  operation  with  the  idea  of 
something  operating,  which  we  call  a  cause."  "  The  idea  of  a 
right-angled  triangle  necessarily  carries  with  it  an  equality  of  its 
angles  to  two  right  ones;  nor  can  we  conceive  this  relation,  this 
connection  of  these  two  ideas,  to  be  possibly  mutable "  (Essay, 
Book  IV.  Chap.  iii.  sect.  xxix.).     He  speaks  of  certain  and  universal 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  45 

knowledge  as  having  "necessary  connection," "necessary  coexis- 
tence," "necessary  dependence"  (see  Webb  on  the  Intellectualism 
of  Locke,  p.  iii.).  5.  He  sees  that  intuitive  general  maxims  are  all 
derived  from  particulars.  This  follows  from  his  general  maxim  that 
the  mind  begins  with  particulars.  "The  ideas  first  in  the  mind,  'tis 
evident,  are  those  of  particular  things,  from  which  by  slow  degrees 
the  understanding  proceeds  to  some  few  general  ones"  (Book  iv. 
Chap.  vii.  sect.  ix.).  "In  particulars  our  knowledge  begins,  and  so 
spreads  itself  by  degrees  to  generals  "  (Book  iv.  Chap.  vii.  sect.  xi.). 
Following  out  this  view,  he  speaks  of  the  general  propositions  be- 
ing" not  innate,  but  collected  from  a  preceding  acquaintance  and 
reflection  on  particular  instances.  These,  when  observing  men  have 
made  them,  unobserving  men  when  they  are  proposed  to  them  can- 
not refuse  their  assent  to  "  (Book  i.  Chap.  ii.  sect.  xxi.).  6.  He  sees 
clearly  —  what  Kant  never  saw  —  that  the  mind  rises  to  universal 
propositions  by  looking  at  things,  and  the  nature  of  things.  "  Had 
they  examined  the  ways  whereby  men  come  to  the  knowledge  of 
many  universal  truths,  they  would  have  found  them  to  result  in  the 
minds  of  men  from  the  being  of  things  themselves  when  duly  consid- 
ered, and  that  they  were  discovered  by  the  application  of  those 
faculties  which  were  fitted  by  nature  to  receive  and  judge  of  them 
when  duly  employed  about  them  "  (Book  i.  Chap.  iv.  sect.  xxv.). 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  Locke  has  admitted  or  controverted 
certain  great  truths.  1.  He  imagines  that  when  he  has  disproved 
innate  ideas  in  the  sense  of  phantasms  and  general  notions,  he  has 
therefore  disproved  them  in  every  sense.  2.  He  does  not  see  that 
the  intuition  which  he  acknowledges  must  have  a  rule,  law,  or 
principle,  which  may  be  described  as  innate,  inasmuch  as  it  is  in 
the  mind  prior  to  all  experience.  3.  Misled  by  his  theory  of  the 
mind  looking  at  ideas  and  not  at  things,  he  represents  intuition  as 
concerned  solely  with  the  comparison  of  ideas.  This  was  noticed 
by  the  Bishop  of  Derry  [Dr.  King,  author  of  the  Origin  of  Evil}, 
in  a  letter  dated  Johnstoun,  October  26,  1697,  to  Locke's  friend, 
Mr.  Molyneux  :  "  To  me  it  seems  that,  according  to  Mr.  Locke,  I 
cannot  be  said  to  know  anything  except  there  be  two  ideas  in  my 
mind,  and  all  the  knowledge  I  have  must  be  concerning  the  relation 
these  two  ideas  have  to  one  another,  and  that  I  can  be  certain  of 
nothing  else,  which  in  my  opinion  excludes  all  certainty  of  sense  and 
of  single  ideas,  all  certainty  of  consciousness,  such  as  willing,  con- 
ceiving, believing,  knowing,  etc.,  and,  as  he  confesses,  all  certainty 
of  faith,  and,  lastly,  all  certainty  of  remembrance  of  which  I  have 


46  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

formerly  demonstrated  as  soon  as  I  have  forgot  or  do  not  actually 
think  of  the  demonstration"  {Letters  between  Locke  and  Molyneux). 
Reid  refers  to  Locke's  notion  that  belief  or  knowledge  consists  in  a 
perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  and  charac- 
terizes it  as  "one  of  the  main  pillars  of  modern  scepticism."  "I 
say  a  sensation  exists,  and  I  think  I  understand  clearly  what  I  mean. 
But  you  want  to  make  the  thing  clearer,  and  for  that  end  tell  me 
that  there  is  an  agreement  between  the  idea  of  that  sensation  and 
the  idea  of  existence.  To  speak  freely,  this  conveys  to  me  no  lio-ht 
but  darkness.  I  can  conceive  no  otherwise  of  it  than  as  an  odd  and 
obscure  circumlocution.  I  conclude,  then,  that  the  belief  which  ac- 
companies sensation  and  memory  is  a  simple  act  of  the  mind  which 
cannot  be  defined  "  (Cullecled  Writings,  Vol.  I.  p.  107).  4.  He  does 
not  see  the  peculiar  nature  of  intuitive  maxims.  He  perceives  that 
they  are  got  by  generalization  —  the  great  truth  overlooked  by  the 
special  supporters  of  innate  ideas;  but  he  fails  to  observe  that  they 
are  the  generalization  of  primitive  cognitions  and  truths,  which  carry 
with  them  self-evidence  and  necessity. 

X.  Leibnitz  has  profound,  but  in  some  respects  extravagant, 
views  of  necessary  truths.  1.  He  sees  that  they  have  a  place  in 
the  mind,  as  habitudes,  dispositions,  aptitudes,  faculties.  "  Les 
connaissances  ou  les  veritds,  en  tant  qu'elles  sont  en  nous,  quand 
menie  on  n'y  pense  point,  sont  des  habitudes  ou  des  dispositions" 
{Nouv.  Essais,  Opera,  p.  213  ;  ed.  Erdmann).  At  the  same  place  he 
calls  them  "aptitudes."  "Lorsqu'on  dit  que  les  notions  innees  sont 
implicitement  dans  I'esprit,  cela  doit  signifier  seulement,  qu'il  a  la 
faculty  de  les  connaitre  "  (p.  212).  2.  "Leibnitz  has  the  honor  of 
first  explicitly  enouncing  the  criterion  of  necessity,  and  Kant  of 
first  fully  applying  it  to  the  phenomena.  In  nothing  has  Kant  been 
more  successful  than  in  this  under  consideration."  So  says  Ham- 
ilton (Rt'id's  Collected  Writimjs,  p.  323).  The  remark  seems  cor- 
rect ;  but  it  should  be  added  that  Aristotle,  as  has  been  shown, 
expressly  fixed  on  necessity,  while  others  appealed  to  it  ;  even 
Locke  speaks  of  knowledge  as  "irresistible,"  and  of  "  necessary  re- 
lations." Leibnitz  draws  more  decidedly  than  had  been  done  before 
the  distinction  between  necessary  and  eternal  truths  and  truths  of 
experience  (p.  209).  3.  Because  of  the  natural  faculty  and  "pre- 
formation," the  ideas  tend  to  come  into  consciousness  in  a  special 
form.  "II  y  a  toujours  une  disposition  particuli^re  k  Paction,  et  a 
une  action  plutot  qu'a  I'autre"  (p.  223).  He  illustrates  this  by 
supposing  that  in  the  marble  there  might  be  veins  which  marked 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  47 

out  a  particular  figure,  say  that  of  Hercules,  preferably  to  others. 
*'  Mais  s'il  y  iivoit  des  veines  dans  la  pierre,  qui  marquassent  la 
figure  d'Hercule  pref^rablement  k  d'autres  figures,  cette  pierre  y 
seroit  plus  determinee,  et  Hercule  y  seroit  comme  inn^  en  quelque 
facon"  (p.  196).  4.  He  represents  the  intellect  itself  as  a  source 
of  ideas.  To  the  maxim  "  Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  non  fuerit  in 
sensu,"  he  adds,  '^  nisi  ipse  intellectus."  The  expression  is  not 
very  explicit.  He  explains  it :  "  Or  Tame  renfernie  I'etre,  la  sub- 
stance, I'un,  le  nieme,  la  cause,  la  perception,  le  raisonnenient,  et 
quantity  d'autres  notions."  But  he  is  surely  wrong  in  identifying 
these  with  Locke's  ideas  of  reflection  (p.  223).  5.  He  sees  that 
there  is  need  of  more  than  spontaneity,  that  there  is  need  of  some 
intellectual  process,  in  order  to  discover  the  general  truth.  "  Les 
maximes  innees  ne  paroissent  que  par  I'attention  qu'on  leur  donne  " 
(p.  213).  But  :  1.  He  separates  necessary  truths  from  things,  and 
making  them  altogether  mental,  he  led  the  way  to  that  subjective 
tendency  which  was  carried  so  far  by  Kant.  2.  He  does  not  dis- 
tinguish between  the  necessary  principle  as  a  disposition  uncon- 
sciously in  the  mind  and  a  general  maxim  discovered  by  a  process. 
3.  He  does  not  see  that  the  general  maxim  is  reached  by  generaliz- 
ing the  individual  necessary  truths. 

XL  LoKD  Shaftesbury  protests  against  Locke's  rejection  of 
everything  innate  and  falls  back  on  the  word  "  connatural,"  derived 
from  Culverwel.  "  Innate  is  a  word  he  (Locke)  poorly  plays  upon; 
the  right  word,  though  less  used,  is  connatural  "  (^Letters  to  a  Young 
Gentleman).  He  shows  that  there  are  many  qualities  natural  to 
man,  and  dwells  fondly  on  the  sense  of  beauty  and  the  moral  sense. 
He  supplied  the  Scottish  School  with  the  phrase  common  sense,  which 
he  represents  as  being  the  same  with  "  natural  knowledge  "  and 
"  fundamental  reason."  "  Whatever  materials  or  principles  of  this 
kind  we  may  possibly  bring  with  us,  whatever  good  faculties,  senses, 
or  anticipating  sensations  and  imaginations  may  be  of  nature's 
growth,  and  arise  properly  of  themselves  without  our  art,  promo- 
tion, or  assistance,  the  general  idea  which  is  formed  of  all  this 
management,  and  the  clear  notion  we  attain  of  what  is  preferable 
and  principal  in  all  these  subjects  of  choice  and  estimation  will  not, 
as  I  imagine,  by  any  person  be  mistaken  for  innate.  Use,  practice, 
and  culture  must  precede  the  understanding  and  wit  of  such  an 
advanced  size  and  growth  as  this"  {Miscellanies,  iii.  2:  in  Charac- 
teristics). 

XH.  Buffier's  principal  treatise  is  on  Premieres  Verites,     He 


48  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE    PRINCIPLES. 

sees  :  1.  That  there  was  in  the  mind  an  original  law,  which  he  char- 
acterizes as  a  "  disposition."  2.  He  speaks  of  it  as  cominjr  forth  in 
common  and  uniform  judgments  among  all  men,  or  the  greater  part. 
3.  He  sees  that  it  does  not  thus  come  forth  till  mature  age,  and  till 
men  come  to  the  use  of  reason.  These  three  points  are  all  brought 
out  in  the  following  sentence  :  "  J'entends  ici  par  le  Sens  Com- 
MUN,  la  disposition  que  la  nature  a  mise  dans  tons  les  hoinmes,  ou 
manifestement  dans  la  plupart  d'entre  eux,  pour  leur  faire  porter, 
quand  ils  ont  atteint  I'usage  de  la  raison,  un  jugement  commun  et 
unifoi'me  sur  des  objets  differents  du  sentiment  intime  de  leur  propre 
perception:  jugement  qui  n'est  point  la  consequence  d'aucun  principe 
anterieur  "  (P.  i.  c.  v.).  4.  He  specifies  several  important  practical 
characteristics  of  first  truths.  "1.  Le  premier  de  ces  caractferes 
est  qu'elles  soicnt  si  claires,  que  quand  on  entreprend  de  les  prouver 
ou  de  les  attaquer,  on  ne  le  puisse  faire  que  par  des  propositions  qui 
manifestement  ne  sont  ni  plus  claires  ni  plus  certaines.  2.  D'etre 
si  universellement  rec^ues  parmi  les  honimes  en  tout  temps,  en  tons 
lieux,  et  par  toutes  sortes  d'csprits,  que  ceux  qui  les  attaquent  se 
trouvent,  dans  le  genre  humain,  etre  manifestement  moins  d'un 
centre  cent,  ou  meme  contre  mille.  3.  D'etre  si  fortement  im- 
prim^es  dans  nous,  que  nous  y  conformions  notre  conduite,  malgr^ 
les  raffinements  de  ceux  qui  imaginent  des  opinions  contraires,  et  qui 
eux-memes  agissent  conformdment,  non  h  leurs  opinions  imagin^es, 
mais  aux  premieres  vdritds  universellement  re9ues  "  (P.  i.  c.  vii.). 
It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  (1)  he  fixed  explicitly  on  their 
deeper  qualities  of  self-evidence  and  necessity,  or  (2)  showed  the 
relation  between  their  individual  and  general  form. 

Xni.  Francis  Hutcheson,  the  founder  of  the  Scottish  School, 
discusses  the  question  whether  metaphysical  axioms  are  innate.  He 
denies  that  they  are  innate  in  the  sense  of  their  being  known  or 
observed  from  our  birth,  and  maintains  that  in  their  general  form 
they  are  not  reached  till  after  many  comparisons  of  singular  ideas. 
He  stands  up  for  self-evident  axioms,  in  which  the  mind  perceives 
at  once  the  agreement  and  disagreement  of  subject  and  predicate, 
and  represents  them  as  being  eternal  and  immutable  (see  his  Meta- 
physics). 

XTV.  Reid's  great  merit  lies  in  establishing  certain  principles  of 
Common  Sense,  such  as  those  of  substance  and  quality,  cause  and 
effect,  and  moral  good,  as  against  the  scepticism  of  Hume.  He  does 
not  profess  to  give  an  exhaustive  account  of  these  principles,  nor  to 
enter  minutely  into  their  distinctive  character  and  mode  of  opera- 


CRITICAL  REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  49 

tion,  but  in  conducting  his  proper  work  he  has  mentioned  nearly  all 
their  distinctive  qualities.  1.  He  represents  them  as  being  in  the 
nature  of  man;  thus  he  speaks  of  "an  original  principle  of  our  con- 
stitution "  (p.  121),  and  calls  them  "  oriL^inal  and  natural  judg- 
ments," as  "  part  of  that  furniture  which  Nature  hath  given  to  the 
human  understanding,"  as  "the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty  "  and 
"a  part  of  our  constitution  "  (p.  209,  Collected  Writings  :  Hamilton's 
edition).  2.  He  represents  the  mind  as  having  a  sense  or  perception 
of  them;  and  on  the  one  hand  avoids  the  error  of  Locke,  who 
regards  intuition  as  concerned  solely  with  a  comparison  of  ideas,  and 
he  does  not,  on  the  other  hand,  fall  into  that  of  Kant,  who  looks  on 
them  as  mere  forms  in  the  mind.  3.  He  follows  Locke  in  fixinjr  on 
self-evidence  as  a  decisive  test.  "  "VYe  ascribe  to  reason  two  offices, 
or  two  degrees.  The  first  is  to  judge  of  things  self-evident;  the 
second,  to  draw  conclusions  that  are  not  self-evident  froln  those  that 
are.  The  first  of  these  is  the  province,  and  the  sole  province,  of 
common  sense,  and  therefore  it  coincides  with  reason  in  its  whole 
extent,  and  is  only  another  name  for  one  branch  or  one  degree  of 
reason"  (p.  425;  see,  also,  p.  422).  4.  He  specifies  necessity  as  a 
mark.  "  By  the  constitution  of  our  nature  we  are  under  a  necessity 
of  assent  to  them  "  (p.  130).  He  speaks  of  a  certain  truth  "  being 
a  necessary  truth,  and  therefore  no  object  of  sense."  "It  is  not 
that  things  which  begin  to  exist  commonly  have  a  cause,  or  even 
that  they  always  in  fact  have  a  cause,  but  that  they  must  have  a 
cause,  and  cannot  begin  to  exist  without  a  cause  "  (p.  455;  see,  also, 
pp.  456,  521).  Yet  he  has  not  a  steady  apprehension  of  necessity  as 
a  test,  f6r  he  says  :  "  I  resolve  for  my  own  part  always  to  pay  a 
great  regard  to  the  dictates  of  common  sense,  and  not  to  depart  from 
them  without  absolute  necessity"  (p.  112),  as  if  necessity  did  not 
preclude  our  departing  from  them.  5.  He  characterizes  them  as 
catholic;  thus  he  appeals  to  the  "universal  consent  of  mankind, 
not  of  philosophers  only,  but  of  the  rude  and  unlearned  vulgar" 
(p.  456). 

His  positive  errors  on  this  subject  are  not  many,  but  he  has  not 
seen  the  full  truth,  and  he  has  fallen  into  several  oversights.  1.  By 
neglecting;  a  ri<j:id  use  of  tests,  he  has  described  some  truths  as  first 
principles  into  which  there  enters  an  experiential  element.  Thus, 
for  example,  "  that  there  is  life  and  intelligence  in  our  fellow-men," 
"  that  certain  features  of  the  countenance,  sounds  of  the  voice,  and 
gestures  of  the  body  indicate  certain  thoughts  and  dispositions  of 
the  mind"  (p.  449);  that  "there   is  a  certain    regard  due  to  hu- 


50  GENERAL   VIEW    OF   PRIMITIVE    PRINCIPLES. 

man  testimony  in  matters  of  fact,  and  even  to  human  authority 
in  matters  of  opinion"  (p.  450)  ;  and  "that  in  the  phenomena  of 
Nature,  what  is  to  be  will  probably  be  like  to  what  has  been  in 
similar  circumstances"  (p.  451).  A  rigid  application  of  the  tests 
of  self-evidence  and  necessity  would  have  shown  that  these  were 
not  first  principles.  2.  He  is  not  careful  to  distinguish  between  the 
Spontaneous  and  Reflex  use  of  common  sense.  He  uses  legitimately 
the  argument  from  common  sense  against  Hume,  but  in  philosophy 
we  must  use  the  reflex  principle  carefully  expressed,  whereas  Reid 
often  appeals  in  a  loose  way  to  the  spontaneous  conviction.  And 
here  I  may  take  the  opportunity  of  stating  my  conviction  (and  this 
notwithstanding  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  defence  of  it  in  Note  A)  that 
the  phrase  "common  sense  "  is  an  unfortunate,  because  a  loose  and 
ambiguous  one.  Common  sense  (besides  its  use  by  Aristotle,  see 
Hamilton's  Note  A)  has  two  meanings  in  ordinary  discourse.  It 
may  signify,  first,  that  unacquired,  unbought,  untaught  sagacity, 
which  certain  men  have  by  nature,  and  which  other  men  never 
can  acquire,  even  though  subjected  to  the  process  mentioned  by 
Solomon  (Prov.  xxvii.  22),  and  brayed  in  a  mortar.  Or  it  might 
signify  the  communis  sensus,  or  the  perceptions  and  judgments 
which  are  conmion  to  all  men.  It  is  only  in  this  latter  sense  that 
the  argument  from  common  sense  is  a  philosophic  one  ;  that  is,  only 
on  the  condition  that  the  appeal  be  to  convictions  which  are  in  all 
men ;  and  further,  that  there  has  been  a  systematic  exposition  of 
them.  Reid  did  make  a  most  legitimate  use  of  the  argument  from 
common  sense,  appealing  to  convictions  in  all  men  ;  and  bringing 
out  to  view,  and  expressing  with  greater  or  less  accuracy,  the 
principles  involved  in  these  convictions.  But  then,  he  has  also 
taken  advantage  of  the  first  meaning  of  the  phrase;  he  represents 
the  strength  of  these  original  judgments  as  good  sense  (p.  209)  ;  he 
appeals  from  philosophy  to  common  sense ;  and  in  order  to  counter- 
act the  impression  left  by  the  high  intellectual  abilities  of  Hume,  he 
shows  that  those  who  opposed  Hume  were  not  such  fools,  after  all, 
but  have  the  good  sense  and  shrewdness  of  mankind  on  their  side 
(see  p.  127,  etc.,  with  foot-notes  of  Hamilton).  This  has  led  many 
to  sujjpose  that  the  argument  of  Reid  and  Beattie  is  altogether  an 
address  to  the  vulgar.  In  this  way,  what  seemed  at  the  time  a 
very  dexterous  use  of  a  two-edged  sword  has  turned  against  those 
who  employed  it,  and  injustice  has  been  done  to  the  Scottish  School 
of  philosophers,  who  do  make  a  proper  use  of  the  argument  from 
common  sense.     3.  lie  does  not  see  how  to  reconcile  the  doctrine 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  61 

(of  Locke)  th.at  all  maxims  appear  in  consciousness  as  particulars, 
with  his  own  doctrine  of  there  being  principles  in  the  constitution 
of  the  mind,  and  thence  coming  forth  in  general  propositions. 

XV.  Kant  has,  next  to  Locke,  exercised  the  greatest  influence 
on  modern  speculation.  As  a  general  rule,  the  one  dwells  upon  and 
matifnifies  the  truths  which  the  other  overlooks.  Kant  is  a  reaction 
against  Locke.  He  carries  out,  in  his  own  logical  way,  certain 
principles  which  had  grown  up  in  the  schools  of  Descartes,  Leib- 
nitz, and  Wolf.  1.  He  sees  more  clearly,  and  explains  more  fully 
than  ever  had  been  done  before,  that  the  a  priori  principles  are  in 
the  mind  in  the  character  of  forms,  or  rules,  prior  to  their  being 
called  forth  or  exercised.  Thus,  speaking  of  our  intuition  of  space, 
he  says  it  must  be  already  a  priori  in  the  mind  ;  that  is,  before  any 
perception  of  objects.  "  Die  Form  derselben  muss  zu  ihnen  ins- 
gesamnit  im  Gemiithe  a  priori  bereit  liegen  und  daher  abgesondert 
von  aller  Empfindung  konnen  betrachtet  werden  '  (^Werke,  Bd.  ii.  p. 
32  ;  ed.  Rosenkranz).  The  mind  has  not  only  Intuitions  of  Space 
and  Time  to  impose  on  phenomena  or  presentations,  it  has  cate- 
gories of  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  Modality,  to  impose  on  its 
cognitions ;  and  Ideas  of  Substance,  Totality  of  Phenomena,  and 
Deity,  to  impose  on  the  judgments  reached  by  the  categories.  2. 
He  maintains  that  the  forms  of  the  sensibility  and  the  categories  of 
the  understanding  have  all  a  reference  to  objects  of  experience,  real 
or  possible ;  this,  in  fact,  is  their  use  —  without  this  they  would  be 
meaningless.  The  ideas  of  pure  reason  do,  however,  refer  to  the 
comparisons  of  the  understanding,  and  not  to  objects,  and  fruitless 
speculation  arises  from  supposing  that  they  refer  to  objects  ;  and 
there  may  also  be  an  undue  use  of  the  forms  of  sense  and  the 
categories  of  the  understanding,  but  in  themselves  they  refer  to 
objects  of  possible  experience  (Kritik  d.  r.  V.  Trans.  Dial.).  3.  He 
proposes  in  his  great  work,  the  Kr'itik  of  Pure  Reason,  to  give  an 
inventory,  in  systematic  order,  of  the  a  priori  principles  in  the  mind  : 
"  Denn  es  ist  nichts  als  das  Inventarium  aller  unserer  Besitze  durch 
reine  Vernunft,  systematisch  geordnet "  (Vorrede  zu  erst.  Auf.). 
He  seeks  for  an  organon,  which  would  be  a  compendium  of  the 
principles  according  to  which  a  priori  cognitions  would  be  obtained  : 
"  Ein  Organon  der  reinen  Vernunft  wiirde  ein  Inbegriff  derjenigen 
Principien  seyn,  nach  denen  alle  reine  Erkcntnisse  a  priori  konnen 
erworben  und  wirklich  zu  Stande  gebracht  werden  "  (Einleit.).  4. 
He  uses  systematically  the  test  of  Necessity  and  Universality,  mean- 
ing by  Universality  the  Universality  of  the  Truth. 


52  GENERAL   VIEW   OF  PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  has  fallen  into  the  grossest  misappre- 
hensions regarding  the  nature  of  the  a  priori  principles  of  reason. 
1.  He  maintains  that  the  mind  can  have  no  intuition  of  things. 
All  that  it  can  know  are  mere  presentations  or  phenomena.  It  is 
all  true  that  the  Forms  of  Sense  and  the  Categories  relate  to 
objects  of  possible  experience,  but  then,  experience  does  not  give 
us  a  knowledge  of  things.  "  Es  sind  demnach  die  Gegenstande  der 
Erfahrung  niemals  an  sich  selbst."  Speaking  even  of  self-conscious- 
ness, he  says,  it  does  not  know  self  as  it  exists :  "  Und  Selbst  ist 
die  innere  und  sinnliche  Anschauung  unseres  Gemiiths  (als  Gegen- 
standes  des  Bewusstseyns)  .  .  .  auch  nicht  das  eigentliche  Selbst, 
so  wie  es  an  sich  existirt  "  (Bd.  ii.  p.  389).  He  thus  separates  the 
intuitions  of  the  mind  altogether  from  things.  2.  He  makes  our 
a  priori  Intuitions  impose  on  phenomena  the  forms  of  Space  and 
Time,  which  have  no  existence  out  of  the  mind.  The  categories 
are  frameworks  for  binding  conceptions  into  judgments.  The  ideas 
of  pure  reason  reduce  the  judgments  to  unity,  but  have  no  reference 
to  objects ;  and  if  we  suppose  them  to  have,  we  are  landed  in  illusion 
and  contradictions.  By  this  system  he  makes  much  ideal  which  we 
are  naturally  led  to  regard  as  real,  and  thus  prepared  the  way  for 
Fichte,  who  made  the  whole  ideal.  3.  His  method  of  discovering 
the  a  priori  principles  of  the  mind  is  not  the  Inductive,  but  the 
Critical.  Reason  is  called  to  undertake  the  task  of  self-examination, 
which  may  secure  its  righteous  claims,  not  in  an  arbitrary  way,  but 
accordinop  to  its  own  eternal  and  unchangeable  laws.  ' '  Eine  Auffor- 
derung  an  die  Vernunft,  das  beschwerlichste  aller  ihrer  Geschafte, 
namlich  das  der  Selbsterkenntniss  aufs  Neue  zu  iibernehmen  und 
einen  Gerichtshof  einzusetzen,  der  sie  bei  ihren  gerechten  Ansprii- 
chen  sichere,  dagegen  aber  alle  grundlose  Anmaassungen  nicht  durch 
Machtspriiche  sondern  nach  ihren  ewigen  und  unwandelbaren  Ge- 
setzen  "  (Vor.  zu  erst.  Auf.).  Reason  was  thus  set  on  criticising 
itself  according  to  laws  of  its  own,  and  a  succession  of  speculators 
set  out  each  with  what  he  alleged  to  be  the  laws  of  reason,  but  no 
two  of  them  agreed  as  to  what  the  laws  of  reason  are,  or  what  the 
standard  by  which  to  test  them,  and  conclusions  were  reached  which 
were  evidently  most  irrational. 

XVI.  DuGALD  Stewart  delighted  to  look  on  our  intuitions 
under  the  aspect  of  "Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Belief"  (Elem. 
Vol.  II.  Chap.  i.).  1.  He  sees  that  they  are  of  the  nature  of  laws 
in  the  mind.  2.  He  sees  that  they  are  natural,  original,  and  fun- 
damental.   3.  He  sees  that  they  are  involved  in  the  faculties.    Hence 


CRITICAL  REVIElW   OF   OPINIONS.  53 

he  calls  them  "elements  of  reason"  (Elem.  "Vol.  n.  p.  49;  Ham. 
edit.)  ;  he  would  identify  them  with  the  exercise  of  our  reasoning 
powers,  and  speaks  of  them  as  "component  elements,"  without 
which  the  faculty  of  reasoning  is  inconceivable  and  impossible  (p.  39). 
It  may  be  added  that  while  he  never  formally  appeals  to  necessity, 
he  is  obliged  to  use  it  incidentally.  Thus  "  every  man  is  impressed 
with  an  irresistible  conviction  that  all  his  sensations,  thoughts,  and 
volitions  belong  to  one  and  the  same  being  "  (Elem.  Vol.  i.  p.  47)  ; 
and  "we  are  impressed  with  an  irresistible  conviction  of  our  per- 
sonal identity  "  (Essays,  p.  59).  Speaking  of  causes,  in  the  meta- 
physical meaning  of  the  word,  he  says,  the  "  word  cause  expresses 
something  which  is  supposed  to  be  necessarily  connected  with  the 
change"  (Elem.  Vol.  i.  p.  97).  In  looking  on  them  as  "funda- 
mental laws,"  and  in  avoiding  the  ambiguity  of  the  phrase  "  com- 
mon sense,"  he  has  gone  beyond  Reid,  but  otherwise  he  has  not 
thrown  much  light  on  them.  He  is  in  great  confusion  from  not 
discovering  how  it  is  that  "the  elements  of  reason"  may  become 
general  maxims,  axioms,  or  principles;  and  his  whole  view  of  mathe- 
matical axioms  is  erroneous  (see  Elem.  Vol.  ii.). 

XVII.  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  has  demonstrated,  with  great  in- 
genuity, that  our  belief  in  the  invariableness  of  cause  and  effect 
cannot  be  had  from  experience  (Cause  and  Effect,  Part  iii.  sect, 
iii.).  He  has  also  shown  that  the  belief  in  our  personal  identity 
is  intuitive  (Led.  13).  When  he  comes  to  our  intuitions,  he  speaks 
of  them  as  "principles  of  thought;  "  as  "primary  universal  intui- 
tions of  direct  belief;"  as  "being  felt  intuitively,  universally,  im- 
mediately, irresistibly;  "as  "an  internal,  never-ceasing  voice  from 
the  Creator  and  Preserver  of  our  being;"  as  "omnipotent,  like 
their  Author  ;  "  and  "  such  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  doubt  them  " 
(Led.  13).  These  are  fine  expressions,  but  his  view  of  them  is 
meagre,  after  all,  and  a  retrogression  from  the  Scottish  School.  He 
makes  no  inquiry  into  their  nature,  laws,  or  tests. 

XVIII.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Note  A,  appended  to  his 
edition  of  Reid's  Collected  Writings ,  is  the  most  important  contribution 
made  in  this  century  to  the  science  of  first  truths.  1.  He  has  there 
specified  nearly  every  important  character  of  our  intuitive  convic- 
tions, and  attached  to  them  an  appropriate  nomenclature.  2.  He  has 
shown  that  the  argument  from  common  sense  is  one  strictly  scientific 
and  eminently  philosophic.  3.  He  has  with  unsurpassed  erudition 
brought  testimonials  in  behalf  of  the  principles  of  common  sense 
from  the  writings  of  the  eminent  thinkers  of  all  ages  and  countries. 


54  GENERAL  VIEW  OF  PRIMITIVE   PRINCIPLES. 

But  on  the  other  hand:  1.  He  fails  to  draw  the  distinction  be- 
tween common  sense  as  an  agrgresjate  of  laws  in  the  mind,  as  con- 
victions  in  consciousness,  and  as  generalized  maxims.  Thus  the 
confusion  of  the  spontaneous  cognition  and  its  generalized  form 
appears  in  such  passages  as  the  following  :  "  Tlie  primitive  cog- 
nitions seem  to  leap  ready  from  the  womb  of  reason,  like  Pallas 
from  the  head  of  Jupiter  ;  sometimes  the  mind  places  them  at  the 
commencement  of  its  operations,  in  order  to  have  a  point  of  support 
and  a  fixed  basis,  without  which  the  operations  would  be  impossible; 
sometimes  they  form  in  a  certain  sort  the  crowning,  the  consumma- 
tion, of  all  the  intellectual  operations  "  {Metaphysics,  Led.  38).  2. 
He  does  not  properly  appreciate  the  circumstance  that  intuitive 
convictions  all  look  to  singulars,  and  that  there  is  need  of  induction 
to  reach  the  general  truth.  He  supposes  that  the  general  truth  is 
revealed  at  once  to  consciousness.  "  Philosophy  is  the  development 
and  application  of  the  constitutive  and  normal  truths  which  con- 
sciousness immediately  reveals."  "Philosophy  is  thus  wholly  de- 
pendent on  consciousness"  (Reid's  Collected  Writings,  p.  746).  It 
is  true  that  philosophy  is  dependent  on  consciousness,  but  it  is 
dependent  also  on  abstraction  and  generalization.  He  calls  ulti- 
mate, primary,  and  universal  principles  facts  of  consciousness  (Met. 
Lect.  15).  3.  His  method  is  not  the  Inductive,  but  that  of  Critical 
Analysis  introduced  by  Kant  (Met.  Lect.  29).  He  fails  to  observe 
that  the  mind  in  intuition  looks  at  objects.  He  makes  the  mind's 
conviction  in  regard  to  such  objects  as  space,  substance,  cause,  and 
infinity  to  be  impotencies,  and  their  laws  to  be  laws  of  thought,  and 
not  of  things  (Append,  to  Discuss,  on  Phil.").  The  error  of  such 
views  will  come  out  as  we  advance. 

XIX.  M.  Cousin  has  given,  throughout  all  his  philosophical 
works,  clear  and  beautiful  expositions  of  the  elements  of  reason.  1. 
It  is  a  favorite  doctrine  that  reason  looks  at  truths,  eternal,  univer- 
sal, and  absolute  ;  truths,  not  to  the  individual  or  the  race,  but  to 
all  intelligonces.  2.  He  uses,  most  successfully,  the  tests  of  neces- 
sity and  universality,  in  order  to  distinguish  the  truths  of  reason 
from  other  truths.  3.  He  has  distinguished  between  the  sponta- 
neous and  reflective  form  of  the  truths  of  reason  (see  ante,  p.  19). 
4.  He  has  shown  that  primitive  truths  are  all  at  first  individual. 
"  C'est  un  fait  qu'il  ne  faut  pas  oublier,  et  qu'on  oublie  beaucoup 
trop  souvent,  que  nos  jugements  sont  d'abord  des  jugements  par- 
ticuliers  et  dt^terminds,  et  que  c'est  sous  cette  forme  d'un  jugement 
particulier  et  determind  que  font   leur  premiere  apparition   toutes 


CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  55 

les  v^rit^s  universelles  et  necessaires  "  {Ser.  ii.  t.  iii.  le<j.  1  ;  see  also 
Ser.  i.  t.  i.  progr.  ;  t.  ii.  progr.  109.  ii.-iv.  xi.).  But  on  the  other 
hand,  he  has  given  an  exaggerated  account  of  the  power  of  human 
reason,  and  has  not  seen  that  induction  is  required  in  order  to  the 
discovery  of  necessary  truth  in  its  general  form.  1.  He  uses  un- 
happy and  unguarded  language  in  speaking  of  reason.  His  favorite 
epithet  as  applied  to  it  is  "  impersonal  ;  "  language  which  has  a 
correct  meaning  inasmuch  as  the  truth  i.s  not  to  the  person,  but  to 
all  intelligences,  but  is  often  so  employed  as,  without  his  intending 
it,  to  come  very  close  to  those  pantheistic  systems  which  identify 
the  Divine  and  human  reason  (see  Ser.  ii.  Ie9.  v.).  2.  His  reduc- 
tion of  the  ideas  of  reason  to  three  is  full  of  confusion.  The  first 
idea  is  supposed  to  be  unity,  substance,  cause,  perfect,  infinite, 
eternal  ;  the  second,  multiple,  quality,  effect,  imperfect,  finite, 
bounded  ;  and  the  third,  the  relation  of  the  other  two.  It  is  to 
confound  the  things  which  manifestly  differ,  to  make  unity,  cause> 
good,  infinite,  to  be  identical.  The  business  of  the  metaphysician 
should.be  to  observe  each  of  these  carefuUv,  and  bring  out  their 
peculiarities  and  their  differences.  3.  He  does  not  see  how  it  is  that 
the  general  maxim  is  formed  out  of  the  particulars.  He  says  that 
abstraction  "  saisit  imm^diatement  ce  que  le  premier  objet  soumis 
k  son  observation  renferme  de  g^ndral  (5er.  i.  t.  i.  le^.  xi.).  He 
does  not  see  that  in  order  to  the  formation  of  the  general  law  there 
is  need  of  a  process,  often  delicate  and  laborious,  of  observation, 
abstraction,  and  generalization. 

XX.  Dr.  Whewell  has  done  great  service  at  once  to  the  phys- 
ical sciences  and  to  metaphysics,  by  showing,  in  his  History  of 
Inductive  Sciences:  1.  That  the  former  proceed  upon  and  imply 
principles  not  got  from  experience  ;  that  geometry  and  aiithmetic 
depend  on  first  truths  regarding  space,  time,  and  number;  and 
mechanical  science  on  intuitions  regarding  force,  matter,  etc.  2.  He 
has  exhibited  these  principles  in  instructive  forms,  announcing  them 
in  their  deeper  and  wider  character  under  the  designation  of 
"  fundamental  ideas,"  and  then  presenting  them  under  the  name  of 
"conceptions"  in  the  more  specific  shapes  in  which  they  become 
available  in  the  particular  sciences  :  thus,  in  mechanical  science 
the  fundamental  idea  of  cause  becomes  the  conception  of  force. 
But  then  he  has  injured  his  work  :  1.  By  following  the  Kantian 
doctrine  of  forms,  and  supposing  that  the  mental  ideas  "  impose  "  and 
"superinduce"  on  the  objects  something  not  in  the  objects,  whereas 
they  merely  enable  us  to  discover  what  is  in  the  objects.     2.  He 


56  GENERAL   VIEW   OF   PRIMITIVE  PRINCIPLES. 

also  fails  to  show  that,  the  ideas  or  maxims  in  the  general  form  in 
which  alone  they  are  available  in  science  are  got  by  induction.  3. 
The  phraseology  which  he  emj)loys  is  unfortunate;  it  is  "  funda- 
mental ideas  "  and  "conceptions."  The  word  "idea"  has  been 
used  in  so  many  different  senses  by  different  writers,  by  Plato,  Des- 
cartes, Locke,  Kant,  and  Hegel,  that  it  is  perhaps  expedient  to 
abandon  it  altogether  in  strict  philosophic  writing ;  it  is  certainly 
not  expedient  to  use  it,  as  VVhewell  does,  in  a  new  application. 
The  word  "conception  "  stands  in  classical  English  both  for  the 
phantasm,  or  image,  and  the  logical  notion;  certain  later  raeta- 
phy.sicians  would  restrict  it  to  the  logical  notion  ;  and  there  is  no 
propriety  in  using  it  to  signify  an  a  priori  law.  4.  He  has  damaged 
the  general  acceptance  of  his  principles,  which  seem  to  me  to  be 
as  true  as  they  are  often  profound,  by  making  a  number  of  truths 
a  priori  which  are  evidently  got  from  experience  :  thus  he  makes 
the  law  of  action  and  re-action,  and  the  laws  of  motion  generally, 
self-evident  and  necessary. 

XXI.  J.  S.  Mill.  I  have  shown  in  Examinatmi  of  Mr.  J.  S. 
MilVs  Philosophy  that  while  denying  intuitive  principles  he  is  obliged 
constantly  to  assume  them. 

XXH.  LoTZE.  He  opens  his  work  on  Metaphysics  by  telling  us 
that  "  Reality  including  Change  is  the  subject  of  Metaphysic."  In 
his  dictations  as  reported  by  Professor  Ladd  he  says  that  Metaphysic 
is  the  science  of  that  which  is  actual,  not  of  that  which  is  merely 
thinkable."  "  The  problem  of  Metaphysic  is  actually  this  :  to  dis- 
cover the  laws  of  the  connection  which  unites  the  particular  (simul- 
taneous or  successive)  elements  of  actuality."  It  is  pleasant  to  find  a 
German  philosopher  thus  turning  to  actuality  which  Kant  had  placed 
at  such  a  distance.  But  he  has  stopped  half-way,  and  has  thus  been 
able  to  do  little  for  a  Realistic  Philosophy.  He  tells  us  that  "  the 
belief  of  ordinary  intuition  that  it  has  an  immediate  perception  of 
the  nature  of  things  can  be  only  short-lived."  By  help  of  certain 
obvious  distinctions  I  have  been  showing  that  this  is  the  philosophy 
sure  to  be  long-lived.  He  says,  "To  be"  means  "  to  stand  in  rela- 
tion," as  if  things  did  not  require  to  he  in  order  to  stand  in  relation. 
He  makes  Space  and  Time  to  have  only  a  subjective  existence, 
whereas  realism  recjuires  us  to  hold  that  the  extension  of  that  wall 
and  the  time  of  sunrise  have  quite  as  objective  a  reality  as  the  wall 
and  the  event. 

XXin.  Herbert  Spencer  enunciates  a  fundamental  principle. 
"  The  inconceivableness  of  its  negation  is  that  which  shows  a  cogni- 


CRITICAL  REVIEW   OF   OPINIONS.  57 

tion  to  possess  the  highest  rank  —  is  the  criterion  by  which  its  un- 
surpassable validity  is  known."  "  If  its  negation  is  inconceivable, 
the  discovery  of  this  is  the  discovery  that  we  are  obliged  to  accept 
it.  And  a  cognition  which  we  are  thus  obliged  to  accept  is  one 
which  we  class  as  having  the  highest  possible  certainty  "  (^Psychology, 
Vol.  II.  p.  407).  This  is  a  very  mutilated  and  partial  version  of  the 
test  of  necessity.  Mr.  Spencer  holds  that  all  our  cognitions  and 
judgments  are  determined  by  our  nervous  structure,  which  has  been 
fashioned  by  heredity.  In  this  evolution  man  has  no  more  freedom 
of  will  than  the  spoke  has  in  the  revolution  of  a  wheel.  We  can 
conceive  only  what  we  are  compelled  to  do  by  our  inherited  nervous 
frame,  and  we  cannot  conceive,  certainly  cannot  believe,  otherwise. 
Liberty  of  choice  would  be  an  evil  in  our  world,  as  it  might  interfere 
with  the  evolution  of  nature.  This  cognition  which  we  arc  obliged 
to  accept  is  not  a  cognition  of  things,  as  is  maintained  in  this  work, 
but  is  a  necessity  imposed  on  us  by  our  descent.  To  us  it  is  "  the 
highest  possible  certainty,  and  unsurpassable,"  but  it  is  not  pretended 
that  it  is  a  certainty  in  the  nature  of  things.  In  other  worlds,  with 
a  different  evolutionary  process,  it  might  not  be  certainty,  but  un- 
certainty and  error.  We  who  feel  as  if  we  were  free  feel  oppressed 
under  this  load. 


PART  SECOND. 

PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION  OF  PRIMITIVE  TRUTHS. 


BOOK  I. 
PRIMITIVE  COGNITIONS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  MIND   BEGINS   ITS   INTELLIGENT   ACTS   "WITH 

KNOWLEDGE. 

It  is  impossible  to  determine  directly  and  certainly 
what  are  the  first  exercises  of  the  soul,  as  the  memory  of 
the  infant  does  not  go  so  far  back.  It  is  supposed  by 
many  that  it  begins  with  some  sort  of  sensations  or  feel- 
ings. This  may  or  may  not  be.  But  it  should  be  care- 
fully noted  that  these  are  not  acts  of  intelligence,  and 
that  we  cannot  argue  from  them  the  existence  of  things 
without  having  more  in  the  conclusion  than  we  have  in 
the  premises. 

I  think  it  can  be  shown  that  the  mind  must  begin  its 
intelligent  acts  with  knowledge,  which  means  that  we 
know  things.  It  is  upon  the  things  thus  known  that  our 
thinking  powers  proceed. 

This  is  not  the  account  usually  given.  From  an  early 
date  the  common  opinion  in  philosophy  was  that  the 
mind  does  not  look  at  things,  but  on  some  idea,  image,  or 
representation  of  things.  This  view,  with  no  pi'etensions 
to  precision  in  the  statement  of  it,  was  a  prevalent  one 


THE   MIND   ACTS   WITH   KNOWLEDGE.  59 

in  ancient  Greece,  in  the  scholastic  ages,  and  in  the 
earher  stages  of  modern  philosophy.  It  seems  to  me  to 
be  the  view  which  was  habitually  entertained  by  Des- 
cartes and  Locke.  In  later  times,  the  mind  was  sup^ 
posed  to  commence  with  "  impressions "  of  some  kind. 
This  view  may  be  regarded  as  introduced  formally  into 
philosophy  by  Hume,  who  opens  his  Treatise  of  Human 
Nature  by  declaring  that  all  the  perceptions  of  the  mind 
are  impressions  and  ideas  ;  that  impressions  come  first, 
and  that  ideas  are  the  faint  images  of  them.  This  view 
has  evidently  a  materialistic  tendency.  Literally,  an 
impression  can  be  produced  only  on  a  material  substance, 
and  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  precisely  what  is  meant 
by  the  phrase  when  it  is  applied  to  a  state  of  the  con- 
scious mind.  This  impression  theory  is  the  one  adopted 
by  the  French  Sensational  School  and  by  the  physiolo- 
gists of  this  country.  In  Germany  the  influence  exer- 
cised by  Kant's  Kritik  of  Pure  Reason  has  made  the 
general  account  to  be  that  the  mind  starts  with  presen- 
tations, and  not  with  things,  with  phenomena  in  the 
sense  of  appearances,  which  "phenomena"  are  but  modi- 
fications of  Hume's  "  impressions  "  and  of  the  "  ideas  " 
of  the  ancients.  Now  it  appears  to  me  that  all  these 
accounts,  consciousness  being  witness,  are  imperfect,  and 
by  their  defects  erroneous.  The  mind  is  not  conscious 
of  these  impressions  preceding  the  knowledge  which  it 
has  immediately  of  self,  and  the  objects  falling  under  the 
notice  of  the  senses.  Nor  can  it  be  legitimately  shown 
how  the  mind  can  ever  rise  from  ideas,  impressions, 
phenomena,  to  the  knowledge  of  things.  The  followers 
of  Locke  have  always  felt  the  difficulty  of  showing  how 
the  mind  from  mere  ideas  could  reach  external  realities. 
Hume  designedly  represented  the  orighial  exercises  of 
the  mind  as  being  mere  impressions,  in  order  to  under- 


60       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

mine  the  very  foundations  of  knowledge.  Though  Kant 
acknowledged  a  reality  beneath  the  presentations,  be- 
yond the  phenomena,  those  who  followed  out  his  views 
found  the  reality  disappearing  more  and  more,  till  at 
length  it  vanished  altogether,  leaving  only  a  concate- 
nated series  of  mental  forms. 

There  is  no  effectual  or  consistent  way  of  avoiding 
these  consequences  but  by  falling  back  on  the  natural 
system,  and  maiiitaining  that  the  mind  in  its  intelligent 
acts  starts  with  knowledge.  But  let  not  the  statement 
be  misunderstood.  I  do  not  mean  that  the  mind  com- 
mences with  abstract  knowledge,  or  general  knowledge, 
or  indeed  with  systematized  knowledge  of  any  descrip- 
tion. It  acquires  first  a  knowledge  of  individual  things, 
as  they  are  presented  to  it  and  to  its  knowing  faculties, 
and  it  is  out  of  this  that  all  its  arranged  knowledge  is 
formed  by  a  subsequent  exercise  of  the  understanding. 
From  the  concrete  the  mind  fashions  the  abstract,  by 
separating  in  thought  a  part  from  the  whole,  a  quality 
from  the  object.  Starting  with  the  particular,  the  mind 
reaches  the  general  by  observing  the  points  of  agree- 
ment. From  premises  involving  knowledge,  it  can  arrive 
at  other  propositions  also  containing  knowledge.  It 
seems  clear  to  me  that  if  the  mind  had  not  knowledge 
in  the  foundation,  it  never  could  have  knowledge  in  the 
superstructure  reared ;  but  finding  knowledge  in  its  fii'st 
intelligent  exercises,  it  can  thence,  by  the  processes  of 
abstraction,  generalization,  and  reasoning,  reach  further 
and  higher  knowledge. 

The  mind  is  endowed  with  at  least  two  simple  cog- 
nitive powers,  —  sense-perception  and  self-consciousness. 
Both  are  cognitive  in  their  nature,  and  look  on  and 
reveal  to  us  existing  things  :  the  one,  material  objects 
presented  to  us  in  our  bodily  frame  and  beyond  it ;  and 


THE   MIND   ACTS   WITH   KNOWLEDGE.  61 

« 

the  other,  self  in  a  particular  state  or  exercise.  It  is 
altogether  inadequate  language  to  represent  these  fac- 
ulties as  giving  us  an  idea,  or  an  impression,  or  an 
apprehension,  or  a  notion,  or  a  conception,  or  a  belief, 
or  looking  to  unknown  appearances :  they  give  us  knowl- 
edge of  objects  under  aspects  presented  to  us.  No  other 
language  is  equal  to  express  the  full  mental  action  of 
which  we  are  conscious. 

If  this  view  be  correct,  the  unit  of  thought  is  not, 
as  is  commonly  represented,  judgment,  but  cognition 
of  things,  on  which  judgments  may  be  formed. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OTJR   INTUITION   OF   BODY   BY   THE   SENSES, 

I. 

We  are  following  the  plainest  dictates  of  conscious- 
ness, we  avoid  a  thousand  difficulties,  and  we  get  a  solid 
ground  on  which  to  rest  and  to  build,  when  we  maintain 
that  the  mind  in  its  first  exercises  acquires  knowledge ; 
not,  indeed,  scientific  or  arranged,  not  of  qualities  of  ob- 
jects and  classes  of  objects,  but  still  knowledge,  —  the 
knowledge  of  things  presenting  themselves,  and  as  they 
present  themselves ;  which  knowledge,  individual  and 
concrete,  is  the  foundation  of  all  other  knowledge,  ab- 
stract, general,  and  deductive.  In  particular,  the  mind 
is  so  constituted  as  to  attain  a  knowledge  of  body  or  of 
material  objects.  It  may  be  difficult  to  ascertain  the 
exact  point  or  surface  at  which  the  mind  and  body  come 
together  and  influence  each  other,  in  particular,  how  far 
into  the  body  (Descartes  without  proof  thought  to  be 
in  tlie  pineal  gland),  but  it  is  certain  that  when  they 
do  meet  mind  knows  body  as  having  its  essential  prop- 
erties of  extension  and  resisting  energy.  It  is  through 
the  bodily  organism  that  the  intelligence  of  man  attains 
its  knowledge  of  all  material  objects  beyond.  This  is 
true  of  the  infant  mind ;  it  is  true  also  of  the  mature 
mind.  Wo  may  assert  something  more  than  this  re- 
garding the  organism.  It  is  not  only  the  medium 
through  which  we  know  all  bodily  objects  beyond  itself; 
it,  is  itself  an  object  primarily  known;  nay,  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that,  along  with  the  objects  immediately 


OUR   INTUITION   OF  BODY   BY   THE   SENSES.  63 

affecting  it,  it  is  the  only  object  originally  known. 
Intuitivel}',  man  seeuis  to  know  nothing  beyond  his  own 
organism,  and  objects  directly  affecting  it ;  in  all  further 
knowledge  there  is  a  process  of  inference  proceeding  on 
a  gathered  experience.  This  theory  seems  to  me  to 
explain  all  the  facts,  and  it  delivers  us  from  many  per- 
plexities. 

Let  us  go  over  the  senses  one  by  one,  with  a  view  of 
determining  what  seems  to  be  the  original  information 
supplied  by  each.  In  the  sense  of  smell,  the  objects 
immediately  perceived  are  the  nostrils  as  affected ;  it  is 
only  by  experience  that  we  know  that  there  is  an  object 
beyond,  from  which  the  smell  proceeds,  and  it  is  only 
by  science  that  we  know  that  odorous  particles  have 
proceeded  from  that  object.  In  hearing,  our  primary 
perceptions  seem  to  be  of  the  ear  as  affected ;  that  there 
is  a  sounding  body  we  learn  by  further  observation,  and 
that  there  are  vibrations  between  it  and  the  ear  we 
are  told  by  scientific  research.  In  taste,  it  is  originally 
the  palate  as  affected  by  what  we  feel  by  another  sense 
to  be  a  tangible  body,  which  body  science  tells  us  must 
be  in  a  liquid  state.  In  touch  proper,  there  is  a  sensa- 
tion of  a  particular  part  of  the  frame  as  affected  by  we 
know  not  what,  but  which  we  ma}'-  discover  by  experi- 
ential observation.  It  is  the  same  with  all  the  impres- 
sions we  have  by  the  sense  of  temperature,  the  sense  of 
titillation,  the  sense  of  shuddering,  the  sense  of  flesh- 
creeping,  the  sense  of  lightness  or  of  weight,  and  the 
like  organic  affections,  usually,  but  improperly,  attrib- 
uted to  touch.  In  regard  to  all  these  senses,  it  seems 
highly  probable  that  our  original  and  primitive  percep- 
tions are  simply  of  the  organism  as  affected  by  some- 
thing unknown  —  so  far  as  intuition  is  concerned.  But 
there  are  other  two  senses  which  furnish,  I  am  inclined  to 


64      PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

think,  a  new  and  further  kmd  of  information.     The  sense 
of  touch,  when  the  phrase  is  used  in  a  loose  sense,  is  a 
complex  one,  embracing  a  considerable  number  and  va- 
riety of  senses,  which  have   not  been  scientifically  clas- 
sified,  and  which,   perhaps,   cannot  be  so   till  we  have 
a  more  thorough  physiology  of  the  nerves.     Certain  it 
is  that  there  is    a  locomotive    energy  and   a    muscular 
sense  entirely  different  from  feeling,  or   such   affections 
as  those  of  heat  and  cold.     The  soul  of  man  instinct- 
ively wills  to  move  the  arm;  an  action  is  produced  in 
a  motor   nerve,  which   sets  in   motion   a   muscle,  with 
probably  an  attached  set  of  bones,  and  the  intimation 
of  such  a  movement  having  taken  place  is  conveyed  to 
the  brain  by  a  sensor  nerve.     As  the  result  of  this  com- 
plex physiological  process,  we   come  to  know  that  there 
is  something  beyond  our  organism  ;  we  know  an  object 
out  of   our   organism    hindering   the   movement  of    the 
organ  and  resisting  our  energy  (a).     It  is  more  difficult 
to  determine  what  is  the  original  perception  by  sight. 
It  must  certainly  be  of  a  colored  surface  affecting  the 
felt   organism.      In    the   famous   case    operated   on   by 
Cheselden,  a  boy  born  blind  had  his  eyes  couched,  and 
"  when  he  first    saw,  he  was    so  far  from  making   any 
judgment  about    distances  that  he   thought    all  objects 
whatever  touched  his  eyes  (as  he  expressed  it),  as  what 
he  felt    did    his    skin."     In  the  Franz  case,  the  object 
seemed,  when  the  boy's  eyes  were  opened,  very  near; 
and  in  the  Trinchinetti  cases,  the  girl  tried  to  grasp  an 
orange  with  her  hand  very  near  the  eye ;   then,  perceiv- 
ing her  error,  stretched  out  her  forefinger,  and  pushed  it 
in  a  straight  line  slowly  until  she  reached  her  object  (J). 
I  think  it  probable  that  the  colored  surface  perceived 
as  affecting  the  living  organism  is  seen  as  in  the  direction 
of  the  felt  and  localized  sentient  organ,  neither  behind  it 


OUR   INTUITION   OF   BODY   BY   THE   SENSES.  65 

nor  at  the  side,  but  at  what  distance  we  know  not  till 
other  senses  and  a  gathered  experience  come  to  our 
aid.  Such  seems  to  be  our  original  knowledge,  received 
throuo-h  the  various  senses  as  inlets. 

But  we  are  not  to  understand  that  the  mind  receives 
sensations  and  information  only  from  one  sense  at  a 
time.  In  order  to  have  a  full  view  of  the  actual  state 
of  things,  we  must  remember  that  man,  at  every  in- 
stant of  his  waking  existence,  is  getting  organic  feelings 
and  perceptions  from  a  number  of  sensitive  sources ; 
possibly  at  one  and  the  same  time  from  the  sense  of 
heat,  from  the  sense  of  taste  in  the  mouth,  from  the 
sense  of  hearing,  from  the  sense  of  sight,  —  say  of  a 
portion  of  our  own  body  and  of  the  walls  of  the  apart- 
ment in  which  we  sit,  —  and  from  the  muscular  sense,  — 
say  of  the  chair  on  which  we  sit,  or  the  floor  on  which 
we  stand.  Our  whole  conscious  state  at  any  given  time 
is  thus  a  very  complex,  or  rather  a  concrete  one.  There 
is  in  it  at  all  times  a  sense  of  the  living  body  as  ex- 
tended, and,  I  may  add,  as  ours.  This  is  a  sense  which 
human  beings,  infant  and  mature,  carry  with  them  every 
instant  of  their  waking  existence,  perhaps  in  a  low 
state  even  in  their  times  of  sleep.  "  This  consciousness 
of  our  own  corporeal  existence  is  the  standard  by  which 
we  estimate  in  our  sense  of  touch  the  extension  of  all 
resisting  bodies."  ^  Along  with  this  there  will,  always 
be  in  our  waking  moments  a  sense  of  something  extra- 
organic  but  affecting  the  organism,  such  as  the  surface 
before  the  eye,  or  the  object  which  supports  us.  But 
the  vividness  of  the  impression  made,  or  some  decisive 
act  of  tiie  will  in  order  to  accomplish  a  desired  end, 
will  at  times  centre  the  mind's  regards  in  a  special 
manner  on  some  one  of  the  objects  made  known  by  the 
1  MuUer's  Physiology,  p.  1081. 


66       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

senses.  Thus,  a  violent  pain  will  absorb  the  whole 
mental  energy  on  the  organ  affected ;  or  a  vivid  hue 
will  draw  out  the  mind  towards  the  color;  or  in  order 
to  some  purpose  we  may  fix"  our  regards  on  the  shape 
of  the  object.  By  these  concentrations  of  intelligence 
we  obtain  a  more  special  acquaintance  with  the  nature 
of  the  objects  presenting  themselves.  It  is  thus  only 
that  the  special  senses  fulfil  their  full  function,  and 
impart  information  abiding  with  us  beyond  the  moment 
when  the  primary  affection  is  produced. 

Such,  approximately  and  provisionally,  seems  to  be  our 
original  stock  of  knowledge  acquired  by  sense.  It  is  as 
yet  within  very  narrow  limits,  within  our  frames,  and  a 
sphere  immediately  in  contact  with  them.  "  We  per- 
ceive," says  Hamilton,  "and  can  perceive  nothing  but 
what  is  relative  to  the  organ,"  We  reach  a  more  ex- 
tended knowledge  by  remembering  what  we  have  thus 
obtained,  by  subjecting  it  to  processes  of  abstraction  and 
generalization,  and  drawing  inferences  from  it.  Our 
information  is  especially  enlarged  and  consolidated  by 
combining  the  information  got  from  several  of  the  senses, 
which  are  all  intended  to  assist  each  other.  In  particu- 
lar, the  two  intellectual  senses  par  excellence,  sight  and 
the  muscular  sense,  are  fitted  to  aid  each  other  and  all 
the  other  senses.  By  sight  we  know  merely  the  object 
as  having  a  colored  surface;  by  the  muscular  sense  we 
may  come  to  know  that  this  object  with  a  superficies  has 
three  dimensions  and  is  impenetrable  ;  we  may  know 
the  object  to  be  the  same  by  our  seeing  upon  it  the  hand 
which  feels  the  pressure  (c).  By  sight  we  know  not 
how  far  the  colored  surface  is  from  our  organism ;  by 
inferences  founded  on  gathered  information  from  the 
muscular  sense  we  come  to  know  how  far  it  is  from  us, 
whether  an  inch  or  many  feet  or  yards.     By  the  muscu- 


OUR   INTUITION   OF   BODY   BY   THE   SENSES.  67 

lar  sense  we  know  solid  objects  only  as  pressing  them- 
selves immediately  on  our  organism  ;  by  sight  we  see 
objects  —  which  sight  does  not  declare  to  be  solid,  but 
which  a  combined  experience  declares  must  be  solid  — 
thousands  or  millions  of  miles  away.  By  inferences  from 
various  senses  united  we  know  that  this  taste  is  from  a 
certain  kind  of  food,  that  this  smell  is  from  a  rose  or 
lily,  that  this  sound  is  from  a  human  voice  or  a  musical 
instrument.  Thus  our  knowledge,  commencing  with  the 
organism  and  objects  affecting  it,  may  extend  to  objects 
at  a  great  distance,  and  clothe  them  with  qualities  which 
are  not  perceived  as  immediately  belonging  to  them. 
We  know  that  this  blue  surface,  seen  indistinctly,  is  a 
bay  of  the  ocean  fifty  miles  off,  and  that  this  brilliant 
spark  up  in  the  blue  concave  is  a  solid  body,  radiating 
light  hundreds  of  millions  of  miles  away. 

Let   us   analyze    what   is   involved    in    this  intuitive 

knowledge. 

II. 

We  know  the  Object  as  Existing  or  having  Being. 
This  is  a  necessary  conviction,  attached  to,  or  rather 
composing  an  essential  part  of,  our  concrete  cognition  of 
every  material  object  presented  to  us,  be  it  of  our  own 
frame  or  of  things  external  to  our  frame  ;  whether  this 
hard  stone,  or  this  yielding  water,  or  even  this  vapory 
mist  or  fleeting  cloud.  We  look  on  each  of  the  objects 
thus  presented  to  us,  in  our  organism  or  beyond  it,  as 
having  an  existence,  a  being,  a  reality.  Every  one  un- 
derstands these  phrases ;  they  cannot  be  made  simpler 
or  more  intelligible  by  an  explanation.  We  understand 
them  because  they  express  a  mental  fact  which  every 
one  has  experienced.  We  may  talk  of  what  we  contem- 
plate in  sense-perception  being  nothing  but  an  impres- 
sion, an  appearance,  an  idea,  but  we  can  never  be  made 


68       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

to  give  our  spontaneous  assent  to  any  such  statements. 
However  ingenious  the  arguments  which  may  be  adduced 
in  favor  of  the  objects  of  our  sense-perceptions  being 
mere  ilkisions,  we  find,  after  listening  to  them,  and  allow- 
ing to  them  all  the  weight  that  is  possible,  that  we  still 
look  upon  bodies  as  realities  the  next  time  they  present 
themselves.  The  reason  is,  we  know  them  to  be  reali- 
ties, by  a  native  cognition  which  can  never  be  overcome. 

III. 

In  our  primitive  cognitions,  we  know  objects  as  having 
an  Existence  Independent  of  the  Contemplative  Mind. 
We  know  the  object  as  separate  from  ourselves.  We  do 
not  create  it  when  we  perceive  it,  nor  does  it  cease  to 
exist  because  we  have  ceased  to  contemplate  it.  Our 
intuition  indeed  does  not  say,  as  to  this  being,  how  or 
when  it  came  to  be  there,  nor  whether  nor  in  what  cir- 
cumstances it  may  cease;  for  information  on  such  topics 
we  must  go  to  other  quarters.  But  when  the  question  is 
started,  we  must  decide  that  this  thing  had  a  being  prior 
to  our  perceiving  it, —  unless  indeed  it  so  happened  that 
it  was  produced  by  a  power  capable  of  doing  so  at  the 
very  time  our  senses  alighted  on  it ;  and  that  it  will  con- 
tinue to  exist  after  we  have  ceased  to  regard  it, —  unless 
indeed  something  interpose  to  destroy  it.  All  this  is  in- 
volved in  our  very  cognition  of  the  object,  and  he  who 
would  deny  this  is  setting  aside  our  very  primitive  know- 
ledge, and  he  who  would  argue  against  this  will  never  be 
able  to  convince  us  in  fact,  because  he  is  opposing  a 
fundamental  conviction  which  will  work  whenever  the 
object  is  presented  (c?). 

IV. 

In  our  primitive  cognition  of  body  there  is  involved  a 
knowledge  of  Outness  or  Externality.    We  know  the  ob- 


OUE   INTUITION   OF  BODY   BY   THE   SENSES.  69 

ject  perceived,  be  it  the  organism  or  the  object  affecting 
the  organism,  as  not  in  the  mind,  but  as  out  of  the  mind. 
In  regard  to  some  of  the  objects  perceived  by  us,  we  may 
be  in  doubt  as  to  whether  they  are  in  the  orgtuiism  or 
beyond  it,  but  we  are  always  sure  that  they  are  extra- 
mental.  This  is  a  conviction  from  which  we  can  never  be 
driven  by  any  power  of  will  or  force  of  circumstances. 
It  is  at  the  foundation  of  the  judgments  to  be  afterwards 
specified  as  to  the  distinctions  between  the  self  and  the 
not-self,  the  ego  and  non-ego  (g). 


We  know  the  object  as  Extended.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  this  knowledge  in  the  concrete  is  involved 
even  in  such  perceptions  as  those  of  smell,  taste,  hearing, 
and  feeling,  and  the  allied  affections  of  temperature  and 
titillation.  In  all  these  we  intuitively  know  the  organ- 
ism as  out  of  the  mind,  as  extended,  and  as  localized. 
At  every  waking  moment  we  have  sensations  from  more 
than  one  sense,  and  we  must  know  the  organs  affected 
as  out  of  each  other  and  in  different  places  (/).  It  is 
acknowledged  that  the  primitive  knowledge  got  in  this 
way  is  very  bare  and  limited,  and  without  those  per- 
ceived relationships  and  distinctions  which  become  asso- 
ciated with  it  in  our  future  life.  But  imperfect  though 
it  be,  it  must  ever  involve  the  occupation  of  space.  The 
other  two  senses  furnish  more  express  information,  the 
eye  giving  a  colored  surface  of  a  defined  form,  and  the 
muscular  sense  extension  in  three  dimensions.  It  should 
be  noticed  that  in  our  knowledge  of  extra-organic  objects, 
whether  by  the  eye  or  the  muscular  sense,  we  know 
them  as  situated  in  a  certain  place  in  reference  to  our 
organism,  which  we  have  alreadj'^  so  far  localized  and 
distributed  in  space,  and  which  henceforth  we  use  as  a 
centre  for  direction  and  distance. 


70       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

VI. 

We  know  the  Objects  as  Affecting  Us.  I  have  already 
said  that  we  know  them  as  independent  of  us.  This  is 
an  important  truth.  But  it  is  equally  true  and  equally 
important  that  these  objects  are  made  known  to  us  aa 
somehow  having  an  influence  on  us.  The  organic  object 
is  capable  of  affecting  our  minds,  and  the  extra-organic 
object  affects  the  organism  which  affects  the  mind. 
Upon  this  cognition  are  founded  certain  judgments  as  to 
the  relations  of  the  objects  known  to  the  knowing  mind. 
In  particular, 

VII. 

In  certain,  if  not  in  all,  of  our  original  cognitions 
through  the  senses  we  know  the  objects  as  exercising 
Potency  or  Property.  This  is  denied  in  theory  by  many 
who  are  yet  found  to  admit  it  inadvertently  when  they 
tell  us  that  we  can  know  matter  only  by  its  properties : 
for  what,  I  ask,  are  properties  but  powers  to  act  in  a 
certain  way  ?  But  still  it  is  dogmatically  asserted  that 
whatever  we  may  know  about  material  objects,  we  can 
never  know  that  they  have  power;  we  cannot  see  power, 
they  say,  nor  hear  power,  nor  touch  power.  In  opposi- 
tion to  these  confident  assertions,  I  lay  down  the  very 
opposite  dogma,  that  we  cannot  see  body,  or  touch,  or 
even  hear,  or  taste,  or  smell  body,  except  as  affecting  us ; 
that  is,  having  a  power  in  reference  to  us.  When  an 
extra-organic  body  resists  our  muscular  energy  (</),  what 
is  it  doing  but  affecting  our  organism  in  a  certain  way  ? 
The  very  colored  surface  revealed  through  sight  is 
known  to  us  as  affecting,  that  is,  having  an  influence 
over,  our  organism.  But  there  is  more  than  this,  —  the 
organism  is  known  as  having  power  to  affect  the  cogni- 


OUR   INTUITION   OF   BODY   BY   THE   SENSES.  71 

tive  self.  The  muscular  effort  resisted,  the  visual  organs 
impressed  by  the  colored  surface,  are  known  as  producing 
an  effect  on  the  mind.  The  organs  affected  in  smell, 
in  taste,  in  temperature,  in  hearing,  in  feeling,  are  all 
known  as  rousing  the  mind  into  cognitive  activity.  It 
might  be  further  maintained,  even  in  regard  to  those 
senses  which  do  not  immediately  reveal  anything  extra- 
organic,  that  they  seem  to  point  to  some  unknown  cause 
of  the  affection  known  ;  but  it  is  better  to  postpone  the 
treatment  of  this  question  till  it  can  be  fully  discussed. 
But  in  regard  to  the  two  senses  which  reveal  objects 
beyond  the  bodily  frame,  and  in  regard  to  all  the  senses 
as  far  as  they  make  known  our  frame  to  us,  it  seems 
clear  to  me  that  there  is  an  intuitive  conviction  of  po- 
tency wrapped  up  in  all  our  cognitions  (^). 

VIII. 

But  it  will  be  vehemently  urged  that  it  is  most  pre- 
posterous to  assert  that  we  know  all  this  by  the  senses. 
Upon  this  I  remark  that  the  phrase  hy  the  senses  is 
ambiguous.  If  by  senses  be  meant  the  mere  bodily 
organism,  —  the  eye,  the  ears,  the  nerves,  and  the  brain, 
—  I  affirm  that  we  know,  and  can  know,  nothing  by  this 
bodily  part,  which  is  a  mere  organ  or  instrument ;  that 
so  far  from  knowing  potency  or  extension,  we  do  not 
know  even  color,  or  taste,  or  smell.  But  if  by  the  senses 
be  meant  the  mind  exercised  in  sense-perception,  sum- 
moned into  activity  by  the  organism,  and  contemplating 
cognitively  the  external  world,  then  I  maintain  that  we 
do  know,  and  this  intuitively,  external  objects  as  in- 
fluencing us  ;  that  is,  exercising  powers  in  reference  to 
us.  I  ask  those  who  would  doubt  of  this  doctrine  of 
what  it  is  that  they  suppose  the  mind  to  be  cognizant  in 
sense-perception.     If  they  say  a  mere  sensation  or  im- 


72       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

pression  in  the  mind,  I  reply  that  this  is  not  consistent 
with  the  revelation  of  consciousness,  which  announces 
plainly  that  what  we  know  is  something  extra-mental. 
If  they  say,  with  Kant,  a  mere  phenomenon  in  the  sense 
of  appearance,  then  I  reply  that  this  too  is  inconsistent 
with  consciousness,  which  declares  that  we  know  the 
thing.  But  if  we  know  the  thing,  we  must  know  some- 
thing about  it.  If  they  say  we  know  it  as  having  exten- 
sion and  form,  I  grasp  at  the  admission,  and  ask  them  to 
consider  how  high  the  knowledge  thus  allowed,  involving 
at  one  and  the  same  time  space,  and  an  object  occupy- 
ing space,  and  so  much  of  space.  Surely  those  who  ac- 
knowledge this  much  may  be  prepared  to  confess  further 
that  the  mind  which  in  perception  is  capable  of  knowing 
an  object  as  occupying  space,  is  also  capable  of  knowing 
the  same  object  as  exercising  power  in  regard  to  us.  We 
have  only  to  examine  the  state  of  mind  involved  in  all 
our  cognitions  of  matter  to  discover  that  there  is  involved 
in  it  a  knowledge  both  of  extension  and  power. 

(a)  The  following  is  the  account  given  by  Miiller  (Physiology, 
trans,  by  Baly,  p.  1080):  "  First,  the  child  governs  the  movement 
of  its  limbs,  and  thus  perceives  that  they  are  instruments  subject  to 
the  use  and  government  of  its  internal  '  self,'  while  the  resistance 
■which  it  meets  with  around  is  not  subject  to  its  will,  and  therefore 
gives  it  the  idea  of  an  absolute  exterior.  Secondly,  the  child  will 
perceive  a  difference  in  the  sensations  produced  according  as  two 
parts  of  its  own  body  touch  each  other,  or  as  one  part  of  its  body 
only  meets  with  resistance  from  without.  In  the  first  instance, 
where  one  arm,  for  example,  touches  the  other,  the  resistance  is 
offered  by  a  part  of  the  child's  own  body,  and  the  limb  thus  giving 
the  resistance  becomes  the  subject  of  sensation  as  well  as  the  other. 
The  two  limbs  are  in  this  case  external  objects  of  perception,  and 
percipient  at  the  same  time.  In  the  second  instance,  the  resisting 
body  will  be  represented  to  the  mind  as  something  external  and 
foreign  to  the  living  body,  and  not  subject  to  the  internal  '  self.' 
Thus  will  arise  in  the  mind  of  the  child  the  idea  of  a  resistance 
which  one  part  of  its  own  body  can  offer  to  other  parts  of  its  body, 


OUR  INTUITION   OF   BODY  BY   THE   SENSES.  73 

and  at  the  same  time  the  idea  of  a  resistance  offered  to  its  body  by 
an  absolute  '  exterior.'  In  this  way  is  gained  the  idea  of  an  external 
world  as  the  cause  of  sensations." 

(b)  The  Cheselden  case  is  reported  in  Phil.  Trans.  1728.  I  have 
noticed  other  cases  in  my  Psychology,  The  Cognidve  Powers,  B.  i.  C. 
i.  11.  Berkeley,  Stewart,  and  Brown  hold  that  color  without  exten- 
sion is  the  proper  object  of  sight.  Hamilton  {Metaphysics,  Lect.  27) 
seems  to  me  to  demonstrate  that  a  perception  of  colors,  and  conse- 
quently of  the  difference  of  colors,  necessarily  involves  the  perception 
of  a  discriminating  line,  and  that  a  line  and  figure  are  modifications 
of  extension,  so  that  "  a  perteption  of  extension  is  necessarily  given 
in  the  perception  of  colors." 

(c)  If  the  eye  gives  lines  and  figures,  it  must  in  a  sense  give  the 
distance  (of  course  not  the  measured  distance)  of  one  point  or  edge 
of  a  figure  from  another.  This  is  a  necessary  modification  of  the 
Berkeleyan  theory  of  vision.  What  the  persons  whose  eyes  were 
couched  felt  as  touching  their  eyes  must  have  been  felt  as  a  surface 
like  their  skin.  Though  they  had  no  intuitive  means  of  determining 
the  distance  of  the  seen  surface  from  their  felt  and  localized  organ- 
ism, yet  it  should  be  observed,  they  have  extension  in  the  original 
ocular  perception,  and  a  preparation  for  measuring  the  distance  of 
the  seen  surface  with  the  aid  of  the  muscular  sense,  more  particularly 
as  the  hand  moves  over  the  seen  object  or  moves  from  one  seen 
object  to  another.  In  reference  to  a  cognate  question,  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  I  think,  that  persons  with  a  newly  imparted  power  of 
vision  would  by  binocular  vision  see  a  solid  as  different  from  a  sur- 
face, but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  would  know  it  to  be  a  solid. 

(d)  The  convictions  referred  to  in  these  paragraphs  set  aside  at 
once  the  doctrine  of  Kant,  that  the  mind,  in  the  intuition  of  sense, 
takes  cognizance  of  phenomena  in  the  sense  of  appearances.  They 
should  also  modify  the  doctrine  of  Hamilton.  "  Our  knowledge  of 
qualities  or  phenomena  is  necessarily  relative,  for  these  exist  only  as 
they  exist  in  relation  to  our  faculties  "  (foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  323). 
It  is  a  truism  that  we  can  know  objects  merely  as  our  faculties  enable 
us  to  know  them ;  but  the  question  is,  What  is  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  knowledge  which  our  faculties  furnish?  I  admit  that  what- 
ever external  objects  we  know,  we  know  in  a  relation  to  us.  But  I 
hold  that  man  and  his  faculties  are  so  constituted  as  to  know  things 
(with  being)  exercising  qualities,  and  to  know  qualities  as  existing 
separate  from  and  independent  of  our  cognition  of  them  by  our 
faculties. 

(e)  The  convictions  spoken  of  in  these  paragraphs  set  aside  all 


74      PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

forms  of  idealism  in  sense-perception.  Berkeley  says  that  "of  un- 
thinking things  without  us  their  esse  is  per  dpi,  nor  is  it  possible  they 
should  have  any  existence  out  of  the  minds  of  thinking  things  which 
perceive  them."  "  When  we  do  our  utmost  to  conceive  the  ex- 
istence of  external  bodies,  we  are  all  the  while  only  contemplating 
our  own  ideas  "  {Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  ii.  xxiv.).  I  hold, 
that  according  to  our  intuitive  conviction,  the  thing  which  we  per- 
ceive must  exist  before  we  can  perceive  it,  and  that  we  perceive  it 
as  an  extended  thing  independent  and  out  of  the  contemplative 
mind.  Fichte  represents  the  external  thing  as  a  creation  or  projec- 
tion of  the  perceiving  mind.  But  the  mind,  in  knowing  the  self  as 
perceiving,  knows  that  it  is  an  external  thing  that  is  perceived,  and 
cannot  be  made  to  think  otherwise.  Professor  Ferrier  bases  his 
fabric  of  demonstrated  idealism  on  the  proposition,  the  object  of 
knowledge  "  always  is,  and  must  be,  the  object  with  the  addition  of 
one's  self,  —  object  plus  subject,  —  thing,  or  thought,  mecum  "  (^Inst. 
of  Metaph.  Prop.  ii.).  If  this  proposition  professes  to  be  a  statement 
of  fact,  I  deny  that  the  fact  of  consciousness  is  properly  stated.  If 
it  professes  to  be  a  first  truth,  I  deny  that  it  ought  to  be  assumed  in 
this  particular  form.  No  doubt  we  always  know  self  at  the  same 
time  that  we  know  an  external  object  by  sense-perception,  but  we 
know  the  external  object  as  separate  from  and  independent  of  self. 
We  might  as  well  deny  that  we  know  the  object  at  all  as  deny  that 
we  know  it  to  have  an  existence  distinct  from  self. 

(/)  Hamilton  says,  "  An  extension  is  apprehended  in  the  appre- 
hension of  the  reciprocal  externality  of  all  sensations"  (Appendix  to 
Reid,  p.  885).  Again,  "  In  the  consciousness  of  sensations  relatively 
localized  and  reciprocally  external,  we  have  a  veritable  apprehension 
and  consequently  an  immediate  perception  of  the  affected  organism, 
as  extended,  divided,  figured,"  etc.  (^Ibid.  p.  884).  Em.  Saisset,  in 
the  article  Sens,  in  Diet,  des  Sciences  Philosophiques,  dwells  on  the 
localization  of  our  sensations  in  their  various  organic  seats. 

(g)  Locke  says  that  impenetrability,  or,  as  he  prefers  calling  it,  as 
having  less  of  a  negative  meaning,  solidity,  seems  the  "idea  most 
intimately  connected  with  and  essential  to  body,  so  as  nowhere  else 
to  be  found  or  imagined,  but  only  in  matter;"  and  he  adds,  we 
"  find  it  inseparably  inherent  in  body  wherever  or  however  modi- 
fied ; "  and  in  explaining  this,  he  says  of  bodies  that  "  they  do  by  an 
insurmountable  force  hinder  the  approach  of  the  parts  of  our  hands 
that  press  them"  (Essay,  ii.  iv.  1).  Herbert  Spencer  has  done 
great  service  to  philosophy  by  showing  that  force  is  implied  in  all 
knowledge  by  the  senses. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISTINCTIONS  TO  BE  ATTENDED  TO  IN  OUE   COGNITION 

OF  BODY. 

It  is  maintained  in  this  work  that  all  we  know  by 
the  senses  is  real.  But  we  must  be  careful  to  deter- 
mine what  we  do  thus  know.  In  order  to  defend  the 
doctrine  of  Realism  we  must  draw  several  important 
distinctions. 

I. 

The  difference  between  Extra  Mental  and  Extra 
Organic  perception.  All  objects  perceived  are  beyond 
the  mind,  but  all  are  not  beyond  the  body.  Probably 
our  first  perceptions,  mingled  with  sensations,  are  of  our 
bodily  frame ;  for  anything  we  know,  there  may  be  tac- 
tile perceptions  by  the  infant  in  the  womb.  It  is 
certain  that  in  our  mature  life  we  have  oi'ganic  affec- 
tions, such  as  those  of  the  alimentary  canal  and  stomach, 
which  exercise  no  action  without  the  body.  We  must 
take  care  not  to  give  the  organic  affections  an  extra 
organic  validity. 

n. 

The  distinction  between  Sensation  and  Perception. 
Perception  is  the  knowledge  of  the  object  presenting 
itself  to  the  senses,  whether  in  the  object  or  beyond  it. 
Sensation  is  the  feeling  associated,  the  feeling  of  the 
organism.  These  two  always  coexist.  There  is  never 
this  knowledge  without  an  organic  feeling ;  never  a 
feeling  of  the  organism  without  a  cognitive  apprehen- 


76       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

sion  of  it.^  These  sensations  differ  widely  from  each 
other,  as  our  consciousness  testifies ;  some  of  them  being 
pleasant,  some  painful ;  others  indifferent  as  to  pleasure 
and  pain,  but  still  with  a  feeling.  Some  we  call  excit- 
ing, others  dull ;  some  we  designate  as  warm,  others  as 
cold ;  and  for  most  of  them  we  have  no  name  what- 
ever, —  indeed  they  so  run  into  each  other  that  it  would 
be  difficult  to  discriminate  them  by  a  specific  nomencla- 
ture. The  perceptions,  again,  are  as  numerous  and  va- 
ried as  the  knowledge  we  have  by  all  the  senses.  Now 
these  two  always  mix  themselves  up  with  each  other. 
The  sensation  of  the  odor  mingles  with  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  nostrils ;  the  flavor  of  the  food  is  joined 
with  the  recognition  of  the  palate ;  the  agreeableness 
or  disagreeableness  of  the  sound  comes  in  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  ear  as  affected ;  and  the  feeling  organ 
which  we  localize  has  an  associated  sensation.  There 
is  an  organic  sensation  conjoined  even  with  the  knowl- 
edge we  have  of  the  extra-organic  object  affecting  our 
muscular  sense,  or  our  visual  organism.  This  sensation 
may  be  little  noticed  because  the  attention  is  fixed  on 
the  object ;  still,  it  is  always  there,  as  we  may  discover 
by  a  careful  introspection  of  the  combined  mental  af- 
fection. But  while  the  two  ever  coexist,  sometimes 
with  the  one  prevailing,  and  sometimes  with  the  other 
predominant,  and  sometimes  with  the  two  nicely  bal- 
anced, it  is  of  importance  to  distinguish  them.  Every 
man  of  sense  draws  the  distinction  between  the  music 
and  the  musical  instrument,  between  the  ear-ache  and 

*  Reid  represents  the  sensation  as  being  "  followed  by  a  perception 
of  the  object  ;"  on  which  Hamilton  remarks,  "  that  sensation  proper 
precedes  perception  proper  is  a  false  assumption  ;  they  are  simulta- 
neous elements  of  the  same  invisible  energy"  (Reid's  Collected  Writ- 
ings, p.  186.     Sec,  also,  p.  853). 


DISTINCTIONS   IN  OUR  COGNITION   OF  BODY.  77 

his  ear.  The  metaphysician  should  also  draw  the  dis- 
tinction,—  indeed,  it  is  essential  that  he  do  so.  The 
two  were  given  for  different  ends.  Our  perceptions  are 
the  main  means  of  supplying  us  with  knowledge, 
whereas  our  sensations  are  meant  to  increase  our  en- 
joyment, to  stimulate  to  exertion,  to  give  warning,  or 
perhaps  to  inflict  penalties.  We  must  beware,  both 
philosophically  and  practically,  of  confounding  our  sen- 
sations and  our  perceptions,  our  feelings  and  our  cog- 
nitions. 

TTI. 
The  distinction  between  Affections  in  our  Bodily 
Frame  and  the  Causes,  as  we  infer,  of  their  production. 
Thus  we  have  an  affection  of  heat  in  our  body,  and 
we  argue  an  external  cause,  which  we  also  call  heat. 
All  that  we  know  intuitively  is  the  bodily  affection.  In 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  cause,  this  can  be  discovered 
only  by  a  scientific  investigation.  This  is  the  case  with 
the  sense  of  smell,  of  taste,  of  touch,  and  temperature, 
—  and  I  think  also,  though  with  some  hesitation,  with 
the  sense  of  hearing.  The  intuitive  conviction  of  cause 
and  effect  does  indeed  intimate  that  there  must  be  a 
cause,  but  as  to  where  that  cause  is  to  be  found  we  must 
trust  to  experience,  which  tells  us  that  in  some  cases 
it  is  to  be  found  in  the  organism  itself,  and  in  other 
cases  in  an  agent  beyond,  —  such  as  odorous  particles, 
sapid  bodies,  heat,  undulations  from  a  sounding  body,  or 
a  solid  object  applied  to  our  nerves  of  touch.  In  all 
cases  the  affection  of  sense  and  the  conviction  of  cause 
combined  are  sufficient  to  prompt  us  to  look  round  for 
an  agent.  The  senses  act  as  monitors  —  and  most  im- 
portant monitors  they  are  —  of  powers  working  in  our 
bodily  frames,  and  in  the  physical  universe  around  us. 
I  believe  that  every  one  of  our  senses  gives  us  intimation 


78       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION  OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

of  powers,  —  such  as  floating  particles,  light,  and  heat, 
which  are  among  the  most  powerful  agencies  conducting 
the  processes  of  the  material  world.  Still,  these  are 
unknown  to  our  senses,  and  we  become  aware  of  their 
existence  merely  as  causes  of  known  effects.  As  to 
what  odors,  sounds,  flavors,  heat,  and,  we  may  add, 
light  and  colors  are,  our  intuitions  are  silent,  and  their 
nature  is  to  be  determined  by  observation,  indeed,  can 
be  determined  only  by  elaborate  scientific  research. 

This  is  the  proper  account  of  the  distinction  drawn 
between  the  Peemary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of 
matter,  a  real  distinction,  but  often  confusedly  appre- 
hended and  expressed.  The  Secondary  Qualities,  such 
as  heat  and  flavor,  are  not,  properly  speaking,  prop- 
erties of  body,  but  affections  of  our  vital  frame.  The 
causes  are  to  be  ascertained  by  physical  investigation. 
To  the  question  so  often  put,  Is  or  is  there  not  heat  in 
that  fire  ?  I  answer  that  the  heat  is  primarily  a  felt 
affection  of  my  body,  and  the  cause  of  it,  as  ascertained 
by  science,  is  a  vibration  in  the  ignited  body. 

The  sense  of  sight  presents  peculiar  difficulties  in  this  connection. 
It  seems  to  me  clearly  to  look  at  an  extended  surface,  not  part  of  our 
organism,  but  affecting  it.  But  what  are  we  to  make  of  color?  It 
is  the  greatest  difficulty  which  the  metaphysician  meets  with  in  the 
investigation  of  the  senses.  The  mind  knows  the  perceived  object 
to  be  in  its  nature  extended;  but  do  we  also  know  it  as  in  its  very 
nature  colored?  If  so,  is  there  color  in  the  object  as  there  is  exten- 
sion ?  The  following  is  the  solution  which  I  am  inclined  to  offer  of 
this  difficult  subject.  The  sense  of  color  may  be  regarded  as  inter- 
mediate between  those  senses  in  which  we  perceive  an  extra-organic 
object,  and  those  other  senses  which  reveal  merely  the  organism  as 
affected,  but  whether  by  agents  within  or  beyond  the  organism  we 
know  not.  In  the  sense  of  color,  we  primarily  know  only  the  organ- 
ism as  affected,  but  we  are  intuitively  led,  at  the  same  time,  to  look 
on  what  thus  affects  our  organism  as  not  in  the  organism,  but  as  in 
the  extended  surface  in  which  it  is  seen.     But  beyond  this,  that  is 


DISTINCTIONS   IN   OUR  COGNITION   OF   BODY.  79 

beyond  color  being  an  extra-organic  cause  of  an  organic  affection, 
we  know  nothing  of  its  nature  by  intuition.  If  this  account  be  cor- 
rect, we  see  tliat  our  sense  of  color  is  different,  on  the  one  hand, 
from  the  knowledge  of  our  sensations  of  heat,  or  smell,  or  taste,  for 
we  do  not  know  whether  the  causes  of  these  are  within  or  beyond 
the  frame,  while  we  do  know  that  color  is  out  of  ourselves  in  a  sur- 
face; and  different,  too,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the.  knowledge  of 
the  extended  surface  and  the  impenetrability  which  are  revealed 
directly  by  the  sight  and  muscular  sense,  whereas  we  do  not  know 
what  color  is.  Hence  arises,  if  I  do  not  mistake,  that  peculiar  con- 
viction regarding  color  which  has  so  puzzled  metaphysicians.  The 
sense  of  color  combines,  in  closest  union,  the  sensation  and  the  per- 
ception, the  organic  affection  and  the  extra-organic.  I  confess  I 
have  always  fondly  clung  to  the  idea  that,  sooner  or  later,  color  will 
be  found  by  physical  investigation  to  have  a  reality  —  I  do  not  say 
of  what  kind. 

IV. 

The  distinction  between  our  Original  and  Acquired 
Perceptions.  In  standing  up  for  the  trustworthiness  of 
our  perceptions,  I  always  mean  our  original  perceptions 
proceeding  from  the  original  principles  of  the  mind,  and 
having  the  sanction  of  him  who  gave  us  our  constitution. 
The  perceptions  acquired  by  induction  and  inference  will 
have  a  reality  only  when  the  processes  have  been  validly 
conducted. 

I  have  endeavored  in  the  last  chapter  to  give  an  ap- 
proximately correct  account  of  what  seem  to  be  our  orig- 
inal perceptions  through  the  various  senses.  But  to  our 
primitive  stock  we  add  others,  and  in  doing  so  we 
employ  rules  derived  from  the  generalizations  of  experi- 
ence, and  deductive  reasoning  in  applying  them  to  given 
cases.  In  taste  we  have  originally  only  a  sapid  affection 
of  the  palate,  but  by  experience  we  are  able  to  declare 
that  this  particular  sensation  is  produced  by  water  and 
that  other  by  wine.  Intuitively  we  cannot  say  what 
sort  of  extra-organic  object  any  smell  comes  from,  but 


80       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

by  observation  we  have  ascertained  that  this  odor  comes 
from  the  rose  and  that  from  the  lily,  and  we  guess  at 
the  distance  of  the  object  by  the  strength  of  the  im- 
pression, and  at  the  direction  by  finding  it  stronger  in 
one  nostril  than  in  another.  In  hearing  we  ascertain  the 
distance  by  the  loudness  of  the  sound,  and  the  direction 
by  finding  it  louder  in  one  of  the  ears  than  in  the  other, 
or,  as  some  suppose,  by  the  affections  of  the  semicircu- 
lar canals,  which  are  usually  three  in  number,  and  lie 
in  different  planes.  Since  the  days  of  Berkeley  it  has 
been  all  but  universally  acknowledged  that  the  percep- 
tion of  linear  distance  from  the  eye  is  not  an  original 
endowment  of  the  sense  of  sight. 

Now  in  our  original  perceptions,  when  our  organism  is 
sound  and  we  employ  it  properly  according  to  its  nature, 
there  can  be  no  errors,  but  there  may  be  many  human 
mistakes  in  our  acquired  perceptions. 

By  help  of  such  distinctions  we  may  defend  the  va- 
lidity of  our  native  convictions  through  the  senses.  We 
do  not  give  an  extra-organic  validity  to  our  organic  affec- 
tions. We  stand  up  for  a  reality  corresponding  to  our 
perceptions  proper,  bub  not,  therefore,  for  the  associated 
sensations.  In  regard  to  what  are  called  the  Secondary 
Qualities  of  matter,  we  maintain  that  we  perceive  the 
organic  affections,  but  the  extra-organic  causes  have  to 
be  determined  by  scientific  observation.  We  stand  up 
for  the  trustworthiness  of  our  original  but  not  necessa- 
rily of  our  acquired  perceptions.  The  senses  can  be  sup- 
posed to  deceive  us,  when  the  organism  and  mind  are  in 
a  sound  state,  only  when  we  overlook  one  or  other  or  all 
of  these  distinctions. 

The  Eleatics  looked  upon  the  senses  as  deceiving,  and  appealed  to 
the  reason  as  discovering  the  abiding  (tJ>  ov)  amid  the  fleeting.  The 
question  arose :  Since  the  senses  are  delusive,  what  reason  have  we 


DISTINCTIONS   IN  OUR  COGNITION  OF  BODY.  81 

for  thinking  that  the  reason  is  trustworthy?  Heracleitus  the  Dark 
thought  that  the  senses  give  only  the  transient,  and  that  man  can 
discover  nothing  more.  Plato  mediated  between  the  two  schools, 
and  thought  that  there  were  two  elements  in  sense-perception,  an 
external  and  an  internal:  Kai  8  S^i  fKaarov  dual  (pafiev  xp'^f-^t  "^^^  ^i 
trpoafiaWov  ovrt  rh  TrpoafiaWinevov  icrrai,  aWa.  fifra^v  Tt  fKaffTcfi  tSiov 
y(yov6s-  t}  ah  ^uaxvpiffaio  &p  d>s  olou  aol  (paiuerai  eKaffrov  xpuifia,  to'ioOtov 
KoX  Kvv\  Kai  OTUoOu  ^ucjj  (TheCEt.  28).  '  Eyevvricre  yap  Sr)  e/c  loioT  rou.  Kal 
Kvvl  Kal  OTcpo^v  (."cDoj  (^Tliecet.  28).  'Ey4vvr\(7e  yap  5^  «/c  twv  TrpoMfioKoyri- 
fifvcov  t6  t6  iroiouv  Ka\  rh  irdaxov  yXvKiTrjTa  re  Kal  aiaOr^aiv,  afxa  (pepofieva 
i./x(p6Tepa  (43).  This  theory  has  ever  since  been  maintained  by  a 
succession  of  thinkers,  including  the  school  of  Kant.  Unfortunately 
they  can  give  us  no  rule  to  enable  us  to  distinguish  between  what  we 
are  to  allot  to  subjective  and  what  to  the  objective  factors.  Possibly 
the  following  passage,  affirming  that  science  is  not  in  sensations  but 
in  our  reasoning  about  them,  may  have  suggested  the  theory  of 
Aristotle,  which  has  long  divided  the  philosophic  world  with  that  of 
Plato  :  'Ey  fj.\v  &pa  to7s  va6i\fjLa(T.v  ovk  epi  iiriffr'fiixri,  iv  Se  t^  irepl  eKtivcov 
avWoyia jxlii  (107). 

Aristotle,  with  his  usual  judgment  and  penetration,  started  the 
right  explanation  (see  De  Anima,  Lib.  iii.  Chap.  i.  iii.  vi.).  He  says 
that  perception  by  a  sense  of  things  peculiar  to  that  sense  is  true,  or 
involves  the  smallest  amount  of  error.  But  when  such  objects  are 
perceived  in  their  accidents  (that  is,  as  to  things  not  falling  pecu- 
liarly under  that  sense),  there  is  room  for  falsehood  ;  when,  for  in- 
stance, a  thing  is  said  to  be  white,  there  is  no  falsehood,  but  when 
the  object  is  said  to  be  this  or  that  (if  the  white  thing  is  said  to  be 
Cleon),  (cf.  III.  1,  7)  there  may  be  falsehood:  'H  a'ladr)(ns  twv  nev  iSlco;/ 
iXriO-lis  iffTiv,  1)  '6ti  6\iyi(TT0v exovfrarhxl/eCSos'  SevrepovSe  rod  (Tvii^i^7]Kevai 
ravTa'  Ka\  (vravOa  ■^Stj  4vS4x^'''ai  Sia^pfvSeadai  on  fiev  yap  \evichv,  ov 
i|/€v5€Toi,  61  5e  TOVTO  TO  Kevnhv  ^  &\\6  Tt,  ipei  Serai  (ill.  iii.  12).  'AAA' 
Sairep  tJ)  bpav  roO  ISiov  a\ri6es,  el  5'  ivOpaiiros  rh  \evKhv  ^  /u)/,  ovk  a\r)Oes  ateC 
(ill.  vi.  7).  Aristotle  saw  that  the  difficulties  might  be  cleared  up 
by  attending  to  what  each  sense  testifies,  and  separating  the  asso- 
ciated imaginations  and  opinions  or  judgments.  The  full  explana- 
tion, however,  could  not  be  given  till  Berkeley  led  men  to  distinguish 
between  the  original  and  acquired  perceptions  of  the  senses,  by 
showing  that  the  knowledge  of  distance  by  the  eye  is  an  acquisition. 

The  views  of  the  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Academics  may  be  gath- 
ered from  the  Academic  Questions  of  Cicero.  All  of  them  sought  to 
save  the  senses  by  a  distinction  of  some  kind.     The  Stoics  represent 


82      PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

the  senses  as  simply  satellites  and  messengers  (see  Cicero,  De  Legibus, 
quoted  Lipsius'  Mantid.  ad  Philos.  Stoic,  ii.  11),  and  place  above 
them  a  power  of  comprehension,  HaTd\rj\pis,  which  judges  the  infor- 
mation given  by  the  senses.  The  Epicureans  thought  the  senses 
never  deceive,  but  then  they  give  us  things  only  as  they  appear. 
The  Academics  maintained  that  the  intellect  and  not  sense  is  the  judge 
of  truth:  "Non  esse  judicium  veritatis  in  seusibus,  mentem  volebant 
rerura  esse  judicem."  They  held  "sensusomnes  hebetes  et  tardos 
esse  arbitrabantur,  nee  percipere  uUo  modo  eas  res,  quse  subjectae 
sensibus  viderentur;  quae  essent  aut  ita  parvae,  ut  sub  sensum  cadere 
non  possent;  aut  ita  mobiles  et  concitatae,  ut  nihil  unqnam  unum  esse 
constans"  (Acad.  Quces.  i.  8),  and  so  reality  becomes  a  matter  of 
opinion  or  probability. 

Augustine  follows  out  the  views  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  spe- 
cially those  of  Aristotle.  Thus  in  his  exposition  of  Categorice  Decern 
ex  Arislotele  Decerptce,  v.:  "Sunt  igitur  ilia  quae  aut  percipimus  sensi- 
bus, aut  mente  et  cogitatione  colligimus.  Sensibus  tenemus  qua?  aut 
videndo,  aut  contrectando,  aut  audiendo,  aut  gustando,  aut  odorando 
cognoscimus.  Mente,  ut  cum  quis  equum,  aut  hominem,  aut  quod- 
libet  animae  viderit,  quanquam  unum  corpus  esse  respondeat,  intelligi 
tamen  multis  partibus  esse  concretum."  He  illustrates  his  meaning 
elsewhere:  "Si  quis  remum  frangi  in  aqua  opinatur,  et  cum  inde 
aufertur  integrari;  non  malum  habet  internuntium,  sed  malus  est 
judex.  Nam  ille  pro  sua  natura  non  potuit  aliter  sentire,  nee  aliter 
debuit;  si  enim  aliud  est  aer,  aliud  aqua,  justum  est  ut  aliter  in  acre, 
aliter  in  aqua  sentiatur  "  (Life,  de  Ver.  Relig.  c.  33).  The  subject 
is  discussed  Contra  Academicos,  24-28.  Anselm  treats  the  subject 
in  much  the  same  way  as  Augustine  (^Dialog,  de  Verit.  vi.).  He  says 
the  error  is  to  be  ascribed,  not  to  the  senses,  but  to  the  judgment  of 
the  mind:  "  Falsitas  non  in  sensibus  sed  opinione."  It  is  the  mind 
that  imparts  the  false  appearances,  as  the  boy  fears  the  sculptured 
dragon.  ''  Unde  contingit  ut  sensus  interior  culpam  suam  imputet 
sensui  exteriori." 

In  modern  times,  metaphysicians  have  vacillated  between  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  theories;  some,  as  Kant  and  Hamilton, 
making  every  perception  partly  subjective,  and  others  ascribing  the 
supposed  deception  to  wrong  deductions  from  the  matter  supplied  by 
the  senses.  The  Sensational  School  of  France  and  T.  Brown  make 
all  external  perception  an  inference  from  sensations  in  the  mind, 
and  refer  the  mistakes  to  wrong  reasoning. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

APPAEENT  DECEPTION   OF   THE  SENSES. 

Almost  all  forms  of  idealism  (the  system  which  sup- 
poses certain  of  our  supposed  cognitions  to  be  creations 
of  the  mind),  and  all  forms  of  scepticism  (the  system 
which  would  set  aside  all  our  cognitions),  plead  the  de- 
ceitfulness  of  the  senses.  Our  senses  are  not  to  be 
trusted  in  some  things,  says  the  idealist,  and  we  are  to 
determine  by  reason  when  they  are  to  be  ti'usted.  Our 
senses  delude  us  in  some  things,  says  the  sceptic,  and  we 
mav  therefore  distrust  them  in  all.  It  is  of  vast  moment 
to  stop  these  errors  at  the  point  at  which  they  flow  out, 
by  showing  that  the  senses,  meaning  our  original  per- 
ceptions through  the  senses,  can  all  be  trusted  in  regard 
to  the  special  testimony  which  they  furnish. 

But  how,  it  is  asked,  does  the  stick  in  the  water,  felt 
to  be  straight  by  the  sense  of  touch,  seem  crooked  to  the 
sense  of  sight  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  knowledge  of 
the  shape  of  an  object  does  not  primarily  fall  under  the 
sense  of  sight,  and  that  when  we  determine  whether  a 
stick  is  or  is  not  straight,  by  the  sense  of  sight,  it  is  by 
a  process  of  inference  in  which  we  have  laid  down  the 
rule  that  objects  that  give  a  certain  figure  before  the  eye 
are  crooked,  —  a  rule  correct  enough  for  common  cases, 
but  not  applicable  to  those  in  which  the  rays  of  light 
are  refracted  in  passing  from  one  medium  to  another. 
Why  does  a  boy  seem  a  man,  and  a  man  a  giant,  in  a 
mist,  whereas,  if  you  clear  away  the  mist,  Tooth  are  in- 
stantly reduced  to  their  proper  dimensions?     A  reply 


84       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

can  easily  be  given.  We  have  laid  down  the  rule  that 
an  object  seen  so  dimly  must  be  distant ;  but  an  object 
appearing  of  such  dimensions  at  a  distance  must  be  large: 
and  the  phenomenon  is  felt  to  be  a  deception  only  by 
those  who  are  not  accustomed  to  move  in  the  mist. 
Why  does  a  mountain,  viewed  across  an  arm  of  the  sea, 
seem  near,  while  the  same  mountain,  seen  at  an  equal 
distance  beyond  an  undulated  country  studded  with 
houses  and  trees,  appears  very  remote  ?  The  answer  is, 
not  that  the  eye  has  deceived  us,  but  that  we  have  made 
a  mistaken  application  of  a  rule  usually  correct,  that  an 
object  must  be  near  when  few  objects  intervene  between 
us  and  it ;  and  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  those  who  are 
accustomed  to  look  across  sheets  of  water  commit  no 
such  mistakes,  for  they  have  acquired  other  means  of 
measuring  distance.  Again,  we  have  found  it  true,  in 
cases  so  many  tiiat  we  cannot  number  them,  that  when 
we  are  at  rest  and  the  image  of  an  object,  say  a  carriage, 
passes  across  the  vision,  the  object  must  be  in  motion. 
That  rule  is  accurate  in  all  cases  similar  to  those  from 
which  it  was  derived  ;  but  it  fails  the  landsman  when, 
feeling  as  if  he  were  at  rest  in  the  ship,  he  infers  that 
the  shore  is  moving  away  from  the  vessel.  In  all  such 
cases  we  see  that  it  is  not  the  senses,  that  is,  the  natural 
and  original  perceptions  of  the  senses  having  the  author- 
ity of  God,  which  deceive  us,  but  rules  formed  or  applied 
illegitimately  by  ourselves. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  ESSENTIAL   QUALITIES   OF   MATTEB. 

Locke  speaks  of  the  Primary  Qualities  as  being  in 
matter  in  whatever  state  it  may  be.  Reid  speaks  of 
them  as  being  directly  perceived  by  us.  These  two 
marks  coincide,  presenting  the  same  truth  under  two  dif- 
ferent aspects,  the  one  objective  the  other  subjective. 
They  are  the  essential  qualities  of  matter  known  in  all 
its  states,  and  known  at  once  and  intuitively.  They  are 
two  in  number. 

I.  There  are  the  Qualities  of  Matter  by  which  it  oc- 
cupies Space  and  is  contained  in  Space,  that  is,  Exten- 
sion. We  have  this  knowledge,  I  believe,  through  each 
of  our  senses ;  for  in  each  we  know  the  corresponding 
organs  as  extended  and  out  of  each  other,  and  through 
two  of  the  senses  we  know  objects  beyond  our  bodily 
frame  as  extended.  Hamilton  represents  extension  as  a 
necessary  constituent  of  our  notion  of  Matter,  and  evolves 
it  from  "  two  catholic  conditions  of  matter :  (1)  the  oc- 
cupying space,  and  (2)  the  being  contained  in  space. 
Of  these,  the  former  affords  (a)  Trinal  Extension,  expli- 
cated again  into  (l.)  Divisibility,  (ll.)  Size,  containing 
under  it  Density  or  Rarity,  (m.)  Figure ;  and  (b)  Ulti- 
mate  Incompressibility ;  while  the  latter  gives  (A)  Mo- 
bility, and  (b)  Situation.  Neglecting  subordination,  we 
have  thus  eight  proximate  attributes :  1.  Extension  ;  2. 
Divisibility ;  3.  Size  ;  4.  Density  or  Rarity ;  5.  Figure ; 
6.  Incompressibility  absolute;  7.  Mobility;  8.  Situa- 
tion."! 

1  Hamilton's  Reid,  Note  D,  p.  848. 


86       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION  OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

II.  The  Qualities  which  one  body  exercises  in  refer- 
ence to  another ;  in  other  words,  the  Properties  or  Forces 
of  matter.  I  have  expended  much  labor  in  vain  if  I 
have  not  shown,  in  previous  sections,  that  here  we  have 
a  necessary  conviction.  In  the  visual  and  locomotive 
senses,  we  know  an  extra-organic  object  as  affecting  us 
and  our  organism.  All  this  seems  to  be  involved  in  our 
perception,  and  to  be  a  native  conviction  of  the  mind,  to 
which  it  is  ever  prompted,  and  from  which  it  can  never 
be  delivered.  Not  only  so,  we  are  ever  led  to  look  for 
a  producing  cause,  even  of  our  purely  organic  affections 
in  the  ear  and  palate  and  nostrils.  A  knowledge  of 
power,  and  a  conviction  of  power  being  in  exercise,  are 
thus  involved  in  our  very  perceptions  through  the  senses. 

Adhering  to  these  views,  we  must  set  aside  at  once 
two  opposite  doctrines  which  have  had  the  support  each 
of  a  number  of  eminent  metaphysicians  or  metaphysical 
speculators.  The  one  is  that  matter  is  known  as  pos- 
sessing no  other  quality  than  extension.  This  error 
originated  with  Descartes,  and  has  prevailed  extensively 
among  those  metaphysicians  who  have  felt  his  influence. 
But  the  view  is  opposed  to  that  intuition  which  repre- 
sents all  matter  as  having  and  exercising  energy.  On 
the  other  side,  there  are  speculators  who  maintain  that 
all  the  phenomena  of  matter  can  be  explained  by  sup- 
posing it  to  possess  potency.  This  mistake  sprang  from 
Leibnitz,  who  supposed  that  the  universe  of  matter  (and 
of  mind)  was  composed  of  monads  having  power,  and  to 
which  the  mind  imparted  the  relation  of  space.  But 
the  dynamical  theory  of  body,  so  far  as  it  denies  the 
existence  of  space,  and  body  as  occupying  space,  is 
utterly  inconsistent  with  that  fundamental  conviction, 
of  which  the  mind  can  never  be  shorn,  which  declares 
that  the  matter  which  has  force  must  be  extended,  and 


THE    ESSENTIAL  QUALITIES   OF  MATTER.  87 

the  force  exercised  is  a  force  in  a  body  in  one  part  of 
space  over  another  body  in  a  different  part  of  space. 

"  L'espace  ou  le  lieu  int^rieur  et  le  corps  qui  est  compris  en  cet 
espace,  ne  sont  diffdrents  aussi  que  par  notre  pensde.  Car,  en  effet 
la  meme  dtendue  en  longueur,  largeur  et  profondeur  qui  constitue 
l'espace  constitue  le  corps"  (Des,  Med.  p.  ii.  10).  Leibnitz  held 
that  bodies  are  endowed  with  some  sort  of  active  force.  "  Les  corps 
sont  douds  de  quelque  force  active."  This  force  may  be  called  life  : 
"  C'est  une  realitd  imniatdrielle,  indivisible  et  indestructible:  11  en 
met  partout  dans  le  corps  croyant  qu'il  n'y  a  point  de  partie  de  la 
masse  oil  il  n'y  ait  un  corps  organise,  doud  de  quelque  perception  ou 
d'une  maniere  d'kme  "  {Op.  p.  694:  ed.  Erdmann).  That  he  looked 
upon  space  as  a  relation  will  come  out  below. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OFE  INTXHTIVE  KNOWLEDGE  OP  SELF  OR   SPIRIT. 

I. 

It  is  probable,  though  it  never  can  be  positively 
proven,  that  the  first  knowledge  acquired  by  the  mind 
is  of  our  own  bodily  frame,  through  the  sensitive  organ- 
ism,—  a  view  which  does  not  imply  that,  apart  alto- 
gether from  such  perceptions,  the  spirit  would  not  have 
operated.  But  whatever  may  be  the  theory  formed  on 
this  speculative  subject,  it  is  certain  that  whenever  or 
however  the  mind  is  aroused  into  an  act  of  intelligence, 
there  is  always  involved  in  the  exercise  a  knowledge  of 
self.  Coexisting  with  every  intelligent  act  of  mind  there 
is  always  a  self-consciousness.  But  let  it  be  carefully 
observed  that  this  knowledge  is  not  of  an  abstract  being 
or  substance,  or  of  an  ego^  or  of  an  essence,  but  of  the 
concrete  self  in  the  particular  state  in  which  it  may  be, 
with  the  particular  thoughts,  sensations,  or  purposes 
which  it  may  be  entertaining  at  the  time. 

The  language  of  Tennyson  is  often  quoted :  — 

"  The  baby  new  to  earth  and  sky- 
Has  never  thought  that  this  is  I." 

There  is  a  truth  here,  or  rather  a  half  truth,  which  leads 
to  a  mutilated  account  of  the  whole  truth.  Not  till  after 
the  years  of  infancy  are  past  does  any  one  entertain  an 
idea  of  self  or  mind  apart  from  the  operations  of  mind. 
No  one  is  likely  to  pronounce  the  judgment  till  a  doubt 
arises  or  a  denial  is  made.     But  meanwhile  there  is  a 


OUR  INTUITIVE   KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR   SPIRIT.         89 

knowledge  of  self  in  tlie  midst  of  all  the  exercises  of  the 
mind.  All  our  sensations  and  feelings,  our  judgments 
and  reasonings,  are  known  by  us  as  our  own.  My  pains 
are  of  myself  and  not  of  any  one  else.  My  pleasures  are 
pleasures  of  my  own  and  not  of  another.  Let  us  observe 
and  seek  to  evolve  what  is  involved  in  the  cognition  of 
self. 

n. 

We  know  Self  as  having  Being,  Existence.  The 
knowledge  we  have  in  self-consciousness,  which  is  asso- 
ciated with  every  intelligent  act,  is  not  an  impression,  as 
Hume  would  say,  nor  a  quality,  as  certain  of  the  Scottish 
metaphysicians  maintain,  nor  of  a  phenomenon  in  the 
sense  of  appearance,  as  Kant  states  it,  but  of  a  thing  or 
reality.  In  affirming  this  we  are  simply  bringing  out  and 
expressing  what  is  embraced  in  our  primitive  cognition. 
No  account  which  falls  short  of  this  can  be  regarded  as 
a  full  exhibition  of  the  facts  falling  under  our  eye  when 
we  look  within.  If  any  man  maintain  that  all  we  can 
discover  is  a  mere  idea,  impression,  phenomenon,  or 
quality  of  an  unknown  thing,  I  ask  him  for  his  evidence, 
and  he  must,  in  replying,  call  in  the  internal  sense,  and 
I  can  then  show  him  that  this  sense,  or  cognitive  power 
(for  it  is  not  a  sense  except  in  an  abusive  application  of 
the  term),  declares  that  we  know  a  something,  or  a  thing 
with  a  positive  existence. 

This  is  a  knowledge  which  cannot  be  explained,  nor 
defined  in  the  sense  of  being  resolved  into,  anything 
simpler,  or  founded  on  anything  deeper.  It  is  a  simple 
element  implied  in  every  intelligent  act,  and  not  derived 
from  any  other  act  or  exercise.  It  is  a  basis  on  which 
other  knowledge  may  be  reared,  and  not  a  superstructure 
standing  on  another  foundation. 

As  it  is  a  primitive,  so  it  is  a  necessary,  conviction. 


90       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

We  cannot,  by  any  other  supposed  knowledge,  under- 
mine or  set  aside  this  fundamental  knowledge.  We 
cannot  be  made  by  any  process  of  speculation  or  ratio- 
cination to  believe  that  we  have  not  being.  The  process 
of  reasoning  which  would  set  aside  this  cognition  can 
plead  no  principle  stronger  than  the  conviction  which  we 
have  in  favor  of  the  reality  of  self. 

In  saying  that  we  know  self  as  possessed  of  being,  we 
do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  we  know  all  about  self,  or 
about  our  spiritual  nature.  There  are  mysteries  about 
self,  as  about  everything  else  we  know,  sufficient  to  awe 
every  truly  wise  man  into  humility.  All  that  is  meant 
is,  that,  whatever  may  be  unknown,  we  always  know 
being  whenever  we  know  any  of  the  objects  presented 
to  us  from  within  or  from  without. 

in. 

We  know  Ourselves  as  Persons.  Our  perception  of 
personality  is  closel}'-  connected  with  our  knowledge  of 
being,  but  there  is  more  in  personality  than  in  being. 
We  know  material  objects  as  having  existence,  but  we 
have  a  special  apprehension  in  regard  to  self  beyond 
what  we  have  in  regard  to  material  objects.  Like  every 
other  simple  perception,  it  cannot  be  defined,  but  it  may 
be  brought  out  to  separate  view  by  abstraction ;  and  con- 
sciousness (with  memory)  will  recognize  it  as  one  of  the 
cognitions  which  it  had  seen  before  in  company  with 
others.  We  express  this  conviction  when  we  say  we  are 
persons.  The  abstract  idea  is  one  not  likely  to  be  spon- 
taneously formed.  The  infant,  the  child,  the  savage,  are 
not  in  the  habit  of  making  any  such  analysis  of  conscious- 
ness, nor  are  the  great  body  of  mankind  at  the  trouble  of 
asseiting  their  own  existence.  Such  a  proposition,  with 
its  8ubj.ect  and  predicate,  will  be  formed  only  after  phi- 


OUR  INTUITIVE   KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR   SPIRIT.         91 

losophy  has  taken  a  shape,  —  probably  only  after  sophis- 
try and  scepticism  have  been  attacking  our  original  con- 
victions. It  is  only  the  metaphysician  who  will  ever  take 
the  trouble  of  affirming  that  he  exists,  and  the  wise  me- 
taphysician will  refrain  from  going  further,  and  trying  to 
prove  that  he  exists. 

Yet  it  is  a  conviction  which  the  mind  ever  carries 
with  it;  it  is  one  of  the  high  characteristics  of  humanity. 
Inanimate  matter  is  without  it.  The  brute  shows  that 
he  is  tending  towards  it,  yet  can  have  it  only  in  an 
incipient  degree.  It  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  the 
man's  individuality,  and  is  one  of  the  main  elements  in 
his  sense  of  independence,  in  his  sense  of  freedom,  in  his 
sense  of  responsibility.  As  possessing  it,  man  feels  that 
he  is  independent  of  physical  nature ;  independent  of  all 
creature  intelligences ;  independent,  in  a  sense,  of  God, 
against  whom,  alas!  he  may  rebel,  and  to  whom  he  must 
for  certain  give  an  account.  It  is  a  conviction  to  be 
used  and  not  abused.  It  would  certainly  be  perverted 
were  it  to  seduce  man  to  isolate  himself  from  the  objects 
around  him,  to  try  to  become  independent  of  the  provi- 
sions made  in  physical  nature  to  aid  his  weakness,  or  to 
separate  himself  from  his  brothers  or  sisters  of  human- 
ity ;  and  still  more,  were  it  to  tempt  him  to  rebel  against 
God.  It  is  properly  used  when,  under  the  guidance  of 
moral  law,  it  is  leading  him,  not  to  be  ever  floating  on 
with  the  stream,  but  at  times  to  be  standing  up  in  the 
midst  of  it  and  acting  as  a  breakwater  in  its  current,  or 
as  a  martyr  seeking  to  stem  the  tide  of  corruption,  or, 
Prometheus -like,  rising  up,  not  against  the  true  God, 
but  against  the  false  gods  who  rule  in  Olympus.  Powers 
hostile  to  the  progress  of  humanity  have  sought  to  sub- 
due this  principle.  Absolutism  would  crush  it,  and 
make  man  live  for  some  slavish  end,  political  or  ecclesi- 


92       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

astical.  Pantheism  would  dissipate  it  till  man  loses  all 
individuality,  and  becomes  relaxed,  as  he  moves  listlessly, 
in  a  hot  and  hazy  atmosphere.  It  is  this  conviction 
which  makes  man  feel  that  he  is  not  a  mere  bubble  on 
the  surface  of  being,  blown  up  in  one  chance  agitation, 
and  about  to  be  absorbed  in  another.  It  keeps  man 
from  being  lost,  —  lost  in  physical  nature,  lost  in  the 
crowd  of  human  beings,  or  lost  in  the  ocean  of  being : 
he  is,  after  all  and  amid  all,  a  person.  As  such  he  has 
a  part  to  act,  an  end  to  serve,  a  work  to  do,  a  destiny  to 
work  out,  and  an  account  to  render. 

The  cognitions  which  have  been  unfolded  in  this 
chapter  form,  when  memory  begins  to  be  exercised,  the 
ground  of  our  recognition  of  our  personal  identity,  and 
lead  us  to  believe  in  a  self  which  abideth  amid  all 
changes  of  thought,  and  mood,  and  feeling.  This  sub. 
ject  will  be  resumed  by  us  under  the  head  of  Primitive 
Judgments  (a). 

IV. 

We  know  Self  as  not  depending  for  its  existence  on 
our  Observation  of  it.  Of  course  we  can  know  self  only 
when  we  know  self;  our  knowledge  of  self  exists  not 
till  we  have  the  knowledge,  and  it  exists  only  so  long  as 
we  have  the  knowledge.  But  when  we  come  to  know 
self,  we  know  it  as  already  existing,  and  we  do  not  look 
on  its  continued  existence  as  depending  on  our  recogni- 
tion of  it. 

V. 

We  know  Self  as  being  in  itself  an  Abiding  Exist- 
ence. Not  tliat  we  are  to  stretch  this  conviction  so  far 
as  to  believe  in  the  self-existence  of  mind,  or  in  its 
eternal  existence.  We  believe  certainly  in  the  perma- 
nence of  mind  independent  of  our  cognition  of  it,  and 
amidst  all  the  shiftings  and  variations  of  its  states.     Yet 


OUR  INTUITIVE   KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR   SPIRIT.         93 

this  does  not  imply  that  there  never  was  a  time  when 
self  was  non-existing.  For  aught  this  conviction  says, 
there  may  have  been  a  time  when  self  came  into  exist- 
ence :  another  conviction  assures  that  when  it  did,  it 
must  have  had  a  cause.  It  must  be  added,  that  this 
conviction  does  not  go  the  length  of  assuring  us  that 
mind  must  exist  forever,  or  that  it  must  exist  after  the 
dissolution  of  the  body.  Intuition  does  indeed  seem  to 
say  that,  if  it  shall  cease  to  exist,  it  must  be  in  virtue 
of  some  cause  adequate  to  destroy  it;  and  it  helps  to 
produce  and  strengthen  the  feeling  which  the  dying  man 
cherishes  when  he  looks  on  the  soul  as  likely  to  abide 
when  the  body  is  dead.  But  as  to  whether  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  bodily  frame  is  a  suflBcient  cause  of  the  de- 
cease of  the  soul,  —  as  to  whether  it  may  abide  when 
the  bodily  frame  is  disorganized,  —  this  is  a  question  to 
be  settled  not  altogether  by  intuition,  but  by  a  number 
of  other  considerations,  and  more  pai'ticularly  by  the 
conviction  that  God  will  call  us  into  judgment  at  last, 
and  is  most  definitely  settled,  after  all,  by  the  inspired 
declarations  of  the  Word  of  God.  But  it  is  pleasant  to 
observe  that  there  is  an  original  conviction  altogether  in 
unison  with  this  derivative  belief,  a  conviction  leading  us 
to  look  on  self  as  permanent,  unless  there  be  a  cause 
working  adequate  to  its  dissolution. 

According  to  the  views  presented  under  these  heads, 
the  existence  of  self  is  a  position  to  be  assumed,  and  not 
to  be  proven.  It  does  not  need  proof,  and  no  proof 
should  be  offered;  no  mediate  proof  could  be  clearer 
than  the  truth  which  it  is  brought  to  support. 

VI. 
We  know  Self  as  exercising  Potency.     We  have  seen 
that  we  know  it  as  having  being ;  but  we  know  it  further 


94       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE    TRUTHS. 

as  having  active  being.  We  knovr  it  as  acting,  we  know 
it  as  being  acted  on,  we  know  it  as  the  source  of  action. 
Even  in  sense-perception  we  know  it  as  being  acted  on 
from  without ;  nay,  we  know  it  as  itself  acting  in  pro- 
ducing the  result.  So  far  as  we  know  objects  acting 
on  it,  we  know  it  as  capable  of  being  influenced;  in 
other  words,  as  having  a  capacity  of  a  particular  descrip- 
tion. So  far  as  we  know  it  acting  in  producing  changes 
in  itself  or  other  things,  we  know  it  as  a  potency,  as 
having  power.  When  we  recollect,  when  we  fix  the 
thoughts  on  a  particular  object,  when  we  fondly  dwell 
on  a  particular  scene,  we  are  exercising  power,  and  by 
consciousness  we  know  that  we  are  doing  so.  When  in 
consequence  of  coming  to  know  of  events  bearing  upon 
us  personally,  —  say  of  some  blessing  about  to  descend, 
or  calamity  about  to  befall,  —  we  i-ejoice  or  grieve,  an 
effect  is  experienced.  This  conscious  potency  is  espe- 
cially felt  in  all  exercises  of  the  will,  whether  it  be  di- 
rected to  the  mental  action  which  we  wish  to  stay  or 
quicken,  or  the  bodily  organism  which  we  propose  to 
move.  I  demur,  indeed,  to  the  view  maintained  by 
some  philosophers  of  eminence,  that  our  idea  of  power 
is  obtained  exclusively  from  the  consciousness  of  the 
power  of  will  over  the  muscles.  But  I  am  persuaded 
that  our  most  vivid  conviction  of  power  is  derived  from 
the  influence  of  the  will  both  on  bodilv  and  mental 
action,  and  that  the  influence  of  the  will  on  the  organ- 
ism is  what  enables  us  to  connect  mental  with  bodily 
action   (/>). 

But  here  it  will  be  necessary  to  offer  an  explanation 
to  save  ourselves  from  obvious  difficulties,  which  many 
have  not  seen  their  way  to  overcome.  We  shall  find, 
under  another  head,  that  while  we  believe  intuitively 
that  every  effect  has  a  cause,  we  do  not  know  by  intui- 


OUR   INTUITIVE   KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR   SPIRIT.  95 

tion  what  the  cause  is  apart  from  experience ;  and  that 
while  we  are  convinced  that  the  cause  produces  the 
effect,  it  is  only  by  experience  we  know  what  the  effect 
is.  It  follows  that  we  do  not  know  intuitively  what  or 
how  many  powers  must  concur  to  produce  a  given  effect. 
This  qualification  will  be  found  to  have  a  great  signifi- 
cance imparted  to  it  by  the  circumstance  to  be  after- 
wards noticed,  that  in  order  to  most  creature  effects 
there  is  need  of  a  concurrence  of  causes,  or  of  a  concause. 
When  I  will  to  move  my  arm,  I  know  that  the  will  is 
one  of  the  elements  in  producing  the  effect,  but  I  do  not 
know,  till  physiology  tells  me,  how  many  others  must 
cooperate.  It  follows  that  one  of  the  elements  of  a 
complex  cause  may  act  and  no  effect  follow,  because  one 
part  of  the  concause  is  absent.  I  may  will  to  take  a 
cheerful  view  of  everything,  and  yet  not  be  able, 
owing  to  the  rise  of  gloomy  thoughts.  I  may  will  to 
move  my  arm,  and  yet  the  arm  may  not  move,  because 
paralysis  has  cut  off  the  concurrence  of  the  organism. 
This  subject  will  again  come  before  us  under  various 
aspects. 

VII. 

We  know  the  Knowing  Mind  to  be  different  from  the 
Material  Object  known,  whether  this  be  the  organism  as 
affected  or  the  object  affecting  it.  Not  that  we  know 
by  intuition  wherein  the  difference  lies  ;  not  that  we  are 
in  a  position  to  say  whether  they  may  not,  after  all, 
have  points  of  resemblance,  and  a  mutual  dependence, 
and  a  reciprocal  influence ;  on  these  points  our  only 
guide  must  be  a  gathered  experience.  But  in  every  act 
in  which  we  know  a  bodily  object,  we  know  it  to  be 
different  from  self,  and  self  to  be  different  from  it.  This 
is  a  conviction  which  we  can  never  lose,  and  of  which  no 
sophistry  can   deprive  us.     We  carry  it  with  us  at  all 


96       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

times,  and  wherever  we  go.  It  makes  it  impossible  for 
any  man  to  confound  himself  with  the  universe,  or  the 
universe  with  him.  Man  may  mistake  one  external  ob- 
ject for  another,  but  it  is  not  possible  that  he  should 
mistake  an  external  object  for  himself,  or  identify  him- 
self with  any  other  object.  This  conviction  is  thus  a 
means,  as  shall  be  shown  later  in  the  treatise,  of  deliver- 
ing us  from  the  more  common  forms  of  idealism,  and 
from  every  form  of  pantheism. 

vin. 

We  know  Self  in  every  One  of  its  States,  as  these 
pass  before  self-consciousness.  And  herein  lies  an  im- 
portant difference  between  the  knowledge  we  have  of 
mind,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  knowledge  we  have 
acquired  of  the  material  universe.  The  knowledge  which 
we  have  of  matter  by  intuition  is  extremely  limited. 
What  we  thus  know,  indeed,  is  supremely  valuable,  as 
the  ground  on  which  we  erect  all  our  other  information  ; 
still  it  is  in  itself  very  narrow,  being  confined  to  an 
acquaintance  with  our  organism  as  extended  and  as 
exercising  an  influence  on  the  mind,  and  to  objects 
immediately  in  contact  with  it.  The  greater  part  even 
of  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  our  organism,  and  of 
objects  in  contact  with  it,  is  derivative ;  and  there  is  a 
process  of  inference  in  all  that  we  know  of  objects  at  a 
distance,  —  of  sun,  moon,  stars,  of  hills,  rivers,  valleys, 
and  of  the  persons,  and  countenances,  and  conversations 
of  our  friends.  But  in  regard  to  our  own  minds,  we 
know  all  the  individual  facts  directly  and  intuitively. 
We  gaze  at  once  on  the  mind  thinking,  imagining,  feel- 
ing, resolving.  In  this  view  it  may  be  safely  said  that 
we  know  more  of  certain  of  the  states  and  of  the  action 
of  the  mind  than  we  know  of  the  whole  material  uni- 


OUR  INTUITIVE   KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR   SPIRIT.  97 

verse,  even  in  this  age  of  advanced  science.  It  should 
be  added,  in  order  to  save  ttie  remark  from  appearing  to 
some  incredibly  extravagant,  that  while  we  thus  know 
spontaneously  so  much  about  the  workings  of  the  mind, 
the  majority  of  men  think  far  more  about  their  objec- 
tive than  their  subjective  knowledge. 

(a)  "  This  self- personality,  like  all  other  simple  and  immediate 
presentations,  is  indefinable;  but  it  is  so  because  it  is  superior  to 
definition.  It  can  be  analyzed  into  no  simpler  elements,  for  it  is 
itself  the  simplest  of  all ;  it  can  be  made  no  clearer  by  description 
or  comparison,  for  it  is  revealed  to  us  in  all  the  clearness  of  an 
original  intuition,  of  which  description  and  comparison  can  furnish 
only  faint  and  partial  resemblances  ' '  (Mansel,  Prolegoviena  Logica, 
p.  129;  see,  also,  Metaphysics).  It  was  the  greatest  of  all  the  over- 
sights of  Kant  that  he  did  not  give  personality  a  place  among  the 
intuitions  of  the  mind,  to  which  it  is  entitled  quite  as  much  as  space 
and  time.  Held  in  by  no  primary  belief  in  personality,  those  who 
came  after,  such  as  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  wandered  out  into 
a  wide  waste  of  Pantheism.  Taking  with  them  no  belief  in  the  per- 
sonality of  self,  they  never  could  reach  personality  in  God. 

It  has  been  keenly  disputed  how  we  are  to  understand  the  "  Co- 
gito,  ergo  sum"  of  Descartes.  Are  we  to  regard  it  as  a  process 
of  reasoning  ?  If  it  be  so,  it  is  either  a  petitio  principii,  or  its 
conclusiveness  may  be  doubted.  If  the  cogiio  be  understood  as 
embracing  ego,  that  is,  be  understood  as  6*70  cogito,  then  the  ego  is 
evidently  involved  in  it,  is  in  fact  assumed.  If  it  means  anything 
short  of  this,  then  it  might  be  difficult  to  establish  the  accuracy  of 
the  inference ;  thus,  if  the  cogito  does  not  embrace  the  ego,  it  is 
not  clear  that  the  conclusion  follows.  Or  are  we  to  regard  the 
statement  as  a  sort  of  primitive  judgment,  not  implying  mediate 
reasoning  or  a  middle  term  ?  Taken  in  this  sense,  I  would  reckon 
that  the  connection  between  thought  and  existence  is  involved  in 
our  knowledge  of  self  as  existing,  rather  than  that  the  knowledge 
of  self  issues  from  the  perception  of  the  connection  between  thought 
and  personal  existence.  Or  are  we  to  look  on  the  expression  as 
simply  a  mode  of  stating  an  assumption  ?  In  this  case,  the  word 
ergo,  the  usual  symbol  of  inference,  comes  in  awkwardly  ;  and  be- 
sides, the  truth  to  be  assumed  is  not  the  complex  judgment,  cogito, 
ergo  sum,  but   the  fact  revealed  at   once   to   consciousness  of   ego 


98       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION  OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

cogUans.  This  primitive  cognition  may  be  the  ground  of  a  number 
of  judgments,  but  it  is  to  reverse  the  order  of  things  entirely  to 
make  any  one  of  these  judgments  the  ground  of  the  cognitions. 

Kant  has  a  powerful  criticism  of  the  "  Cogito,  ergo  sum,"  con- 
sidered as  an  argument,  in  his  Paralogismen  in  the  Kritik.  See  the 
subject  discussed  by  M.  Cousin,  Prem  :  Ser :  tome  1. 

In  answering  the  objections  of  Gassendi,  Descartes  says  :  "  Cum 
advertimus  nos  esse  res  cogitantes,  prima  quaedam  notio  est  quss  et 
nuUo  syllogismo  concluditur  ;  neque  etiam  quis  dicit  '  Ego  cogito, 
ergo  sum,  sive  existo,'  existentiam  ex  cogitatione  per  syllogismum 
deducit,  sed  tanquam  rem  per  se  notam  simplici  mentis  intuitu 
agnoscit." 

Buffier  eives  the  correct  account  with  his  usual  clearness  :  "  C'est 
par  une  meme  perception  de  notre  ame  que  nous  ^prouvons  le  senti- 
ment intime  et  de  notre  pensee  et  de  notre  existence"  (Buffier, 
Prem.  Ver.  p.  i.  c.  i.). 

The  Scottish  School  generally  maintains  that  we  do  not  know 
mind  and  body,  but  only  the  qualities  of  them.  Reid  indeed  says, 
"  Every  man  is  conscious  of  a  thinking  principle,  or  mind,  in  him- 
self "  (Collected  Writings,  p.  217).  Campbell,  in  his  Philosophy  of 
Rhetoric,  speaks  of  consciousness  being  concerned  with  "  the  exist- 
ence of  mind  itself,  and  its  actual  feelings,"  etc.  (Book  i.  Chap. 
V.  But  this  language  is  not  free  from  ambiguity.  Reid  says 
that  "  sensation  suggests  to  us  both  a  faculty  and  a  mind,  and  not 
only  suggests  the  notion  of  them,  but  creates  a  belief  of  their  ex- 
istence ;  "  and  he  defends  the  use  of  the  word  "  suggest,"  which  I 
reckon  a  very  unfortunate  one  in  such  an  application  (Collected 
Writings,  pp.  110,  111).  This  view  is  carried  out  and  elaborated  by 
D.  Stewart:  "It  is  not  matter  or  body  which  I  perceive  by  my 
senses,  but  only  extension,  figure,  color,  and  certain  other  qualities, 
which  the  constitution  of  my  nature  leads  me  to  refer  to  something 
which  is  extended,  figured,  and  colored.  The  case  is  precisely 
similar  with  respect  to  mind.  We  are  not  immediately  conscious  of 
its  existence,  but  we  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  and  voli- 
tion, operations  which  imply  the  existence  of  something  which  feels, 
thinks,  and  wills"  (Elem.  Vol.  i.  p.  46;  see  also  Vol.  ii.  p.  41,  and 
Phil.  Essays,  p.  58). 

Kant  holds  that  the  inner  sense  gives  no  intuition  of  the  soul  as 
an  object.  "  Der  innere  Sinn,  vermittelst  dessen  das  Gemiith  sich 
selbst,  oder  seinen  innercn  Zustand  anschaut,  giebt  zwar  keine 
Anschauung  von  der  Seele  selbst,  als  einem  Object  "  (Kr.  d.  r.  V. 


OUR  INTUITIVE  KNOWLEDGE   OF   SELF   OR  SPIRIT.  99 

p.  34).  He  speaks  of  the  subject  envisaging  itself,  not  as  it  is  but  as 
it  appears:  "Da  es  denn  sich  selbst  anschaut,  nicht  wie  es  sich 
unmittelbar  selbstthatig  vorstellen  wiirde,  sondern  nach  der  Art  wie 
es  von  innen  afficirt  wird,  folglich  wie  es  sich  erscheint,  nicht  wie  es 
ist"  {Zw.  Aufg.  p.  718),  He  says  that  by  the  inner  sense  we  know 
the  subject  self  as  phenomenon,  and  not  as  it  is  in  itself:  "  Was  die 
innere  Anschauung  betrifft,  unser  eigenes  Subject  nur  als  Erschei- 
nuno-,  nicht  aber  nach  dem,  was  es  an  sich  selbst  ist,  erkennen  " 
{lUd.  p.  850).  Dr.  Mansel  has  done  great  service  to  philosophy  by 
maintaining  so  clearly  and  resolutely,  in  his  Prolegomena  Logica  and 
Metaphysics,  that  we  intuitively  know  self.  "  I  am  immediately 
conscious  of  myself  seeing  and  hearing,  willing  and  thinking  "  {Prol. 
Log.  p.  129).  Hamilton  speaks  of  our  being  conscious  every  moment 
of  our  existence,  and  of  the  ego  as  a  "  self-subsistent  entity  "  {Metaph. 
Leet.  19). 

(6)  It  can  be  shown  that  Locke  consistently  or  inconsistently 
states  that  we  know  power  as  being  in  body,  but  especially  in  mind. 
"  Bodies  by  our  senses  do  not  afford  us  so  clear  and  distinct  an  idea 
of  active  power  as  we  have  from  reflection  on  the  operations  of  our 
own  mind."  In  deriving  our  idea  of  Power  from  Sensation  and  Re- 
flection he  supposes  the  mind  to  be  actively  and  intelligently  exer- 
cised. "  Whatever  change  is  observed,  the  mind  must  collect  a 
power  somewhere  to  make  that  change  "  (Sssay,  ii.  xxi.  4).  But 
Locke  has  omitted  to  inquire  what  it  is  in  the  mind  which  insists 
that  it  must  collect  a  cause  icherever  there  is  a  change. 

Hamilton  admits  all  I  am  pleading  for.  "I  know  myself  as  a 
force  in  energy,  the  not-self  as  a  counter-force  in  energy  "  (Note  D, 
p.  666,  of  Ap.  to  Reid).  And  again  we  have  a  perceptive  power  of 
the  secundo  primary  quality  of  resistance  in  an  extra-organic  force 
as  an  immediate  cognition  "  (p.  883).  Is  this  statement  an  essential 
part  of  his  doctrine,  or  an  incidental  admission?  If  part  of  his  sys- 
tem, it  should  modify  the  view  he  has  given  elsewhere  of  our  convic- 
tion of  power  as  being  a  mere  impotency  (see  Appendix  to  Discuss.). 
If  it  be  inadvertent,  it  is  a  proof  that  truth  will  come  out  of  honest 
men  in  spite  of  the  errors  of  their  system. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SUBSTANCE. 


Sir  W.  Hamilton  remarks  that  the  word  "substance" 
may  be  "  viewed  as  derived  from  subsistendo,  and  as 
meaning  ens  per  se  subsistens  (^oicna  in  Greek) :  or  it 
may  be  viewed  as  the  basis  of  attributes,  in  which  sense 
it  may  be  regarded  as  derived  from  substando,  and  id 
quod  substat  accidentibus ;  like  the  Greek  vn-oo-Tao-is, 
vTTOKciixevov.  In  either  case  it  will,  however,  signify  the 
same  thing  viewed  in  a  different  aspect."  With  this 
latter  statement  I  cannot  concur.  In  the  first  of  these 
senses  there  is  such  a  thing  as  substance,  and  its  charac- 
teristics can  be  specified.  But  I  can  see  no  evidence 
whatever  for  the  existence  of  any  such  thing  as  a  sub- 
stance in  the  other  sense,  that  is,  as  a  substratum  lying 
in  and  beyond,  or  standing  under,  all  that  comes  under 
our  immediate  knowledge.  There  is  no  topic  on  which 
there  has  been  a  greater  amount  of  unsatisfactory  lan- 
guage employed  than  on  this.  We  know,  it  is  said,  only 
qualities,  but  we  are  constrained  by  reason,  or  by  com- 
mon sense,  to  believe  in  a  something  in  which  they 
inhere.  Or  qualities,  it  is  said,  fall  under  sense,  while 
substance  is  known  by  vous,  or  reason.  Others,  proceed- 
ing on  these  admissions,  maintain  that,  qualities  alone 
being  known,  we  may  doubt  whether  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  substance,  and  may  certainly  affirm  that  we  can 
never  know  it.  Now  in  opposition  to  all  this  style  of 
thinking  and  writing,  which  has  prevailed  to  so  great  an 


SUBSTANCE.  101 

extent  since  the  days  of  Locke,  I  maintain  that  we  never 
know  qualities  without  also  knowing  substance.  Quali- 
ties as  qualities  distinct  from  substance  are  as  much  un- 
known to  us  as  substance  distinct  from  qualities.  We 
know  both  in  one  concrete  act. 

All  that  the  metaphysician  can  do  in  regard  to  sub- 
stance is  to  show  that  our  cognition  of  it  is  original  and 
fundamental,  and  to  evolve  what  is  contained  in  the  cog- 
nition. He  should  not  attempt  to  prove  how  it  is  so  and 
so  (the  StoTt  of  Aristotle),  but  he  may  show  that  it  is  so 
and  so  (the  on  of  Aristotle).  He  could  not  give  the 
dimmest  idea  of  it  to  one  who  had  not  already  the 
knowledge,  but  he  may  separate  it  by  analysis  from  the 
other  cognitions  with  which  it  is  combined,  and  make  it 
stand  out  distinctly  to  the  view.  He  may  so  weigh  and 
measure  it  as  to  show  its  extent  and  boundary,  and  de- 
liver it  from  those  crudities  in  which  speculators  have  in 
crusted  it.     The  following  is  the  best  analysis  I  am  able 

to  furnish. 

II. 

In  all  knowledge  of  substance  there  is  involved  Be- 
ing or  Existence,  not  of  being  in  the  abstract,  but  of 
something  in  being.  This  we  have  seen  is  an  essential 
element  in  our  cognition,  both  of  mind  and  body.  The 
mind  starts  with  knowledge,  and  with  the  knowledge  of 
things  as  existing.  This  is  the  foundation,  the  necessary 
foundation,  of  all  other  exercises.  If  the  mind  did  not 
begin  with  knowledge,  it  could  not  end  with  knowledge. 
In  particular,  if  it  had  not  knowledge  in  the  concrete,  it 
never  could  reach  knowledge  in  the  abstract.  If  there 
were  not  a  knowledge  of  things  in  the  premises  with 
which  we  set  out,  there  never  could  be  knowledge  in  the 
conclusion.  But  having  knowledge,  obtained  by  intui- 
tion, to  set  out  with,  we  find  that  when  we  proceed 


102      PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

legitimately  —  that  is,  according  to  the  laws  of  thought 
—  in  our  discursive  exercises,  we  have  always  reality  in 
the  conclusion. 

Those  who  assert  that  substance  has  a  substratum,  a 
something  standing  under  it,  have  caught  a  glimpse  of  a 
truth  which  however  they  have  not  fully  comprehended. 
All  substance  has  a  Being  which  combines  and  gives  a 
unity  to  what  is  embraced  in  it. 

ni. 

In  all  knowledge  of  substance  there  is  involved  Ac- 
tive Power.  We  cannot  know  self,  or  the  mind  that 
knows,  except  as  active,  that  is,  exerting  power,  or  as 
being  affected.  Nor  can  we  know  material  objects  ex- 
cept as  exercising  or  suffering  an  influence,  —  that  is,  a 
certain  kind  of  power.  They  become  known  to  us  as 
having  a  power  either  upon  ourselves  or  upon  other  ob- 
jects, and  we  express  this  when  we  say  that  we  know 
matter  by  its  properties. 

This  is  a  doctrine  which  has  been  opposed  by  a  large 
school  of  metaphysicians  that  have  felt  directly  or  in- 
directly the  influence  of  Descartes,  who  represented  ex- 
tension as  the  essence  of  matter.  This  oversight  has 
marred  their  whole  speculations,  and  landed  them  in 
innumerable  difficulties.  For,  not  finding  power  in  our 
original  cognitions,  they  have  either  with  the  sceptic 
Hume  denied  that  we  have  any  such  cognition,  or  with 
Kant  they  have  made  it  a  form  which  the  mind  imposes 
on  objects.  Still  a  large  amount  of  authority  can  be 
pleaded  in  behalf  of  the  doctrine,  that  power  is  involved 
in  our  idea  of  substance.  It  is  the  expressed  view  of 
Locke.  It  is  maintained  by  Leibnitz  with  all  the  inge- 
nuity of  his  speculative  genius.  Even  Kant  acknowledges 
(though,  from  the  subjective  character  which  he  ascribes 


SUBSTANCE.  103 

to  our  intuitive  convictions,  he  can  turn  it  to  no  profit- 
able account)  that  cause  is  involved  in  our  idea  of  sub- 
stance. It  has  been  incidentally  admitted  by  many  who 
have  theoretically  denied  it. 

rv. 

There  is  involved  in  our  knowledge  of  substance  a 
conviction  of  its  having  a  Permanence.  This  propo- 
sition must  be  very  guardedly  stated.  By  being  loosely 
and  inaccurately  announced,  it  has  led  to  very  erroneous 
and  dangerous  doctrines.  But  there  is  a  truth  here,  if 
we  could  only  properly  apprehend  and  express  it.  A 
substance  is  not  a  spectre  which  appeared  when  we 
began  to  see  it,  and  which  may  cease  to  exist  when  we 
have  ceased  to  view  it.  This  conviction  is  at  the  basis 
of  the  belief  in  the  abiding  nature  of  every  existing 
thing,  amid  all  the  changes  which  it  may  undergo. 
However  a  piece  of  matter  may  be  beat  or  cut  mechan- 
ically, we  do  not  believe  it  to  be  destroyed.  However  it 
may  be  evaporated  or  decomposed  by  heat  or  chemical 
processes,  we  are  not  convinced  that  it  is  annihilated. 
When  the  moisture  on  the  earth  disappears,  we  do  not 
therefore  conclude  that  it  has  vanished  into  nothing ;  we 
look  for  it  in  a  new  form,  and  our  expectation  is  gratified 
when  we  discover  it  in  the  vapor  of  tne  atmosphere  or 
the  cloud.  When  fuel  is  put  on  the  fire  it  gradually  dis- 
appears from  the  view,  but  we  inquire  for  it  elsewhere, 
and  find  it  in  the  ashes  and  in  the  smoke.  Our  convic- 
tion of  the  abiding  nature  of  self  is  still  more  deeply 
rooted  and  fixed.  We  believe  in  its  continuance  amid 
all  the  changes  of  thought  and  sensation,  mood  and  feel- 
ing, lethargy  and  activity. 

But  while  there  is  all  this  in  our  apprehension  of 
substance,  there   is  not  more  than  this,  and  the  errors 


104       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

have  arisen  from  supposing  that  there  is  more.  In  par- 
ticular, our  conviction  does  not  require  us  to  believe 
either  in  the  necessary  existence  of  every  substance,  or 
in  its  indestructibility.  Our  intuition  does  not  say 
whether  it  has  or  has  not  been  created,  whether  it  does 
or  does  not  need  the  Divine  power  to  maintain  and 
uphold  it,  whether  it  may  or  may  not  be  destroyed.  It 
does  not  entitle  us  to  affirm  that  matter  must  have 
existed  forever,  or  must,  if  formed,  have  been  fashioned 
out  of  preexisting  materials.  Nor  does  it  say  how  long 
it  has  existed,  or  how  long  it  will  exist.  An  analogous 
intuitive  conviction  —  that  of  cause — says  that  if  pro- 
duced, it  must  have  been  produced  by  a  cause ;  that  if 
destroyed,  it  must  be  by  a  power  independent  of  itself. 
Hence  we  cannot  assert  positively,  when  we  see  a  sub- 
stance, say  a  piece  of  burned  coal,  disappearing  from 
our  view,  that  it  must  still  exist,  for  in  the  operation  of 
combustion  there  may  have  been  a  power  to  destroy  it ; 
all  that  we  can  affirm  is,  that  the  substance  did  not  van- 
ish of  itself.  All  that  our  intuition  guarantees  is,  that 
in  itself  substance  has  permanence,  and  that,  if  destroyed, 
it  must  be  by  something  ab  extra. 


According  to  the  account  now  given,  the  Conscious 
Self  or  Spirit  must  be  a  substance.  We  know  it  as 
having  being,  we  know  it  as  having  power  and  perma- 
nence. While  it  has  these,  it  is  to  be  studiously  noticed 
that  we  do  not  know  it  to  have  all,  or  indeed  any,  of 
these  independently.  For  aught  our  intuition  says,  it 
may  be  dependent  for  all  of  these  on  the  creative  power 
or  concurrent  power  of  God.  Not  only  so,  it  may,  for 
anything  our  intuition  intimates,  be  dependent  for  some 
of  these  on  its  association  with  the  bodily  organism  in 


SUBSTANCE.  105 

this  present  state  of  things.  If  we  wish  to  settle  these 
questions,  we  must  look  to  other  circumstances  and  con- 
siderations. 

Many  metaphysicians  have  felt  greater  difficulty  in 
allowing  that  Matter  is  a  substance.  But,  explaining 
substance  as  has  been  done  in  this  section,  it  is  entitled 
to  be  so  regarded.  It,  too,  has  being,  power,  and  endu- 
rance. We  can  deny  this  only  by  refusing  to  follow 
our  native  convictions.  But  in  standing  up  for  the  sub- 
stantial nature  of  body,  it  is  still  more  necessary  than 
in  the  case  of  spirit  to  bear  in  mind  the  qualifications 
under  which  we  make  the  statement.  We  cannot  affirm 
of  matter  that  it  has  derived  its  characteristics  from  no 
source  independent  of  itself.  Nor  can  we  declare  of  it 
that  it  can  subsist  of  itself,  and  independent  of  the  co- 
operating power  of  mind,  that  is,  the  Divine  Mind.  We 
are  stretching  intuition  altogether  beyond  its  province 
if  we  make  it  pronounce  oracular  decisions  on  any  such 
questions. 

But  are  mind  and  matter  different  substances  ?  I 
reply  that  there  are  certain  positions  on  this  subject 
which  can  be  defended  against  all  opposition.  Firsts  in 
the  cognition  of  the  knowing  mind,  which  ever  coexists 
with  our  cognition  of  matter,  we  always  know  the  two 
to  be  different.  When  we  look  at  these  hills  we  have 
ever  an  accompanjnng  cognition  of  self  as  looking  at 
the  hills,  and  we  know  the  hills  to  be  different  from  self, 
and  self  to  be  different  from  the  hills.  Secondhj,  we 
know  that  the  very  things  by  which  substance  is  charac- 
terized —  existence,  potency,  and  permanence  —  are  not 
the  same  in  the  case  of  mind  and  body.  Thus,  the 
being  of  mind  is  not  the  same  with  that  of  matter,  nor 
are  the  powers  of  mind  the  same  with  those  of  matter, 
Dor  does  the  permanence  of  body  depend  on  human  beings 


106       PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION  OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

observing  it,  nor  can  it  be  shown  that  the  permanence 
of  mind  depends  on  the  permanence  of  the  bodily  frame. 
With  these  proofs  or  presumptions  in  our  favor,  we  may 
surely  throw  the  onus  prohandi  of  proving  that  they  are 
the  same  substance  on  our  opponents.  But  thirdly,  all 
attempts  to  resolve  mind  into  matter,  or  matter  into 
mind,  have  utterly  failed.  If  we  deny  that  matter  has 
an  existence  independent  of  the  contemplative  mind,  we 
are  trampling  on  one  of  the  intuitions  of  our  nature. 
Those  who  resolve  mind  into  matter  always  overlook 
the  very  essential  qualities  of  the  knowing,  the  con- 
scious, the  thinking,  the  moral,  the  responsible  soul. 
We  are  thus  entitled,  from  all  we  can  know  of  substance, 
to  declare  them  to  be  different  substances.  As  to 
whether  they  may  not,  after  all,  have  some  unity  in  the 
view  of  higher  intelligences,  who  take  a  deeper  view  of 
substance,  this  is  a  question  which  we  need  not  start,  for 
we  cannot  settle  it ;  the  alleged  unity  must  be  such  that 
we  can  never  discover  nor  comprehend  it.  It  is  enough 
for  us  that  they  are  different  substances  in  all  the  char- 
acteristics of  substance  known  to  us. 

By  the  limitations  drawn  above,  we  are  saved  from  certain  per- 
nicious consequences  which  were  supposed  to  follow  from  the  doc- 
trine of  Descartes.  According  to  him,  a  substance  is  that  which 
subsists  of  itself,  which  has  no  need  of  anything  else  in  order  to 
its  existence.^  Proceeding  on  this  definition,  Spinoza  labored  to 
show  that  there  was  and  could  be  only  one  substance,  of  which 
everything  is  an  attribute  or  a  mode.  The  school  of  Descartes 
sought  to   save   themselves  from  this   pantheistic  consequence  by 

1  "  Per  substantiam  nihil  aliud  possumus,  quam  rem  quae  eta  exis- 
tet,  ut  nulla  alia  re  indigeat  ad  existendum.  Et  quidem  substantia 
quaj  nulla  plane  re  indigeat,  unica  tantum  potest  intellige  nempe 
DeuR.  Alias  vero  omnes  non  nisi  ope  concursus  Dei  existere  posse 
percipimus  "  (Prin.:  Phil:  i.  51.)  He  speaks  of  created  substances, 
"  quod  sint  res  quae  solo  Dei  concursus  egeunt  ad  existendum."  lb.  62. 


SUBSTANCE.  107 

various  devices.  To  me  it  appears  that  we  must  amend  the  defi- 
nition of  Descartes,  and  reject  the  definition  of  Spinoza,  and  then 
all  the  conclusions  founded  on  them  must  fall  to  the  ground.  "I 
understand,"  says  Spinoza,  "  by  substance,  that  which  is  in  itself 
and  conceived  by  itself ;  that  is  to  say,  that  of  which  the  concept 
can  be  formed  without  having  need  of  the  concept  of  any  other 
thinij."  ^  There  is  a  whole  asrgregate  of  things  iumbled  in  this  defi- 
nition.  That  which  is  in  itself  is  one  thing  ;  that  which  is  con- 
ceived by  itself  is  another  thing,  which  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as 
that  which  is  given  in  explanation,  viz.,  that  of  which  a  concept 
can  be  formed  without  having  need  of  the  concept  of  any  other 
thing.  I  object  to  our  conviction  in  regard  to  substance  being 
called  a  concept,  a  phrase  denoting  an  abstract  or  general  notion 
formed  by  a  discursive  process  of  the  understanding  :  the  conviction 
is  an  intuition.  The  intuition  says  of  every  substance  that  it  is  a 
thing  or  reality,  but  it  does  not  say  whence  the  reality  has  pro- 
ceeded. It  says  that  substance  has  power,  but  it  does  not  say 
whence  that  power.  No  doubt  a  substance  is  a  thing  known  (not 
merely  conceived)  in  itself,  but  the  same  may  be  said  of  space  and 
time,  and  everything  apprehended  intuitively.  Having  removed 
this  definition  out  of  the  way,  as  not  the  expression  of  our  intuitive 
knowledge,  we  leave  the  whole  pantheism  of  Spinoza  without  a 
foundation.  I  am  certain  that  our  native  conviction  as  to  substance 
gives  no  countenance  to  pantheism  of  any  kind.  Our  intuition  says 
that  substance  has  being,  but  it  does  not  say  that  it  is  underived, 
or  whence  it  is  derived.  It  says  that  it  has  permanence,  but  does 
not  say  that  it  has  not  been  created  and  that  it  cannot  be  destroyed. 
"If  any  one  will  examine  himself  concerning  his  notion  of  pure 
substance  in  general,  he  will  find  that  he  has  no  other  idea  of  it  at 
all,  but  only  a  supposition  of  he  knows  not  what  support  of  such 
qualities  which  are  capable  of  producing  simple  ideas  in  us  ;  which 
qualities  are  commonly  called  accidents"  (Locke,  Essay,  ii.  xxiii. 
23).  His  view  is  thus  fully  expounded  in  his  Letter  to  Slillingjleet : 
"  Your  Lordship  well  expresses  it,  —  Wejind  that  we  can  have  no  true 
conception  of  any  modes  or  accidents,  but  we  must  conceice  a  substratum 
or  subject  wherein  they  are :  i.  e.  that  they  cannot  exist  or  subsist  of 
themselves.     Hence  the  mind  perceives  their  necessary  connection 

^  "  Per  substantiam  intelligo  id  quod  in  se  est  et  per  se  percipitur 
hoc  est  id  cujus  conceptus  non  indiget  conceptu  alternus  rei,  a  quo 
formari  debeat." 


108       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

with  inherence,  or  being  supported;  which  being  a  relative  idea, 
superadded  to  the  red  color  in  a  cherry,  or  to  thinking  in  a  man, 
the  mind  frames  the  correlative  idea  of  a  support.  For  I  never 
denied  that  the  mind  could  frame  to  itself  ideas  of  relation,  but 
have  showed  the  quite  contrary  in  my  chapters  about  relation.  But 
because  a  relation  cannot  be  founded  on  nothing,  or  be  the  relation 
of  nothing,  and  the  thing  here  related  as  a  supporter  or  support  is 
not  represented  to  the  mind  by  any  clear  and  distinct  idea,  therefore 
the  obscure,  indistinct,  vague  idea  of  thingj  or  somethinn;  is  all  that 
is  left  to  be  the  positive  idea  which  has  the  relation  of  a  support  or 
substratum  to  modes  or  accidents  ;  and  that  general  undetermined 
idea  of  something  is  by  the  abstraction  of  the  mind  derived  also 
from  the  simple  ideas  of  Sensation  and  Reflection  ;  and  thus  the 
mind,  from  the  positive  simple  ideas  got  by  sensation  or  reflection, 
comes  to  the  general  relative  idea  of  substance,  which  without  these 
positive  simple  ideas  it  could  never  have."  I  have  quoted  this 
passage  because  it  lets  us  see  fully  what  Locke's  precise  theory  is, 
and  what  are  its  defects.  The  mind  gets  all  its  ideas  from  sen- 
sation and  reflection,  but  in  comparing  ideas  it  discovers  necessary 
relations.  Among  these  is  substance,  of  which  the  idea  is  very 
obscure.  Still  the  mind  is  led  to  suppose  that  there  is  such  a  thing 
acting  as  a  support  or  substratum. 

Berkeley  admits  the  existence  of  all  that  we  perceive :  "  That 
what  I  see,  hear,  and  feel  doth  exist,  that  is  to  say,  is  perceived  by 
me,  I  no  more  doubt  than  I  do  of  my  own  being."  But  he  adds  : 
"  I  do  not  see  how  the  testimony  of  sense  can  be  alleged  as  a  proof 
of  the  existence  of  anything  which  is  not  perceived  by  sense  " 
(Prin.  Hum.  Know.  40).  In  particular,  he  is  not  satisfied  that  there 
is  a  material  substratum  to  what  we  perceive  or  a  support  of  it.  "  It 
is  evident  support  cannot  here  be  taken  in  its  usual  or  literal  sense, 
as  when  we  say  that  pillars  support  a  building ;  in  what  sense,  there- 
fore, must  it  be  taken  ?  If  we  inquire  into  what  the  most  accurate 
philosopliers  declare  themselves  to  mean  by  material  substance,  we 
shall  find  them  acknowledge  they  have  no  other  meaning  annexed  to 
those  sounds  but  the  idea  of  being  in  general,  together  with  the  rela- 
tive notion  of  its  supporting  accidents  "  (16,  17).  Now  Berkeley  is 
right  in  saying  that  we  are  not  required  to  allow  the  existence  of 
more  than  we  perceive.  But  (1)  he  is  wrong  in  maintaining  that 
we  can  perceive  nothing  more  than  ideas  in  our  own  minds.  "  When 
we  do  our  utmost  to  conceive  the  existence  of  external  bodies,  we 
are  all  the  while  only  contemplating  our  own  ideas  "  (23).     Then 


SUBSTANCE.  109 

(2)  he  errs  in  not  unfolding  how  much  is  comprised  in  the  object  as 
perceived  by  us;  we  perceive  body  as  having  being,  power,  and 
existence  without  us  and  independent  of  us.  "  It  will  be  urged  that 
thus  much  at  least  is  true,  to  wit,  that  we  take  away  all  corporeal 
substances.  To  this  my  answer  is,  that  if  the  word  substance  be 
taken  in  the  vulgar  sense  for  a  combination  of  sensible  qualities, 
such  as  extension,  solidity,  weight,  and  the  like,  this  we  cannot  be 
accused  of  taking  away.  But  if  it  be  taken  in  a  philosophic  sense, 
for  the  support  of  accidents  or  qualities  without  the  mind,  then 
indeed  I  acknowledge  that  we  take  it  away,  if  one  may  be  said  to 
take  away  that  which  never  had  any  existence,  not  even  in  imagi- 
nation" (37).  Berkeley  was  misled  throughout  by  following  the 
Lockian  doctrines  that  the  mind  perceives  immediately  only  its  own 
ideas,  and  that  substance  is  to  be  taken  merely  as  the  support  or 
substratum  of  qualities.  It  is  important  to  add  that  Berkeley  is 
wrong  (as  Brown  also  is)  in  holding  that  we  perceive  material  sub- 
stance "  as  a  combination  of  sensible  qualities."  I  am  not  aware 
that  intuitively  we  perceive  qualities  separately  or  a  combination  of 
them;  we  know  body  as  an  existing  thing  with  extension  and  solidity. 
Hamilton  says,  that  when  we  think  a  quality  we  are  constrained  to 
think  it  "as  inhering  in  some  basis,  substratum,  hypostasis,  or  sub- 
stance," which  substance  is  represented  as  unknown:  he  speaks  of 
being  "compelled  to  refer  it  to  an  unknown  substance"  (Discuss. 
App.  I.  a).  I  hold  that  in  the  one  concrete  act  we  know  both  sub- 
stance and  quality. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MODE,    QUALITY,   PROPERTY,   ESSENCE. 

Two  great  truths  press  themselves  on  the  reflecting 
mind  when  it  contemplates  this  world  of  ours.  One,  the 
more  obvious,  is  the  mutability  of  all  mundane  objects. 
Nothing  seems  to  be  enduring ;  all  is  perceived  as  fluc- 
tuating. This  has  been  a  favorite  theme  with  poets,  to 
whom  it  has  furnished  a  succession  of  kaleidoscope  pic- 
tures ;  moralists  and  divines  have  dwelt  upon  it,  in  order 
to  allure  us  to  seek  for  something  more  stable  than  this 
world  can  furnish ;  and  even  libertines  have  turned  it  to 
their  own  use,  and  exhorted  us  to  catch  the  enjoyment 
while  it  passes,  to  shoot  the  bird  on  the  wing :  "  Let  us 
eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die."  Philosophies 
have  been  built  on  this  doctrine  of  the  fluctuation  of  all 
things.  Heracleitus  of  Ephesus  taught  that  all  things 
are  in  a  perpetual  flux ;  that  we  cannot  enter  the  same 
stream  twice ;  whereon  Cratylus  corrected  him,  and 
showed  that  we  cannot  do  so  once.  But  there  is  another 
truth  which  has  a  no  less  important,  indeed  a  deeper, 
place  in  the  nature  of  things.  In  the  midst  of  all  these 
mutations  objects  have,  after  all,  a  permanence.  Ever 
changing,  they  are  yet  all  the  while  ever  the  same.  Per- 
sons of  deeper  thought,  or  at  least  more  addicted  to 
abstraction,  looking  beneath  the  changing  surface,  dwell 
on  this  permanence,  which  they  discover  to  be  like  the 
fixed  mountain,  while  the  changes  are  merely  like  the 
colors  that  pass  over  its  surface ;  and  some  have  so  mag- 
nified it  as  to  make  it  set  aside  the  mutability.  The 
Eleatics  carried  their  doctrine  so  far  as  to  maintain  the 


MODE,   QUALITY,   PROPERTY,   ESSENCE.  Ill 

oneness  and  unchangeableness  of  all  being.  The  founder 
of  the  school,  Xenophanes,  identified  this  immutable 
oneness  with  the  Divine  Being.  His  disciple,  Par- 
menides,  degenerating  in  religious  faith,  though  superior 
to  the  master  in  logical  power,  narrowed  this  unity  into 
metaphysical  being.  Zeno,  who  followed,  showed  his 
subtlety  by  pointing  out  the  difficulties  in  which  they 
are  involved  who  maintain  the  existence  of  multiplicity 
and  motion.  The  expansive  mind  of  Plato  wrestled  with 
both  these  extremes,  and  sought  by  his  doctrine  of  supra- 
sensible  ideas,  and  an  exuberance  of  subtleties,  to  es- 
tablish a  doctrine  of  being  not  inconsistent  with  mul- 
tiplicity and  change.  In  modern  times  Descartes  and 
Spinoza  have  magnified  the  importance  of  Substance 
quite  as  much  as  the  Eleatics  did  Being ;  while  the  great 
mass  of  physicists,  and  all  the  speculators  of  the  Sensa- 
tional School,  never  go  down  deeper  than  the  fleeting, 
the  superficial,  and  the  phenomenal. 

The  wise  and  the  only  proper  course  is  to  assume 
both ;  to  assume  both  as  first  truths.  No  attempt  should 
be  made  to  support  either  by  mediate  proof ;  each  carries 
with  it  its  own  evidence.  Neither  can  be  set  aside  by 
any  sophistical  reasoning  founded  on  the  other.  It  is 
the  business  of  philosophy  not  to  attempt  to  discard 
either,  but  rather  to  give  the  proper  account  of  each, 
when  they  will  be  seen  not  to  be  inconsistent.  The 
doctrine  of  the  permanence  of  objects  is  founded  on 
being  and  substance.  We  must  take  a  view  of  the  other 
truth  in  this  section. 

Every  substance,  we  have  seen,  is  known  as  having 
being,  power,  and  endurance.  But  every  terrestrial  sub- 
stance is  at  the  same  time  known  as  changing.  Self 
changes  as  we  look  in  upon  it;  the  material  world 
changes  as  we  look  out  upon  it.     No  attempt  should  be 


112      PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

made  to  explain  how  the  two  can  coexist,  the  permanent 
and  the  changeable.  For  mind  and  body  are  known  at 
one  and  the  same  time  as  both.  The  one  is  quite  as 
much  known,  and  therefore  quite  as  conceivable  ever 
afterwards,  as  the  other  ;  and  there  can  be  no  difficulty 
(whatever  metaphysicians  may  ingeniously  urge  in  oppo- 
sition) in  conceiving  of  their  compatibility,  since  they 
were  ever  known  to  exist  together.  It  is  one  of  the 
permanent  characters,  both  of  mind  and  body,  that  they 
are  ever  known  as  changing.  Their  liability  to  change 
is  an  element  in  their  very  nature.  Now  the  appropriate 
term  to  express  the  given  state  of  any  one  substance  is 
Mode  ;  or  if  we  wish  a  convenient  change  of  phrase- 
ology. Modification,  State,  or  Condition. 

From  this  account  we  see  in  what  sense  it  is  that  sub- 
stance implies  mode,  and  mode  implies  substance.  Mode 
implies  substance,  not  only  inasmuch  as  a  state  must  be 
the  state  of  something,  but  inasmuch  as  mode  is  the 
state  of  a .  substance  liable  to  change,  and  so  capable  of 
manifesting  itself  in  more  than  one  phase.  Substance 
implies  mode,  inasmuch  as  it  must  always  be  in  a  certain 
state,  and  is  liable  to  be  in  different  states.  The  maxim 
is  more  than  a  verbal  one,  more  than  a  truism,  more 
than  an  identical  (analytic)  judgment  involved  in  the 
terms ;  it  is  a  judgment  affirming  a  truth  intuitively  dis- 
covered by  the  mind  when  looking  at  the  things  (a 
synthetic  judgment  a  priori). 

Every  object  is  known  not  only  as  having  being,  but 
is  known  as  having  a  certain  being  or  nature.  That  by 
which  it  manifests  itself  to  us  may  be  something  com- 
mon to  this  one  thing  with  other  things,  or  it  may  be 
something  peculiar  to  the  thing  itself.  Every  particular 
substance  known  is  known  as  at  least  having  being  and 
potency  and  an  abiding  nature,  and  is  known  also  as  pos- 


MODE,  QUALITY,   PROPERTY,   ESSENCE.  113 

sessing  peculiar  or  distinguishing  attributes.  That  by 
which  the  object  is  thus  known  to  us  as  in  itself,  or  as 
acting,  may  be  called  a  quality  of  the  substance.  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  speaks  of  the  qualities  of  substance  as  "  its 
aptitudes  and  manners  of  existence  and  of  action."  ^ 

But  let  us  properly  understand  the  relation  of  the  two, 
substance  and  quality.  The  two  are  ever  known  in  one 
concrete  act.  Thus  when  at  a  given  moment  we  know 
self  as  rejoicing,  we  do  not  know  the  self  as  separate,  or 
the  rejoicing  as  separate,  but  we  grasp  the  self  and  the 
rejoicing  at  once.  But  then  it  is  necessary  for  many 
purposes  to  distinguish  between  them,  and  we  do  so  by 
analysis ;  indeed,  the  analysis  is  in  a  sense  done  for  us 
naturally.  For  while  self  is  rejoicing  to-day,  it  may  be 
grieving  to-morrow.  To  express  the  distinction  it  is 
needful  to  have  a  nomenclature,  and  so  we  distinguish 
between  the  substance  and  the  quality.  Not  that  the 
substance  can  ever  exist  without  the  quality  or  the  quality 
without  the  substance.  On  the  contrary,  the  one  implies 
the  other.  The  substance  must  always  have  at  least  the 
qualities  by  which  all  substance  is  characterized,  and  it 
may  have  many  others.  The  qualities  must  always  be 
qualities  of  a  thing  having  these  clmracteristics.  The 
maxim  that  the  substance  implies  the  quality,  is  thus  a 
proposition  of  the  same  character  as  that  the  substance 
implies  the  mode. 

The  word  "  substance  "  may  be  used  either  as  an  ab- 
stract or  a  general  term.  As  an  abstract  term  it  desig- 
nates the  thing  as  having  the  characteristics  of  sub- 
stance, which  I  believe  to  be  existence,  potency,  and  con- 
tinuance. As  a  general  term  it  denotes  all  those  things 
which  have  the  characteristics  of  substance.  Quality, 
too,  may  be  employed  as  an  abstract  or  a  general  term. 

1  Metaph.  Lect.  8. 


114      PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

As  an  abstract  term  it  denotes  that  in  any  given  sub- 
stance by  which  it  acts  or  manifests  itself.  As  a  general 
term  it  denotes  all  the  manifestations  or  actions  of  a 
substance.  Some  of  these  qualities  are  found  in  all  sub- 
stance :  such  are  the  characteristics  of  substance  of  which 
I  have  so  often  spoken.  Others  are  peculiar  to  certain 
substances,  or  manifest  themselves  in  certain  substances 
at  certain  times.  Particular  qualities  are  known  by  us 
intuitively  to  be  in  mind  or  matter.  Thus  we  know 
consciousness,  personality,  thought,  and  will,  as  in  mind ; 
while  we  know  extension  and  incoinpressibility  as  being 
in  matter :  these  may  appropriately  be  styled  Essential 
Qualities  of  spirit  and  body.  Other  qualities  are  dis- 
covered by  a  gathered  experience.  Both  mind  and  body 
may  have  qualities  which  can  never  be  known  by  us.  As 
to  the  qualities  which  become  known  to  us  by  experience, 
and  the  qualities  concealed  from  us,  we  can  never  know 
whether  any  of  them  are,  or  are  not,  essential  either  to 
body  or  mind. 

If  this  view  be  correct,  we  see  that  a  wrong  account  is 
often  given  of  substance  and  qualities,  and  the  relation 
between  them.  Thus  it  is  very  common  to  say  that 
substance  is  a  thing  behind  the  qualities  or  underneath 
them,  acting  as  a  substratum,  basis,  ground,  or  support. 
All  such  language  is  in  its  very  nature  metaphorical ; 
the  analogy  is  of  the  most  distant  kind,' and  may  have  a 
misleading  character.  The  substance  is  the  very  thing 
itself,  considered  in  a  certain  aspect,  and  the  qualities 
are  its  action  or  manifestation.  Again,  it  is  frequently 
said  that  qualities  are  known,  whereas  substance  can- 
not be  known,  or,  if  known,  known  only  by  some  deeper 
or  more  transcendental  principle  of  the  mind.  Now  I 
hold  tliat  we  never  know  quality  except  as  the  quality  of 
a  substance,  and  that  we  know  both  equally  in  one  un- 


MODE,   QUALITY,   PROPERTY,   ESSENCE.  116 

divided  act.  This  is  a  somewhat  less  mystical  or  mys- 
terious account  than  that  commonly  given  by  metaphysi- 
cians, but  is,  as  it  appears  to  me,  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  revelations  of  consciousness. 

I  have  said  that  the  term  "  quality  "  expresses  all  in 
the  substance  by  which  it  acts  or  manifests  itself.  That 
in  substance  which  acts  is  power,  and  in  all  substance 
(we  have  seen)  is  power.  The  term  Peoperty,  which 
signifies  peculiar  quality,  might,  I  think,  in  accordance 
with  a  usage  to  which  it  has  of  late  been  approximating 
more  and  more,  be  appropriated  to  express  the  powers 
of  any  given  substance,  as  the  power  of  thinking  or 
feeling  in  mind,  or  of  gravity  or  chemical  affinity  in 
body.  To  vary  the  phraseology,  the  word  Faculty  may 
be  employed  when  we  speak  of  mental  powers,  and  Force 
when  we  speak  of  material  powers.  It  is  the  business  of 
science  to  determine  by  observation  and  generalization 
the  powers  or  properties  of   mind  and  body. 

Another  phrase  with  the  ideas  involved  in  it  requires  to  be  ex- 
plained here,  and  that  is  Essence.  It  is  a  very  mystical  word, 
and  a  whole  aggregate  of  foolish  speculation  has  clustered  round  it. 
Still  it  may  have  a  meaning.  As  applied  logically  to  classes  of 
objects,  it  has  a  signification  which  can  be  precisely  fixed  ;  it  de- 
notes the  common  quality  or  qualities  which  are  found  in  all  the 
members  of  the  class.  Thus  the  possession  of  four  limbs  is  the 
essence  of  the  class  quadruped.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  when 
the  class  is  one  of  what  some  logicians  call  Kinds,  it  is  impossible  to 
specify  all  the  common  qualities  which  go  to  constitute  it.  Thus 
we  cannot  tell  all  the  attributes  which  go  to  make  up  such  natural 
classes  as  those  of  metal,  dog,  or  rose.  All  that  we  can  do  is  to  spe- 
cify some  of  the  more  marked,  which  are  signs  of  others.  But  for 
such  logical  purposes  the  phrase  "  common  attribute "  or  "  difTer- 
entia"  is  the  better,  and  is  more  frequently  employed.  It  is  in  meta- 
physics that  the  word  "  essence  "  is  supposed  to  have  a  place.  Thus 
the  question  is  often  put,  What  is  the  essence  of  mind  ?  or,  What 
is  the  essence  of  body?  or,  What  is  the  essence  of  this   individual 


116      PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION   OF  PRIMITIVE  TRUTHS. 

mind,  or  of  this  piece  of  clay  or  chalk  ?  Now,  we  can  answer  such 
a  question  as  this,  only  when  we  are  allowed  to  draw  distinctions 
and  offer  explanations.  First,  we  may  allowably  conceive  that 
every  one  object,  and  every  class  of  objects,  has  an  aggregate  of 
things  which  go  to  constitute  it,  and  we  may  with  perfect  propriety 
refer  to  such  an  essence  as  possibly  or  probably  existing,  but  always 
on  the  distini-t  condition,  forthwith  to  be  specified  more  formally, 
that  we  do  not  speak  of  the  essence  as  something  which  can  be 
known  by  us  in  all  its  totality.  Locke  {Letter  to  SliUingJleel)  takes 
Essences  "to  be  in  everything  that  internal  constitution,  or  frame,  or 
modification  of  the  Substance,  which  God,  in  his  wisdom  and  good 
pleasure,  thinks  fit  to  give  to  every  particular  creature  when  he 
gives  it  a  being ;  and  such  essences  I  grant  there  are  in  all  things 
that  exist."  Secondly,  there  are  some  things  which  we  know  to 
belong  to  the  essence  of  certain  objects  ;  thus  we  know  that  being, 
power,  and  permanence  are  essential  to  all  substance,  and  that 
certain  qualities,  such  as  consciousness  and  thought,  belong  to 
mind,  and  certain  (jualities  such  as  extension  and  incompressibility, 
to  body.  But  we  must  ever  guard  against  the  idea  that  there  may 
not  be  other  qualiiies  also  essential  to  these  objects.  For,  thirdly, 
the  essence  of  a  thing,  at  least  in  its  totality,  must  always  be  un- 
known to  man.  How  many  things  are  united  in  body  or  mind,  or 
in  any  individual  mind  or  material  object,  —  this  can  never  be  ascer- 
tained by  human  observation  or  ingenuity.  In  this  sense  it  is  proper 
in  us  to  speak  of  the  essence  of  things  as  being  unknown  to  man  ; 
meaning  thereby,  not  that  we  cannot  know  the  substance,  which  I 
maintain  we  do  know,  or  that  we  cannot  know  some  of  the  qualities 
which  go  to  make  up  the  essence,  but  merely  that  we  cannot  know 
what  precisely  constitutes  the  essence  in  its  entireness.  But, 
fourthly,  we  are  not  warranted  to  maintain  that  there  must  be  some- 
thing lying  further  in  than  the  qualities  we  know,  and  that  this  one 
thing  is  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  the  essence  of  the  object.  We 
have  no  ground  whatever  for  believing  that  there  must  be,  or  that 
there  is,  something  more  internal  or  central  than  the  substance  and 
quality  wliiih  we  know.  True,  there  are  j)rohnbly  occult  qualities, 
even  in  tliose  objects  with  which  we  are  most  intimately  aequainted, 
but  we  are  not  tlierefore  warranted  to  conclude  that  wliat  is  concealed 
must  <liffer  in  nature  or  in  kind  from  what  is  revealed,  or  that  it  is  in 
any  way  more  necessary  to  the  existence  or  the  continuance  of  the 
object.  I  liave  a  shrewd  suspicion  that  there  is  a  vast  amount  of  un- 
meaning talk  in  the  language  which  is  employed  on  this  special  subject 


MODE,   QUALITY,   PROPERTY,   ESSENCE.  117 

by  metaphysicians,  who  would  see  something  which  the  vulgar  cannot 
discern,  whereas  they  should  be  contented  with  unfolding  the  nature 
of  what  all  men  perceive.  It  is  quite  conceivable,  and  perfectly 
possible,  that,  though  we  should  know  all  about  any  given  material 
or  spiritual  object,  we  should  after  all  not  fall  in  with  anything 
more  mysterious  or  deep  than  those  wonders  which  come  every  day 
under  our  notice  in  the  world  without,  or  the  world  within  us. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

BEING. 

The  abstract  notion  of  Being  is  one  which  the  mind 
is  not  much  disposed  to  fashion.  As  to  many  other 
abstractions,  it  is  led  naturally  to  form  them ;  they  are 
framed  for  it,  or  it  is  compelled  by  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  is  placed  to  frame  them.  Thus  I  see  an  indi- 
vidual with  a  black  coat  one  day,  and  with  a  gray  coat 
the  next,  and  I  cannot  but  separate  the  man  from  his 
clothing.  But  in  such  high  abstractions  as  Being,  that 
which  we  contemplate  is  never,  in  fact,  separated  from 
any  one  thing.  Still  Being  is  an  abstraction  which  we 
are  constrained  to  make  for  philosophic  purposes,  and  it 
was,  in  fact,  f(u-med  so  early  as  the  age  of  the  specula- 
tors of  the  Eleatic  School.  It  is  the  one  thing  to  be 
found  objectively  in  all  our  knowledge.  Hence  in  all 
our  abstractions  it  is  that  which  remains ;  in  the  ascend- 
ing process  of  generalization  it  is  the  summum  genus. 
This  does  not  prove  that  Being  can  exist  apart  from  a 
special  mode  of  existence,  or  the  exercise  of  some  qual- 
ity. Nor  does  it  pi'ove  that  we  can  know  Being  separate 
from  a  concrete  existence.  I  hold  the  one  as  well  as 
the  other  of  these  to  be  impossible.  But  in  all  knowl- 
edge we  know  what  we  know  as  having  existence,  which 
is  Being. 

I  cannot  give  my  adhesion  to  the  opinion  of  those  who 
speak  so  strongly  of  man  being  incapacitated  to  know 
Being.  I  have  already  intimated  my  dissent  from  the 
Kantian  doctrine  that  we  do  not  know  things,  but  ap- 


BEING.  119 

pearances ;  and  even  from  the  theory  of  those  Scottish 
metaphysicians  who  affirm  that  we  do  not  know  things, 
but  qualities.  What  we  know  is  the  thing  manifesting 
itself  to  us,  —  is  the  thing  exercising  particular  qualities. 
But  then  it  is  confidently  asserted  by  Kantians  that  we 
do  not  know  the  "  thing  in  itself."  The  language,  I 
rather  think,  is  unmeaning  ;  but  if  it  has  a  meaning,  it 
is  incorrect.  I  do  not  believe  that  there  is  any  such 
thing  in  existence  as  Being  in  itself,  or  that  man  can 
even  so  much  as  imagine  it ;  and  if  this  be  so,  it  is  clear 
that  we  cannot  know  it,  and  desirable  that  we  should 
not  suppose  that  we  know  it.  Of  this  I  am  sure, 
that  those  Neo-Platonists  who  professed  to  be  able  to 
rise  to  the  discovery  of  Being  in  itself  (which  could  only 
be  the  abstract  idea  of  Being),  and  to  be  employed  in 
gazing  on  it,  had  miserably  bare  and  most  unprofitable 
matter  of  meditation,  whether  for  intellectual,  or  moral, 
or  religious  ends.  But  if  any  one  mean  to  deny  that  we 
can  know  Being  as  it  is,  T  maintain  in  opposition  to  him, 
and  I  appeal  to  consciousness  to  confirm  me  when  I  say, 
that  we  immediately  know  Being  in  every  act  of  cogni- 
tion. But  then  we  are  told  that  we  cannot  know  the 
mystery  of  Being.  I  am  under  a  strong  impression 
that  speculators  have  attached  a  much  greater  amount  of 
profundity  to  this  simple  subject  than  really  belongs  to 
it.  Of  this  I  am  sure,  that  much  of  the  obscurity  which 
has  collected  around  it  has  sprung  from  the  confused 
discussions  of  metaphysicians,  who  have  labored  to  ex- 
plain what  needs  no  explanation  to  our  intelligence,  or 
to  seek  a  basis  on  which  to  build  what  stands  securely 
on  its  own  foundation.  I  do  indeed  most  fully  admit 
that  there  may  be  much  about  Being  which  we  do  not 
know ;  much  about  Being  generally,  much  about  every 


120       PARTICULAR  EXAMINATION  OF  PRIMITIVE  TRUTHS. 

individual  Being,  unknown  to  us  and  unknowable  in  this 
world.  Still  I  do  affirm  that  we  know  Being  as  Being, 
and  that  any  further  knowledge  conveyed  to  us  would 
not  set  aside  our  present  knowledge,  but  would  simply 
enlarge  it. 


CHAPTER  X. 

EXTENSION. 

The  knowledge  of  extension  is  involved  in  every  ex- 
ercise of  sense -perception,  even  as  the  knowledge  of 
personality  is  implied  in  every  exercise  of  self-conscious- 
ness. We  certainly  cannot  employ  the  senses  of  sight 
and  muscular  energy,  —  we  cannot,  I  believe,  perceive 
through  any  of  the  senses,  —  without  knowing  the  ob- 
ject, be  it  the  organism  or  something  affecting  the  organ- 
ism, as  possessing  extension,  —  always  along  with  other 
qualities.  This,  then,  is  historically  the  origin  of  our 
idea  of  space,  —  that  is,  we  have  a  perception  of  it  in 
every  cognition  of  body.  But  in  this  primitive  knowl- 
edge we  do  not  apprehend  it  as  distinct  from  body.  It 
is  an  extended  and  a  colored  surface,  which  we  know 
through  the  eye;  it  is  an  extended  body  capable  of 
resisting  us,  which  we  know  through  the  muscular  sense 
and  locomotive  energy;  it  is  a  set  of  organs  localized 
and  out  of  each  other,  that  we  know  by  the  other  senses- 
But  by  an  easy  intellectual  act  we  can  separate  the 
extension  from  the  impenetrability  and  the  associated 
sensations.  We  are  greatly  aided  in  our  apprehensions 
of  empty  space  by  certain  exercises  of  sense-perception. 
For  we  have  experience  ever  presenting  itself  of  two 
bodies  seen  or  felt,  with  nothing  between  obvious  to 
the  senses.  True,  scientific  research  shows  that  the  in- 
terval is  not  a  pure  vacuum,  that  there  is  air,  or  ether, 
between  the  bodies;  still  it  is  in  our  apprehension  a 
void,  —  that  is,  a  space,  with  no  perceived  body  to  fill  it. 
We  are  thus  led  to  an  apprehension  of  space  as  different 


122    PARTICULAR   EXAMINATION   OF   PRIMITIVE   TRUTHS. 

from  body  occupying  space.  We  are  not  to  look  on  the 
extension  thus  reached  as  an  illusion,  a  nonentity,  or  as 
nothing.  If  we  know,  as  I  maintain  we  do,  body  in 
space,  the  space  must  have  an  existence  (I  do  not  say 
what  sort  of  existence),  just  as  much  as  the  body  has. 
When  we  separately  contemplate  the  extension,  we  are 
contemplating  a  reality  just  as  verily  as  when  we  per- 
ceive the  body.  It  will  not  do  to  dismiss  space  sum- 
marily by  describing  it  as  a  mere  abstraction :  in  order 
to  our  apprehension  of  it  there  is  need  of  abstraction, 
but  it  is  an  abstraction  of  a  real  part  from  a  real  whole. 
To  this  cognition  of  space,  and  to  every  apprehension 
of  it,  there  is  attached  a  number  of  intuitive  beliefs. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  metaphysician  to  unfold  these 
in  an  inductive  manner,  and  point  out  and  determine 
their  nature  and  laws  as  precisely  as  possible.  This  re- 
quires to  be  done  in  another  Book  of  this  Treatise,  to 
which  therefore  I  adjourn  the  further  discussion  of  space, 
as  it  embraces  a  larger  faith  than  it  does  of  a  cognitive 
element  in  our  apprehension  of  it. 

Prof.  Bain  maintains  {The  Senses  and  Intellect,  2d  ed.  p.  397), 
that  the  localization  of  our  bodily  feelings  is  the  result  of  experi- 
ence. I  admit  that  it  is  by  the  muscular  sense  and  the  eye  that  we 
know  the  external  configuration  of  our  frame,  and  that  it  is  by  a 
gathered  experience  we  connect  this  with  the  internal  feelings.  But 
I  hold  that  we  give  an  externality  and  a  direction  to  our  bodily 
sensations.  Mr.  Bain  acknowledges  that  the  body  is  to  us  an  ex- 
ternal object  (p.  397).  If  so,  it  must  be  known  in  space.  But  it 
has  never  yet  been  shown  how  we  can  know  an  object  as  external 
to  us  and  in  space  except  intuitively.  "I  do  not  see,"  says  Mr. 
Bain,  in  criticising  Hamilton  (p.  376),  "how  one  sensation  can  be 
felt  out  of  another  without  already  supposing  that  we  have  a  feeling 
of  space."  What  we  suppose  is  that  in  thus  regarding  the  body  as 
external  and  localizing  the  sensations  we  get  the  idea  of  space.  It 
is  a  law  of  this  localizing  that  the  sensation  is  felt  at  the  part  of  the 
body  to  which  the  nerve  reaches.     And  "  when  different  parts  of 


EXTENSION.  123 

the  thickness  of  the  same  nerves  are  severally  subjected  to  irrita- 
tion, the  same  sensations  are  produced  as  if  the  different  terminal 
brancliL'S  of  these  parts  of  the  nerves  had  been  irritated.  If  the 
uhiar  nerve  be  irritated  mechanically,  particularly  by  pressing  it 
from  side  to  side  with  the  finger,,  the  sensation  of  pins  and  needles  is 
produced  in  the  palm  and  back  of  the  hand,  and  in  the  fourth  and 
fifth  fingers.  But  according  as  the  pressure  is  varied  the  pricking 
sensation  is  felt  by  turns  in  the  fourth  finger,  in  the  fifth,  in  the 
palm  of  the  hand,  on  the  back  of  the  hand,  and  both  in  the  palm 
and  on  the  back  of  the  hand  the  situation  of  the  pricking  sensation 
is  different  according  as  the  pressure  on  the  nerves  is  varied,  that  is 
to  say,  according  as  different  fibres  or  fasciculi  of  fibres  are  more 
pressed  upon  than  others  "  (Miiller's  Pliysiology,  pp.  745-74  7). 
Surely  all  this  is  instinctive,  not  acquired.  So  deep  is  the  disposi- 
tion to  localize  that  it  cannot  be  eradicated.  "  When  a  limb  has 
been  removed  by  amputation,  the  remaining  portion  of  the  nerve 
which  ramified  in  it  may  still  be  the  seat  of  sensations  which  are  re- 
ferred to  the  lost  part."  "  These  sensations  are  not  of  an  undefined 
character  ;  the  pains  and  tingling  are  distinctly  referred  to  single 
toes,  to  the  sole  of  the  feet,  to  the  dorsum,"  etc.  A  case  is  quoted 
of  a  person  whose  arm  had  been  amputated,  and  who  declared 
twenty  years  after  that  "the  sense  of  the  integrity  of  the  limb  is 
never  lost."  There  is  appended  a  note  by  Baly  :  "Professor  Val- 
entin has  observed,  that  individuals  who  are  the  subjects  of  conge- 
nital imperfection  or  absence  of  the  extremities  have  nevertheless 
the  internal  sensations  of  such  limbs  in  their  perfect  state.  A  girl 
aged  nineteen  years,  in  whom  the  metacarpal  bones  of  the  left  hand 
were  very  short,  and  all  tlie  bones  of  the  phalanges  absent,  a  row  of 
imperfectly  organized  wartlike  projections  representing  the  fingers, 
assured  M.  Valentin  that  she  had  constantly  the  internal  sensation  of 
the  palm  of  the  hand  on  the  left  side  as  perfect  as  in  the  right." 


CHAPTER  XI. 

NUMBER. 

We  seem  to  derive  our  knowledge  of  number  from 
our  cognition  of  being,  and  especially  from  our  cognition 
of  self  as  a  person.  We  know  self  as  one  object;  we 
also  know  other  and  external  objects  as  singulars.  Al- 
ready then  have  we  number  in  the  concrete,  involved  in 
this  our  primary  knowledge.  Every  object  known,  and 
especially  self,  is  known  as  one.  Every  other  object 
known  is  known  as  another  one.  If  we  know  self  as 
one,  then  the  external  object  which  is  known  as  different 
from  self  is  known  as  a  second  one.  The  mind  can  now 
think  of  one  object,  and  of  one  object  +  another  object, 
or  of  two,  and  of  one  object  -f  another  object  -f-  another 
object,  or  of  three.  It  can  then,  by  a  process  of  ab- 
straction, separate  the  numbers  from  the  objects,  in 
order  to  their  separate  consideration.  Not  that  it  sup- 
poses for  one  instant  that  numbers  can  exist  apart  from 
objects,  but  it  can  separately  contemplate  them.  One 
cannot  exist  apart  from  one  object,  or  tivo  from  two 
objects,  but  the  mind  can  think  about  the  one  or  the  two 
apart  from  the  peculiarity  of  the  objects.  Its  judgments 
and  its  conclusions  in  all  such  cases,  if  conducted  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  thought,  will  apply  to  objects; 
that  is,  all  its  judgments  regarding  one,  two,  or  a  thou- 
sand, will  apply  to  a  corresponding  number  of  objects. 
Having  obtained  in  this  way  a  knowledge  of  numbers  in 
the  concrete,  and  numbers  in  the  abstract,  the  mind  is 
prepared  to  discover  relations  among  numbers  in  a  man- 


NUMBER.  125 

ner  to  be  afterwards  specified  in  the  book  on  Primitive 
Judgments. 

But  before  leaving  our  present  topic,  it  may  be 
proper  to  state  that  the  mind  has  no  such  conviction  of 
the  existence  of  numbers  separate  from  the  objects  num- 
bered, as  it  has  of  space,  distinct  from  the  objects  in 
space,  or  as  it  has  of  time,  distinct  from  the  events  which 
happen  in  time ;  nor  has  it  any  intuitive  belief  as  to  the 
necessary  infinity  of  objects  or  of  numbers.  True,  it 
can  set  no  limit  to  the  number  of  objects,  but  it  is  not 
compelled  to  believe  that  there  can  be  no  limits,  as  it  is 
constrained  to  believe  that  there  can  be  no  bounds  to 
space  or  to  time. 

Aristotle  places  number  among  the  sensibles  perceived  by  the 
common  sense  {De  Anivia,  ir.  6  ;  in.  1).  He  says  each  sense  per- 
ceives unity:  kKacm]  yhp  Uv  alaedveTai  atadttais  (ni.  1,  5,  ed.  Trend.), 
Descartes  makes  number  perceived  by  us  in  all  perceptions  of  body 
(JPrin.  Part  l.  69).  Locke  says  of  Unity  or  One  :  "  Every  object 
our  senses  are  employed  about,  every  idea  in  our  understandings, 
every  thought  of  our  minds,  brings  this  idea  along  with  it  "  (Essay, 
u.  xvi.  1).  Buffier  says  that  the  knowledge  that  /  exist,  I  am,  I 
think,  is  in  a  sense  the  same  as,  or  at  least  includes  this,  I  am  one 
(Prem.  Ve'r.  Part  ii.  10). 


CHAPTER  XII. 

MOTION. 

Our  perception  of  motion  is,  as  it  appears  to  me, 
intuitive.  But  it  supposes  more  than  sense,  or  sense- 
perception,  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  prob- 
able that  we  have  an  apprehension  of  change  of  place, 
from  the  movement  of  our  intuitively  localized  organs, 
—  say  from  a  member  of  the  body  being  moved  by  the 
locomotive  energy,  as  when  I  lift  my  arm  ;  this  percep- 
tion will  be  especially  apt  to  arise  when  we  move  the 
hand  along  organs  to  which  a  place  has  been  given.  Or 
we  may  apprehend  an  extra-organic  body  by  the  touch 
or  muscular  sense,  and  by  the  same  sense  feel  our  hand 
or  some  other  extra-organic  body  passing  over  it.  We 
may  also  get  the  perception  by  the  sense  of  sight.  The 
chiid  touching  a  part  of  the  body  by  its  hand,  will  see 
the  image  of  its  hand  moving  to  perform  the  act.  Be- 
sides, the  "  image  of  our  own  body  occupies,  in  nearly 
all  pictures  on  our  retina,  regularly  some  determinate 
space  in  the  upper,  middle,  or  lower  pai't  of  the  field  of 
vision  ;"  it  remains  constant  while  the  other  images  are 
seen  moving.  There  is  more  here,  however,  than  imme- 
diate cognition.  There  is  a  brief  exercise  of  memory; 
we  must,  at  the  same  time  that  we  perceive  the  body  as 
now  in  one  place,  remember  that  it  was  formerly  in 
another  place.  There  is  an  exercise,  too,  of  comparison 
in  noticing  the  relation  between  the  object  in  respect  of 
the  place  in  which  it  has  been,  and  the  place  in  which  it 
now  is.     And  upon  our  discovering  change  of  any  kind 


MOTION. 


127 


in  the  motion,  the  intuition  of  cause  comes  in  to  declare 
that  there  must  have  been  active  power  at  work.  This 
is  one  of  those  cases  which  will  come  before  us  more  and 
more  frequently  as  we  advance,  in  which  cognitions, 
beliefs,  and  judgments  mingle  together ;  and  yet  the  act 
can  scarcely  be  described  as  complex,  except  in  this 
sense,  that  on  other  occasions  some  of  the  parts  can  exist 
separately  or  in  other  combinations.  The  circumstance 
that  these  other  elements  conjoin  in  our  conviction  as  to 
motion,  will  bring  the  subject  before  us  in  other  parts  of 
the  Treatise. 

MuUer's  Physioloyy ,  trans,  by  Baly,  p.  1083.  Aristotle  places 
motion,  like  number,  among  the  common  sensibles  ;  Descartes 
among  the  properties  perceived  in  every  perception  of  body  (see 
places  in  last  note) ;  and  Locke  among  the  primary  qualities  of 
bodies,  which  are  always  in  them  (ii,  viii.  22).  The  young  man 
operated  upon  by  Dr.  Franz  for  cataract,  three  days  after  the  opera- 
tion, saw  "an  extensive  field  of  light,  in  which  everything  ap- 
peared dull,  confused,  and  in  motion."  In  a  case  reported  by  Dr. 
Wardrop,  the  woman  returning  home  after  the  operation  saw  a 
hackney  coach  pass,  and  asked,  "What  is  that  large  thing  that 
passed  us  ?  "     (See  Abbott,  Sight  and  Touch,  p.  153.) 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

POWER. 

I  HAVE  been  laboring  to  show,  in  the  last  chapter  and 
in  this,  that  power  is  involved  in  our  knowledge  of  sub- 
stance. We  can  never  know  either  self,  or  bodies  be- 
yond self,  except  as  exercising  influence  or  potency. 
Not  that  we  are  to  suppose  that  we  have  thus  by  in- 
tuition an  abstract  or  a  general  idea  of  power  ;  all  that 
we  have  is  a  knowledge  of  a  given  substance  acting. 
This  seems  the  only  doctrine  iu  accordance  with  the 
revelations  of  consciousness.  It  is  involved  in  the  com- 
mon statement  that  we  c.innot  know  substance  except 
by  its  properties ;  for  what  are  properties  but  powers 
acting  when  the  needful  conditions  are  supplied?  I 
reckon  it  as  an  oversight  in  a  great  body  of  metaphy- 
sicians that  they  have  been  afraid  to  ascribe  our  appre- 
hension of  power  to  intuition.  In  consequence  of  this 
neglect,  some  never  get  the  idea  of  power,  but  merely  of 
succession,  within  the  bare  limits  of  experience,  which 
can  never  entitle  us  to  argue  that  the  world  must  have 
proceeded  from  Divine  Power;  others  have  been  obliged 
to  find  cause,  not  in  any  perception  of  the  mind  as  it 
looks  on  things,  but  in  some  form  imposed  by  the  mind 
on  subjects  ;  while  a  considerable  number  hesitate  and 
vacillate  in  their  account,  representing  it  now  as  an 
original  conviction,  and  now  as  an  acquisition  of  expe- 
rience. 

Wherever  there  is  power  in  act,  there  is  an  effect. 
But  the  discovery  of  the  relation   between   cause   and 


POWER.  129 

effect  cannot  be  discovered  except  by  an  exercise  of 
judgment.  The  discussion  of  the  nature  of  our  convic- 
tion of  Power  will  be  resumed  under  the  head  of  Primi- 
tive Judgments. 

It  is  by  overlooking  the  varied  attributes  perceived  by  intuition, 
as  specified  in  these  last  chapters,  that  J.  S.  Mill  reaches  his  deplo- 
rably defective  definitions  of  matter  and  mind.  He  says  :  "Matter 
may  be  defined  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensations  "  (^Examination 
of  Hamilton,  p.  198).  No  doubt  there  are  accompanying  sensations, 
but  matter  is  perceived  by  us  as  a  thing  without  us,  extended  and 
with  potency  in  multiplied  forms.  Mind  "  is  a  series  of  feelings 
aware  of  itself."  But  we  know  it  as  vastly  more  :  it  is  a  series  not 
only  of  feelings,  but  of  perceptions  of  things,  memories,  imaginations, 
judgments,  moral  decisions,  volitions.  And  then  there  is  an  itself, 
of  which,  it  ia  acknowledged,  we  are  aware,  and  this  makes  the 
•whole  a  substance. 


BOOK  II. 

PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THEIE,   GENERAL  NATUKE. 
I. 

Our  primary  cognitions  and  beliefs  are  very  inti- 
mately connected,  and  they  run  almost  insensibly  into 
each  other.  Yet  they  may  be  distinguished.  The 
phrase  "  primitive  cognition,"  when  we  find  it  needful 
to  separate  it  from  faith,  might  be  confined  in  strictness 
to  those  mental  energies  in  which  the  mind  looks  on 
an  object  now  present,  —  say  on  body  perceived  by  the 
senses,  or  on  self  in  a  particular  state,  or  on  a  represen- 
tation in  the  mind  ;  and  then  "  faith  "  would  be  applied 
to  all  those  exercises  in  which  we  are  convinced  of  the 
existence  of  an  object  not  now  before  us,  or  under  im- 
mediate inspection. 

Philosophers  have  drawn  the  distinction  between  Pre- 
sentative  and  Representative  Knowledge.  In  the  former 
the  object  is  present  at  the  time ;  we  perceive  it,  we  feel 
it,  we  are  conscious  of  it  as  now  and  here  and  under  our 
inspection.  In  Representative  Knowledge  there  is  an 
object  now  present,  representing  an  absent  object.  Thus 
I  may  have  an  image  or  conception  of  Venice,  with  its 
decaying  beauty,  and  this  is  now  present  and  under  the 
eye  of  consciousness  ;  but  it  represents  something  absent 
and  distant,  of  the  existence  of  which  I  am  at  the  same 
time  convinced.     When  I  was  actually  in  Venice,  and 


THEIR   GENERAL   NATURE.  131 

gazed  on  its  churches  and  palaces  rising  out  of  the 
waters,  there  would  have  been  no  propriety  in  saying 
that  I  believe  in  the  existence  of  the  city,  —  the  correct 
phrase  would  have  been  that  I  know  it  to  exist.  I  know, 
too,  that  I  have  at  this  moment  an  idea  of  Venice  ;  but  as 
Venice  itself  is  not  before  me,  the  proper  expression  of 
my  conviction  is,  that  I  believe  in  its  existence.  I  main- 
tain that  whenever  we  have  passed  beyond  Presentative 
Knowledge,  and  are  assured  of  the  reality  of  an  absent 
object,  there  faith  —  it  may  be  in  a  very  simple  form, 
but  still  real  faith  —  has  entered  as  an  element.  So  far 
as  I  am  conscious  of  an  imaging  of  the  past,  or  a  judg- 
ing of  it,  or  a  reasoning  about  it,  my  mental  state  is 
cognition ;  but  so  far  as  I  am  convinced  of  the  existence 
of  the  absent  object,  my  state  of  mind  is  belief.  In  such 
examples  the  faith  is  of  a  low  order,  and  need  not  be 
distinguished  from  knowledge,  except  for  the  purposes 
of  rigid  science ;  but  still  faith  is  there,  and  there  in  its 
essential  character ;  and  he  who  would  know  what  faith 
is,  must  view  it  in  these  lower  forms,  "  which  exist  more 
simple  in  their  elements,"  as  well  as  in  the  higher,  just 
as  he  who  would  know  the  nature  of  the  plant  or  animal 
must  study  it  in  the  lichen  or  zoophyte.  These  are  the 
incipient  movements  of  a  mental  power  which  is  capable 
of  rising  to  the  greatest  heights  of  earth,  and  looking 
up  to  the  heaven  above,  which  can  call  before  it  all  time, 
and  go  forth  even  into  the  eternity  beyond. 

According  to  this  account  we  are  said  to  know  our- 
selves, and  the  objects  presented  to  the  senses  and  the 
representations  (always,  however,  as  presentations)  in 
the  mind  ;  but  to  believe  in  objects  which  we  have  seen 
in  time  past,  but  which  are  not  now  present,  and  in 
objects  which  we  have  never  seen,  and  very  specially  in 
objects  which  we  can  never  fully  know,  such  as  an  Infi- 


132  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

nite  God.  The  mind  seems  to  begin,  not  with  faith,  but 
with  cognition.  It  sets  out  with  tlie  knowledge  of  an 
external  object  presented  to  it,  and  with  a  knowledge  of 
self  contemplating  that  object.  I  cannot,  then,  agree 
with  those  who  maintain  that  faith — I  mean  natural 
faith  —  must  precede  knowledge.  I  hold  that  knowledge, 
psj'chologieally  considered,  appears  first,  and  then  faith. 
But  around  our  original  cognition  there  grows  and  clus- 
ters a  body  of  primitive  beliefs  which  goes  out  far  be- 
yond our  personal  knowledge.  Knowledge  is,  after  all, 
the  root ;  but  from  this  stable  and  more  earthly  ground 
there  spring  beliefs  which  mount  in  living  power  and  in 
lovely  form  and  color  toward  the  sky. 

II. 

By  this  account  we  keep  faith  from  being  wrapt  up  in 
such  a  cloud  as  it  often  is.  We  see  how  it  joins  on  to 
cognition  and  mingles  with  it.  Faith,  as  the  telescope, 
shows  objects  which  unaided  sense  cannot  discern,  but 
still  there  is  a  personal  knowledge,  an  eye  to  guarantee 
the  accuracy  of  the  vision.  We  have  immediate  knowl- 
edge always  with  us  —  we  have  self  in  a  particular  state 
or  exercise;  but  rising  from  this  we  believe  in  an  object 
which  is  absent, — in  the  loftier  exercises  of  faith  we 
believe  in  objects  which  we  have  never  seen,  and  which 
we  never  can  see  in  this  world.  We  are  thus  prevented, 
too,  from  making  faith  a  mere  subjective  feeling,  and 
sep;vratiiig  it  from  things.  It  is  in  regard  to  objects  ap- 
prehended, and  apprehended  because  we  have  known 
them,  or  have  known  others  with  like  qnivlities,  that  we 
enteitaiii  faith.  It  is  from  the  contemplation  of  such 
objects  that  we  are  led  to  believe  that  they  have  quali- 
ties which  do  not  fall  under  our  immediate  cognizance. 
In  a  sense  we  know  space,  for  it  is  present  to  us ;  cer- 


THEIR   GENERAL   NATURE.  133 

tainly  body  occupying  space  is  ever  before  the  senses ; 
but  when  we  look  on  space  as  having  no  bounds,  we  are 
beyond  the  territory  of  knowledge,  we  have  mounted 
into  the  region  of  faith. 

An  important  question  is  here  raised,  Can  there  be 
faith  without  some  idea  of  what  is  believed  ?  I  am  con- 
vinced that  there  is  always  an  apprehension  of  some 
kind  in  faith.  Without  an  image  or  notion  to  fix  on, 
there  could  be  no  faith.  But  to  qualify  this  statement 
we  must  take  along  with  us  several  other  truths  equally 
important.  We  may  believe  in  truths  which  we  cannot 
comprehend  in  the  sense  of  knowing  all  their  qualities 
and  relations.  In  this  sense  it  may  be  said  that  we 
cannot  fully  comprehend  any  one  object  in  earth  or 
heaven  ;  for  everything  known  to  us  has  references  to 
other  things  which  are  unknown ;  beyond  every  country 
known,  there  is  to  us  a  terra  incognita.  But  there  are 
objects  which  impress  us  with  the  conviction  that  we 
have  scarcely  any  acquaintance  with  their  nature,  and 
that  there  is  much  in  them  or  about  them  which  is  to 
us  incognizable.  Thus  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
there  is  so  much  apprehended  by  us  because  revealed,  but 
there  is  more  which  we  try  in  vain  to  compass.  We  be- 
lieve, too,  in  truths  which  we  cannot  reconcile  with  other 
truths;  and  we  may  adhere  to  them  resolutely  in  spite 
of  improbabilities  and  difficulties.  I  apprehend,  indeed, 
that  in  all  such  cases  our  intellectual  nature  will  con- 
strain us  to  believe  that  there  must  be  some  method  of 
reconciliation,  though  the  link  cannot  be  perceived  by 
us.  Were  it  shown  in  regai'd  to  any  proposition  that  it 
is  inconsistent  with  an  acknowledged  truth,  I  suppose 
our  faith  in  it  would  vanish.  Could  it  be  demonstrated 
—  which,  however,  it  never  has  been  —  that  a  primary 
faith  is  contradicted  by  any  other  primary  truth,  I  be- 


134  PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS. 

lieve  we  should  be  landed  in  absolute  scepticism.  Fur- 
ther, we  may  believe  objects  to  possess  qualities  of 
which  we  have  no  notion.  Thus  in  heaven  there  are 
pleasures  such  as  it  hath  not  entered  into  the  heart  of 
man  to  conceive.  Thus,  too,  on  earth  we  often  find 
effects  proceeding  from  causes  which  are  utterly  un- 
known. Still  even  in  such  cases  there  is  an  apprehen- 
sion ;  there  is  an  apprehension  of  an  object  with  a  qual- 
ity ;  there  is  an  apprehension  of  a  place  with  pleasures 
of  a  kind  different  from  those  which  we  enjoy  on  earth ; 
there  is  the  apprehension  of  a  cause  producing  this  effect. 
In  such  exercises  the  mind  is  impressed  at  times  pain- 
fully, at  times  sublimely,  with  the  inadequacy  of  its  ideas 
to  represent  the  object,  and  this  is  often  one  of  the  pecu- 
liar features  of  our  faith,  marking  it  out  from  our  clear 
intellectual  notions  and  judgments.  In  many  of  our 
faiths  the  mind  sees  but  a  speck  of  light  in  midst  of 
circumambient  darkness. 

The  two,  knowledge  and  faith,  differ  psychologically, 
and  there  are  important  philosophic  ends  to  be  served  by 
distinguishing  them ;  but  after  all  it  is  more  important 
to  fix  our  attention  on  their  points  of  agreement  and 
coincidence.  The  belief  has  a  basis  of  cognition,  the 
cognition  has  a  superstructure  of  beliefs.  The  one  con- 
viction, equally  with  the  other,  carries  within  itself  its 
validity  and  authority.  No  man  is  entitled  to  restrict 
himself  to  cognitions,  and  refuse  to  attend  or  to  yield  to 
the  beliefs  which  he  is  also  led  to  entertain  by  the  very 
constitution  of  his  mind.  No  man  can  do  so,  in  fact. 
He  who  would  do  so  must  needs  go  out  of  the  world. 
Every  man  must  act  upon  his  native  beliefs  as  well  as 
upon  his  cognitions.  He  requires  no  external  considera- 
tion to  lead  him  to  trust  in  the  one  any  more  than  in  the 
other,  for  each   has  its    sufficiency  in   itself.      He   who 


THEIR  GENERAL   NATURE.  135 

would  weakly  give  up  his  native  faiths  because  assaults 
are  made  on  them,  and  doggedly  resolve  to  yield  to 
nothing  but  immediate  cognitions,  will  find  that  the  scep- 
tic who  has  driven  him  from  the  beliefs  will  go  on  to 
attack  the  cognitions  likewise,  and  that  he  can  defend 
the  cognitions  only  on  grounds  which  might  have  ena- 
bled him  to  stand  by  his  credences  likewise.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  grieve  over  the  attempts,  for  the  last  age 
or  two,  of  a  school  of  thinkers  who  labor  to  prove  that 
the  understanding,  or  the  speculative  reason,  leads  to 
scepticism  and  nihilism,  and  then  appeal  to  faith  to  save 
us  from  the  abyss  before  us.  I  have  no  toleration  for 
those  who  tell  us  with  a  sigh,  too  often  of  affectation, 
that  they  are  very  sorry  that  knowledge  or  reason  leads 
to  insoluble  doubts  and  contradictions,  from  which  they 
are  longing  to  be  delivered  by  some  mysterious  faith. 
It  is  time  to  put  an  end  to  this  worse  than  civil  strife, 
to  this  setting  of  one  part  of  the  soul  against  another. 
I  do  not  believe  that  the  understanding,  or  the  reason, 
or  any  other  power  of  the  mind,  lands  us  in  scepticism. 
Each  cognitive  faculty  conducts  in  its  own  way  to  its 
own  truths.  The  intelligence  and  the  faith  are  not  con- 
flicting, but  conspiring  elements.  I  am  sure  that  the 
criticism  which  has  attacked  the  knowledge  would,  if 
followed  out,  be  no  less  formidable  in  its  assaults  on  the 
belief.  In  these  pages  I  am  endeavoring  to  show  how 
they  concur  and  cooperate,  being  almost  always  associ- 
ated in  one  concrete  act,  which  we  analyze  merely  for 
scientific  ends. 

III. 

But  while  we  must  yield  to  our  intuitive  beliefs  as 
well  as  perceptions,  we  are  not  therefore  to  suppose  that 
our  faiths  are  beyond  inspection  and  above  examination. 
They  are  liable  to  be  tried,  and  should  at  times  be  tried, 


136  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

by  the  very  same  tests  as  our  cognitions.  We  are  not  to 
allow  ourselves,  without  examination  and  without  review, 
to  yield  to  whatever  may  suggest  itself  to  our  own 
minds,  or  be  recommended  to  us  by  others,  as  a  primi- 
tive belief.  We  must  try  the  spirits,  whether  they  are 
of  God.  In  nothing  is  man  so  apt  to  run  into  excess 
and  extravagance,  into  folly  and  error,  as  in  yielding  to 
plausible  beliefs.  The  tendency  of  faith  is  upwards,  but 
it  needs  weights  and  plummets  to  hold  it  down,  lest  it 
mount  into  a  region  of  thin  air,  and  there  burst  and 
dissolve.  Fortunately  we  have  a  ready  means  at  hand 
of  trying  our  constitutional  beliefs,  and  determining  for 
us  when  they  should  be  disallowed,  and  when  they 
should  be  allowed  to  flow  out  freely.  Are  they  self- 
evident?  Are  they  necessary,  —  so  necessary  that  we 
cannot  believe  the  opposite?  Are  they  universal? 
These  three  questions,  searchingly  asked  and  honestly 
answered,  will  settle  for  us  whether  we  ought  or  ought 
not  to  follow  a  belief  proffered  to  our  acceptance.  We 
are  at  liberty  to  employ  a  belief  in  argument,  appeal, 
and  speculation,  only  under  the  same  conditions  as  a 
cognition ;  that  is,  having  shown  that  it  is  a  constitu- 
tional one,  we  must  further  determine  more  accurately 
its  nature  and  law,  its  extent  and  limits.  Thus,  and 
thus  only,  can  we  hope  on  the  one  hand  to  be  kept  from 
mistaking  our  own  fancies,  misapprehensions,  wishes,  or 
prejudices  for  primitive  and  heaven-born  beliefs,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  be  justified  in  appealing  to  the  faiths 
which  have  the  sanction  of  our  constitution,  and  the  God 
who  gave  us  our  constitution,  and  in  using  them  as  a 
basis  on  which  to  rear  a  fabric  of  philosophical,  or  eth- 
ical, or  theological  truths. 

The  question  is  started.  Whence  the  seeming  mistakes 
of   memory  ?     We   find  at  times  two   honest  witnesses 


THEIR  GENERAL   NATURE.  137 

giving  different  accounts  of  the  same  transaction.  We 
have  all  found  ourselves  at  fault  in  our  recollections  on 
certain  occasions.  I  believe  we  must  account  for  the 
seeming  treachery  of  the  memory  in  much  the  same 
way  as  we  do  for  the  deception  of  the  senses.  There 
ever  mingle  with  our  proper  recollections  more  or  fewer 
inferences,  and  in  these  there  may  be  errors.  In  order 
to  clear  up  the  subject  we  draw  the  distinctiou  between 
our  natural  or  pure  reminiscences  and  those  mixed  ones 
in  which  there  are  processes  of  reasoning.^ 

The  distinction  between  Presentative  and  Representative  Knowl- 
edge is  drawn  by  Hamilton  in  bis  edition  of  Reid,  Note  B.  The 
view  given  by  me  in  the  text  seems  to  be  in  accordance  with  such 
language  as  the  following,  used  by  him  in  Melaph.  Lect.  12  :  "  Prop- 
erly speaking,  we  know  only  the  actual  and  the  present,  and  all 
real  knowledge  is  an  immediate  knowledge.  What  is  said  to  be  me- 
diately known  is  in  truth  not  known  to  be,  but  only  believed  to  be." 
Speaking  of  memory,  he  says  :  "  It  is  not  a  knowledge  of  the  past 
at  all,  but  a  knowledge  of  the  present  and  a  belief  of  the  past." 
Consistently  or  inconsistently,  he  says  that  "  belief  always  precedes 
knowledge"  (Lect.  3).  Speaking  of  the  external  world,  he  says: 
"  We  believe  it  to  exist,  only  because  we  are  immediately  cognizant 
of  it  as  existing  "  (Reid,  p.  750).  With  this  I  concur.  But  I  can- 
not agree  with  what  follows,  where  he  seems  to  found  our  knowledge 
on  a  belief,  and  represents  our  knowing  that  we  know  as  founded  on 
a  belief  prior  to  or  deeper  than  knowledge.  "  If  asked,  indeed, 
How  do  we  know  that  we  know  it  ?  .  .  .  how  do  we  know  that  this 
object  is  not  a  mere  mode  of  mind  illusively  presented  to  us  as  a 
mode  of  matter  ?  then  indeed  we  must  reply  that  we  do  not  (?)  in 
propriety  know  that  what  we  are  compelled  to  perceive  as  not-self  is 
not  a  perception  of  self,  and  that  we  can  only  on  reflection  believe 
such  to  be  the  case,  in  reliance  on  the  original  necessity  of  so  believ- 
ing imposed  on  us  by  our  nature." 

Autrustine  gave  a  province  both  to  knowledge  and  faith  without 
very  distinctly  clearing  up  the   boundaries:   "  Quamvis   enim,   nisi 

^  See  this  explained  in  my  Psychology :  The  Cognitive  Powers,  pp. 
163,  164. 


138  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

aliquid  intelligat  nemo  possit  credere  in  Deum  ;  tamen  ipsa  fide  qua 
credit,  sanetur,  et  intelligat  ampliora.  Alia  sunt  enim  quae  nisi 
intelligaraus  non  credimus ;  et  alia  sunt  quse  nisi  credainus  non  intel- 
ligimus  "  (E)tar.  in  Psalm  118).  There  were  profound  discussions 
in  the  scholastic  ages  as  to  the  relation  of  faith  and  knowledge,  but 
it  was  in  regard  to  matters  of  religion,  specially  of  revelation  includ- 
ing church  authority.  Anselm  gave  the  first  or  deeper  place  to 
faith  :  "  Neque  enim  quasro  intelligere  ut  credam,  sed  credo  ut  intel- 
ligam  "  (Med.  21).  Abelard,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  that  we 
must  begin  with  finding  reasons  to  show  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
and  thence  reach  faith,  and  go  on  to  a  higher  cognition  or  intuition 
(I'heol.  ii).  The  discussion  has  been  renewed  from  age  to  age  ever 
since  by  theologians.  Romanists  and  High  Church  Divines  have 
commonly  given  the  precedence  to  faith,  and  decided  Protestants  to 
knowledge.  In  particular,  the  Puritans  represent  a  certain  amount 
of  knowledge  as  necessary  to  faith,  but  also  add  that  faith  has  a 
powerful  influence  in  increasing  knowledge.  Thus  Char  nock  (Knowl- 
edge of  God)  :  "  There  can  be  no  act  about  an  unknown  object." 
"Faith  cannot  be  without  the  knowledge  of  God  and  Christ." 
"  Knowledge  is  antecedent  to  faith  in  the  order  of  nature."  There 
was  confusion  in  this  whole  discussion  owins:  to  its  not  beino^  deter- 
mined  psychologically  what  is  the  precise  nature,  and  what  are  the 
diiferences,  of  knowledge  and  faith,  and  of  reason  and  faith.  In 
every  exercise  of  mind  about  the  great  objects  and  truths  of  religion, 
there  must  be  both  cognitive  and  faith  elements  embraced,  and  rea- 
son always  comprises  faith  when  it  refers  to  the  existence  of  absent 
objects. 

Kant  labored  to  demonstrate  that  the  Speculative  Reason  lands  us 
in  contradiction,  and  was  not  given  us  in  order  to  reach  objective 
truth ;  but  then  he  called  in  a  Practical  Reason  which  guaranteed  a 
moral  law,  a  God,  and  immortality.  See  the  Methodenlehre  in  the 
Krilik  of  Pure  Reason.  Jacobi  admitted  far  too  readily,  to  Kant 
and  Fichte,  that  speculation  and  philosophy  led  to  scepticism,  but  he 
fell  back  on  Faith  (Glaube)  or  Sentiment  (Gefiihl),  which  he  repre- 
sented as  a  Revelation  (Offenbarung).  See  his  David  Hume:  Ueber 
den  Glfiuhen,  and  Jacobi  an  Fichte.  He  has  given  views  of  intuition 
and  of  faith  as  true  as  they  are  beautiful  ;  but  he  has  not  unfolded 
the  precise  nature  of  faith,  nor  seen  its  relation  to  the  understand- 
ing. Even  Fichte,  after  trying  to  show  that  knowledge  (Wissen) 
leads  to  an  absolute  idealism,  in  which  we  know  not  whether  our 
very  thought  may  not  be  a  dream,  resorts  to  Faith  (Glaube),  and 


THEIR   GENERAL   NATURE.  139 

allows  an  appeal  to  the  Heart  (Hertz)  {Bestimmung  des  Menschen, 
Buch  III.  Glaube).     Sir  W.  Hamilton  maintains  that  "  all  that  we 
know  is  phenomenal  of  the  unknown  "   (^Discuss,  p.  644,  2d  ed.), 
and    that   "  the   knowledge  of   Nothing  is   the  principle   or   result 
of  all  true  philosophy"  (p.  609),  but  delights  to  recognize  a  faith 
which  looks  beyond  ;   not  explaining,  however  what  he  means   by 
faith.     "  We  are  warned,"  he  says,  "  from  recognizing  the  domain  of 
our   kiiowledij;e  as  necessarily  coextensive  with  the  horizon  of  our 
faith."    And  he  adds :  "  And  by  a  wonderful  revelation  we  are  thus, 
in  the  very  consciousness  of  our  inability  to  conceive  aught  above 
the  relative  and  the  finite,  inspired  with  a   belief  in  the  existence 
of  something  unconditioned,  beyond  the  sphere  of  all  comprehensive 
reality  "  (p.  15).     Hamilton  is  often  appealing  to  faith,  but  has  left 
a  very  imperfect  account  of  it.     "He  adopts,"  as  Mr.  Calderwood 
acutely   remarks,   "the   Kantian  distribution,    which   embraces   the 
mental  phenomena  under  the  three  divisions  of  Cognition,  Feeling, 
and  Appetency.     The  first  embraces  the  phenomena  of  knowledge  ; 
the  second,  of  pleasure  and  pain;  and  the  third,  of  will  and  desire. 
If,  then,  faith  has  any  place  in  its  distribution,  it  is  to  be  found 
among  the  phenomena  of   knowledge  "  (Philosophy  of  the   Infinite, 
where   are    many    fine   remarks   on   faith   and   knowledge,    2d   ed. 
p.  136).     But  the  truth  is,  it  is  not  clear  in  which  of  the  three  divi- 
sions Kant  or  Hamilton  would  put  faith.     The  difficulty  of  finding  a 
place  for  faith,  and  we  may  add,  for  conscience  and  imagination, 
shows  that  their  three-fold  division  of  the  mental  attributes  is  defec- 
tive ;  the  same  may  be  said  of  that  of  Professor  Bain  (Senses  and 
Intellect,  pp.  2-10,  and  App.  I.).      But   passing  over   this,  it  would 
almost  look  as  if  Hamilton  would  have  to  put  faith  into  the  compart- 
ment of  feelinjj.    "  Knowledge  and  belief  differ  not  only  in  degree  but 
in  kind.     Knowledge  is   certainly  founded  on  intuition.     Belief  is 
certainly  founded   upon  feeling  "    (Logic,  Lect.  37).     We   cannot 
conceive  a   more  radically  defective  account  than  this  of  faith,  to 
found   it  upon  feeling,  which  he  explains  as  consisting  in  pleasure 
and  pain.     The  disciples  of  Hamilton  have  not  thrown   any  light  on 
the  subject.     Faith  is  explained  by  Professor  Fraser  (Essays,  p.  32) 
as  "  the  belief  of  principles  which  in  themselves  are  incognizable  or 
irreconcilable  by  the  understanding,  and  yet  unquestionable."     But 
surely  we  have  faith  in  God,  who  j-et  is  not  incognizable.     Professor 
Veitch  says  (Art.  Hamilton  in  Diet.  Univ.  Biog.):  "  The  absolute  or 
infinite  is  cast  beyond  the  sphere  of  thought  and  science  ;  it  is  still, 
however,  allowed  by  Hamilton  to  remain  in  some  sense  in  conscious- 


140  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

ness,  for  it  is  grasped  by  faith,  and  faith  is  a  conscious  act.  The 
question,  accordingly,  at  once  meets  us  :  In  what  sense  and  how  far 
can  there  be  an  object  within  consciousness  which  is  not  properly 
within  thought  or  knowledge  ?  In  other  words,  how  far  is  our  faith 
in  the  infinite  intelligent  and  intelligible  ?  This  point  demands 
farther  and  more  detailed  treatment  than  it  has  met  with  either  at 
the  hands  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  himself,  or  any  one  who  has  sought 
to  carry  out  his  principles."  For  years  past  I  have  been  calling  on 
the  disciples  of  Hamilton  to  explain  what  they  mean  by  faith.  Till 
this  point  is  cleared  up,  there  is  an  unfiUed-up  chasm  in  the  whole 
psychology  and  philosophy  of  the  school. 


CHAPTER  II. 

SPACE  AND   TIME. 

I. 

Of  Space  in  tlie  concrete  we  have  an  immediate 
knowledge ;  that  is,  by  the  senses,  certainly  by  some  of 
them,  such  as  the  touch  and  the  sight ;  most  probably  by 
all  of  them  we  know  bodies,  say  our  own  bodily  organ- 
ism, as  extended,  that  is,  as  occupying  space.  By  ab- 
straction we  can  fix  our  attention  on  the  space  as  distinct 
from  associated  qualities,  and  by  inward  reflection  we 
can  gather  what  are  the  convictions  attached.  These 
convictions  pass  beyond  knowledge  proper,  and  become 
beliefs,  that  is,  convictions  in  regard  to  something  which 
we  do  not  immediately  know,  nay,  which  we  may  never 
be  able  to  know. 

With  Time,  also,  we  have  an  immediate  acquaintance. 
In  sense-perception  and  self-consciousness  we  know  a 
particular  object  or  mental  state  as  now  present.  Our 
consciousness  is  continuous ;  speedily  does  immediate 
consciousness  slide  into  memory ;  the  present  becomes 
past,  and  is  remembered  as  past.  The  child's  organism 
is  now  in  a  state  of  pain  ;  immediately  after  the  pain  is 
gone,  but  the  pain  of  the  past  is  remembered,  and  re- 
membered as  being  past.  Already,  then,  there  is  the 
idea  of  time  always  in  the  concrete,  —  we  remember 
something  as  having  been  under  our  consciousness  in  the 
past.  By  abstraction  we  can  then  think  of  the  time  as 
different  from  the  event  remembered  in  time ;  and  by 
introspection  we  can  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  attached 
convictions.     Many  of  these  are  of  the  nature  of  faiths 


142  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

going  far  beyond  what  is,  or  ever  can  be,  immediately 
known. 

Space  and  time  mingle  with  all  our  perceptions.  Yet 
after  all  we  can  say  little  about  them ;  all  that  we  can 
do  as  metaphysicians  is  to  analyze  and  express  our  orig- 
inal convictions.  It  belongs  to  the  mathematician  to 
evolve  deductively  what  is  involved  in  certain  of  them. 
In  unfolding  the  necessary  convictions  we  may  make  the 
following  affirmations :  — 

II. 

Time  and  Space  have  a  reality  independent  of  the 
Percipient  Mind,  and  out  of  the  percipient  mind.  The 
intelligence  does  not  create  them,  it  discovers  them,  and 
it  discovers  them  as  having  an  existence  independent  of 
the  mind  contemplating  them,  as  having  this  existence 
whether  the  mind  contemplates  them  or  no,  and  an 
existence  out  of  and  beyond  the  mind  as  it  thinks  of 
them.  He  who  denies  this,  is  in  the  yevy  act  setting 
aside  one  of  the  clearest  of  native  principles,  and  has 
left  himself  no  standpoint  from  which  to  repel  any  pro- 
posal, suggested  to  himself  or  oifered  by  another,  to  set 
aside  any  other  conviction,  or  all  other  convictions.  If 
some  one  affirm  that  space  has  no  objective  existence, 
he  leaves  it  competent  for  any  other  coming  after  him 
to  maintain  that  the  objects  perceived  in  space  have  no 
reality.  He  who  allows  that  time  may  have  no  reality 
except  in  the  contemplative  mind,  will  find  himself 
greatly  troubled  to  answer  the  sceptic  when  he  insists 
that  the  events  in  time  are  quite  as  unreal  as  the  time  is 
in  which  they  are  perceived  as  having  occurred.  There 
is  only  one  sure  and  consistent  mode  of  avoiding  these 
troublesome  and  dangerous  consequences,  and  that  is  by 
standing  up  for  the  veracity  of  all  our  fundamental  per- 


SPACE   AND   TIME.  143 

ceptions,  and,  among  others,  of  our  convictions  regarding 
the  reality  of  space  and  time. 

According  to  Kant,  space  and  time  are  the  forms 
given  by  the  mind  to  the  phenomena  which  are  presented 
througfh  the  senses,  and  are  not  to  be  considered  as  hav- 
ing  anything  more  than  a  subjective  existence.  It  is  one 
of  the  most  fatal  heresies  —  that  is,  dogmas  opposed  to 
the  revelations  of  consciousness  —  ever  introduced  into 
philosophy,  and  it  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  the  aberrations 
in  the  school  of  speculation  which  followed.  For  those 
who  were  taught  that  the  mind  could  create  the  space 
and  time,  soon  learned  to  suppose  that  the  mind  could 
also  create  the  objects  and  events  cognized  as  in  space 
and  time,  till  the  whole  external  universe  became  ideal, 
and  all  reality  was  supposed  to  lie  in  a  series  of  con- 
nected mental  forms.  He  who  would  arrest  the  stream 
must  seek  to  stop  it  at  the  place  whence  it  flowed  out ; 
otherwise  all  his  efforts  will  be  ineffectual. 

III. 

Space  and  Time  are  Continuous,  that  is,  they  extend 
out,  flow  on,  without  break,  separation,  or  interruption. 
In  this  respect  they  are  different  from  matter  or  body, 
which  may  be  broken  into  parts,  and  the  parts  separated 
from  each  other.  But  there  can  be  no  gaps  in  space,  no 
cessation  in  time.  There  are,  and  can  be,  no  variations 
in  the  one  or  other.  We  do  speak  of  times  changing, 
but  we  mean  the  circumstances  in  time.  We  say  tempora 
mutantur,  but  the  changes  are  in  the  events,  which 
mutantur  in  illis. 

This  is  one  of  several  circumstances  which  has  made 
space  and  time  to  be  classed  together.  Yet  while  they 
may  be  grouped  under  one  head,  they  are  not  identical, 
and  they  have  their  points  of  difference.     In  particular, 


144  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

space  has  three  dimensions,  —  length,  breadth,  and 
depth ;  that  is,  we  may  contemplate  it  as  extending 
along  any  given  line,  as  spreading  out  in  a  surface,  or  as 
going  out  in  all  directions.  Time  again  has  only  succes- 
sion, present,  priority  and  posteriority.  We  often  apply 
to  time  language  derived  from  space,  and  we  represent 
time  as  a  line,  and  speak  of  it  as  being  only  in  one  direc- 
tion. But  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  such  language  is 
used  metaphorically,  and  has  no  literal  meaning  as  ap- 
plied to  time.  Still  it  points  to  a  truth,  and  specifies  a 
difference  between  space  and  time.  But  in  regard  to 
their  extension  or  flow,  both  are  continuous,  and  spread 
out  or  run  on  without  a  possible  division. 

But  it  will  be  urged,  that  the  question  is  often  dis- 
cussed as  to  whether  space  and  time  are  infinitely  divis- 
ible, and  that  certain  mathematicians  maintain  that  they 
have  demonstrated  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space.  In 
looking  at  this  question,  it  is  desirable  first  of  all  to  have 
it  settled  in  what  sense  extension  is  capable  of  division. 
We  cannot  divide  space  in  the  sense  in  which  we  divide 
matter.  In  dividing  body  we  separate  one  part  of  it 
from  another,  so  as  to  leave  a  space  between.  We  can 
thus  divide  an  apple,  and  keep  one  part  of  it  in  our 
hand,  and  lay  the  other  on  the  table.  But  we  cannot 
thus  separate  or  isolate  space  apart  from  space.  In  the 
sense  of  separation,  we  cannot  with  propriety  speak  of 
the  infinite  divisibility  of  space,  for  it  is  not  divisible  at 
all,  either  finitely  or  infinitely.  The  same  remark  holds 
good  of  time.  The  mind  declares  that  the  separation  of 
space  from  space,  or  of  time  from  time,  is  impossible  in 
the  nature  of  things. ^ 

There  may,  however,  be  relations  discovered  both  in 

1  This  view  is  developed  with  great  acuteness  in  Gillespie's  Neces- 
sary Existence  of  Deity  (Exam.  Antith.  Refut.  Part  in.). 


SPACE   AND   TIME.  145 

Space  and  time.  We  can  conceive  of  less  or  more  of 
extension,  und  of  proportions  between  the  less  and  the 
more  ;  the  one  muy  be  twice  or  ten  times  as  much  as  the 
other.  All  this  we  are  allowed,  nay  necessitated,  to 
think.  The  science  wliich  treats  of  quantity,  that  is, 
mathematics,  has  specially  to  do  with  these  relations. 
There  may  be  little  or  no  impropriety  in  calling  these 
proportions  parts,  provided  we  do  not  misunderstand  the 
language  we  employ,  or  understand  it  as  implying  that 
between  two  spaces  there  can  be  an  interval  in  which 
there  is  no  space.  What  is  meant  by  the  infinite  divi- 
sion of  space  seems  to  be,  that,  fixing  our  thoughts  on 
any  given  section  or  proportion  of  space,  say  the  thou- 
sandth part  of  an  inch,  we  are  at  liberty  to  conceive  of 
the  half  of  it,  and  again  of  the  half  of  the  quotient,  and 
so  on  indefinitely  as  far  as  may  serve  our  purpose  or  we 
may  choose.  Some  of  these  subjects  will  be  resumed 
when  we  come  to  consider  those  primitive  judgments 
which  relate  to  quantity. 

But  before  leaving  the  subject  immediately  before  us, 
it  is  of  importance  to  have  it  noticed  that  our  convictions 
say  nothing  whatever  on  (what  is  a  very  different  mat- 
ter from  the  divisibility  of  space,  though  the  two  have 
often  been  confounded)  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter. 
This  latter  is  a  question  which  can  be  settled  by  nothing 
but  experience  ;  expeiience  at  this  present  stage  of 
science  says  nothing  whatever  on  the  subject,  and  I  sus- 
pect will  never  be  able  to  settle  it  on  one  side  or  other. 
There  might  be  limits  to  man's  capacity  of  dividing 
body  which  would  not  be  limits  to  other  beings,  and 
whether  there  could  be  any  limits  to  a  Being  of  Infinite 
Power  is  a  question  which  it  transcends  our  faculties  to 
answer,  and  which  therefore  we  should  not  attempt  to 
answer. 


146 


PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS. 


IV. 

Space  and  Time  have  and  can  have  no  Limits.  Nor  is 
this  a  mere  negative  proposition,  as  some  have  declared 
it  to  be ;  it  is  a  positive  affirmation  that  to  whatever 
point  we  go,  in  reality  or  in  imagination,  there  must 
be  a  space  and  time  beyond.  Nor  is  it,  as  it  has  been 
represented,  an  impotency  of  mind.  It  is  not  a  mere 
incapacity  to  conceive  that  when  we  go  a  certain 
length  back  or  forward  in  time,  or  out  into  space,  there 
time  and  space  should  cease.  It  is  a  conviction  of  a 
positive  kind,  that  beyond  these  points,  or  beyond  any 
other  space  conceivable,  there  must  still  be  time  and 
space.  This,  as  will  be  shown  more  fully  forthwith,  is  a 
truth  self-evident,  necessary,  universal.  If  we  were  car- 
ried out  to  the  utmost  point  to  which  the  furthest-seeing 
telescope  can  reach,  or  beyond  this  as  far  as  imagination 
can  range,  we  should  confidently  stretch  forth  our  hand 
into  an  outer  region,  believing  that  there  must  be  space 
into  which  it  might  enter,  and  that  if  it  were  hindered 
it  must  be  by  body  occupying  space. 

There  is  more  than  this  embraced  in  our  native  con- 
viction. We  are  constrained  to  believe  as  to  the  space 
and  time  which  we  know  in  part,  and  which  we  are  con- 
strained to  regard  as  beyond  our  power  of  imagination, 
that  they  are  such  that  no  addition  could  be  made  to 
them.  This  is  a  further  and  a  most  important  element 
in  our  conviction.  We  intuitively  know  space  and  time  : 
with  this  we  start.  Looking  to  the  space  and  time  which 
we  thus  know,  we  are  constrained  to  regard  them  as  ever 
going  beyond  our  image  of  them.  But  we  do  more  :  we 
are  convinced  that  they  are  such  in  their  very  nature 
that  no  further  space  and  time  could  be  added  to  them. 
Join  these  elements  together,  and,  so  far  as  I  can  discover 


SPACE  AND   TIME.  147 

by  reflection  on  the  operations  of  my  own  mind,  we  have 
the  conception  and  belief  which  the  mind  of  man  is  able 
to  attain  as  to  the  infinity  of  space  and.  time. 

V. 

But  we  are  already  in  the  heart  of  the  subject  of  the 
Infinite,  to  which  a  separate  chapter  must  be  allotted. 
In  this  chapter  we  have  yet  to  take  up  difficulties  which 
press  on  us  when  we  contemplate  space  and  time.  We 
may  have  occasion  to  show,  at  a  later  part  of  this  work, 
that  our  very  cognitions  often  land  us  in  mysteries,  that 
is,  in  propositions  to  which  we  must  assent,  but  which 
have  bearings  which  we  caimot  comprehend.  To  a  still 
greater  extent  is  it  of  the  nature  of  faith  ever  to  be  going 
out  into  darkness.  For  the  truths  believed  in  may  not 
be  fully  comprehended  in  themselves,  and  their  relations 
may  be  altogether  beyond  our  ken.  It  should  be  frankly 
acknowledged  that  we  are  landed  in  mysteries  which  the 
human  intellect  cannot  explicate,  whenever  we  inquire 
beyond  the  narrow  limits  within  which  our  convictions 
restrain  us.  But  it  is  of  all  courses  the  most  foolish  and 
suicidal  to  urge  the  difficulties  connected  with  space  and 
time  as  a  reason  for  setting  aside  our  intuitive  convictions 
respecting  them,  say  in  regard  to  their  reality.  Doubt- 
less we  are  landed  in  some  perplexities  by  allowing  that 
they  are  real,  but  we  are  landed  in  more  hopeless  diffi- 
culties and  in  far  more  serious  consequences  when  we 
deny  their  reality ;  and  there  is  this  important  difference 
between  the  cases,  that  in  the  one  the  difficulties  arise 
from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  whereas  in  the  other  they 
are  created  by  our  own  unwarranted  affirmations  and 
speculations. 

But  what  are  space  and  time  is  the  question  that  will 
be  pressed  on  us.     To  this  I  reply,  that  it  is  true  of 


148  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

them,  as  of  the  objects  of  every  other  intuitive  convic- 
tion, that  we  cannot  explain  them  except  by  referring  to 
our  original  perception.  All  that  has  been  attempted  in 
this  chapter  is  to  bring  out  clearly  what  is  involved  in 
the  intuition. 

But  it  will  be  asked,  Are  they  substances,  are  they 
modes,  or  are  the}^  relations?  To  this  I  reply,  that 
these  questions  relate  not  so  much  to  the  nature  of  space 
or  time  as  the  classification  of  them,  and  that  they  are 
not  to  be  classified  with  substances,  modes,  or  relations. 
We  cannot  call  them  substances,  for  we  do  not  know  that 
they  have  power  or  action.  Nor  can  we  call  them  modes, 
for  we  have  no  intuitive  knowledge  of  any  substance  in 
which  they  inhere.  And  they  are  certainly  more  than 
relations  of  one  thing  to  another,  for  we  know  no  two  or 
more  things  which  by  their  relation  could  yield  space  and 
time.  They  are  not,  then,  to  be  arranged  with  such  cog- 
nitions as  these.  They  seem  indeed  to  be  entitled  to  be 
put  in  a  class  by  themselves,  and  resemble  substances, 
modes,  relations,  only  in  that  they  are  existences,  entities, 
realities. 

Certain  mystical  divines  and  philosophers  are  accus- 
tomed to  speak  of  space  and  time  as  having  no  reality  to 
the  Divine  mind.  It  follows,  I  think,  that  if  they  have 
no  reality  to  the  God  who  knows  all  truth,  they  can, 
properly  speaking,  have  no  reality  at  all.  If  our  convic- 
tions testify  (as  I  have  endeavored  to  show)  that  they 
have  a  reality,  it  follows,  I  think,  that  they  have  a  real- 
ity to  the  Divine  mind.  Again,  there  are  some  who  talk 
of  an  Eternal  Now  :  — 

"  Nothing  is  there  to  come,  and  nothing  past, 
But  an  Eternal  Now  does  ever  last." 

These  lines  of  Cowley  embody,  as  definitely  as  can 
be  done,  a  view  which  was  countenanced  by  certain  ex- 


SPACE   AND   TIME.  149 

pressions  of  Augustine,  and  systematized  in  the  scholas- 
tic ages,  and  which  has  ever  since  been  floating  in  the 
statements  of  divines  in  speaking  of  God  and  Eternity 
and  Time.  But  the  language  has  either  no  meaning,  or, 
if  it  has,  it  lands  us  in  hopeless  contradictions. 

It  would  have  been  very  different  if  divines  had  con- 
tented themselves  with  stating  that  they  do  not  know 
how  space  and  time  stand  related  to  the  Divine  mind. 
We  are  here  in  the  midst  of  a  mystery,  which  we  have 
no  faculties  to  clear  up.  We  know  that  space  and  time 
exist ;  we  know  on  sufficient  evidence  that  God  exists  : 
but  we  have  no  means  of  knowing  how  space  and  time 
stand  related  to  God.  There  may  be  truth  in  the  state- 
ment of  Joannes  Damascenus,  that  "  God  is  his  own 
place,  filling  all  things,  and  being  over  all  things,  and 
himself  containing  all  things,"  but  how  much  truth  can- 
not be  determined  by  the  limited  mind  of  man.^  The 
view  taken  by  Sir  Isaac  Newton  —  "  Deus  durat  semper 
et  adest  ubique,  et,  existendo  semper  et  ubique,  duratio- 
nem  et  spatium  constituit"^  —  is  certainly  a  grand  one, 
but  I  doubt  much  whether  human  intelligence  is  entitled 
to  affirm  dictatorially  that  it  is  as  true  as  it  is  sublime. 

It  is  by  placing  the  subject  beyond  the  human  facul- 
ties that  we  are  able  to  meet  an  objection  urged  with 
great  logical  power  by  Kant,  and  usually  thought  to  be 
insuperable.^  If  space  and  time  be  real  and  infinite,  then 
we  have  two  infinites  ;  and  if  God  be  also  infinite,  our 
difficulties  are  increased.  For  it  is  absurd,  if  not  contra- 
dictory, to  suppose  that  there  can  be  two  infinite  things, 
—  that  God  can  be  infinite  while  space  and  time  are  also 

'  'O  6ehs  eai/ToC  tcJttos  icrrt,  tA  Travra  vX-qpSiv,  Kol  iwep  TairdvTa  Siv,  koX 
aiiroi  <TvviX'»v  tI  rcivra  (De  Orthod.  Fid.  I.  13). 

2  Scholium  at  close  of  Phil.  Nat.  Prin.  Math. 

3  Kritik  d.  r.  Vern.  Die  transcen.  ^sthet. 


150  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

infinites.  Now  to  this  I  might,  without  the  possibility  of 
a  positive  refutation,  urge,  firstly^  that  there  may,  for 
aught  we  know,  be  nothing  inconsistent  in  supposing 
that  there  are  two  things,  as  space  and  time,  the  one  un- 
bounded and  the  other  without  beginning  or  end,  and 
that  there  can  even  be  nothing  contradictory  in  suppos- 
ing that  space  and  time  on  the  one  hand,  and  God  on  the 
other,  may  have  infinite  attributes.  They  could  be  held 
as  contradictory  only  in  the  supposition  that  the  exist- 
ence of  unbounded  space  and  unending  time  were,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  inconsistent  one  with  another  or  with 
the  existence  of  an  infinite  God ;  which  it  may  safely  be 
said  can  never  be  proven.  As  to  how  they  could  subsist 
together,  is  a  question  we  are  not  obliged  to  answer,  for 
we  must  believe  many  separate  truths,  each  on  its  evi- 
dence, without  being  able  to  trace  a  connection,  or  so 
much  as  to  say  that  there  is  a  how  between  them.  But 
I  plant  myself  on  far  firmer  ground  when  I  maintain, 
secondly,  that  while  I  believe  that  space  and  time  are  in- 
finite, and  that  God  is  infinite,  I  am  not  necessarily 
obliged  to  hold  that  the  infinity  of  space  and  time  is  in- 
dependent of  the  infinity  of  God.  Who  will  venture  to 
affirm  that  the  statement  we  have  quoted  from  the  great 
Newton  may  not  be  true  ?  Who  will  venture  to  affirm 
that  space  and  time,  being  dependent  on  God,  may  not 
stand  in  a  relation  to  God  which  is  altogether  indefina- 
ble and  utterly  inconceivable  by  us  ?  True,  we  are  con- 
strained to  believe  that  space  and  time  have  an  existence 
independent  of  us,  but  we  are  not  compelled  to  believe 
that  they  have  an  existence  independent  of  everything 
else,  and  least  of  all  independent  of  God  —  we  must  keep 
ourselves  from  falling  into  the  heathen  sin  of  deifying 
Chronos.  In  such  a  subject,  where  we  have  no  light 
from  intuition  or  from  experience  to  guide  us,  true  wis- 


SPACE   AND   TIME.  151 

dom  sliows  itself  in  refusing  to  assert  or  dogmatize,  or 
even  to  speculate ;  and  when  it  has  observed  this  rule 
for  itself,  it  is  the  better  able  to  rebuke  doubt  and  scepti- 
cism, when  they  would  bring  forth  their  difficulties  from 
regions  which  are  beyond  the  reach  of  human  knowledge. 

Lucretius  (i.  460)  maintained  that  time  has  no  existence  of  itself  : 
"  Tempus  item  per  se  non  est."  Very  possibly  space  and  time  may 
have  no  independent  existence.  Very  possibly  there  may  be  no  such 
thing  as  unoccu[)ied  space,  or  time  without  an  event.  Most  proba- 
bly space  and  time  may  not  be  independent  of  God.  Still  they 
exist,  and  exist  independent  of  our  contemplation  of  them. 

Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  in  an  article  on  Villers,  "  Philosophie  de 
Kant,"  in  No.  ii.  (1803)  of  the  Edinburgh  Review^  dwells  on  this. 
"  The  truth  of  space  and  of  the  world  being  to  our  reasoning  scepti- 
cism the  same,  we  cannot  deny  space  and  admit  the  reality  of  sensible 
objects."  D.  Stewart,  after  affirming  that  the  idea  of  space  "is 
manifestly  accompanied  with  an  irresistible  conviction  that  space  is 
necessarily  existent,  and  that  its  annihilation  is  impossible,"  adds, 
"  to  call  this  proposition  in  question  is  to  open  a  door  to  universal 
scepticism  "  {Disser.  p.  597).  In  our  day  we  find  the  greatest  oppo- 
nent of  the  Dialectic  of  Hegel  who  has  appeared  taking  the  same 
view.  "  Hiernach  sind  Raum  und  Zeit  etwas  Subjectives  und  zwar 
nach  Kant  etwas  nur  Subjectives.  Wenn  dies  folgt,  so  verflUchtet 
sich  damit  die  ganze  Weltansicht  in  Erscheinung,  und  Erscheinung 
ist  vom  Scheine  nicht  weit  entfernt.  Wenn  Raum  und  Zeit  nur  und 
ausschliessend  Subjectives  sind,  so  drangt  sich  allenthalben  diese 
Zuthat  ein.  Wie  die  Luftschicht  zwischen  dem  Auge  und  dem 
Gegenstande,  wirft  sie  auf  alles  eine  fremde  Triibung ;  denn  alles 
erscheint  in  Raum  und  Zeit,  die  nur  aus  uns  geboren  sind.  Wir 
erkennen  nun  nichts  an  sich  ;  denn  die  Verstandesbegriffe  haben 
(nach  Kant)  nur  Anwendung  durch  diese  Formen  der  Anschauung, 
und  die  Vernunftbegriffe  suchen  wieder  nur  eine  Einlieit  fiir  die 
Verstandeserkenntniss.  Wie  wollen  wir  uns  von  dem  Zauberkreise 
losen,  da  er  vielmehr  unser  eigenstes  Wesen  ist  ?  "  (Trendelenburg, 
Logische  Untersuchungen,  b.  i.  v.)  Sir  W.  Hamilton  agrees  with 
Kant  as  to  the  k  priori  idea  of  space,  and  to  avoid  the  difficulties 
calls  in  an  h  posteriori  notion  :  "  We  have  a  twofold  cognition  of 
space  :  (a)  an  k  priori  or  native  imagination  of  it  in  general,  as  a 
necessary  condition   of  the  possibility  of   thought  ;   and  (6)  under 


152  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

that  an  a  posteriori  or  adventitious  percept  of  it,  in  particular  as 
contingently  apprehended  in  this  or  that  complexus  of  sensations  " 
(Reid's  Coll.  Writ.  p.  882).  "  In  this  I  venture  a  step  beyond  Reid 
and  Stewart,  no  less  than  beyond  Kant"  (p.  126).  A  simpler  and 
a  more  natural  account  of  the  relations  between  a  priori  and  a  pos- 
teriori would  bring  these  two  notions  to  a  unity. 

It  has  been  asked  why  the  mind  gives  three  dimensions  to  space  and 
only  one  to  time.  Those  who  regard  space  and  time  as  the  creation 
of  the  mind  may  amuse  themselves  with  answering  this  question. 
There  is  profound  sense  in  the  following  remarks  of  Sir  J.  Herschel, 
in  his  "Review  of  Whewell "  (Essays,  p.  202)  :  "The  reason,  we 
conceive,  why  we  apprehend  things  without  us,  is  that  they  are  with- 
out us.  We  take  it  for  granted  that  they  exist  in  space  because 
they  do  so  exist,  and  because  such  their  existence  is  a  matter  of  di- 
rect perception,  which  can  neither  be  explained  in  words  nor  con- 
travened in  imagination  ;  because,  in  short,  space  is  a  reality."  *'  That 
which  has  parts,  proportions,  and  susceptibilities  of  exact  measure- 
ment, must  be  a  *  thingr.'  " 

Leibnitz  held  space  and  time  to  be  relations  given  to  objects  by 
the  mind.  "  Je  tenois  I'Espace  pour  quelque  Ae  purement  rela- 
TiF,  comme  le  Temps  ;  pour  un  ordke  de  coexistence,  conime 
le  Temps  est  un  ordre  de  successions  "  (Op.  p.  752.  See,  also, 
pp.461,  756,  769).  He  speaks  of  space  and  time  as  being  "rapports," 
and  as  "  id^al."  Leibnitz  thus  prepared  the  way  for  the  more  sys- 
tematic doctrine  of  Kant.  Samuel  Clarke  argues  powerfully  that 
space  and  time  are  realities,  but  makes  them  attributes,  properties, 
or  modes,  of  an  eternal  substance  (see  his  Letters  to  Leibnitz).  D. 
Stewart,  with  his  usual  wisdom,  says  that  "  space  is  neither  substance, 
nor  an  accident,  nor  a  relation  ;  "  adding,  "  But  it  does  not  follow 
from  this  that  it  is  nothing  objective  "  (Dissert,  p.  596). 

The  difliculty  has  been  started,  Are  space  and  time  made  up  of 
parts?  and  if  so,  are  infinite  time  and  space  made  up  of  parts?  To 
this  1  re{)ly,  first  and  decisively,  that  we  cannot  conceive  them  as 
made  up  of  partitions,  or  separable  parts,  as  an  apple  or  an  orange  is, 
or  as  the  earth  is,  or  the  sun  is.  But  then,  secondly,  we  can  con- 
ceive proportions  in  space  and  time;  and  if  we  take  any  of  these 
proportional  sections  and  divide  it  into  two,  thought  will  compel  us 
to  say  that  the  two  must  make  up  the  whole.  In  this  sense  the  parts 
make  up  the  whole,  that  is,  the  sub-sections  make  up  the  .section.  If 
the  question  be  extended  beyond  this,  and  it  be  asked,  Is  infinite 
space  made  up  of  parts  ?  I  answer  that,  as  we  can  have  no  adequate 


SPACE   AND    TIME.  153 

notion  of  infinite  space,  so  we  cannot  be  expected  to  answer  all  the 
questions  wbioli  may  be  put  regarding  it.  It  is  certain  that  neither 
infinite  space  nor  finite  space  is  made  up  of  separable  parts.  We  can 
speak  intelligibly  of  proportions  in  finite  space,  and  determine  their 
relations  to  each  other  and  the  whole.  1  tremble  to  speak  of  the 
proportions  of  infinite  space,  lest  I  be  using  language  which  has  or 
can  have  no  proper  meaning,  and  the  signification  attached  to  which 
by  me  or  others  might  be  altogether  inapplicable  to  such  a  subject. 
Still  there  are  propositions  which  we  might  intelligibly  use.  It  is 
self-evident  that  any  proportion  of  space  must  be  less  than  infinite 
space,  and  if  infinite  space  can  be  conceived  as  having  proportions, 
and  we  could  conceive  all  these  proportions,  then  these  proportions 
would  be  equal  to  the  whole.  But  as  we  cannot  adequately  conceive 
the  whole,  so  neither  can  we  conceive  of  the  proportions  of  the 
whole.  We  are  in  a  region  dark  and  pathless  and  directionless,  and 
we  may  as  well  draw  back  at  once,  for  nothing  is  to  be  gained  by 
advancing. 

"  Non  igitur  respondere  curabimus  iis,  qui  quaei'unt  an  si  daretur 
linea  infinita,  ejus  media  pars  esset  etiam  infinita  ;  vel  an  numeras 
infinitus  sit  par  anve  impar  ;  et  talia;  quia  de  iis  nulli  videntur  de- 
bere  cogitare  nisi  qui  mentem  suam  infinitam  esse  arbitrantur  "  (Des- 
cartes, Prin.  p.  i.  26). 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE   INFINITE. 

The  subject  now  opening  before  us  is  a  profound  one. 
In  meditating  upon  it  we  feel  as  we  do  when  we  look 
into  the  blue  expanse  of  heaven,  or  when  from  a  solitary 
rock  we  gaze  on  a  shoreless  ocean  spread  all  around  us. 
The  topic  has  exercised  the  profoundest  minds  since 
thought  began  the  attempt  to  solve  the  problems  of  the 
universe,  and  has  been  specially  discussed  since  Christian 
theology  made  men  familiar  with  the  idea  of  an  eternal 
and  omnipresent  God.  All  that  I  profess  to  do  is  to  en- 
deavor to  discover  by  induction  what  is  the  mind's  idea 
and  conviction  in  regard  to  infinity.  A  priori  cogitation 
is  not  to  be  tolerated  in  its  proffered  determinations  of 
what  our  idea  of  Infinity  should  be  or  must  be.  Logical 
dissection  and  division,  instead  of  aiding,  may  only  lead 
us  into  hopeless  difficulties.  Lofty  generalizations  em- 
bracing all  other  objects  may  have  no  application  to  an 
object  which  from  its  very  nature  must  be  sui  generis. 

I. 

Two  Negative  Peopositions  may  be  established. 

The  mind  can  form  no  adequate  apprehension  of  the 
infinite.^  in  the  sense  of  image  or  phantasm.  In  saying 
so,  I  do  not  mean  merely  that  we  cannot  construct  a 
mental  picture  of  the  infinite  as  an  attribute.  Of  no 
quality  can  the  mind  fashion  a  picture  ;  it  cannot  have 
a  mental  representation  of  transparency,  apart  from  a 
transparent  substance,  and  just  as  little  can  it  picture 


THE  INFINITE.  155 

to  itself  infinity  apart  from  an  infinite  duration,  or  infi- 
nite extension,  or  an  infinite  God,  But  it  is  not  in  this 
sense  simply  that  the  mind  cannot  apprehend  the  infi- 
nite:  it  cannot  have  before  it  an  apprehension  of  an 
infinite  object,  say  of  an  infinite  space,  or  an  infinite 
God.  For  to  image  a  thing  in  our  mind  is  to  give  it 
an  extent  and  a  boundary.  When  v^e  would  imagine 
unlimited  space,  we  swell  out  an  immense  volume,  but 
it  has  after  all  a  boundary,  commonly  a  spherical  one. 
When  we  would  picture  unlimited  tune,  we  let  out  an 
immense  line  behind  and  before,  but  the  rope  is  after 
all  cut  at  both  ends.  When  we  would  represent  to  our- 
selves almighty  power,  we  call  up  some  given  act  of  God, 
say  creating  or  annihilating  the  universe ;  but  after  all, 
the  work  has  a  measure,  and  may  be  finished.  In  the 
sense  of  image,  then,  the  mind  cannot  have  any  proper 
apprehension  of  infinity  as  an  attribute,  or  of  an  infinite 
object. 

The  mind  can  form  no  adequate  logical  notion  of  an 
infinite  object.  For  apprehension  may  be  considered  as 
an  act  of  the  understanding  as  well  as  a  mere  act  of  the 
fantasy.  We  can  conceive,  we  can  think  about  much, 
which  we  cannot  image.  We  can  meditate  and  reason 
about  such  things  as  law,  government,  duty,  religion, 
while  yet  we  can  form  no  mental  picture  of  them.  The 
grand  question  in  this  discussion  is.  Can  we  form  an  in- 
tellectual notion  of  an  infinite  object,  say  of  an  infinite 
God  ?  And  I  feel  constrained  to  admit  and  maintain 
that  human  intelligence  can  form  no  proper  or  adequate 
conception  of  an  infinite  existence.  By  what  process 
can  it  be  supposed  to  construct  such  a  conception  ?  Cer- 
tainly not  by  abstraction,  for  abstraction  separates,  takes 
away,  diminishes.  It  is  just  as  certain  that  it  cannot 
compass  this  end   by  generalization,  for  generalization 


166  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

merely  groups  objects  by  attributes  known,  and  unless 
we  have  infinity  first  in  the  individual  we  cannot  have  it 
in  the  general.  Nor  can  we  reach  it  by  addition,  multi- 
plication, composition  ;  these  will  give  the  enlarged,  but 
not  the  unlimited :  a  distance  of  a  quintillion  of  quin- 
tillions  of  years  or  ages  has  as  distinct  a  termination  as 
an  ell  or  an  inch.  Nor  can  the  understanding  attain  it 
by  a  process  of  ratiocination,  for,  unless  the  infinite  were 
in  the  premise,  no  canon  of  reasoning  would  justify  its 
having  a  place  in  the  conclusion.  If  the  intelligence 
does  not  find  the  infinite  in  the  perception  with  which  it 
sets  out,  it  never  could  fashion  it  by  cutting  or  carving, 
by  construction  or  supraposition. 

So  much  may  be  allowed  to  those  British  philosophers 
who  have  been  at  pains  to  show  that  we  can  form  no 
conception  of  the  infinite,  or  that  the  notion  is  at  best 
negative.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  prepared  to 
maintain  that  the  mind  has  some  positive  apprehension 
and  belief  in  regard  to  infinity  ;  otherwise,  why  do  medi- 
tative minds  find  the  thought  so  often  pressing  itself  upon 
them  ?  why  has  it  such  a  place  in  our  faith  in  God  ?  why 
is  it  ever  coming  up  in  theology  ?  And  if  we  have  an 
idea  and  conviction,  it  is  surely  possible  to  determine 
what  they  are  by  a  careful  observation  of  w^hat  passes 
through  the  mind  when  it  would  muse  on  the  eternal, 
the  omnipi-esent,  the  perfect. 

n. 

Two  Positive  Propositions  may  be  laid  down. 

(1.)  The  mind  apprehends  and  believes  that  there  is 
and  must  he  something  beyond  its  widest  image  and  con- 
cept. Let  us  follow  the  mind  in  its  attempt  to  grasp 
infinity.  I  have  allowed  that  we  cannot  have  an  idea 
of  infinite  space  and  time,  in  the  sense  of  imaging,  pic- 


THE   INFINITE.  157 

taring,  or  representing  them.  Stretch  itself  as  it  may, 
the  imaging  power  of  the  mind  can  never  go  beyond  an 
expansion  with  a  boundary,  commonly  a  globe  or  sphere 
of  which  self  is  the  centre,  and  duration  stretching  along 
like  a  line,  but  with  a  beginning  and  an  end.  In  respect, 
then,  of  the  mental  picture  or  representation,  the  appre- 
hension is  merely  of  the  very  large  or  the  very  long,  but 
still  of  the  finite,  of  what  might  be  called  the  indefinite, 
but  not  the  infinite.  But  any  account  of  our  conviction 
as  to  infinity  which  goes  no  further  leaves  out  the  main, 
the  peculiar  element.  The  sailor  is  not  led  by  any  na- 
tive instinct  to  believe  that  the  ocean  has  no  bottom, 
simply  because  in  letting  down  the  sounding-line  he  has 
not  reached  the  ground.  When  the  astronomer  has 
gauged  space  as  far  as  his  telescope  can  penetrate,  he 
finds  that  there  are  still  stars  and  clusters  of  stars,  but 
he  is  not  necessitated  to  believe  that  there  must  be  star 
after  star  on  and  forever.  The  geologist  in  going  down 
from  layer  to  layer  still  finds  signs  of  the  existence  of  a 
previous  earth,  but  he  is  not  obliged  to  conclude  that 
there  must  have  been  stratum  before  stratum  from  all 
eternity.  But  man  is  constrained  to  believe  that  what- 
ever be  the  point  of  space  or  time  to  which  his  eye  or 
his  thoughts  ma}^  reach,  there  must  be  a  space  and  time 
beyond.  Whence  this  belief  of  the  mind,  on  space  and 
time  being  presented  to  it  ?  Whence  this  necessity  of 
thought  or  belief?  This  is  the  very  phenomenon  to  be 
accounted  for  ;  and  yet  the  British  school  of  metaphysi- 
cians can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  contemplated  it  seri- 
ously or  steadfastly,  with  the  view  of  unfolding  the 
depth  of  meaning  embraced  in  it.  It  implies  that  to 
whatever  point  of  space  or  time  we  might  go  in  our  per- 
sons or  in  our  fancy,  there  would  still  be  a  spacQ  and 
a  time  beyond.     I  can  easily,  in  imagination,  go  out  as 


158  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

far  as  the  rim  of  the  earth,  or  as  the  moon,  or  as  the  sun, 
or  as  the  nearest  star,  or  as  the  farthest  star  seen  by  the 
eye,  or  as  the  remotest  star  discovered  as  a  speck  in  a 
nebulous  cloud  of  light  by  the  telescope  ;  but  when  there, 
I  must  believe  that  space  still  goes  on,  and  that  if  I  were 
carried  ten  thousand  million  times  farther  there  would 
still  be  space.  I  can  represent  to  myself  the  instant  of 
time  when  man  was  created,  and  beyond  this  the  time 
when  the  lion  or  the  worm,  or  the  palm  or  the  lichen, 
were  created,  or  when  the  earth  or  the  angels  were 
created ;  but  though  this  period  were  multiplied  by  itself 
millions  of  billions  of  trillions  of  times,  I  not  only  can- 
not believe  that  duration  did  then  begin,  I  am  con- 
strained to  believe  that  it  did  not  and  could  not  then 
commence.  This  intuitive  belief,  accompanied  as  it  is 
with  a  stringent  necessity  of  feeling,  is  the  very  peculi- 
arity of  the  mind's  conviction  in  regard  to  infinity,  as 
it  is  one  of  the  grandest  characteristics  of  human  intelli- 
gence. It  should  be  added  that  it  is  a  power  which  ever 
impresses  man  with  his  powerlessness. 

This  conviction  has  the  chai'acters  and  can  bear  the 
tests  of  intuition.  It  is  self-evident.  Indeed,  if  it  did 
not  shine  in  its  own  light,  it  could  never  be  seen  in  any 
other  which  we  might  hold  up  to  it.  It  can  stand  the 
test  of  necessity.  It  is  necessary,  we  must  believe  it 
when  our  intelligence  is  directed  towards  it.  We  can- 
not be  made  to  believe  otherwise,  to  believe  that  there  is 
a  limit  to  immensity  and  duration.  It  is,  when  properly 
understood,  universal.  The  image,  it  is  true,  of  space 
or  time,  formed  by  the  boy  or  savage,  may  be  very  con- 
tracted. The  widest  space  of  which  he  has  had  any  ex- 
perience may  be  the  glorious  dome  spread  over  his  head 
in  the  sky,  and  his  imagination  may  be  able  to  go  very 
little    beyond   the   visible  heavens  or   the   distant   hills 


THE   INFINITE.  159 

which  bound  his  view ;  still  he  is  sure  that  beyond  there 
must  be  something,  an  "  outer  infinite,"  and  perhaps  he 
will  be  eager  to  know  what  is  beyond  that  horizon.  His 
idea  of  time,  as  a  positive  picture,  may  extend  no  further 
than  the  date  of  the  oldest  story  which  his  grandfather 
has  told  him  ;  but  he  is  sure  that  at  that  point  duration 
did  not  begin,  and  he  may  be  interested  to  know  what 
happened  before. 

"  Heaven  lies  about  us  in  our  infancy. 


Hence  in  a  season  of  calm  weather, 

Though  inland  far  we  be, 
Our  souls  have  sight  of  that  immortal  sea 
Which  brought  us  hither, 

Can  in  a  moment  travel  thither, 
And  see  the  children  sport  upon  the  shoi'e, 
And  hear  the  mighty  waters  rolling  evermore." 

I  suspect  that  this  is  rather  a  poetical  expression  of 
what  passes  through  the  mind  of  infants  :  but  it  is  true 
and  correct  so  far  as  it  indicates  that  there  is  an  imagina- 
tive tendency  which  from  very  early  life  goes  out  from 
the  actual  to  the  ideal.  "  Let  them,"  says  John  Howe 
in  his  Living  Temple^  "  therefore  reject  it  if  they  can. 
They  will  feel  it  reimpositig  itself  upon  them  whether 
they  will  or  no,  and  sticking  as  close  to  their  minds  as 
their  very  thinking  power  itself."  But  this  is  not  all 
that  is  comprised  in  the  conviction. 

(2.)  We  apprehend  and  are  constrained  to  believe  in 
regard  to  the  ohjects  which  we  look  upon  as  infinite  that 
they  are  incapable  of  augmentation.  Here,  as  in  every 
apprehension  which  we  have  of  infinity,  the  imaging 
power  of  the  mind  fails  and  must  fail :  still  we  have  an 
image  and  an  intellectual  conception ;  say,  an  image 
with  a  notion  of  extension,  or  duration,  or  Deity.     Or 


160  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

we  represent  to  ourselves  the  Divine  Being,  with  certain 
attributes,  —  say,  as  wise  or  as  good,  —  and  our  belief  as 
to  him  and  these  attributes  is,  that  he  cannot  be  wiser 
or  better.  This  aspect  may  be  appropriately  designated 
as  the  Perfect.  This  is  the  conviction  of  the  Perfect,  of 
which  many  profound  philosophers  make  so  much,  but 
not  more,  as  I  think,  than  they  are  entitled  to  do  ;  thougli 
they  have  not,  as  it  appears  to  me,  always  given  the  cor- 
rect account  of  the  nature  and  of  the  genesis  of  the 
notion.  We  think  of  God  as  having  all  his  attributes 
such  that  no  addition  could  be  made  to  them ;  and  we 
call  such  attributes  his  perfections.  In  regard,  indeed, 
to  the  moral  attributes  of  Deity,  it  is  this  significant 
word  Perfect,  rather  than  infinite,  which  expresses  the 
conviction  which  we  are  led  to  entertain  in  regard,  for 
example,  to  the  wisdom,  or  benevolence,  or  righteousness 
of  God. 

This,  too,  seems  a  native  conviction  of  the  mind.  It 
needs,  indeed,  a  certain  matter  provided  for  it,  and  to 
which  it  may  adhere.  In  a  positive  state  it  springs  up 
late,  and  grows  slowly  in  all  minds  to  which  it  is  not 
externally  given  by  education,  out  of  the  Bible  or  other- 
wise. Still  it  is  there  in  the  mind  as  a  tendency,  placing 
before  every  man  some  sort  of  "  Idea "  in  the  Platonic 
sense  ;  a  model,  or  heau  idSal,  which  he  is  ever  prompted 
to  strive  after,  while  he  is  made  to  feel  that  he  has  not 
reached  it.  It  is  this  impulse,  I  apprehend,  which  makes 
even  the  heathens  speak  of  their  gods,  or  at  least  their 
supreme  god,  as  ineffably  good  and  immortal:  the  actual 
conceptions  of  his  excellence  and  duration  may  be  ex- 
tremely inadequate,  still  they  will  not  allow  that  there 
could  be  any  increase  made  to  his  attributes  ;  and,  under 
fostering  circumstances,  the  conviction  will  come  out  in 
a  more  decided  form.     When  the  object  is  brouglit  under 


THE   INFINITE.  161 

our  notice,  we  see  that  it  is  pei-fect,  that  it  must  be  per- 
fect, and  that  it  cannot  be  otherwise.  The  faith  is  uni- 
versal, but  the  conception  takes  the  form  which  may  be 
given  it  by  the  education  or  the  intellectual  strength  and 
growth  of  the  individual. 

But  it  will  be  urged  that  these  two  aspects  or  sides  of 
infinity  are  inconsistent.  According  to  the  one,  infinity 
is  something  to  which  something  can  be  ever  added ; 
whereas,  according  to  the  other,  it  is  something  to  which 
nothing  can  be  added.  But  in  this,  as  in  every  other  case 
of  apparent  or  alleged  contradiction  among  our  original 
perceptions,  the  inconsistency  vanishes  on  a  careful 
inspection  of  the  precise  nature  of  the  convictions. 
The  infinite  is  something  beyond  our  image  or  notion; 
but  it  is  not  something  beyond  the  infinite  itself.  It  is 
something  which  admits  of  no  increase,  but  that  some- 
thing is  not  the  imperfect  notion  we  form,  and  which  we 
know  to  be  imperfect.  The  two  are  not  contradic- 
tory, but  the  one  is  supplementary  to  the  other.  They 
cannot,  however,  be  represented  as  the  complement  the 
one  of  the  other ;  for,  while  they  make  up  such  an  appre- 
hension as  the  finite  mind  of  man  can  form,  they  do  not 
make  up  the  infinite  itself,  which  is  confessedly  far  be- 
yond. The  first  of  these  views  tends  to  humble  us,  as 
showing  how  far  our  creature  impotency  is  below  Creator 
Power.  The  other  has  rather  a  tendency  to  elevate  us, 
by  showing  a  perfect  exemplar,  which  is  indeed  far  above 
us,  but  to  which  we  may  ever  look  up.  The  Perfect 
shines  above  us  like  the  sun  in  the  heavens,  distant  and 
unapproacliable,  dazzling  and  blinding  us  as  we  would 
gaze  (m  it,  but  still  our  eye  ever  tends  to  turn  up  towards 
it,  and  we  feel  that  it  is  a  blessed  thing  that  there  is  such 
a  light,  and  that  we  are  permitted  to  walk  in  it  and  re- 
joice in  it. 


162  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

lU. 

From  this  account  we  see  that  there  is  both  an  idea 
and  a  belief  in  our  apprehension  of  the  infinite.  I  have 
admitted  that  the  image  and  the  notion  are  not  adequate. 
Still  there  is  always  an  idea.  Round  this,  as  a  body,  the 
belief  gathers,  as  the  atmosphere  does  round  the  earth. 
First,  there  must  always  be  an  image  and  a  notion  of  an 
existing  thing,  say  space  or  time ;  or,  as  far  more  con- 
ceivable, a  living  and  an  intelligent  God.  The  mind 
labors  to  heighten,  to  deepen,  to  widen,  this  idea  on 
every  side.  It  is  after  all  within  limits;  bat  it  can  in- 
quire what  is  beyond.  It  can  do  more :  it  can  look  out 
on  what  is  beyond.  It  can  do  yet  more  :  it  knows  that 
there  is  something  beyond,  and  perceives  somewhat  of  it. 
It  is  sure,  for  example,  that,  as  far  as  it  has  gone  in  space, 
there  is  a  space  beyond ;  far  as  it  has  gone  in  time,  there 
is  a  time  beyond ;  much  as  it  has  conceived  of  God,  there 
is,  after  all,  more  of  the  Divine  perfections.  There  is 
thus  a  conception  of  an  object ;  there  is  thus,  too,  a  con- 
ception of  this  same  object  being  beyond,  and  still  fur- 
ther. The  belief  attaches  to  this  conception,  and  declares 
that  this  thing  conceived,  this  thing  conceived  as  still 
beyond,  is  a  reality,  and  that  it  is  such  that  it  cannot 
be  increased.  My  readers  must  consult  their  own  con- 
sciousness as  to  whether  the  account  now  given  of  the 
nature  and  genesis  of  our  conviction  is  the  correct  one. 

This  notion,  with  its  adhering  belief,  is  a  mental  phe- 
nomenon which  we  have  a  word  to  expi'ess.  We  can 
subject  it  to  logical  processes  ;  it  comes  in,  like  all  our 
perceptions,  in  the  concrete  ;  it  is  something,  say  space, 
time,  or  Deity,  we  apprehend  as  infinite  ;  but  we  can 
abstract  the  infinite  from  the  object  regarded  as  infinite, 
and  form  the  abstract  idea  of  infinity.     We  can  gener- 


THE   INFINITE.  163 

alize  it,  and  use  it  as  a  predicate :  thus  we  can  talk  of 
space  and  time  and  God  as  being  infinite.  We  can  utter 
judgments  regarding  it,  as  that  the  infinite  God  is  in 
every  given  place ;  there  is  no  place  of  vehich  we  may 
not  say,  "  Surely  the  Lord  is  in  this  place."  We  can 
even  reason  about  it ;  thus  we  can  infer  that  this  puny 
effort  of  man,  set  against  the  recorded  will  of  God,  shall 
most  certainly  be  frustrated  by  his  infinite  power. 
Keeping  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the  nature  of 
the  convictions,  man  can  speak  about  the  infinite  and  be 
intelligible  ;  he  can  legitimately  employ  it  in  argument, 
and  he  can  muse  upon  it,  and  find  it  to  be  among  the 
most  ennobling  and  precious  of  themes. 

And  yet  it  is  true  all  the  while  that  the  notion  is  en- 
gulfed in  mystery.  It  is  of  all  things  the  most  prepos- 
terous in  certain  speculators  to  set  out  with  the  idea  of 
the  infinite  without  a  previous  induction  of  its  nature, 
and  thence  proceed,  consecutively  or  deductively,  to  draw 
out  a  body  of  philosophy  or  theology.  Such  men  have 
lost  themselves  in  attempting  to  voyage  an  "  unreal,  vast, 
unbounded  deep  of  horrible  confusion ; "  and  yet  they 
would  seek  to  pilot  others,  only  to  conduct  them  into 
darker  gloom  and  more  inextricable  straits,  and,  in  the 
end,  bottomless  abysses.  The  account  we  have  given  of 
the  conception  and  belief,  shows  how  narrow  the  limits 
within  which  man  can  make  intelligible  assertions  ;  how 
strait  the  road  in  which  he  must  walk,  if  he  would  not 
lose  himself  in  wilderness  and  in  morass.  He  who  passes 
these  bounds  is  talking  without  a  meaning ;  he  wlio 
would  start  with  the  notion  of  the  absolute,  and  thence 
construct  a  system  embracing  God,  the  world,  and  man, 
will  without  fail  land  himself  in  helpless  and  hopeless 
contradictions,  —  the  necessary  consequent  and  the  ap- 
propriate punishment  of  his  folly  and  presumption. 


164  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

IV. 

The  question  is  here  started,  What  is  it  that  we  are  to 
regard  as  infinite  ?  And  here  it  is  of  importance  to  remind 
the  reader  that,  as  a  native  law  or  reguhitive  law  in  the 
mind,  our  intuition  as  to  the  infinite  is  a  tendency  or  apt- 
itude, and  not  perception  or  knowledge.  In  this  respect 
it  is  like  our  other  inborn  convictions.  Man  is  endowed 
by  nature  with  senses,  but  the  senses  do  not  perceive  till 
an  object  is  presented.  On  falling  in  with  a  phenome- 
non we  look  for  a  cause,  but  (as  we  shall  see)  it  is  by 
experience,  and  not  by  intuition,  that  we  know  what  the 
cause  is.  We  all  have  a  conscience  which  prepares  us 
for  discerning  between  good  and  evil,  but  it  is  not  till  a 
voluntary  action  is  presented  that  we  pronounce  a  de- 
cision. So  with  our  conviction  as  to  infinity  :  the  innate 
law  is  a  tendency  to  look  out  beyond  the  actual,  and  to 
seek  for  the  perfect.  In  order  to  the  exercise  and  mani- 
festation of  the  disposition,  there  must  be  an  object  made 
known  and  conceived,  and  on  which  the  conviction  may 
fasten.  What  the  object  is  must  be  determined  by  an 
inductive  observation  of  the  exercises. 

(1.)  We  look  on  infinity  as  an  attribute  of  an  object. 
The  infinite  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  having  an  independent 
being ;  it  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  substance  or  a  sepa- 
rate entit}':  it  is  simply  the  quality  of  a  thini:^,  very  pos- 
sibly tlie  attribute  of  the  attribute  of  an  object.  Thus 
we  apply  the  phrase  to  the  Divine  Being  to  denote  a 
perfection  of  his  nature  ;  we  apply  it  also  to  all  his  per- 
fections, such  as  his  wisdom  and  goodness,  which  we 
describe  as  infinite.  It  is  the  more  necepsary  to  insist 
on  this  view,  from  the  circumstance  that  metapliysicians 
are  very  much  tempted  to  give  an  independent  being  to 
abstractions ;    and,  in    particular,  some    of    them   write 


THE  INFINITE.  165 

about  the  infinite  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  their  readers 
look  upon  it  as  a  separate  existence.  I  stand  up  for  the 
reality  of  infinity,  but  I  claim  for  it  a  reality  simply  as 
an  attribute  of  some  existing  object.  Let  us  endeavor  to 
ascertain  what  the  object  is. 

(2.)  We  look  on  space  and  time  as  infinite,  and  believe 
in  the  possibility  of  infinite  being  or  substance.  We 
cannot  be  made  to  believe  that  at  any  given  point  space 
should  cease,  or  that  at  any  given  instant  time  should 
begin,  or  should  come  to  an  end.  But  let  us  consider 
how  much  is  implied  in  this.  Place  and  time  are  looked 
upon  by  us  mainly  as  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  ^ 
the  existence  of  other  objects.  Wherever  there  is  space 
there  may  be  active  existence,  and  in  all  time  there  may 
be  events  happening.  The  infinity  of  space  and  time 
thus  implies  the  possibility  of  infinite  being  to  dwell  in 
them.  There  is  ever  felt  to  be  an  emptiness  about  pure 
space  and  time.  We  know  not  in  fact  of  a  space  or  time 
without  a  substantial  existence  in  them.  I  do  indeed 
maintain,  on  the  ground  of  ineradicable  conviction,  that 
we  must  believe  them  to  be  independent  of  ourselves 
contemplating  them,  or  of  material  objects  placed  in 
them.  But  the  mind  has  a  difficulty  in  conceiving  of 
them  as  altogether  separate  and  independent  entities.  It 
is  from  this  cause,  I  am  convinced,  that  so  many  philoso- 
phers represent  them  as  mere  relations  of  things  rather 
than  things,  or  as  forms  given  to  objects  by  the  mind,  or 
as  mere  conditions  of  existence.  These  are  very  incor- 
rect representations  ;  still  the  very  fact  that  they  have 
been  advanced  is  an  evidence  of  the  difficulty  which  the 
mind  experiences  in  grasping  the  realities  of  empty  space 
and  time,  which  do  look  as  if  they  were  voids  to  be  filled 
up.  Indejienflent  of  us,  they  scarcely  look  as  if  they  were 
independent  of  a  substantial  existence.      I  am   not  pre- 


166  PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS. 

pared  to  affirm  with  S.  Clarke  that  they  are  modes  of 
substance ;  but  I  have  little  to  say  against  another  state- 
ment of  the  same  author,  that  "  they  are  immediate  and 
necessary  consequences  of  the  existence  of  God,  and  that 
without  them  his  Eternity  and  Ubiquity  would  be  taken 
away ;  "  or  the  statement  of  Newton,  that  "  God  consti- 
tutes time  and  space."  The  mind  feels  as  if  there  were 
something  wanting,  till  it  learns  of  One  to  occupy  the 
vacuum  ;  but  it  is  met  and  gratified  in  every  one  of  its 
intellectual  and  moral  intuitions  when  it  is  brought  to 
know  Him  who  inhabiteth  eternity  and  immensity,  and 
fiUeth  them  with  living  and  life-giving  fulness. 

(3.)  Our  intuition  is  satisfied  only  by  the  contemplation 
of  an  infinite  God.  I  am  not  convinced  that  our  intui- 
tive convictions  as  to  infinity,  of  themselves,  and  apart 
from  auxiliary  considerations,  guarantee  the  existence  of 
infinite  substance.  I  am  sure  they  give  no  sanction  to 
the  doctrine  held  by  so  many  of  the  ancient  Greek  phi- 
losophers, that  material  substance  is  eternal ;  we  can 
easily  conceive  and  believe  matter  to  have  been  brought 
into  existence  at  some  point  in  time  by  a  power  adequate 
to  produce  it.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  that  we  are  con- 
strained by  our  convictions  on  this  special  subject,  taken 
apart  from  all  other  evidence,  to  believe  in  the  existence 
of  an  eternal  or  omnipresent  God.  Herein  I  have  al- 
ways thought  that  the  argument  a  priori  or  intuitive  in 
behalf  of  the  Divine  existence  fails.  There  is  a  link 
wanting  which  shows  that  the  proof  is  not  apodictic  or 
demonstrative ;  that  it  is  not  founded  on  truths  which 
are  self-evident  throughout,  as  is,  for  example,  the  propo- 
sition that  the  opposite  angles  made  by  the  intersection 
of  two  straight  lines  are  equal.  We  have  and  can  have 
no  such  demonstrative  evidence  of  other  truths  to  wliich 
the  mind  cleaves  most  resolutely  ;  as,  for  example,  that 


THE  INFINITE.  167 

we  ever  had  a  sister,  or  brother,  or  friend,  or  that  we 
ever  sat  under  the  shelter  of  a  father's  wisdom,  or  were 
refreshed  by  the  dews  of  a  mother's  tenderness.  There 
is  need  of  other  considerations,  and  particularly  of  an 
experiental  element,  in  the  form  of  certain  obvious  facts, 
to  prove  the  existence  of  a  being  dwelling  in  infinite 
time  and  space,  and  possessed  of  infinite  power  and  good- 
ness. I  may  have  occasion  to  show  that  when  the  patent 
facts  and  native  convictions  are  brought  together,  the 
certainty  is  of  the  very  highest  order  short  of  demonstra- 
tion, which  it  falls  beneath  only  so  far  as  not  absolutely 
to  preclude  the  possibility  of  doubt  when  the  fool  is 
determined  to  say  in  his  heart,  "  There  is  no  God."  It 
would  be  premature  to  bring  forward  in  detailed  array 
these  combined  considerations  at  this  stage  of  our  in- 
quiries, and  to  show  how  the  order  and  adaptation  in 
nature  are  evidence  of  a  designing  and  planning  mind ; 
how  the  evident  effects  in  nature  evoke  the  intuition 
which  demands  that  there  be  a  cause  ;  how  our  convic- 
tions of  moral  obligation  imply  a  law,  the  embodiment  of 
the  nature  of  a  lawgiver  ;  and  how  all  these  unite  to 
establish  the  existence  of  a  living  being,  intelligent  and 
holy.  When  this  being  is  made  known  to  us  by  these 
or  by  other  means,  our  conviction  as  to  infinity  fastens 
on  it  as  its  appropriate  object,  and  we  believe  that  He 
who  made  all  things,  and  who  is  thus  powerful,  thus 
benevolent,  thus  holy,  is  and  must  be  the  Infinite,  the 
Perfect. 

The  nature  of  man's  conviction  in  regard  to  infinity  is 
fitted  to  impress  us,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  with  the 
strength  and  the  weakness  of  human  intelligence,  which 
is  powerful  in  that  it  can  apprehend  so  much,  but  feeble 
in  that  it  can  apprehend  no  more.  The  idea  entertained 
is  felt  to  be  inadequate,  but  this  is  one  of  its  excellences, 


168  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

that  it  is  felt  to  be  inadequate  ;  for  it  would  indeed  be 
lamentably  deficient  if  it  did  not  acknowledge  of  itself  that 
it  falls  infinitely  beneath  the  magnitude  of  the  object. 
The  mind  is  led  by  an  inward  tendency  to  stretch  its 
ideas  wider  and  wider,  but  is  made  to  know  at  the  most 
extreme  point  which  it  has  reached  that  there  is  some- 
thing further  on.  It  is  thus  impelled  to  be  ever  striving 
after  something  which  it  has  not  yet  reached,  and  to 
look  beyond  the  limits  of  time  into  eternity  beyond,  in 
which  there  is  the  prospect  of  a  noble  occupation  in  be- 
holding, through  ages  which  can  come  to  no  end  and  a 
space  which  has  no  bounds,  the  manifestations  of  a  might 
and  an  excellence  of  which  we  can  never  know  all,  but 
of  which  we  may  ever  know  more.  It  is  an  idea  which 
would  ever  allure  us  up  towards  a  God  of  infinite  perfec- 
tion, and  yet  make  us  feel,  more  and  more  impressively 
the  higher  we  ascend,  that  we  ai'e,  after  all,  infinitely 
beneath  him.  Man's  capacity  to  form  such  an  idea  is  a 
proof  that  he  was  formed  by  an  infinite  God,  and  in  the 
image  of  an  infinite  God  ;  his  incapacity,  in  spite  of  all 
his  efforts  to  form  a  higher  idea,  is  fitted  to  show  us  how 
wide  the  space  and  how  impassable  the  gulf  which  sepa- 
rates man  as  finite  from  God  the  infinite. 

They  are  in  error  who  conclude  that  they  cannot  know 
an  infinite  God,  but  they  are  equally  in  en-or  who  sup- 
pose that  they  can  reach  a  perfect  knowledge  of  him. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  he  may  be  described  as  the 
unknown  God,  for  no  human  intellect  can  come  to  know 
all  the  attributes  of  God,  or  even  know  all  about  any 
one  of  his  perfections  ;  but  there  is  a  sense  in  which  he 
is  emphatically  the  known  God,  inasmuch  as  he  has 
been  pleased  to  manifest  and  reveal  himself,  and  every 
human  being  is  required  to  attain  a  clear  and  positive, 
though  at  the  same  time  a  necessarily  inadequate,  knowl- 


THE  INFINITE.  169 

edge  of  liim.  It  is  true,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  in- 
visible things  of  God  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are 
clearly  seen,  being  understood  from  the  things  which  are 
made,  even  his  eternal  power  and  Godhead  ;  but  it  is 
equally  true,  on  the  other,  that  we  cannot  by  search- 
ing find  out  God,  that  we  cannot  find  out  the  Almighty 
unto  perfection.  The  wide  finite,  with  its  horizon  ever 
widening  as  we  ascend,  should  call  forth  our  admiration, 
our  adoration,  and  our  love  ;  the  wider  infinite,  which 
is  round  about,  and  into  which  we  can  only  gaze  as  we 
often  gaze  into  the  deep  sky,  should  impress  us  with  a 
feeling  of  awe  in  reference  to  Him  who  fills  it  all,  and 
a  feeling  of  humility  in  reference  to  ourselves  who  can 
know  so  little. 

He  who  dwells  in  infinity  is  at  once  a  God  who  reveals 
and  a  God  who  conceals  himself.  We  can  know,  but 
we  can  know  only  in  part.  The  knowledge  which  we 
can  attain  is  the  clearest,  and  yet  the  obscurest,  of  all 
our  knowledge.  A  child,  a  savage,  can  acquire  a  certain 
acquaintance  with  him,  while  neither  sage  nor  angel  can 
rise  to  a  full  comprehension  of  him.  God  may  be  truly 
described  as  the  Being  of  whom  we  know  the  most,  inas- 
much as  his  works  are  ever  pressing  themselves  upon 
our  attention,  and  we  behold  more  of  his  ways  than  of 
the  ways  of  any  other  ;  and  yet  he  is  the  Being  of  whom 
we  know  the  least,  inasmuch  as  we  know  comparatively 
less  of  his  whole  nature  than  we  do  of  ourselves  or  of 
our  fellow-men,  or  of  any  object  falling  under  our  senses. 
They  who  know  the  least  of  him  have  in  this  the  most 
valuable  of  all  knowledge  ;  they  who  know  the  most, 
know  but  little  after  all  of  his  glorious  perfections. 
Let  us  prize  what  knowledge  we  have,  but  feel  mean- 
while that  our  knowledge  is  comparative  ignorance. 
They  who  know  little  of  him  may  feel  as  if  they  know 


170  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

much ;  they  who  know  much  will  always  feel  that  they 
know  little.  The  most  limited  knowledge  of  him  should 
be  felt  to  be  precious,  but  this  mainly  as  an  encourage- 
ment to  seek  knowledge  higher  and  yet  higher,  without 
limit  and  without  end.  They  who  in  earth  or  heaven 
know  the  most,  know  that  they  know  little  after  all  ;  but 
they  know  that  they  may  know  more  and  more  of  him 
throughout  eternal  ages. 

Hobbes,  following  out  his  theory  that  all  our  ideas  are  derived 
from  sensation,  reaches  the  conclusion  :  "Whatever  we  imagine  is 
finite.  There  is  therefore  no  idea  or  conception  which  can  arise 
from  this  word  infinite.  The  human  mind  cannot  comprehend  the 
idea  (image)  of  infinite  magnitude,  nor  conceive  infinite  swiftness, 
infinite  force,  infinite  time,  or  infinite  power.  When  we  say  that 
anything  is  infinite,  we  only  mean  by  this  that  we  are  not  able  to 
conceive  the  bounds  or  limits  of  that  thing,  or  to  conceive  any  other 
thing  except  our  own  impotence.  Therefore  the  name  of  God  is  not 
employed  that  we  may  conceive  of  him,  for  he  is  incomprehensible, 
and  his  greatness  and  power  inconceivable,  but  that  we  may  honor 
him  "  {Leviathan,  in.).  "  When  we  say  that  anything  is  infinite  we 
do  not  intend  any  quality  in  the  thing  itself,  but  a  want  of  power  in  our 
own  minds  ;  as  if  we  should  say  that  we  know  not  whether  it  has  limits 
or  where.  Nor  can  it  be  reverently  said  of  God  that  we  have  an  idea 
of  him  in  our  minds;  for  an  idea  is  our  conception,  and  there  is  no 
conception  of  anything  but  what  is  finite  "  (De  Give,  xv.).  This  doc- 
trine was  at  once  observed  to  have  an  atheistical  tendency,  and  John 
Francis  Buddc^us  remarks  :  "  What  Hobbes  affirms  is  therefore  most 
false,  that  the  word  '  infinite '  only  signifies  that  we  cannot  conceive 
the  limits  of  what  is  so  called.  For  he  erroneously  passes  over  what 
is  positive  in  the  idea  of  an  infinite  being,  and  allows  only  what  is 
negative;  and  the  positive  idea  he  explains  thus  :  '  For,  first  of  all, 
we  conceive  a  certain  supreme  idea  of  perfection ;  then  we  confess 
that  this  perfection  is  so  great  that  we  cannot  reach  its  bounds  or 
limits  '  "  {Theses  de  Atheismo  et  Superstitione,  v.,  quoted  in  Harrison's 
Notes  to  Cudworth's  Intellectual  System,  Vol.  ii.  p.  593). 

Locke  was  prevented,  by  the  defects  of  his  theory  and  his  antipa- 
thy to  innate  ideas,  from  developing  all  that  is  in  our  conviction  of 
infinity.  Yet,  while  he  maintains  that  our  idea  of  the  infinite  is 
negative,  he  admits  "  that  it  has  something  of  positive  in  all  those 


THE  INFINITE.  171 

things  we  apply  to  it,  inasmuch  as  the  mind  comprehends  so  much 
of  the  object  "  (Essay,  ii.  xvii.  15).  He  even  admits,  though  rather 
incidentally,  that  the  mind  has  a  necessary  conviction  as  to  the  ex- 
istence of  an  infinite.  Thus,  speaking  of  space,  he  says  the  mind 
"  must  necessarily  conclude  it,  by  the  very  Nature  and  Idea  of  each 
part  of  it,  to  be  actually  infinite  "  (4).  Again:  '*  I  think  it  unavoid- 
able, for  every  considering  rational  creature  that  will  but  examine 
his  own  or  any  other  existence,  to  have  the  notion  of  an  eternal 
wise  Beintr  who  had  no  beginning  :  and  such  an  Idea  of  infinite  dura- 
tion  I  am  sure  I  have  "  (1 7).  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Locke  never 
unfolded  all  that  is  contained  in  these  "  necessary  "  and  "  unavoid- 
able "  mental  processes. 

Hamilton  says  our  notion  of  infinity  is  an  "impotency,"  say  an 
impotency  to  conceive  that  space  and  time  should  have  bounds.  I 
am  endeavoring  to  show  in  these  paragraphs  that  there  is  more  than 
this.  Hamilton  maintains  that  a  conception  of  the  infinite  is  impos- 
sible, because  of  certain  laws  or  conditions  of  human  intelligence. 
In  particular,  Dr.  Mansel  maintains  that  it  is  one  condition  of  con- 
sciousness that  we  distinguish  between  one  object  and  another,  and 
a  second  that  we  perceive  the  relation  between  subject  and  object, 
both  of  which  imply  limitation  and  relation.  These  laws  will  be 
examined  (infra,  p.  187,  foot-note).  Hamilton  admits  that  we  have 
a  belief  in  the  infinite  :  "The  sphere  of  our  belief  is  much  more 
extensive  than  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge,  and  therefore,  when  I 
deny  that  the  infinite  can  by  us  be  known,  I  am  far  from  denying 
that  by  us  it  is,  must,  and  ought  to  be  believed.  This  I  have  indeed 
anxiously  evinced  both  by  reason  and  authority  "  (Metaph.  Vol.  ii. 
App.  p.  530).  But  if  this  faith  be  beyond  consciousness,  his  view  is 
liable  to  all  the  objections  which  he  urges  so  powerfully  against  the 
theory  of  Schelling,  "  which  founds  philosophy  on  the  annihilation 
of  consciousness  "  (Discuss.  Art.  Philos.  of  Unconditioned).  On  the 
other  hand,  if  this  faith  be  within  consciousness,  as  he  evidently 
supposes  when  he  says  (Aletaph.  Vol.  i.  p.  191),  "  Knowledge  and 
belief  are  both  contained  under  consciousness,"  then  the  objections 
derived  from  the  conditions  of  consciousness,  which  he  urges  against 
the  knowledge  and  idea,  apply  equally  to  the  belief.  Besides,  must 
not  a  belief  in  a  thing  of  which  we  have  no  conception,  be  a  belief 
in  Zero  f  The  mind  is  shut  up,  it  is  supposed,  into  this  belief,  by 
the  principles  of  contradiction  and  excluded  middle,  which  requires 
that  of  two  extremes  (the  absolute  and  infinite)  exclusive  of  each 
other,  one  must  be  admitted  as  necessary.     But  then  both  these  ex- 


172  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

tremes,  i.  e.,  the  absolute  and  infinite,  are  represented  as  inconceiv- 
able, and  I  rather  think  it  would  defy  Hamilton  or  any  other  man  to 
tell  the  contradictory  of  what  is  inconceivable.  Of  this  1  am  sure, 
that  the  laws  of  contradiction  and  excluded  middle,  derived  from 
our  conceptions,  can  be  applied  only  to  what  we  conceive,  and  can 
have  no  meaning  as  referring  to  what  we  cannot  conceive.  He  main- 
tains that  our  conceptions  as  to  the  infinite  land  us  in  contradictions. 
"  We  are  altogether  unable  to  conceive  space  as  bounded,  as  finite; 
that  is,  as  a  whole  beyond  which  there  is  no  further  space."  "  On  the 
other  hand,  we  are  equally  powerless  to  realize  in  thought  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  opposite  contradictory.  We  cannot  conceive  space 
infinite  or  without  bound  "  (Melaph.  Lect.  38).  I  may  be  permitted  to 
quote  the  criticism  I  have  offered  on  this  alleged  contradiction  :  "  The 
seeming  contradiction  here  arises  from  the  double  sense  in  which  the 
word  '  conceive  '  is  used.  In  the  second  of  these  counter-proposi- 
tions, the  word  is  used  in  the  sense  of  imaging,  or  representing  in 
consciousness,  as  when  the  mind's  eye  pictures  a  fish  or  a  mermaid. 
In  this  signification  we  cannot  have  an  idea  or  notion  of  the  infinite. 
But  the  thinking,  judging,  believing  power  of  the  mind  is  not  the 
same  as  the  imaging  power.  The  mind  can  thhik  of  the  class  fish, 
or  even  of  the  imaginary  class  mermaid,  while  it  cannot  picture  the 
class.  Now,  in  the  first  of  the  opposed  propositions,  the  word  '  con- 
ceive '  is  taken  in  the  sense  of  thinking,  deciding,  being  convinced. 
We  picture  space  as  bounded,  hut  we  cannot  think,  judge,  or  believe 
it  to  be  hounded.  When  thus  explained,  all  appearance  of  contra- 
diction disappears  :  indeed,  all  contradictions  which  the  Kantians, 
Hcixelians,  and  Hamiltonians  are  so  fond  of  discovering  between 
our  intuitive  convictions  will  vanish,  if  we  but  carefully  inquire  into 
the  nature  of  the  convictions.  Both  propositions,  when  rightly  un- 
derstood, are  true,  and  there  is  no  contradiction.  They  stand  thus  : 
*  We  cannot  image  space  as  without  bounds;'  'we  cannot  think 
that  it  has  bounds,  or  believe  that  it  has  bounds.'  The  former  may 
perhaps  be  a  creature  impotency ;  the  latter  is  most  assuredly  a 
creature  potency,  —  is  one  of  the  most  elevated  and  elevating  con- 
victions of  which  the  mind  is  possessed,  and  is  a  conviction  of  which 
it  can  never  be  shorn." 

It  is  of  something,  say  of  space,  or  of  the  attribute  of  something, 
say  of  the  power  of  God,  that  we  predicate  that  they  nro.  infinite. 
This  cerlaiidy  implies  that  no  space  can  be  added  to  infinite  space, 
but  (Iocs  not  ini[)ly  that  space,  because  it  is  infinite,  must  contain  all 
existence,  must  comprise,  say  wisdom  and  goodness.     Il-  imj)lics  that 


THE   INFINITE.  173 

God  cannot  be  more  righteous  than  he  is,  but  does  not  involve  that 
his  righteousness  or  even  that  his  being  must  embrace  all  being. 
Dr.  Mansel,  in  the  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  3d  ed.  p.  46,  quotes 
the  Lmguage  of  Hegel  :  "  What  kind  of  an  Absolute  Being  is  that 
which  does  not  contain  in  itself  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil  in- 
cluded ?  "  and  refers  to  Schelling,  Schleiermacher,  and  Parker  as 
holdin'T  similar  views.  I  am  s^ure  that  the  mind  is  not  shut  up  into 
any  such  doctrine  by  its  native  convictions.  Against  such  a  view  the 
artillery  of  Hamilton  and  Mansel  tells  with  irresistible  power. 
They  have  shown  most  conclusively  that  such  a  notion  involves  in- 
extricable confusion  and  ho[)cless  contradictions.  I  freely  abandon 
such  a  conception  to  them,  to  tear  it  to  pieces  with  their  remorseless 
logic.  But  I  decidedly  demur  to  the  statement  of  Dr.  Mansel,  "  that 
which  is  conceived  as  absolute  and  infinite  must  be  conceived  as  con- 
taining within  itself  the  sum,  not  only  of  all  actual,  but  of  all  possi- 
ble modes  of  being."  I  have  nothing  here  to  say  as  to  the  absolute, 
but  I  do  affirm  that  we  have  a  conception  as  to  the  infinite,  the  per- 
fect—  I  do  not  say  of  the  infinite,  the  perfect  —  which  does  not 
imply  this  consequence,  and  that  we  can  both  think  an<l  speak  of 
infinity  without  falling  into  contradictions.  I  hold  it  to  be  quite 
possible  to  muse  and  reason  about  the  attribute  "infinite,"  as  it  is 
in  fact  conceived  and  believed  in  by  the  mind,  without  falling  into 
the  difficulties  in  which  the  German  supporters  of  the  absolute  have 
involved  themselves  ;  and  that  we  can  think  of  God  and  write 
about  God  as  infinite,  without  being  compelled  by  any  locrical  ne- 
cessity to  look  upon  him  as  embracing  all  existence,  or  to  reckon  it 
impossible  or  inconceivable  that  he  should  create  a  world  and  liv- 
ing agents  different  from  himself.  We  cannot  conceive  that  God's 
power  should  be  increased,  but  we  can  conceive  it  exercised  in 
creating  beings  possessed  of  power.  We  cannot  conceive  his  good- 
ness to  be  enlarged,  but  we  can,  without  a  contradiction,  conceive 
him  creating  other  beings  also  good.  Nor  are  we  by  this  conception 
shut  up  to  the  conclusion  that  the  creature-power  or  creature-excel- 
lence might  be  added  to  the  divine  power  and  goodness,  and  thus 
make  it  greater.  To  all  quibbles  proceeding  in  this  line,  I  say  that 
for  aught  I  know  it  may  not  be  possible  they  should  be  added,  or  that, 
if  added,  they  should  increase  the  divine  perfections ;  and  no  reply 
could  be  given,  drawn  either  from  intuition  or  experience,  the  only 
lights  to  which  I  can  allow  an  appeal.  Nor  will  I  venture  to  affirm 
how  much  truth  there  is  in  the  following  statement  of  Howe  (Liring 
Temple,   Part  i.   Chap,  iv.)  :    "  This  necessarily  is  such  to   which 


174  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

nothing  can  be  added,  so  as  that  it  should  be  really  greater  or  better 
or  more  perfect  than  it  was  before."  But  then  it  is  said,  could  you 
not  add  the  finite,  and  "  is  there,  therefore,  nothing  more  of  existent 
being  than  there  was  before  this  production?"  It  is  answered, 
"  Nothing  more  than  virtually  was  before ;  for  when  we  suppose  an 
infinite  being,  and  afterwards  a  finite,  this  finite  is  not  to  be  looked 
upon  as  emerging  or  springing  up  of  itself  out  of  nothing  ;  or  pro- 
ceeding from  some  third  thing  as  its  cause,  but  as  produced  by  that 
infinite,  or  springing  out  of  that  which  it  could  not  do  but  as  being 
before  virtually  contained  in  it.  For  the  infinite  produces  nothing 
which  it  could  not  produce,  and  what  it  could  produce  was  before- 
hand contained  in  it  as  in  the  power  of  its  cause." 

I  had  noticed  both  these  aspects  of  infinity  before  I  discovered 
that  I  had  been  anticipated  by  Aristotle  in  Phys.  Aus.  iii.  6.  He 
describes  the  infinite  as  that  which  has  always  something  beyond: 
ov  yap  ov  firiSev  H^w,  a\\'  o5  aei  ri  e^a>  iari,  tovto  &ireip6v  effnv.  But  then 
the  complete,  the  entire,  is  that  which  has  nothing  beyond  :  ov  Se 
/tTjSej/  6|a>,  TovT  4(ttI  reKeiov  Kal  '6\op.  I  look  on  both  these  remarkable 
expressions  as  applicable,  the  one  to  our  idea,  the  other  to  the  object. 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  would  identify  the  '6\ov  with  the  German  "  Abso- 
lute," but  Aristotle  gives  a  homeher  account  when  he  describes  the 
"  whole  "  as  that  which  needs  nothing  beyond,  "  as  a  man  or  a  cas- 
ket." It  could  be  shown  that  theolo2;ians,  in  laborinoj  to  describe 
infinity,  have  very  often  caught  glimpses  of  one  or  other  or  both 
these  characteristics,  and  have  fixed  them  with  more  or  less  clearness 
and  decision. 

In  musing  on  divine  things,  the  thought  occurred  to  Anselm  that 
it  might  be  possible  to  find  a  single  argument  which  would  of  itself 
prove  that  there  is  a  God,  and  that  he  is  the  Supreme  Good.  Man, 
he  says,  is  able  to  form  a  conception  of  something  than  which  noth- 
ing greater  can  be  conceived;  and  this  conception,  he  argues,  implies 
the  existence  of  a  corresponding  being  (Proslogion).  A  similar  ar- 
gument occurred  to  Descartes.  He  found  in  himself  the  idea  of  a 
Perfect  being ;  and  he  argues  that  in  this  idea  the  existence  of  the 
Being  is  comprised,  as  the  equality  of  the  three  angles  to  two  right 
angles  is  comprised  in  the  idea  of  a  triangle  (Meth.  p.  4,  etc.).  Leib- 
nitz acknowledges  that  the  argument  is  valid ;  provided  he  is 
allowed  to  supply  a  missing  link,  and  to  show  that  it  is  possible 
that  God  should  exist  (Op.  p.  273).  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
these  arguments  for  the  Divine  Existence,  derived  from  the  mere  idea 


THE  INFINITE.  175 

of  the  Perfect,  are  valid,  independent  of  external  facts.  But  these 
eminent  men  are  right  in  saying  that  the  mind  has  some  conception 
and  conviction  as  to  the  perfect ;  and  these  combine,  with  the  obser- 
vation of  traces  of  design,  to  enable  us  to  construct  an  argument  for 
the  Divine  Existence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE    EXTENT,    TESTS,    AND     POWER     OF    OUR    NATIVE 

BELIEFS. 

The  above  are  some  of  the  principal  —  I  will  not  ven- 
ture to  say  that  they  are  the  whole  —  of  our  native 
beliefs.  As  they  grow  upon  our  native  cognitions,  so 
they  attach  themselves  to  our  primitive  judgments,  in 
most  of  which  there  is  more  or  less  of  the  faith  element, 
that  is,  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  object  not  directly 
known.  There  is  belief,  for  instance,  involved  in  the 
judgment  that  this  effect  has  a  cause,  which  cause  may 
be  unknown.  There  is  belief,  too,  exercised  in  certain 
of  our  moral  judgments,  as  when  we  believe  in  the  in- 
tegrity of  a  good  man,  or  trust  in  the  word  of  God,  even 
when  his  providence  seems  in  opposition.  But  these  are 
topics  which  fall  to  be  discussed  specially  in  subsequent 
books. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  remark  that  faith  is  an  af- 
fecti(m  of  mind,  not  limited  to  our  primary  convictions. 
Faith  collects  round  our  observational  knowledge,  and 
even  around  the  conclusions  reached  by  inference.  We 
believe  —  the  course  of  nature  being  unchanged  by  its 
Author  —  that  the  seed  cast  into  the  ground  in  spring 
will  yield  a  return  in  autumn,  that  the  sun  will  rise  to- 
morrow as  he  has  done  to-day,  and  that  the  planet  Saturn 
a  year  lience  will  be  found  in  the  very  place  calculated 
for  us  by  the  astronomer.  We  exercise  faith,  every  one 
of  us,  in  listening  to  the  testimony  of  credible  witnesses, 
and  faith  is  in  one  of  its  liveliest  forms  when  it  becomes 


EXTENT,    TESTS,   AND   POWER   OF   OUR   NATIVE   BELIEFS.      177 

trust  in  the  ability,  the  excellence,  and  the  love  of  a 
fellow-creature.  Our  highest  faiths  are  those  in  which 
there  is  a  mixture  of  the  observational  and  intuitional 
elements,  the  observational  supplying  the  object,  and 
the  intuitional  imparting  to  them  a  profundity  and  a 
power  as  resting  on  an  immovable  foundation  and  going 
out  into  the  vast  and  unbounded.  In  particular,  when 
God  has  been  revealed,  faith  ever  clusters  round  him  as 
its  appropriate  object. 

There  are  canons  whereby  to  try  the  trustworthiness 
of  our  beliefs.  First,  so  far  as  our  intuitive  beliefs  are 
concerned,  there  are  the  general  tests  of  intuition.  Take 
our  belief  in  the  infinite.  We  have  to  ask,  Is  the  truth 
believed  in  self-evident,  or  does  it  lean  on  something 
else  ?  Is  it  necessary  ?  Can  we  believe  that  space  and 
time  and  the  Being  dwelling  in  them  have  limits?  Is  it 
universal,  that  is,  do  men  ever  practically  believe  that 
they  can  come  to  the  verge  of  time  and  space  ?  Such 
queries  as  these  will  settle  for  us  at  once  what  beliefs  are 
original  and  fundamental.  We  should  put  these  ques- 
tions to  every  belief  that  may  suggest  itself  to  our  own 
minds.  We  are  entitled  to  put  them  to  every  faith 
which  may  be  pressed  on  us  by  others.  Then,  secondly, 
as  to  our  derivative  or  observational  beliefs,  there  are  the 
ordinary  rules  of  evidence,  as  enunciated  in  works  of 
special  or  applied  logic,  or  as  stated  in  books  on  the  par- 
ticular departments  of  knowledge,  or,  more  frequently, 
as  caught  up  by  common  experience,  and  incorporated 
into  the  good  sense  of  mankind.  In  no  such  case  are  we 
to  believe  without  proof  being  supplied,  and  we  are  en- 
titled and  required  to  examine  the  evidence.  Thirdly 
as  to  mixed  cases  in  which  our  faith  proceeds  partly  on 
intuition  and  partly  on  observation,  our  business  is  care- 
fully to  separate  the  two,  and  to  judge  each  by  its  appro- 


178  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

priate  tests.  In  the  use  of  such  rules  as  these,  while  led 
to  yield  to  the  faith  sanctioned  by  our  ^rational  nature, 
we  shall  at  the  same  time  be  saved  from  those  extrava- 
gant credences  which  are  recommended  to  us  by  unau- 
thorized authority,  by  mysticism  which  has  confused  it- 
self, by  superstition,  by  bigotry,  by  fanaticism,  by  pride, 
or  by  passion. 

Looked  at  under  one  aspect,  belief  might  be  consid- 
ered as  so  far  a  weakness  cleaving  to  man,  for  where  he 
has  faith,  other  and  higher  beings  may  have  immediate 
knowledge.  But  when  contemplated  under  other  as- 
pects, it  is  an  element  of  vast  strength.  In  heaven, 
much  of  what  here  faith  is,  will  be  brightened  into  sight, 
but  even  in  heaven  faith  abideth.  Our  faiths  widen  in- 
definitely the  sphere  of  our  convictions ;  they  surround 
our  solid  cognitions  with  an  atmosphere  in  which  it  is 
bracing  and  exhilarating  to  walk,  which  no  doubt  has  its 
mists  and  clouds,  but  has  also  a  kindling  and  irradiating 
capacity,  and  may  be  warmed  into  the  fervor  and  reflect 
the  very  light  of  heaven  in  a  thousand  varied  colors. 
He  who  would  tear  off  from  the  mind  its  proper  beliefs, 
would  in  the  very  act  be  shearing  it  of  one  of  its  principal 
glories. 

What  a  power  even  in  our  earthly  faiths,  as  when  men 
sow  in  the  assurance  that  they  shall  reap  after  a  long 
season,  and  labor  in  the  confidence  of  a  reward  at  a  far 
distance !  What  an  efl&cacy  in  the  trust  which  the  child 
reposes  in  the  parent,  which  the  scholar  puts  in  his  mas- 
ter, which  the  soldier  places  in  his  general,  and  which  the 
lover  commits  to  the  person  beloved  !  These  are  among 
the  chief  potencies  which  have  been  moving  mankind  to 
good,  or,  alas  !  to  evil.  As  it  walks  steadfastly  on,  it  dis- 
covers an  outlet  where  sense  thought  that  the  path  was 
shut  in  and  closed.     Difficulties  give  way  as  it  advances, 


EXTENT,   TESTS,   AND   POWER  OF   OUR   NATIVE   BELIEFS.      179 

iind  impossibilities  to  prudence  speedily  become  accom- 
plishments before  the  might  and  energy  of  faith.  To  it 
we  owe  the  greatest  achievements  which  mankind  have 
effected  in  art,  in  travel,  in  conquest ;  setting  out  in 
search  of  the  unseen,  they  have  made  it  seen  and  palpa- 
ble. It  was  thus  that  Columbus  persevered  till  the  long- 
hoped-for  country  burst  on  his  view  :  it  is  always  thus 
that  men  discover  new  lands  and  new  worlds  outside 
those  previously  known. 

But  faith  has  ever  a  tendency  to  go  out  with  strong 
pinions  into  infinity,  which  it  feels  to  be  its  proper  ele- 
ment. It  has  a  telescopic  power,  whereby  it  looks  on 
vast  and  remote  objects,  and  beholds  them  as  near  and 
at  hand.  There  is  a  constancy  in  its  course  and  a  steadi- 
ness in  its  progress,  because  its  eye  is  fixed  on  a  pole-star 
far  above  our  earth.  How  lofty  its  mien  as  it  moves  on, 
looking  upward  and  onward,  and  not  downward  and 
backward,  with  an  eye  kindled  by  the  brilliancy  of  the 
object  at  which  it  looks  !  Hence  its  power,  a  power 
drawn  from  the  attraction  of  the  world  above.  No  ele- 
ment in  all  nature  so  potent.  The  lightning  cannot 
move  with  the  same  velocity  ;  light  does  not  travel  so 
quick  from  the  sun  to  the  earth  as  faith  does  from  earth 
to  heaven.  It  heaves  up,  as  by  an  irresistible  hydrostatic 
pressure,  the  load  which  would  press  on  the  bosom.  It 
glows  like  the  heat,  it  burns  like  the  fire,  and  obstacles 
are  consumed  before  its  devouring  progress.  Persecution, 
coming  like  the  wind  to  extinguish  it,  only  fans  it  into 
a  brighter  flame. 

The  proper  object  of  faith  is,  after  all,  the  Divine 
Being.  Time  and  space  and  infinity  seem  empty  and 
dead  and  cold,  till  faith  fills  them  with  the  Divine  Pres- 
ence, quickens  them  with  the  Divine  Life,  and  warms 
them  with  the  Divine  Love.     When  thus  grounded,  how 


180  PRIMITIVE   BELIEFS. 

stable  !  firmer  than  sense  can  ever  be,  for  the  objects  at 
which  it  looks  are  more  abiding.  "  The  things  which 
are  seen  are  temporal,  but  the  things  which  are  unseen 
are  eternal."  When  thus  fixed,  the  soul  is  at  rest,  as 
secure  in  Him  to  whom  it  adheres.  When  thus  directed, 
all  its  acts,  even  the  meanest,  become  noble,  being  sanc- 
tified by  the  divine  end  which  they  contemplate.  All 
doubts  are  now  decided  on  the  right  side  by  eternity 
being  cast  into  the  scale.  When  thus  associated,  its 
might  is  irresistible.  It  carries  with  it,  and  this  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  of  it,  the  power  of  God.  It  is,  no 
doubt,  weak  in  that  it  leans,  but  it  is  strong  in  that  it 
leans  on  the  arm  of  the  Omnipotent.  It  is  a  creature 
impotency  which  makes  us  lay  hold  of  the  Creator's 
power. 


BOOK   III. 

PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 
CHAPTER   I. 

THEIR   GENERAL  NATURE,   AND   A  CLASSIFICATION 

OF  THEM. 

I. 

The  mind  of  man  has  a  set  of  Simple  Cognitive  — 
called  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  Presentative  —  Powers, 
such  as  Sense-Perception  and  Self-Consciousness,  by  which 
it  knows  objects  before  it.  From  these  we  obtain  our 
Primitive  Cognitions.  It  has  also  a  set  of  Reproductivo 
Powers,  such  as  the  Memory  and  the  Imagination,  by 
which  it  recalls  the  past  in  old  forms  or  in  new  disposi- 
tions. Out  of  them  arise  many  of  our  Faiths,  as  in  the 
existence  of  objects  which  have  fallen  under  our  notice 
in  time  past,  and  in  an  infinity  surpassing  our  utmost 
powers  of  imagination.  But  the  mind  has  also  a  Power 
of  Comparison  by  which  it  perceives  Relations  and  forms 
Judgments. 

Our  Primitive  Judgments  are  formed  from  our  Primi- 
tive Cognitions  and  Primitive  Beliefs.  On  comparing 
two  or  more  objects  known  or  believed  in,  or,  we  may 
add,  imagined,  we  discover  that  they  bear  a  necessary 
relation  to  each  other.  The  necessity  of  the  relation 
arises  from  the  nature  of  the  things.  We  discover  that 
objects  have  a  certain  relation  because  of  their  nature  as 
it  has  become  known  to  us,  or  as  we  have  been  led  to 


182  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

believe  it  to  be  ;  and  whenever  we  are  led  to  discover  a 
necessary  relation,  it  is  because  we  have  such  an  ac- 
quaintance with  things  as  to  observe  that  there  is  a  rela- 
tion implied  in  their  very  nature.  It  should  be  added, 
that  because  of  our  limited  and  imperfect  knowledge, 
there  may  be  many  necessary  relations  which  are  alto- 
gether unknown  to  us,  even  among  objects  which  are  so 
far  known. 

In  accepting  this  account,  we  are  saved  from  the  ex- 
travagant positions  taken  up  by  many  metaphysicians  as 
to  the  a  priori  judgments  of  the  mind,  which  they  repre- 
sent as  fashioned  by  a  power  of  reason  independent  of 
things,  whereas  they  are  formed  on  the  contemplation 
of  things,  and  of  the  nature  of  things,  so  far  as  appre- 
hended. Such  questions  as  the  following  are  often  put 
by  ingenious  minds  :  How  is  it  that  two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space?  How  is  it  that  time  appears 
like  a  line  stretching  behind  and  before,  whereas  the 
analogous  thing,  space,  extends  in  three  dimensions  ? 
The  proper  reply  is,  that  all  this  follows  from  the  very 
nature  of  space  and  time.  And  if  the  question  be  put, 
How  do  we  know  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose 
a  space,  and  that  time  has  length  without  breadth?  the 
answer  is,  that  all  this  is  involved  in  our  primary  knowl- 
edge of  space  and  time.  No  other  answer  can  be  given  ; 
no  other  answer  should  be  attempted.  Our  primitive 
judgments  proceed  on  our  primitive  cognitions  and  be- 
liefs, which  again  are  founded  on  the  nature  of  things, 
as  we  are  constituted  to  discover  it. 

11. 

It  will  be  necessary  at  this  place  to  examine  a  very 
common  representation  that  the  mind  begins  with  Judg- 
ments, rather  than  the  knowledge  of  individual  things, 


THEIR  GENERAL  NATURE.  183 

and  that  there  is  judgment  or  comparison  in  all  knowl- 
edge. According  to  Locke,  knowledge  is  nothing  but  the 
perception  of  the  connection  and  agreement,  or  disagree- 
ment and  repugnancy,  of  any  two  ideas.  Sir  VV.  Hamil- 
ton and  Dr.  Mansel  maintain  that  in  every  cognitive  act 
there  is  judgment  or  comparison.  In  opposition  to  Locke, 
I  hold  that  the  mind  does  not  commence  with  ideas  and 
the  comparison  of  ideas,  but  with  the  knowledge  of 
things,  of  which  it  can  ever  after  form  ideas,  and  which 
it  is  able  to  compare.  I  reckon  it  impossible  for  the 
mind,  from  mere  ideas  not  comprising  knowledge,  or 
from  the  comparison  of  such  ideas,  ever  to  rise  to  knowl- 
edge, to  the  knowledge  of  things.  The  system  of  Locke 
is  at  this  point  involved  in  difficulties  from  which  it  can- 
not be  delivered  by  those  who  hold,  as  he  did,  that  man 
can  reach  a  knowledge  of  objects.  The  onl}'^  consistent 
issue  of  such  a  doctrine  is  an  idealism  which  maintains 
that  the  mind  can  never  get  beyond  its  own  circle  or 
globe,  and  is  there  engaged  forever  in  the  contemplation 
and  comparison  of  its  own  ideas,  in  regard  to  which  it 
never  can  be  certain  whether  they  have  any  external 
reality  corresponding  to  them.  The  doctrine  of  Hamil- 
ton and  Mansel  is  not  so  objectionable,  as  they  allow  that 
we  compare  objects.  Still  it  is  an  unsatisfactory  state- 
ment to  make  all  our  knowledge  to  be  not  of  things,  but 
of  the  comparison  or  the  relations  of  things.  If  I  inter- 
pret my  consciousness  aright,  we  first  know  things,  and 
then  are  able  to  compare  them  because  of  our  knowledge 
of  their  qualities.  Any  other  doctrine  makes  our  knowl- 
edge indirect  and  remote,  —  we  know  not  the  object,  but 
merely  a  relation  of  it  to  some  other  object,  of  which 
object  our  knowledge  must  also  be  relative,  that  is,  in 
relation  to  something  else. 

I  acknowledge  that  every  intuitive  cognition  may  fur- 


184  PRIMITIVE   JUDGMENTS. 

nish  the  matter  and  supply  the  ground  for  a  judgment. 
Thus,  out  of  the  knowledge  of  a  stone  as  before  me,  I 
can  form  the  judgment,  "  This  stone  is  now  present,"  by 
an  analysis  of  the  concrete  cognition.  The  knowledge 
of  self  as  thinking  enables  me,  as  I  distinguish  between 
the  ego  and  the  particular  thought,  and  observe  the  rela- 
tion of  the  two,  to  affirm,  "I  think."  I  believe  that 
every  primary  cognition  may  entitle  me,  by  an  easy  ab- 
straction and  comparison,  to  frame  a  number  of  primary 
judgments.  Thus  the  cognition  of  the  stone  enables  me 
to  say,  "  This  stone  exists  ;  "  "  This  stone  is  here ; "  and  if 
the  perception  be  by  the  eye,  "  This  stone  is  extended ; " 
and  if  it  be  by  the  muscular  sense,  "  This  stone  resists 
pressure  ;  "  while  the  cognition  of  self,  as  perceiving  the 
stone,  enables  me  to  affirm,  "  I  perceive  the  stone  ;  "  "I 
exist ;  "  "I  perceive."  The  two  indeed  —  our  primary 
cognitions  and  beliefs  on  the  one  hand,  and  our  primary 
judgments  on  the  other  —  are  intimately  connected. 
Every  cognition  furnishes  the  materials  of  a  judgment ; 
and  a  judgment  possible,  I  do  not  say  actual,  is  involved 
in  every  cognition.  As  the  relation  is  implied  in  the 
nature  of  the  individual  objects,  and  the  judgment  pro- 
ceeds on  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  objects,  so 
the  two,  in  fact,  may  be  all  but  simultaneous,  and  it  may 
scarcely  be  necessaiy  to  distinguish  them,  except  for 
rigidly  exact  philosophic  purposes.  Still  it  is  the  cogni- 
tion which  comes  first,  and  forms  the  basis  on  which  the 
judgments  are  founded ;  in  the  case  of  the  primitive 
judgments,  directly  founded.  It  should  be  frankly  ad- 
mitted that  what  is  given  in  primary  cognition  is  in  itself 
of  the  vaguest  and  most  valueless  character,  till  abstrac- 
tion and  comparison  are  brought  to  bear  upon  it.  Still 
our  cognitions  and  beliefs  furnish  the  materials  of  all 
that  the  discursive  understanding  weaves  into  such  rich 
and  often  complicated  webs  of  comparison  and  inference. 


THEIR  GENERAL   NATURE.  185 

ni. 

It  is  to  be  carefully  observed  that  our  primitive  cogni- 
tions and  beliefs  being  of  Realities,  all  the  intellectual 
processes  properly  founded  on  them  must  relate  to  reali- 
ties also.  If  what  we  proceed  on  be  unreal,  that  which 
we  reach  by  a  logical  process  may  also  be  unreal.  If 
space  and  time,  for  example,  have,  as  some  suppose,  no 
reality  independent  of  the  contemplative  mind,  then  all 
the  relations  of  space  and  time,  as  unfolded  in  mathe- 
matical demonstrations,  must  also  be  regarded  as  unreal 
in  the  same  sense.  On  the  other  hand,  if  space  and 
time  have  (as  I  maintain)  an  existence  irrespective  of 
the  mind  thinking  about  them,  then  all  the  necessary 
relations  drawn  from  our  knowledge  may  also  be  regarded 
as  having  a  reality  independent  of  the  mind  reflecting  on 
them.  Not  that  they  are  to  be  supposed  to  have  an  ex- 
istence as  individuals,  or  independent  of  the  things  re- 
lated ;  they  have  precisely  such  a  reality  as  we  are  intui- 
tively led  to  believe  them  to  have  ;  that  is,  they  exist  as 
necessary  relations  of  the  separate  things. 

IV. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  announce  here  generally,  what 
will  be  shown  specially  at  every  stage  as  we  advance, 
that  all  the  primitive  judgments  of  the  mind  are  Indi- 
vidual. The  mind  does  not  in  its  spontaneous  operations 
declai'e  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and 
not  to  be,  but  upon  being  satisfied  that  a  certain  thing 
exists,  it  at  once  sets  aside  the  thouglit  or  assertion  that 
it  does  not  exist.  It  does  not  affirm  in  a  general  propo- 
sition that  no  two  straight  lines  can  enclose  a  space,  but 
it  says  these  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space ; 
and  it  would  say  the  same  of  every  other  two  straight 


186  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

lines.  It  does  not  metaphysically  announce  that  every 
quality  implies  a  substance,  that  every  effect  must  have 
a  cause ;  but  it  declares  of  this  property  contemplated 
that  it  implies  a  substance,  and  of  this  given  effect  that 
it  must  have  had  a  cause.  It  is  out  of  these  individual 
judgments  that  the  general  maxim  is  obtained  by  a  pro- 
cess of  generalization.  But  then  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
it  is  not  a  generalization  of  an  outward  experience, — 
which  must  always  be  limited,  and  never  can  furnish 
ground  for  a  necessary  and  universal  proposition,  —  but 
of  inward  and  immediate  judgments  of  the  mind,  which 
carry  in  them  the  conviction  of  necessity,  which  necessity 
therefore  will  attach  itself  to  the  general  maxim,  on  the 
condition  of  our  having  properly  performed  the  discur- 
sive operation. 

V. 

It  is  necessary  for  our  purposes  to  Classify  the  primary 
judgments  pronounced  by  the  mind  ;  but  this  is  by  no 
means  an  easy  task.  An  arrangement  may,  however, 
serve  very  important  ends,  even  though  it  be  not  thor- 
oughly exhaustive  and  altogether  unobjectionable.  The 
following  is  to  be  regarded  simply  as  the  best  which  I 
have  been  able  to  draw  out,  and  may  be  accepted  as  a 
provisional  one  till  a  better  be  furnished.  The  mind 
seems  capable  of  noticing  intuitively  the  relations  of,  — 

I.  IDENTITY  AND  DIFFERENCE.  V.  TIME. 

II.  WHOLE  AND  PARTS.  VI.  QUANTITY. 

III.  RESEMBLANCE.  VII.  ACTIVE  PROPERTY. 

IV.  SPACE.  VIII.  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. 

VI. 

It  is  said  to  be  the  oflBce  of  judgment  or  comparison 
to  discover  Relations.  Let  us  properly  understand  what 
is  meant  by  relations.     It  always  implies  two  or  more 


THEIR   GENERAL   NATURE.  187 

things.  The  relation  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
things.  We  must  know  so  far  the  nature  of  the  things 
before  we  can  discover  their  relation.  In  Identity  we 
know  the  object  as  at  one  time  and  again  at  another 
time,  and  looking  at  each  of  the  things,  and  comparing 
them,  we  discover  them  to  be  the  same.  In  Comprehen- 
sion we  have  before  the  mind  an  object,  and  also  a  part 
or  parts,  say  a  house  and  a  window,  and  we  decide  the 
window  to  be  part  of  the  house.  In  Resemblance  we 
perceive  a  quality  in  each  of  the  objects,  and  pronounce 
it  the  same.  It  should  be  noticed  here  that  while  the 
quality  is  the  same,  this  does  not  make  the  objects  iden- 
tical. In  Space  we  discover  relations  of  extension  and 
position,  say  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  to  one  another. 
In  Time  we  have  always  a  present  perception,  and  we 
remember  the  past  or  anticipate  the  future,  and  declare 
their  relations  of  priority  and  posteriority.  In  Quantity 
we  look  at  the  muchness  of  objects,  as  being  less  or  more, 
and  at  their  proportions.  In  Quality  we  contemplate 
objects  as  affecting  each  other,  say  as  attracting  one  an- 
other. In  Causation  we  discover  a  power  in  one  object 
to  affect  another. 

A  judgment  is  usually  defined  as  a  comparison  of  two  notions. 
Upon  which  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  remarks,  that  "propositions  (except 
where  the  mind  itself  is  the  subject  treated  of)  are  not  assertions 
respecting  our  ideas  of  things,  but  assertions  respecting  things  them- 
selves," adding,  "My  belief  has  not  reference  to  the  ideas,  it  has 
reference  to  the  things  "  (^Logic,  i.  v.  1).  There  is  force  in  the 
criticism,  yet  it  does  not  give  the  exact  truth.  In  propositions  about 
extra-mental  objects,  we  are  not  comparing  the  two  notions  as  states 
of  mind  ;  so  far  as  logicians  have  proceeded  on  this  view,  they  have 
fallen  into  confusion  and  error.  But  still,  while  it  is  true  that  our 
predications  are  made,  not  in  regard  to  our  notions,  but  of  things,  it 
is  in  regard  to  things  apprehended,  or  of  which  we  have  a  notion,  as 
Mr.  Mill  admits:  "In  order  to  believe  that  gold  is  yellow,  I  must 
indeed  have  the  idea  of  gold  and  the  idea  of  yellow,  and  something 
having  reference  to  those  ideas  must  take  place  in  my  mind." 


188  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

According  to  Locke,  "  Perception  is  the  first  operation  of  all  our 
intellectual  faculties,  and  the  inlet  of  all  knowledge  into  our  minds  " 
(^Esf:aij,  ir.   X.    15).     According  to  the  view  I    take,  perception  is 
knowledge.     According  to  Locke,  "  Knowledge  is  nothing  but  the 
Perception  of  the  Connection  and  Agreement,  or  Disagreement  and 
Repugnancy,  of  any  of  our  ideas  "  (iv.  i.  1).     See  King's  and  Reid's 
review  of   this    doctrine   of  Locke,   supra ^  p.  45.     Hamilton  says: 
"  Consciousness  is  primarily  a  judgment  or  affirmation  of  existence. 
Again,  consciousness  is  not  merely  the  affirmation  of  naked  exist- 
ence, but  the  affirmation  of  a  certain  qualified  or  determinate  ex- 
istence "  (Melaph.  Lect.  24.   See,  also.  Notes  to  Reid's  Works,  pp.  243, 
275).     Dr.  ]\Iansel  says  :  "  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  canon 
of  Psychology,  that  every  act  of   consciousness,  intuitive  or  discur- 
sive, is  comprised  in  a  conviction  of  the  presence  of  its  object,  either 
internally  in  the  mind,  or  externally  in   space.     The  result  of  every 
such  act  may  thus  be  generally  stated  in  the  proposition,  '  This  is 
here.' "     He  is  obliged  to  distinguish  between  such  a  psychological 
judgment  and   a  logical  one.      "The  former  is  the  judgment  of  a 
relation  between  the  conscious  subject  and  the  immediate  object  of 
consciousness.     The  latter  is  the  judgment  of  a  relation  which  two 
objects  of  thought  bear  to  each  other"   (Proleg.  Log.    Chap.  ii.). 
What  he  calls  a  psychological  judgment  seems  to  me  to  be  a  cog- 
nition, which  may  be  explicated  into  a  judgment,  which  judgment 
will  be  a  logical  one.     Hamilton  and  Mansel  carry  out  still  further 
their   doctrine  of  comparison  being   involved   in   knowledo-e.      Dr. 
Mansel  quotes  J.  G.  Fichte :  "  AUes,  was  fur  uns  Etwas  ist,  ist  es 
nur  inwiefern  es  Etwas  anderes  auch  nicht  ist;  alle  Position  ist  mir 
moglich  durch  Negation."     This  doctrine  is  in  perfect  consonance 
with  Fichte' s  idealism,  but  does  not  consort  so  well  with  Scottish 
realism.     And  yet  Hamilton  says:  "The  knowledge  of  opposites  is 
one;  thus  we  cannot  know  what  is   tall  without  knowino-  what  is 
short ;  we  know  what  is  virtue  only  as  we  know  what  is  vice ;  the 
science  of  health  is  but  another  name  for  the  science  of  disease  " 
(Metnph.  Lect.  1 3 ;  see,  also,  34).     So,  also,  Dr.  Mansel  (Lim.  ofRelig. 
Thought,  Lect.  3),  "  To  be  conscious,  we  must  be  conscious  of  some- 
thing; and  that  something  can  only  be  known  as  that  which  it  is,  by 
being  distinguished  from  that  which  it  is  not."     This  seems  to  me  a 
doctrine  wrong  in  itself,  and  of  very  doubtful  tendency.    True,  there 
are  some  ideas  confessedly  relative,  such  as   the  ideas  of  tall  and 
short.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  cognitions,  and  there  are 
ideas  which  are  positive;  thus  we  know  self  as  thinking,  we  know 


THEIR   GENERAL   NATURE.  189 

virtue  as  good,  without  reference  to  anything  else,  and  it  is  because 
we  are  thus  able  to  know  things  separately  that  we  are  able  to  dis- 
cover relations  between  them.  We  do  not  6rst  discern  diflerences 
and  then  know  the  things:  we  first  know  the  things  and  then  observe 
points  of  resemblance  or  difference. 

Both  Locke  and  Kant  give  the  mind  a  power  of  intuition,  but  they 
bring  it  in  at  different  places.  Locke  confines  it  to  our  judgments  ; 
we  perceive  intuitively  the  relation  of  ideas  (^Essay,  B  iv.  1).  Kant 
gives  the  mind  an  intuition  of  phenomena  under  forms  which  it  im- 
poses, but  withholds  fi'ora  the  mind  any  intuition  in  judj;ment  or 
understanding.  I  give  the  mind,  within  rigid  limits,  an  intuition  both 
of  thinors  and  the  relations  of  things. 

Locke  speaks  of  relations  as  being  infinite,  and  mentions  only  a 
few.  He  specifies  Cause  and  Effect,  Time,  Place,  Identity  and 
Diversity,  Proportion,  and  Moral  Relations  (Essay,  ii.  xxviii.). 
Hume  mentions  Resemblance,  Identity,  Space  and  Time,  Quantity, 
Degree,  Contrariety,  Cause  and  Effect.  Kant's  Categories  are, — 
(I.)  Quantity,  containing  Unity,  Plurality,  Totality;  (II.)  Quality, 
containing  Reality,  Negation,  Limitation  ;  (III.)  Relation,  compris- 
ing Inherence  and  Subsistence,  Causality  and  Dependence,  Com- 
munity of  Agent  and  Patient  ;  (IV.)  Modality,  under  which  are 
Possibility  and  Impossibility,  Existence  and  Non-Existence,  Neces- 
sity and  Contingence.  Dr.  Brown  arranges  them  as  those  of, —  (I.) 
Coexistence,  embracing  Position,  Resemblance  or  Difference,  Pro- 
portion, Degree,  Comprehension ;  (IL)  Succession,  containing 
Causal  and  Casual  Priority.  Of  late  there  has  been  a  tendency 
among  British  psychologists  to  narrow  the  relations  which  the  mind 
can  discover.  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  account  (Metaph.  Lect.  34)  is  a 
retrogression  in  science.  In  comparison,  —  (L)  We  affirm  the  ex- 
istence of  the  ego  and  the  non-ego;  (2.)  We  discriminate  the  two  ; 
(3.)  We  notice  resemblance  or  dissimilarity  ;  (4.)  We  collate  the 
phenomena  with  the  native  notion  of  substance ;  (5.)  We  collate 
them  with  the  native  notion  of  causation.  Prof.  Bain  says  (Senses 
and  Intell.  p.  329),  "What  is  termed  judgment  may  consist  in  dis- 
crimination on  the  one  hand,  or  in  the  sense  of  agreement  on  the 
other  :  we  determine  two  or  more  things  either  to  differ  or  to  agree. 
It  is  impossible  to  find  any  case  of  judging  that  does  not,  in  the  last 
resort,  mean  one  or  other  of  these  two  essential  activities  of  the  in- 
tellect." I  wish  my  readers  to  compare  these  views  of  Hamilton 
and  Bain  with  those  of  the  older  thinkers  quoted  above,  and  with 
those  expounded  in  this  work.     Both  seem  to  me  to  narrow  the 


190  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

mind's  power  of  discovering  relations  among  things,  which  in  fact 
is  the  highest  intellectual  power  which  the  mind  can  exercise. 
Hamilton's  account  seems  to  me  to  be  an  unnatural  one,  especially 
what  he  says  about  a  collation  with  "native  notions  "  of  substance 
and  causation.  We  discover  the  relations  in  looking  at  things. 
Bain's  account  in  confining  the  mind's  power  to  the  discovery  of 
agreement  and  difference  is  miserably  meagre. 


CHAPTER  II. 

RELATIONS  INTUITIVELY  OBSERVED  BY  THE  MIND. 

I. 

Relation  of  Identity.  —  We  have  seen  that  every  ob- 
ject known  by  us  is  known  as  having  being  ;  I  do  not 
say  an  independent  being,  but  a  separate  and  individual 
being.  This  being,  continuing  in  the  object,  constitutes 
its  identity.  This  identity  every  object  has  as  long  as 
it  exists,  and  this  whether  the  identity  does  or  does  not 
become  known  to  us  or  to  any  other  created  being.  An 
object  has  identity  not  because  the  identity  is  known  to 
us ;  but  an  object  having  continued  being,  and  therefore 
identity,  intelligent  beings  may  come  to  discover  it.  We 
are  so  constituted  as  to  be  able  to  know  being,  —  that  is, 
that  the  object  known  to  us  possesses  being,  —  and  we 
look  on  the  object  as  retaining  that  being  as  long  as  it 
exists.  We  are  prepared  to  decide  then  that  if  we  ever 
fall  in  with  this  object  again,  it  will  have  retained  its 
identity.  We  may  fall  in  with  the  same  object  again 
without  discovering  it  to  be  the  same,  because  of  a  defect 
of  memory,  or  because  the  object  was  disguised  in  a 
crowd.  But  in  regard  to  certain  objects,  we  cannot 
avoid  observing  the  sameness,  and  cannot  be  deceived  in 
pronouncing  them  the  same. 

So  far  as  self  is  concerned,  we  discover  the  identity 
intuitively  as  we  look  on  the  objects  presented  in  self- 
consciousness  and  memory.  We  have  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  self  in  every  exercise  of  consciousness. 
We  have  a  recollection  of  self  in  some  particular  state 


192  PRIMITIVE   JUDGMENTS. 

iu  every  exercise  of  memory.  The  mind  has  thus  before 
it,  at  every  waking  moment,  a  knowledge  of  a  present 
self  ;  and  in  every  exercise  of  memory  it  has  a  past  self ; 
and  in  looking  at  and  comparing  the  two,  it  at  once  pro- 
claims the  identity.  It  will  be  observed  that  here,  as  in 
every  other  case,  the  judgment  throws  us  back  on  cog- 
nition, specially  personality,  and  belief;  the  necessary 
facts  on  which  the  mind  pronounces  the  necessary  judg- 
ment are  furnished  in  the  exercise  of  consciousness  and 
memory. 

In  regard  to  objects  external  to  the  mind,  we  have  no 
such  intuitive  means  of  discovering  an  identity.  Our 
original  perceptions  do  not  extend  even  to  the  identity 
of  our  bodily  frame.  Every  particle  of  matter  in  the 
body  may  be  changed  in  seven  years,  as  physiologists 
tell  us,  in  perfect  accordance  with  our  intuitive  percep- 
tions. We  may  be  without  a  body  in  the  state  between 
death  and  the  resurrection,  and  may  receive  an  entirely 
new  and  spiritual  body  in  heaven,  and  j^et  retain  all  the 
while  our  identity  and  feeling  of  identity.  And  in  the 
case  of  extra-organic  objects  there  is  always  a  possibility 
of  doubt  as  to  whether  what  we  perceive  now  is  the  same 
object  as  fell  under  our  notice  at  some  previous  time. 
The  infant,  prompted  by  his  instinct  as  to  the  continu- 
uance  of  being,  and  making  a  wrong  application  of  it, 
■will  often  be  inclined  to  discover  identity  where  there 
is  only  resemblance,  will  be  apt,  for  example,  to  look  on 
every  man  he  meets  with  as  his  father.  As  he  advances 
in  life  he  will  be  led  to  pay  more  regard  to  differences. 
As  to  when  there  is  a  sufficient  amount  of  resemblance 
to  denote  a  sameness,  this  is  to  be  determined  solely  by 
the  laws  of  experiential  evidence.  In  some  cases,  as 
when  we  recognize  our  friends  and  familiar  objects,  there 
is  moral  certainty ;  in  other  cases  there  is  probability,  less 


RELATIONS   INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED   BY   THE   MIND.      193 

or  greater,  according  to  the  proof  which  is  perceived  or 
can  be  adduced  (a). 

The  intuitive  judgments  are  always  individual,  and 
are  pronounced  on  the  objects  being  presented.  When 
generalized,  they  take  the  form  of  such  metaphysical 
maxims  as  these  :  "  It  is  Impossible  for  the  same  thing 
to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time."  "  Everything 
preserves  its  identity  as  long  as  it  exists."  "  We  are 
sure  that  we  are  the  same  beings  as  we  were  since  con- 
sciousness began,  and  must  continue  the  same  as  long  as 
consciousness  exists." 

The  above  are  judgments  pronounced  on  individual 
objects  contemplated.  Under  the  same  head  there  fall 
to  be  placed  predications  which  the  mind  makes  at  once 
and  intuitively  in  regard  to  relations  which  have  been 
previously  perceived  and  sanctioned  by  the  mind.  Sup- 
pose that,  on  the  ground  of  experience,  we  become  con- 
vinced that  no  reptile  is  warm-blooded  ;  on  the  bare 
contemplation  of  the  notions,  we  at  once  and  intuitively 
declare  that  no  warm-blooded  animal  can  be  a  reptile. 
In  all  such  cases  it  is  presupposed  that  there  is  a  pre- 
viously discovered  relation.  It  is  possible  that  the  mind 
may  have  been  deceived,  and  that  the  relation  does  not 
really  exist ;  and  in  this  case  the  judgment  pronounced 
according  to  the  law  of  identity  would  also  be  wrong  as 
a  matter  of  fact.  Thus  if  a  proposition  were  given  that 
"no  mammal  is  warm-blooded,"  the  mind  would  pro- 
nounce that  no  "  warm-blooded  animal  can  be  a  mam- 
mal." The  error,  however,  would  lie,  not  in  the  law  of 
thought,  but  in  the  original  proposition  furnished. 

This  is  the  proper  place  to  explain  the  famous  distinc- 
tion drawn  by  Kant  between  Analytic  and  Synthetic 
Judgments.  Analytic  Judgments  are  those  in  which  the 
predicate  is  involved  in  the  vei'y  notion  which  constitutes 


194  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

the  subject;  as  when  we  say  that  "an  island  is  sur- 
rounded with  water,"  *'  a  king  has  authority  to  rule," 
"the  moral  law  should  be  obeyed."  '  All  such  judgments 
are  said,  in  the  nomenclature  of  the  Kantian  school,  to  be 
a  priori.  We  have  come  to  entertain  certain  apprehen- 
sions in  regard  to  island,  king,  and  moral  law,  and  now 
we  pronounce  a  set  of  judgments  on  the  bare  contempla- 
tion of  these,  and  involved  in  them  by  the  law  of  iden- 
tity. The  judgments  involved  in  the  general  law  of 
identity,  the  analytic  judgments  of  Kant,  have  been  care- 
fully examined  of  late  years  in  Germany.  They  take 
the  following  forms:  I.  The  Law  of  Identity  Proper, 
which  requires  us  to  recognize  the  same  to  be  the  same, 
presented  it  may  be  at  different  times,  or  in  different 
circumstances,  or  in  different  forms.  II.  The  Law  of 
Contradiction,  according  to  which  it  is  impossible  for 
the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time ; 
this  whatever  the  thing  be,  an  independently  existing 
object,  or  an  attribute.  III.  The  Law  of  Excluded 
Middle,  which  requires  that  when  two  propositions  are 
in  the  relation  of  contradictories,  one  or  other  must  be 
true,  and  yet  both  cannot  be  true.  These  Laws  have  a 
great  importance  in  Formal  Logic.  Being  carried  out 
and  applied  in  special  forms,  they  show  what  may  be 
drawn  from  any  proposition  or  set  of  propositions  given, 
and  they  keep  thought  consistent  with  itself.  (5) 

Synthetic  (as  distinguished  from  Analytic)  Judgments 
are  those  in  which  the  predicate  affirms  or  denies  some- 
thing more  than  is  embraced  in  the  concept ;  as  when  we 
say  "  gold  is  yellow,"  "  body  gravitates,"  "  sin  will  be 
punished."  Most  of  these  judgments  are  said  to  be  a 
posteriori,  that  is,  they  are  the  result  of  gathered  obser- 
vation. Others  of  them  are  called  a  priori,  being  prior 
to  observation.     But  the  account  given  by  Kant  cannot 


RELATIONS  INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED  BY   THE   MIND.      196 

be  accepted  by  me,  as  it  is  not  consistent  with  realism. 
He  mukes  the  judgments  formed  by  the  mind  by  its  own 
independent  power,  according  to  its  own  laws  and  im- 
posed on  things.  I  hold  that  we  pronounce  them  as  we 
look  at  things.  This  makes  them  relate  to  things. 
There  are  cases  innumerable  in  which  we  form  judg- 
ments on  the  bare  inspection  of  things,  without  any 
gathered  observation.  We  perceive  the  relation  at  once, 
and  the  judgment  is  necessary  and  universal.  Thus  we 
perceive  that  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing 
are  equal  to  one  another,  and  that  what  begins  to  be 
must  have  a  cause.  Such  relations  can  be  observed,  gen- 
eralized, and  expressed.  They  may  be  called  a  priori 
judgments,  but  I  think  more  appropriately  primitive 
judgments.  I  am  in  this  Book  to  unfold  these  Judg- 
ments. 

(a)  These  views  determine  the  light  in  which  we  should  look  on 
as  "  pretty  "  a  controversy  as  ever  raged  in  metaphysics  or  out  of  it, 
as  to  whetlier  two  things  in  every  respect  alike  —  say  two  drops  of 
water  —  would  or  would  not  be  identical.  Leibnitz  held  that  each 
thing  differed  from  every  other  by  an  internal  principle  of  distinc- 
tion, and  that  no  individuals  could  be  alike  in  every  respect,  and 
that  if  they  were,  they  could  have  no  principle  of  individuation  (Op. 
p.  277).  Kant  criticised  this  view,  and  urged  that  even  though  they 
were  in  every  respect  alike,  they  would  differ  as  being  in  different 
parts  of  space  (Werke,  Bd.  ii.  p.  217).  The  common  representation 
was  that  they  would  differ  numerically.  I  am  not  sure  that  any  of 
these  accounts  is  correct.  It  is  quite  conceivable  that  there  might 
be  two  things  in  every  respect  alike,  except  in  their  individual  being. 
It  is  not  their  existence  in  different  parts  of  space  which  constitutes 
their  difference,  but  as  different  in  their  being,  they  exist  in  different 
parts  of  space.  They  have  a  distinct  being,  not  because  they  are 
numerically  different,  but  they  are  numerically  distinct  because  they 
have  a  distinct  being. 

(h)  I  have  shown  in  my  work  on  Logic,  at  the  close,  how  these 
Analytic  Judgments  regulate  discursive  thought.  Identity  Proper 
rules  affirmative  inferences  immediate  and  mediate.     Contradiction 


196  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

controls  negative  inferences.     Excluded  Middle  guides  in  our  infer- 
ences from  contradictories. 

II. 

Relations  of  Wliole  and  Parts.  —  It  is  a  fundamental 
principle  of  this  treatise  that  the  mind  begins  with  the 
concrete,  —  a  truth  which  should  always  go  along  with 
the  other,  which  has,  however,  been  more  frequently- 
noticed,  that  it  begins  with  the  individual.  Being  fur- 
nished with  the  concrete  in  its  primary  knowledge  and 
beliefs,  —  and  we  may  add,  imaginations,  —  the  mind 
can  consider  a  part  of  the  concrete  whole  separate  from 
the  other  parts.  In  doing  so,  it  is  much  aided  by  the 
circumstance  that  the  concrete  whole  seldom  comes 
round  in  all  its  entireness.  The  child  sees  a  man  with 
a  hat  to-day  and  without  his  hat  to-morrow,  and  is  thus 
the  better  enabled  to  form  a  notion  of  the  hat  apart  from 
the  man  that  wore  it. 

In  all  abstraction  there  is  judgment  or  comparison ; 
that  is,  we  discover  a  relation  between  two  objects  con- 
templated. We  contemplate  a  concrete  whole,  and  we 
contemplate  a  part,  and  observe  a  relation  of  the  part 
as  a  part  to  the  whole.  It  should  be  admitted  that, 
without  any  exercise  of  comparison,  we  are  capable  of 
imaging  a  part  of  a  whole,  in  cases  where  the  part  can 
be  separated  ;  thus,  having  seen  a  man  on  horseback,  I 
can  easily  picture  to  myself  the  man  separately,  or  the 
horse  separately,  without  thinking  of  any  relation  be- 
tween them ;  but  in  such  processes  there  is  no  exercise 
of  abstraction.  Abstraction  is  eminently  an  intellectual 
operation.  In  it  we  contemplate  a  part  as  part  of  a 
whole,  say  a  quality  as  a  quality  of  a  substance  ;  for  ex- 
ample, transparency  as  a  quality  of  ice,  or  of  some 
other  substance.  In  all  such  exercises  there  is  involved 
a  Correlative  Power.     This  power  may  be  called  Com- 


RELATIONS   INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED   BY   THE  MIND.      197 

prehension,  inasmuch  as  it  contemplates  the  whole  in  its 
relation  to  the  parts;  or  Abstraction,  inasmuch  as  it 
contemplates  the  part  as  part  of  a  whole;  and  the  Fac- 
ulty of  Analysis  and  Synthesis,  inasmuch  as  it  resolves 
the  whole  into  its  parts,  and  shows  that  the  parts  make 
up  the  whole.  There  is,  if  I  do  not  mistake,  intuition 
involved  in  every  exercise  of  this  power.  The  opera- 
tions of  the  intuition  are  always  singular,  but  they  may 
be  generalized,  and  being  so,  they  will  give  us  the  fol- 
lowing as  involved  in  Abstraction  :  — 

1.  The  Abstract  implies  the  Concrete.  This  arises 
from  the  very  nature  of  abstraction.  When  an  object 
is  before  it  in  the  concrete,  the  mind  can  separate  a  qual- 
ity from  the  object,  and  one  quality  from  another.  It 
can  distinguish,  for  example,  between  a  man  taken  as 
a  whole,  and  any  one  quality  of  his,  such  as  bodily 
strength  ;  and  distinguish  between  any  one  quality  and 
another,  as  between  his  bodily  strength  and  intellectual 
power,  between  his  intellectual  faculties  and  his  feelings, 
and  between  any  one  feeling,  such  as  joy,  and  any  other- 
feeling,  such  as  sorrow.  But  we  are  not  to  suppose  that, 
while  we  can  thus  distinguish  between  a  whole  and  its 
parts,  between  an  object  and  its  qualities,  between  one 
quality  and  another,  therefore  the  part  can  exist  inde- 
pendent of  the  whole,  or  the  quality  of  its  object.  Every 
abstracted  quality  implies  some  concrete  object  from 
which  it  has  been  separated  in  thought. 

2.  When  the  Concrete  is  Heal,  the  Abstract  is  also 
Real.  In  this  respect  there  is  a  truth  in  the  now  ex- 
ploded doctrine  of  realism.  Abstraction,  if  it  proceeds 
on  a  reality  and  is  properly  conducted,  ever  conducts  to 
realities.  It  is  thus  a  most  important  intellectual  exer- 
cise for  the  discovery  of  truth,  enabling  us  to  discover 
the  permanent  amidst  the  fleeting,  the  real  amidst  the 


198  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

phenomenal.  As  I  look  on  a  piece  of  magnetized  iron, 
I  know  it  to  be  a  real  existence,  and  I  think  of  it  as 
having  a  certain  form,  and  of  its  attracting  certain  ob- 
jects, and  I  must  believe  that  this  figure  is  a  reality  quite 
as  much  as  the  iron  which  has  the  form,  and  that  the 
attractive  power  is  not  a  mere  fiction,  any  more  than  the 
iron  of  which  it  is  a  property.  But  it  is  to  be  carefully 
observed  that  this  abstract  thing,  while  it  has  an  exist- 
ence, has  not  necessarily  an  independent  existence. 
We  have  already  seen  that  when  it  is  a  quality  it  must 
always  be  the  quality  of  a  substance.  Beauty  is  cer- 
tainly reality,  but  it  has  no  existence  apart  from  a  beau- 
tiful person  or  scene,  of  whom  or  of  which  it  has  an 
attribute. 

A  philosopher,  says  Kant,  was  asked.  What  is  the  weight 
of  smoke  ?  and  he  answered.  Subtract  the  weight  of  the 
ashes  from  the  weight  of  the  fuel  burned,  and  we  have 
the  weight  of  smoke.  At  the  basis  of  his  judgment  is 
the  intuitive  maxim  that  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum 
of  its  parts.  The  individual  intuitive  judgments  which 
the  mind  pronounces  on  looking  at  whole  and  parts  may 
perhaps  be  all  generalized  into  two  principles:  (1.)  The 
parts  make  up  the  whole.  (2.)  The  whole  is  equal  to  the 
sum  of  its  parts.  From  the  first  of  these  we  may  derive 
the  rules,  that  the  abstract  part  is  involved  in  the  con- 
crete whole,  and  that  the  abstract,  as  part  of  a  real  con- 
crete thing,  is  also  a  real.  From  the  first  we  have  the 
rule  that  each  part  is  less  than  the  whole  ;  and  from  the 
second  the  maxim  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  the 
parts.  It  is  of  importance  to  have  such  maxims  as  these 
accurately  enunciated  in  mathematical  demonstration 
and  logical  and  metaphysical  science.  Spontaneously, 
however,  the  mind  does  not  form  any  such  general  axi- 
oms, which  are  merely  the  generalized  expression  of  its 
individual  judgments. 


RELATIONS   INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED   BY   THE   MIND.      199 

Still,  the  maxim  is  underlying  many  of  our  thoughts 
in  all  departments  of  investigation.  Thus  in  Natural 
History  it  urges  us  to  seek  for  a  classification  in  which 
all  the  members  of  any  subdivision  will  make  up  the 
whole.  It  impels  the  chemist  to  look  out  for  all  the  ele- 
ments which  go  to  constitute  the  compound  substance. 
In  psychology  and  metaphysics  it  prompts  us  to  analyze 
a  concrete  mental  state  into  parts,  and  insists  that  in  the 
synthesis  the  parts  be  equal  to  the  whole.  In  logic  it 
demands,  as  a  rule  of  division,  that  the  members  make 
up  the  class,  and  is  involved  in  all  those  processes  in 
which  we  infer  (in  subalternation)  that  what  is  true  of 
all  must  be  true  of  some  ;  or  (in  disjunctive  division) 
that  what  is  true  of  one  of  two  alternatives  (A  and  B), 
and  is  not  true  of  one  (A),  must  be  true  of  the  other 
(B).  In  most  of  such  cases  the  more  prominent  ele- 
ments are  got  from  experience  ;  in  some  of  them,  other 
intuitions  act  the  more  important  part ;  but  in  all  of 
them  there  are  intuitions  of  whole  and  parts  underly- 
ing the  mental  processes,  —  unconsciously  and  covertly, 
no  doubt,  but  still  capable  of  being  brought  out  to  view 
for  scientific  purposes. 

III. 

The  Relations  of  Resemblance.  —  It  has  been  generally 
acknowledged  that  man's  primary  knowledge  is  of  indi- 
vidual objects :  not  that  he  as  yet  knows  them  to  be  in- 
dividual ;  it  is  only  after  he  has  been  able  to  form  gen- 
eral notions  that  he  draws  the  distinction,  and  finds  that 
what  he  first  knew  was  singular.  What  is  meant  is,  that 
the  boy  does  not  begin  with  a  notion  of  man  or  woman, 
or  humanity  in  general,  but  with  a  knowledge  of  a  par- 
ticular man,  say  his  father,  or  a  particular  woman,  say 
his  mother ;    and  it   is   only  as   other   men    and   other 


200  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

women  come  under  his  notice,  and  he  observes  their 
points  of  agreement,  that  he  is  able  to  rise  to  the  general 
notion  of  man,  or  woman,  or  humankind. 

In  the  mental  processes  involved  in  generalization,  the 
most  important  part  is  the  observational  one.  When  we 
discover,  for  example,  the  resemblance  of  plants,  and 
proceed  to  group  them  into  species,  genei-a,  and  orders, 
the  operation  is  one  of  induction  and  comparison.  There 
is  no  necessity  of  thought  involved  in  the  law  that  roses 
have  five  petals,  or  that  fishes  are  cold-blooded,  or  indeed 
in  any  of  the  laws  of  natural  history.  Still  there  are 
laws  of  thought  which  have  a  place  in  the  generalizing 
process. 

1.  The  universal  implies  singulars.  —  The  mind  pro- 
nounces this  judgment  when  it  looks  at  the  nature  of  the 
individuals  and  the  generals.  '  The  universal  is  not  some- 
thing independent  of  the  singulars,  prior  to  the  singulars, 
or  above  the  singulars.  A  general  notion  is  the  notion 
of  an  indefinite  number  of  objects  possessing  a  common 
attribute  or  attributes,  and  includes  all  the  objects  pos- 
sessing the  common  quality  or  qualities.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  the  general  proceeds  on  and  presupposes 
individuals.  If  there  were  no  individuals,  there  would 
be  no  general ;  and  if  the  individuals  were  to  cease,  the 
general  would  likewise  cease.  If  there  were  no  individual 
roses,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  a  class  of  plants 
called  roses. 

2.  When  the  singulars  are  real^  the  universal  is  also 
real ;  always,  of  course,  on  the  supposition  that  the 
generalization  has  been  properly  made.  There  exists, 
we  shall  suppose,  in  nature,  a  number  of  objects  possess- 
ing common  attributes;  we  have  observed  their  points  of 
resemblance,  and  put  them  in  a  class :  has,  or  has  not, 
the  class  an  existence  ?     In  reply,  I  say  that  the  genus 


RELATIONS   INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED   BY   THE   MIND.      201 

has  an  existence  and  a  reality  as  well  as  the  individual 
objects.  An  indefinite  number  of  animals  chew  the 
cud,  and  are  called  ruminant ;  the  class  ruminant  has  an 
existence  quite  as  much  as  the  individual  animals.  But 
let  us  observe  what  sort  of  reality  the  class  has  ;  it  is  a 
reality  merely  in  the  individuals,  and  in  the  possession 
of  common  qualities  by  these  individuals. 

3.  Whatever  is  predicated  of  a  class  may  he  predicated 
of  all  the  members  of  the  class;  and  vice  versd,  whatever  is 
predicated  of  all  the  members  of  a  class  may  be  predicated 
of  the  class.  This  is  a  self-evident  and  necessary  propo- 
sition. It  is  pronounced  by  the  mind  in  an  individual 
form  whenever  it  contemplates  the  relation  of  a  class  and 
the  members  of  the  class  ;  thus,  if  the  general  maxim  be 
discovered  or  allowed,  that  all  reptiles  are  cold-blooded, 
and  the  further  fact  be  given  or  ascertained  that  the 
crocodile  is  a  reptile,  the  conclusion  is  pronounced  that 
the  crocodile  is  cold-blooded. 

The  laws  mentioned  in  this  section  play  an  important 
part  in  Logic,  and  have  a  place  in  the  Notion,  in  the 
Judgment,  and  in  Reasoning. 

IV. 

delations  of  Space.  —  I  have  endeavored  to  show  that 
the  mind  in  sense-perception  has  a  knowledge  of  objects 
as  occupying  space,  and  that  round  these  original  cogni- 
tions there  gather  certain  native  beliefs.  Upon  the  con- 
templation of  the  objects  thus  apprehended,  the  mind  is 
led  at  once  and  necessarily  to  pronounce  certain  judg- 
ments.    They  may  be  arranged  as  follows :  — 

1.  There  are  all  the  mathematical  axioms  which  relate 
to  limited  extension,  such  as,  "  The  shortest  distance 
between  any  two  points  is  a  straight  line ; "  "  Two 
straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space ; "   "  Two  straight 


202  PRIMITIVE   JUDGMENTS. 

lines  which  when  produced  the  shortest  possible  distance 
are  not  nearer  each  other,  will  not,  if  produced  ever  so 
far,  approach  nearer  each  other;  "  "All  right  angles  are 
equal  to  one  another."  Under  the  same  head  are  to  be 
placed  the  postulates  involved  in  the  definitions  and  in 
the  propositions  founded  on  them,  such  as  the  following, 
put  in  the  form  of  maxims:  "A  straight  line  may  be 
drawn  from  any  one  point  to  any  other  point;"  "A 
straight  line  may  be  produced  to  any  length  in  a  straight 
line ;  "  "  There  may  be  such  a  figure  as  a  circle,  that  is, 
a  plane  figure  such  that  all  straight  lines  drawn  from  a 
certain  point  within  the  figure  are  equal  to  one  another  ;  " 
and  that  "  A  circle  may  be  described  from  any  centre  at 
any  distance  from  that  centre."  I  shall  have  occasion,  in 
speaking  of  the  application  of  the  principles  laid  down 
in  this  treatise  to  mathematics,  to  return  to  axioms,  and 
shall  then  show  that  the  intuitive  judgments  pronounced 
by  the  mind  in  regard  to  the  relations  of  space  are  all 
individual,  and  that  the  form  assumed  by  them  in  the 
axioms  of  geometry  is  the  result  of  the  generalization, 
not  indeed  of  an  outward  experience,  but  of  the  individual 
decisions  of  the  mind. 

2.  There  are  certain  axioms  in  regard  to  motion,  snch 
as  that  "All  motion  is  in  space  ;  "  "  All  motion  is  from 
one  part  of  space  to  another ;  "  "  All  motion  is  by  an 
object  in  space  ;  "  "A  body  in  passing  from  one  part  of 
space  to  another  must  pass  through  the  whole  interme- 
diate space." 

3.  There  are  the  primitive  truths  which  arise  from  the 
relation  of  objects  to  space,  such  as  "  Body  occupies 
space  ;  "  "  Body  is  contained  in  space ;  "  "  Body  occupies 
a  certain  portion  of  space ;  "  and  thus  "  Body  has  a  de- 
fined figure."  But  what,  it  may  be  asked,  do  our  intui- 
tive convictions  say  as  to  the  relation  of  mind  and  space  ? 


RELATIONS  INTUITIVELY   OBSERVED   BY   THE   MIND.      203 

I  am  inclined  to  think  that  our  intuition  declares  of 
spirit,  that  it  must  be  in  space.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  so 
far  as  mind  acts  on  body,  it  must  act  on  body  as  in  space, 
say  in  making  that  body  move  in  space.  But  beyond 
this,  I  am  persuaded  that  we  have  no  means  of  knowing 
the  relation  which  mind  and  space  bear  to  each  other. 
As  to  whether  spirit  does  or  does  not  occupy  space,  this 
is  a  subject  on  which  intuition  seems  to  say  nothing,  and 
I  suspect  that  experience  says  as  little. 

4.  There  are  certain  metaphysical  judgments  as  to 
space,  such  as  "  Space  is  continuous ;  "  "  Space  cannot 
be  divided  in  the  sense  of  its  parts  being  separated  ;  " 
and  all  those  derived  from  the  infinity  of  space,  such  as 
that  "  Space  has  no  limits  ;  "  "  Any  line  may  be  infinitely 
prolonged  in  space." 


The  Relations  of  Time.  —  The  apprehension  of  time  is 
given  in  every  exercise  of  memory ;  we  remember  the 
event  as  having  happened  in  time  past.  Round  this 
primary  conviction  there  collect  a  number  of  beliefs. 
When  time  thus  apprehended  is  contemplated  by  us,  we 
are  led,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  object,  to  make  cer- 
tain affirmations  and  denials.  It  declares  that  "  Time  is 
continuous  ; "  that  "  Time  cannot  be  divided  into  sepa- 
rable parts  ;  "  and  that  "  Time  has  no  limits."  The  mind 
also  declares  that  "  Every  event  happens  in  time." 

VI. 

The  Relations  of  Quantity.  —  These  are  equivalent  to 
the  relations  of  proportion  referred  to  b}'^  Locke,  and  the 
relations  of  proportion  and  degree  mentioned  by  Brown ; 
they  are  the  relations  of  less  and  more.  The  mind,  in 
discovering   them,   proceeds    upon    the   knowledge   pre- 


204  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

viously  acquired  of  objects  as  being  singulars,  that  is, 
units ;  it  is  upon  a  succession  of  units  coming  before  it 
that  the  judgment  is  pronounced.  It  also  very  frequently 
proceeds  on  other  relations  which  have  been  previously 
discovered ;  on  perceiving,  for  instance,  that  objects  re- 
semble each  other  in  respect  of  space,  time,  and  property, 
we  may  notice  that  they  have  less  or  more  of  the  com- 
mon thing  in  respect  of  which  they  agree. 

It  is  to  this  intuition  I  refer  the  power  which  the  mind 
has  of  discovering  the  relation  of  simple  numbers.  I  be- 
lieve that  one,  or  unity,  is  involved  in  our  primary  cog- 
nition of  objects.  Not  that  I  think  it  necessai-y  to  call 
in  a  special  intuition  in  order  to  our  being  able  to  count 
or  number ;  but  I  believe  that,  besides  the  exercise  of 
memory,  and  the  discovery  of  the  relations  of  the  succes- 
sion in  time,  there  must  be  the  general  power  of  dis- 
covering the  relations  of  quantity  :  we  must  be  able,  not 
only  to  go  over  the  units,  but  further,  to  discover  the  re- 
lations of  the  units  and  of  their  combinations. 

To  this  faculty  I  refer  all  those  operations  in  which 
we  discover  equality,  or  difference,  or  proportions  of  any 
kind,  in  numbers.  The  mental  capacity  is  greatly  aided, 
and  its  intuitive  perceptions  are  put  in  a  position  to  act 
more  readily  and  extensively,  through  the  divisions  and 
notations  by  tens  in  our  modern  arithmetic ;  every  ten, 
every  hundred,  every  thousand,  and  so  on,  comes  to  be 
regarded  as  a  unit,  and  the  judgments  in  regard  to  units 
are  made  to  reach  numbers  indefinitely  large.  These 
numeric^d  judgments  admit  of  an  application  to  exten- 
sion in  space.  Fixing  on  a  certain  length,  superficies  or 
solid,  as  a  unit,  we  form  judgments  which  embrace  lines 
or  surfaces  or  solids  never  actually  measured.  I  am- per- 
suaded that,  even  in  its  common  or  practical  operations, 
—  as,  for  example,  in  the  measurement  of  distance  by 


RELATIONS   INTUITIVELY    OBSERVED   BY   THE   MIND.      205 

the  eye,  —  the  mind  fixes  on  some  known  and  familiar 
length  as  its  standard,  and  estimates  larger  space  by  this. 
Ever  since  Descartes  conceived  the  method  of  expressing 
curve  lines  and  surfaces  by  means  of  equations,  mathe- 
matics may  be  said  to  be  concerned  with  quantity  as 
their  summum  genus.  The  judgments  as  intuitive  are 
all  individual,  but  they  can  be  generalized,  when  they 
will  assume  such  forms  as  the  "  Common  Notions,"  so 
far  as  they  relate  to  quantity,  prefixed  by  Euclid  to  his 
Elements.  "  Things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing 
are  equal  to  one  another ; "  "  If  equals  be  added  to 
equals,  the  wholes  are  equal  ; "  "  If  equals  be  taken  from 
equals,  the  remainders  are  equal ;  "  "  If  equals  be  added 
to  unequuls,  the  wholes  are  unequal ;  "  "  If  equals  be 
taken  from  unequals,  the  remainders  are  unequal  ; " 
"  Things  which  are  double  the  same  thing  are  equal  to 
one  another  ;  "  "  Things  which  are  half  the  same  thii^g 
are  equal  to  one  another." 

VII. 

Relations  of  Active  Property. — I  have  been  striving 
to  prove  that  we  cannot  know  either  self  or  body  acting 
on  self,  except  as  possessing  property.  On  looking  at 
the  properties  of  objects,  the  mind  at  once  pronounces 
certain  decisions.  These,  like  all  our  other  intuitive 
judgments,  have  a  reference,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the 
individual  case  presented,  but  may  be  made  universal  by 
a  process  of  generalization.  Thus,  the  mind  dechires, 
"  This  property  implies  a  substance  ;  "  "  This  substance 
will  exercise  a  property,""  The  abstract  truths  will 
seldom  be  formally  enunciated,  but,  as  regulative  prin- 
ciples, they  underlie  our  common  thoughts,  and  we  pro- 
ceed on  them,  even  when  entirely  unaware  of  their 
nature  or  of  their  existence.     Every  action  or  manifes- 


206  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

tation  we  intuitively  regard  as  the  action  or  exhibition 
of  a  something  having  a  substantial  being.  On  falling 
in  with  a  new  substance,  say  an  aerolite  just  dropped 
from  the  heavens,  we  know  not  indeed  what  its  proper- 
ties are,  but  we  are  sure  that  it  has  properties,  and  we 
make  an  attempt  to  discover  them. 


CHAPTER  III. 

RELATION   OP  CAUSE   AND  EFFECT. 

Causation  has  been  involved  in  a  denser  dust  of  dis- 
cussion, especially  since  the  days  of  Hume,  than  any 
other  subject,  except  Free  Will,  which  is  intimately  con- 
nected with  cause  and  effect.  There  is  no  agreement 
among  psychologists  as  to  the  internal  conviction,  nor 
among  physicists  as  to  the  external  relation.  I  must 
content  myself  with  enunciating  a  few  principles  which 
are  defensible  and  consistent  with  the  latest  discoveries 
of  science. 


We  have  a  primitive  Cognition  of  Power.  I  have 
labored  in  vain  if  I  have  not  shown  that  in  all  our  cog- 
nition by  the  senses  of  taste,  smell,  hearing,  and  seeing, 
and  especially  by  the  muscular  touch,  we  know  objects  as 
affecting  us.  We  have  a  special  knowledge  of  power  in 
volition  :  we  will  to  move  our  arm  or  to  stay  a  thought, 
and  the  effect  follows.  I  am  to  show  that  upon  this 
primitive,  knowledge  of  potency  our  judgment  as  to  cause 
and  effect  proceeds. 

IL 

Objects,  Material  and  Mental,  Act  on  Each  Other.  — 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  body  is  passive.  An  atom,  if 
isolated  from  all  other  bodies,  will  continue  in  the  state 
in  which  it  is.  But  if  brought  into  relationship  with 
another  body,  the  one  body  acts  on  the  other,  or  rather 
the  bodies  mutually  affect  each  other,  mechanically  or 


208  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

chemically.  Thus  viewed,  matter  is  active.  The  two 
bodies  acting  on  each  other  constitute  the  cause  ;  the 
change  produced  constitutes  the  effect.  "  The  statement 
of  the  cause  is  incomplete,"  says  J.  S.  Mill,  "unless  in 
some  shape  or  other  we  introduce  all  the  conditions.  A 
man  takes  mercury,  goes  out  of  doors,  >and  catches  cold. 
We  say  perhaps  that  the  cause  of  his  taking  cold  was 
the  exposure  to  the  air.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  his 
having  taken  mercury  may  have  been  a  necessary  condi- 
tion of  his  catching  cold;  and  though  it  might  consist 
with  usage  to  say  that  the  cause  of  his  attack  was  expo- 
sure to  air,  to  be  accurate  we  ought  to  say  that  the  cause 
was  exposure  to  the  air  while  under  the  effect  of  mer- 
cury." More  accurately,  the  true  cause  of  the  effect, 
the  cold,  was  not  the  air  alone,  or  the  body  alone,  but 
the  air  and  the  body  under  mercury. 

There  is  a  like  joint  action,  a  concause,  in  psychical 
or  mental  action.  I  will  to  move  my  arm  and  the  arm 
moves ;  in  the  cause  there  is  the  will,  but  there  are  con- 
current physiological  processes  without  which  no  effect 
would  follow.  I  will  to  detain  a  pleasant  thought :  there 
is  a  volition,  but  there  is  also  the  thought  which  is  de- 
tained. 

m. 

There  is  Power  in  the  Cause  or  Concause  to  produce 
the  effect.  We  have  seen  that  we  know  substances, 
mind  and  body,  as  having  power.  In  causation  the 
power  is  acting.  The  substances  act  according  to  their 
properties,  that  is,  powers.  A  change  is  produced  upon 
the  substances,  and  this  is  the  effect.  The  body  A  strikes 
the  body  B  :  this  is  the  cause.  The  effect  is  that  both  A 
and  B  are  affected :  B  is  moved,  and  A  is  stayed  in  its 
motion.     There  has  been  power  both  in  A  and  B,  and 


RELATION  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT.        209 

the  power  in  the  two  is  the  same  before  and  after  the 
collision.  We  see  the  error  of  Hume,  who  makes  causa- 
tion mere  invariable  antecedence  and  consequence ;  and 
of  J.  S.  Mill,  who  makes  it  unconditional  sequence.  It  is 
not  the  invariable  or  unconditional  succession  which  con- 
stitutes causation,  but  it  is  the  power  in  the  cause  which 
produces  the  invariable  succession. 

IV. 

Every  effect,  that  is,  every  thing  Beginning  To  Be, 
has  a  cause.  This  conviction  is  not  the  result  of  a  wide 
generalization  of  instances.  The  causal  belief  is  as  strong 
in  infancy  as  in  mature  life.  It  is  as  strong  among  sav- 
ages as  in  civilized  countries.  It  is  entertained  by  men 
brought  up  in  very  different  countries  and  situations, 
attached  to  different  sects  and  creeds.  But  the  circum- 
stance which  proves  it  to  be  intuitive  is,  that  the  convic- 
tion is  necessary.  No  possible  length  or  uniformity  could 
or  should  give  this  necessity  of  conviction  to  the  judg- 
ment. We  might  have  seen  A  and  B,  this  stone  and 
that  stone,  this  star  and  that  star,  this  man  and  that 
man,  together,  a  thousand,  or  a  million,  or  a  billion  of 
times,  and  without  our  ever  having  seen  them  separate  ; 
but  this  would  not  and  ougrht  not  to  necessitate  us  to 
believe  that  they  have  been  forever  together,  and  shall 
be  forever  together,  and  must  be  forever  together.  No 
doubt  it  would  lead  us,  when  we  fell  in  with  the  one,  to 
look  for  the  other,  and  we  would  wonder  if  the  one  pre- 
sented itself  without  the  other ;  still  it  is  possible  for  us 
to  conceive,  and,  on  evidence  being  produced,  to  believe, 
that  there  may  be  the  one  without  the  other.  It  was 
long  supposed  that  all  metals  are  comparatively  heavy, 
but  while  every  one  was  astonished  at  the  fact,  no  one 
prepared  to  deny  it,  when  it  was  shown  by  Davy  that 


210  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

potassium  floated  on  water.     A  very  wide  and  uniform 
experience  would  justify  a  general  expectation,  but  not 
a  necessary  conviction ;  and  this  experience  is  liable  to 
be  disturbed  at  any  time  by  a  new  occurrence  inconsis- 
tent with  what  has  been  previously  known  to  us.     But 
the  belief  in  the  connection  between  cause  and  effect  is 
of  a  totally  diit'erent  character.     We  can  believe  that 
two  things  which  have  been  united  since  creation  began, 
may  never  be  united  again  while  ci-eatiou   lasts ;  but  we 
never  can   be   made  to  believe,  or  rather  think,  judge, 
or  decide  (for  these  are  the  right  expressions),  that  a 
change  can  take  place  without  a  cause.     We  can  believe 
that  night  and  day  might  henceforth  be  disconnected, 
and  that  from  and  after  this  day  or  some  other  day  there 
would  only  be  perpetual  day  or  perpetual  night  on  the 
earth ;  but  we  could  never  be  made  to  decide  that,  the 
causes  which  produced  day  and  night  being  the  same, 
there  ever  could  be  any  other  effect  than  day  or  night. 
We  could  believe,  on   sufficient  evidence,  that  the  sun 
might  not  rise  on  our  earth  to-morrow,  but  we  never 
could  be  made  to  judge  that,  the  sun  and  earth  and  all 
other  things   necessary  to   the   sun   rising  on  our  earth 
abiding  as  they  are,  the  luminary  of  day  should  not  run 
his  round  as  usual.      We  see   at  once  that  there  is   a 
difference  between  the  judgment  of  the  mind  in  the  two 
cases :  in  the  case  in  which  we  have  before  us  a   mere 
conjunction  sanctioned  by  a  wide  and  invariable  induc- 
tion, and  that  in  which  we  have  an  effect  and  connect 
it  with  its  cause.     The  one  belief  can  be  overcome,  and 
should  be  overcome,  at  any  time  by  a  new  and  inconsis- 
tent fact  coming  under  our  observation  ;  whereas,  in  re- 
gard to  the  other,  we  are  confident  that  it  never  can  be 
modified  or  set  aside,  and  we  feel  that  it  ought  not  to  be 
overborne. 


RELATION  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT.         211 

V. 

There  must  be  an  Adequacy  or  Sufficiency  of  power 
to  produce  the  effect.  We  look  not  only  for  a  cause,  but 
for  a  competent  cause.  Experience^  it  is  true,  and  ex- 
perience alone,  can  tell  us  what  is  a  sufficient  cause,  as  it 
alone  can  inform  us  what  is  the  cause.  Still  there  seems 
to  be  an  inherent  conviction  of  the  mind  which  leads  us, 
in  looking  for  a  cause,  to  make  the  cause  equal  to  the 
work  which  it  accomplishes.  Powers  differ  in  kind,  and 
they  differ  in  degree.  There  is  need,  for  instance,  of 
\  more  than  human  power  to  create  a  substance  out  of 
nothing.  There  is  need  of  more  than  the  power  residing 
in  material  substance  to  produce  thought  and  emotion 
and  will.  The  ant  which  carries  a  seed  of  grain  is  not 
competent,  like  man,  to  carry  a  sack  of  corn  ;  and  the 
strength  of  man  is  inadequate  to  raise  a  weight  which 
can  be  lifted  with  ease  by  a  steam-engine.  The  lily  can 
reproduce  a  lily  after  its  kind,  but  cannot  produce  a  pine 
or  an  oak.  These  facts,  I  am  aware,  can  be  known  only 
by  observation.  But  underneath  all  our  experiential 
knowledge  there  is  a  necessary  principle  which  con- 
strains us,  when  we  discover  an  effect,  to  look  not  only 
for  a  cause,  but  a  cause  with  the  kind  of  power  which 
is  fitted  to  produce  the  kind  of  effect,  and  to  proportion 
the  extent  of  the  power  to  the  extent  of  the  effect.  This 
original  principle  is  the  source  of  a  number  of  most  im- 
portant derivative  ones ;  as,  when  we  have  found  a  sub- 
stance exercising  a  certain  sort  of  power,  we  anticipate 
that  it  will  always  exercise  the  same  sort  of  power ;  and 
when  we  have  found  it  exercising  a  certain  amount  of 
force,  we  expect  that  it  will  always  be  fit  for  the  same, 
—  of  course,  always  on  the  necessary  conditions  being 
furnished.     Thus,  having  found  that  our  minds  can  fol- 


212  PRIMITIVE  JUDGMENTS. 

low  a  train  of  reasoning,  we  are  sure  that  they  will 
always  be  able  to  do  so,  —  of  coui'se,  on  the  supposition 
that  the  bodily  organism  needful  to  mental  operation  in 
man  is  not  in  a  state  of  derangement.  The  amount  of 
force  which  drives  a  ball  a  certain  distance  to-day,  we 
are  sure,  will  impel  it  to  the  same  distance  to-morrow. 
If  a  definite  weight  of  oxygen  has  been  ascertained 
chemically  to  unite  with  a  certain  definite  weight  of 
hydrogen,  we  are  sure  it  will  ever  do  so ;  and  if  we  find 
the  very  same  amount  of  oxygen  not  drawing  to  it  the 
same  amount  of  hydrogen,  we  argue  that  there  must 
have  been  some  change  in  the  conditions  of  the  oxygen. 
It  is  acknowledged  that  in  such  judgments  there  is  and 
must  be  an  observational  element,  which  in  spontaneous 
thought  is  ever  the  more  prominent,  —  it  is  ever  the  one 
about  whicb  the  mind  is  most  anxious,  as  being  the  only 
doubtful  one  ;  still  there  is  also  a  necessary  principle, 
which  is  overlooked  only  because  it  is  indisputable  and 
invariable.  Rising  from  earthly  to  heavenly  things,  we 
look  on  God,  who  has  produced  works  in  which  are 
traces  of  such  large  power  and  admirable  wisdom,  as  a 
Being  possessed  of  power  and  wisdom  corresponding  to 
the  effects  we  discover,  and  as  capable,  whenever  he 
may  see  fit,  of  producing  works  distinguished  by  the 
same  lofty  characteristics. 

VI. 

I  may  now  refer  to  some  Defective  or  Erroneous  Views 
commonly  taken  of  Causation.  Some  have  laid  down  the 
principle  that  it  is  like  that  affects  like.  This  seems  to 
have  been  the  principle  of  Empedocles,  the  Sicilian  phi- 
losoplier,  that  like  is  only  affected  by  like.  The  likeness 
of  things  enables  us  to  put  them  into  classes ;  but  it  con- 
tains no  principle  of  power.  Very  unlike  things  affect 
each  other. 


RELATION   OF   CAUSE   AND  EFFECT.  213 

We  are  not  constrained  to  seek  for  an  endless  series  of 
causes.  An  effect  comes  from  a  substance  or  substances 
with  power.  But  the  law  of  causation  does  not  require 
us  to  go  further  back  and  seek  for  an  endless  series  of 
causes.  When  we  trace  the  production  of  all  things  to 
God,  the  self-existent,  with  all  power  in  himself,  the 
mind  is  satisfied.  It  is  thus  we  are  to  meet  the  scepti- 
cism of  Hume  and  the  difficulty  of  Kaut  as  to  our  being 
oblioed  to  seek  for  a  cause  of  God. 

I  have  declared  that  while  we  have  a  native  and 
necessary  conviction,  it  does  not  announce  what  effect 
any  given  cause  must  produce,  or  what  is  the  cause  of 
any  given  effect.  On  an  effect  presenting  itself  we  be- 
lieve that  it  must  have  a  cause,  but  what  the  cause  is,  is 
to  be  determined  by  observation  and  a  gathered  expe- 
rience.    It  is  of  special  importance  to  observe  that  — 

Our  intuitive  conviction  is  not  of  the  Uniformity  or 
Continuance  of  the  Course  of  Nature.  This  is  the  vague 
shape  in  which  the  principle  appears  in  the  works  of 
Reid  and  Stewart.  The  former  says  :  "  God  hath  im- 
planted in  the  human  mind  an  original  principle  by 
which  we  believe  and  expect  the  continuanc^B  of  the 
course  of  nature,  and  the  continuance  of  those  con- 
nections which  we  have  observed  in  time  past.  Ante- 
cedent to  all  reasoning,  we  have  by  our  constitution  an 
anticipation  that  there  is  a  fixed  and  steady  course  of 
nature."  There  is  a  uniformity  in  nature.  It  is  formed 
by  a  number  of  causes  being  so  arranged  as  to  produce 
orderly  results,  such  as  the  alternation  of  day  and  night 
and  the  succession  of  the  seasons.  This  regularity  does 
not  proceed  from  mere  causation.  Day  does  not  cause 
night,  nor  night  day.  Spring  does  not  produce  summer, 
nor  does  summer  produce  autumn.  Every  occurrence 
might  be  produced  by  causation  without  our  having  the 


214  PRIMITIVE   JUDGMENTS. 

uniformity  which  we  find  in  nature.  To  produce  the 
order,  it  is  needful  that  there  be  a  collocation  or  adjust- 
ment of  causes.  The  uniformity  of  nature  is  not  a  self- 
evident,  a  necessary,  or  universal  principle  of  belief, 
which  causation  is. 

It  is  a  circumstance  worthy  of  being  noted,  that  the  powerful 
mind  of  Kant,  in  his  chase  after  the  Unconditioned,  represented  by 
him  as  ideal,  finds  a  progressus  or  a  regressus  of  some  kind  or  other 
in  time,  in  space,  in  matter,  in  cause,  in  the  possible  or  actual,  but 
admits  fully  and  explicitly  that  in  regard  to  sul)stance  the  reason  has 
no  ground  to  proceed  regressively  with  conditions.  In  regard  to 
causality  we  have  a  series  of  causes  which  go  back  unendingly,  the 
unconditioned  being  the  absolute  totality  of  the  series.  But  in  sub- 
stance there  is  no  such  regressus.  "  Was  die  Kategorien  des  realen 
Verhiiltnisses  unter  den  Erscheinuns;en  anlancrt,  so  schickt  sich  die 
Kategorie  der  Substanz  mit  ihren  Accidenzen  nicht  zu  einer  trans- 
cendentalen  Idee,  d.  i.  die  Vernunft  hat  keinen  Grund,  in  Ansehung, 
ihrer  regressiv  auf  Bedingungen  zu  gehen  "  (Kritik  d.  r.  Vernunft, 
p.  328).  We  have  only  to  connect  this  doctrine  of  substance, 
not  necessarily  calling,  according  to  the  principles  of  reason,  for  a 
regressus,  with  his  admission  that  substance  involves  power,  to  be  able 
to  maintain,  and  this  without  falling  into  any  contradiction,  that  the 
effects  seen  in  nature  of  a  power  above  nature  argue  a  substance 
having  power,  for  which  we  are  not  required  to  seek  for  a  cause. 

Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  is  successful  in  showing  {Logic,  Book  in.  Chap,  xxi.) 
that  man's  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  the  result  of  experi- 
ence, that  it  is  entertained  only  by  the  educated  and  civilized  few, 
and  that  even  among  such  it  has  been  of  slow  growth.  But  Mr.  Mill 
has  fallen  into  a  glaring  "fallacy  of  confusion  *'  in  confounding  our 
belief  in  causation  with  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature.  The 
distinction  was  before  him,  at  least  for  an  instant,  when,  speaking  of 
the  irregularities  of  nature,  he  says  :  "  Such  phenomena  were  com- 
monly, in  that  early  stage  of  human  knowledge,  ascribed  to  the  direct 
intervention  of  the  will  of  some  supernatural  being,  and  therefore 
still  to  a  cause.  This  shows  the  strong  tendency  of  the  human  mind 
to  ascribe  every  phenomenon  to  some  cause  or  other."  It  is  of  this 
tendency  that  I  affirm  that  it  is  native  and  irresistible.  He  tells  us 
that  one  "  accustomed  to  abstraction  and  analysis,  who  will  fairly 
exert  his  faculties  for  the  purpose,  will,  when  his  imagination  has 


RELATION   OF   CAUSE   AND    EFFECT.  215 

once  learned  to  entertain  the  notion,  find  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
that  in  some  one,  for  instance,  of  the  many  firmaments  into  which 
sidereal  astronomy  now  divides  the  universe,  events  may  succeed  one 
another  at  random,  without  any  fixed  law;  nor  can  anything  in  our 
experience,  or  in  our  mental  nature,  constitute  a  sufficient,  or  indeed 
any,  reason  for  believing  that  this  is  nowhere  the  case."  This  state- 
ment about  fixed  laws  is  ambiguous.  If  by  fixed  law  be  meant 
simply  order  and  uniformity  among  physical  events,  the  statement  is 
true.  But  if  meant  to  signify  an  event  without  a  cause,  material  or 
mental,  the  statement  is  contradicted  by  our  "  mental  nature,"  which 
impels  us  to  seek  for  a  cause  of  every  event.  He  is  right  in  affirm- 
ing that  "  experience"  cannot  authorize  such  a  belief,  but  it  is  just  as 
certain  that  our  "  mental  nature  "  constrains  us  to  entertain  it ;  and 
surely,  if  there  be  laws  in  physical  nature,  there  may  also  be  trust- 
worthy laws  in  our  mental  nature.  There  is  the  same  confusion  of 
two  different  things  in  the  following  passage:  "  The  uniformity  in 
the  succession  of  events,  otherwise  called  the  law  of  causation,  must 
be  received,  not  as  the  law  of  the  universe,  but  of  that  portion  of  it 
only  which  is  within  the  range  of  our  means  of  sure  observation,  with 
a  reasonable  degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases."  I  freely  admit 
all  this  in  regard  to  the  order  observable  everywhere  in  our  Cosmos ; 
there  may  or  may  not  be  similar  uniformity  in  the  regions  of  space 
beyond.  But  our  mental  nature  will  not  allow  us  to  think,  judge,  or 
believe  (these,  and  not  "  conceive,"  which  is  ambiguous,  are  the 
proper  phrases),  that  in  this  our  world,  or  in  any  other  world,  there 
can  be  an  event  without  a  cause. 

It  is  not  to  my  present  purpose  to  enter  on  the  subject  of  Miracles, 
but  it  does  fall  in  with  the  topics  discussed  in  the  text  to  remark,  that 
there  is  nothing  in  a  miracle  opposed  to  any  intuition  of  the  mind, — 
certainly  nothing  opposed  to  our  intuition  as  to  cause.  Hume,  the 
sceptic,  takes  all  sorts  of  objections  to  miracles,  and  the  evidence  by 
which  they  are  supported,  but  he  does  not  maintain  that  a  miracle  is 
impossible.  It  is  "  experience,"  according  to  him,  "  which  assures 
us  of  the  laws  of  nature  "  {Essay  on  Miracles)  ;  arid  I  hold  that  the 
same  experience  shows  us  effects  in  nature  which  constrain  us,  ac- 
cording to  the  intuitive  law  of  causation,  to  argue  a  Power  above 
nature,  which  power  is  an  adequate  cause  of  any  miracle  which  may 
be  attested  by  proper  evidence.  Brown  has  shown  us  very  satisfac- 
torily that  a  miracle,  with  the  Divine  Power  as  its  cause,  is  not  in- 
consistent with  our  intuitive  belief  in  causation  (Cause  and  Effect, 
note  E).     Ever  since  Fichte  published  his  Versuch  einer  Kritik  alter 


216  PRIMITIVE   JUDGMENTS. 

Offenbarung,  there  have  been  persons  in  Germany  who  represent  it 
as  impossible  for  God  to  perform  a  miracle.  This  may  be  a  necessary 
consequence  of  those  false  assumptions  regarding  our  knowing  only 
self,  which  landed  Fichte  in  an  incongruous  pantheism,  in  which  he 
at  one  time  represents  the  Ego  as  the  All-including  God,  as  the 
"  moral  order;  "  and  at  another  time  represents  God  as  the  All,  and 
absorbing  the  Ego.  But  it  can  plead  in  its  behalf  no  principle  either 
natural  or  necessary.  A  mii'acle  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  uni- 
formity of  nature,  and  the  Bible  miracles  serve  their  purpose  as 
evidences,  because  of  this ;  but  they  are  in  thorough  accordance,  as 
Mr.  Mill  admits,  with  the  law  of  causation,  for  they  claim  God 
as  their  cause.  The  result  at  which  we  have  arrived  is,  that  the 
question  of  the  occurrence  of  miracles  is  to  be  determined  by  the 
ordinary  laws  of  evidence. 


BOOK   IV. 

OUR  INTUITIVE  MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THEIR   GENERAL  NATURE. 

I. 

Still  deeper  interests  are  involved  in  our  being  able 
to  prove  that  there  is  an  immutable  and  eternal  morality 
than  even  in  showing  that  there  is  immutable  and  eternal 
truth.  After  having  labored  at  such  length  to  demon- 
strate that  there  are  fundamental  principles  involved  in 
the  intellectual  exercises  of  the  mind,  it  will  not  be  need- 
ful to  take  such  pains  to  prove  that  there  are  like  con- 
victions of  a  moral  character. 

While  our  moral  powers  are  not  the  same  with  the 
intellectual,  they  are  in  many  respects  analogous.  We 
have  a  power  of  discerning  truth  and  error ;  we  have  also 
a  power  of  knowing  moral  good  and  evil.  The  latter  is 
the  Conscience,  as  the  former  is  the  Intelligence.  I  am 
not  here  to  unfold  its  properties  and  its  modes  of  action, 
as  I  have  done  in  my  "  Psychology,  the  Motive  Powers." 
Nor  am  I  to  construct  a  science  of  our  moral  nature,  as 
is  done  in  Ethics.  I  am  simply  to  set  forth  the  funda- 
mental principles  involved  in  Morality. 

IL 

The  pi'imitive  moral  principles  take  the  same  Three 
Forms  as  the  intellectual  ones.    We  have  a  moral  cogni- 


218  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

tion  when  the  acts  are  immediately  before  us,  and  we 
discern  at  once  that  certain  of  them  are  good,  such  as 
benevolence,  and  certain  of  them  are  evil,  such  as  malice. 
We  have  moral  beliefs  going  beyond  our  immediate  per- 
ceptions, as  when  we  declare  the  character  of  Cato  to  be 
commendable,  and  that  of  Sextus  to  be  vile.  We  can 
thus  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  a  goodness  which  is 
eternal.  We  pronounce  moral  judgments,  as  when  we 
declare  that  virtue  deserves  happiness. 

III. 

Our  moral  intuitions  are  to  be  tried  by  the  same  three 
tests  as  the  intellectual,  namely,  self-evidence,  necessity, 
and  catholicity.  We  perceive  at  once  that  this  daugh- 
ter is  good  when  toiling  for  an  invalid  mother.  When 
we  candidly  contemplate  the  deed,  we  cannot  be  made 
to  decide  otherwise.  We  notice,  thirdly,  that  the  act 
meets  with  an  approving  response  in  every  bosom. 

It  is  of  special  importance  to  obsei-ve  what  is  the  ne- 
cessity attached  to  these  moral  convictions.  As  every 
intuition  has  its  own  nature,  so  it  has  also  its  own  kind 
of  corresponding  necessity.  A  necessity  attached  to  a 
cognition,  that  there  is  a  colored  surface  before  my  eyes, 
is  somewhat  different  from  the  necessity  to  believe  that 
space  is  unbounded ;  but  there  is  a  necessity  in  both 
when  the  mind  contemplates  the  objects.  So  our  con- 
viction that  ingratitude  is  a  sin  is  different  from  either 
of  these,  while  there  is  a  necessity  of  judgment  in  each 
when  the  cases  are  fairly  represented  to  it.  The  neces- 
sity covers  what  is  involved  in  the  intuition,  neither  less 
nor  more. 


CHAPTER  II. 

VIRTUE  WITH  ITS   ATTACHED   OBLIGATIONS. 

I. 

What  is  approved  of  by  our  Moral  Nature,  or  Con- 
science, is  called  Moral  Good,  or  Virtue.  I  believe  we 
can  theoretically  determine  what  virtue  is.     It  IS  Love 

ACCORDING   TO    LAW. 

In  maintaining  this  position  we  must  include  in  the 
love  Self-Love.  We  are  bound  to  love  ourselves.  Self- 
love  is  not  merely  an  impulse,  an  instinct,  it  is  a  duty. 
But  let  us  understand  what  we  mean  when  we  say  so. 
We  do  not  mean  by  this  a  love  of  pleasure,  a  love  of 
power,  a  love  of  fame,  a  love  of  money ;  all  these  are 
selfish  affections.  The  affection  that  is  a  duty  is  a  love 
of  ourselves  as  ourselves,  of  ourselves  as  God  made  us, 
with  intelligence,  with  feeling,  with  conscience,  moral 
and  responsible. 

It  is  to  be  a  love  regulated  by  Law.  We  are  not  at 
liberty  to  cast  away  ourselves,  our  health,  our  lives,  our 
talents,  our  affections,  our  character,  our  purity,  our  in- 
fluence for  good.  We  are  bound  to  respect,  to  honor 
ourselves,  to  improve  ourselves,  to  cultivate  the  gifts 
which  God  has  bestowed  upon  us,  and  extend  our  in- 
fluence for  good.  Temperance,  in  the  Greek  and  Roman 
senses  of  the  term,  should  be  to  us  one  of  the  cardinal  vir- 
tues :  we  have  to  restrain  ourselves,  our  lusts  and  pas- 
sions. We  are  to  aim  at  nothing  less  than  holiness,  a 
separation  from  all  evil.  A  self-love  of  this  kind,  that  is, 
love  regulated  by  law,  is  a  virtue,  and  a  virtue  of  the 


220  OUR  INTUITIVE  MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

highest  order.     But  it  is  ever  to  be  accompanied  with  a 

sister  Virtue. 

II. 

It  is  love  to  Others.  The  standard  of  this  is  already 
set :  we  are  to  love  our  neighbors  as  we  love  ourselves. 
It  may  manifest  itself  in  two  forms :  — 

The  Love  of  Complacency.  We  delight  in  the  object 
or  person  beloved.  It  is  thus  that  the  mother  clasps  her 
infant  to  her  bosom ;  thus  that  the  sister  interests  herself 
in  every  movement  of  her  little  brother,  and  is  proud  of 
his  feats ;  thus  that  the  father,  saying  little  but  feeling 
much,  follows  the  career  of  his  son  in  the  trying  rivalries 
of  the  world ;  thus  that  throughout  our  lives,  our  hearts, 
if  hearts  we  have,  clung  round  the  tried  friends  of  our 
youth ;  thus  that  the  wife  would  leave  this  world  with 
the  last  look  on  her  husband ;  thus  that  the  father  would 
depart  with  his  sons  and  daughters  around  his  couch. 
Love  looks  out  for  the  persons  beloved.  The  mother 
discovers  her  son  in  that  crowd.     The  blacksmith 

Hears  his  daughter's  voice. 
Singing  in  the  village  choir. 

The  Love  of  Benevolence.  In  this  we  not  only  delight 
in  the  contemplation  and  society  of  the  persons  beloved  ; 
we  wish  well  to  them,  we  wish  them  all  that  is  good. 
"  Therefore  all  things  whatsoever  ye  would  that  men 
should  do  to  you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them,  for  this  is  the 
law  and  the  prophets."  We  will  oblige  them  if  we  can  ; 
we  will  serve  them  if  in  our  power ;  we  will  watch  for 
opportunities  of  promoting  their  welfare  ;  we  will  make 
sacrifices  for  their  good.  This  love  is  ready  to  flow  forth 
towards  relatives  and  friends,  towards  neighbors  and 
companions,  towards  all  with  whom  we  come  in  contact ; 
it  will  go  out  towards  the  whole  family  of  mankind.    We 


VIRTUE   WITH   ITS  ATTACHED   OBLIGATIONS.  221 

are  ready  to  increase  their  happiness,  and  in  the  highest 
exercises  of  love  to  raise  them  in  the  scale  of  being,  and 
to  elevate  them  morally  and  spiritually. 

III. 

Moral  Good  lays  an  Obligation  on  us  to  attend  to  it. 
This  sense,  or  rather  conviction  of  obligation,  is  one  of 
the  peculiarities,  is  indeed  the  chief  peculiarity,  of  our 
moral  perceptions.  Herein  do  our  moral  convictions, 
whether  of  the  nature  of  cognitions,  beliefs,  or  judg- 
ments, differ  from  the  intellectual  convictions  which 
have  passed  under  our  notice  in  the  previous  parts  of 
this  treatise.  That  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  be- 
tween two  points,  this  I  am  constrained  to  decide  when 
my  attention  is  called  to  the  subject,  but  I  know  of  no 
duty  thence  arising,  no  affection  which  I  should  thereon 
cherish,  no  action  which  I  ought  to  do.  But  when  I  am 
led  to  believe  that  there  is  a  good  God  who  made  me 
and  upholds  me,  the  mind  declares  that  it  is  and  must 
be  good  to  love  and  obey  that  Being,  and  that  there  is 
an  obligation  lying  on  me  to  do  so.  This  is  expressed 
by  such  phrases  as  Se'oi/,  duty^  rights  ought,  ohligation,  the 
convictions  embodied  in  which  cannot  be  accounted  for 
on  any  utilitarian  hypothesis.  It  is  shown  that  a  par- 
ticular action  readily  within  our  power  will  tend  to 
promote  the  happiness  of  an  individual  or  of  society  ; 
the  mind's  apprehension  of  this  is  one  thing,  and  the 
conviction  that  we  ought  to  do  it  is  an  entirely  different 
thing,  and  the  two  should  never  be  confounded. 

But  the  conscience  is  not  only  a  cognitive,  it  is  a  mo- 
tive, power.  This  conviction  of  obligation  distinguishes 
it  at  once  from  the  other  motive,  as  it  does  from  tlie  other 
cognitive,  powers.  The  inducements  addressed  to  man's 
sense  of  duty  are  altogether  different  from   those  ad- 


222  OUR  INTUITIVE  MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

dressed  to  the  other  appetencies  of  the  mind.  The  love 
of  pleasure,  of  fame,  and  of  activity,  do  all  hold  out 
allurements  to  man,  but  none  of  them  carries  with  it  a 
binding  obligation.  When  we  follow  them  we  have  no 
sense  of  merit ;  when  we  decline  them  we  have  no  sense 
of  guilt.  It  is  different  when  our  moral  convictions  say 
that  a  particular  line  of  conduct  should  be  pursued.  We 
feel  now  not  only  that  we  may  do  it,  but  that  we  should 
do  it,  and  that  if  we  neglect  to  do  it  we  are  guilty  of  sin. 
Hence  arises  the  great  ethical  doctrine,  expounded  in  so 
masterly  a  manner  by  Bishop  Butler,  that  the  conscience 
is  supreme ;  that  is,  supreme  among  the  other  moving 
powers.  Just  as  appetite  craves  for  food,  and  the  love 
of  society  for  social  intercourse,  so  the  conscience  directs 
to  certain  conduct,  but  with  this  difference,  that  it  de- 
clares itself  superior  to  the  other  springs  of  action.  It 
carries  with  it  its  authority,  and  asserts  its  claims,  and  is 
prepared  to  denounce  us  if  we  disregard  them. 

IV. 

The  Conscience  points  to  an  Authority  above  itself. 
It  is  supreme  as  within  the  mind,  but  it  is  not  absolutely 
supreme.  It  claims  to  be  superior  to  all  other  motives, 
such  as  the  love  of  pleasure,  and  even  to  the  desire  of 
intellectual  improvement ;  indeed,  it  seems  to  point  to 
an  authority  above  the  mind  altogether.  At  the  same 
time,  it  does  not  seem  to  announce  what  is  the  nature  of 
the  object  which  it  would  prompt  us  to  seek  after.  In 
this  respect  it  is  like  some  of  our  intellectual  intuitions, 
which  impel  us  to  look  round  for  something  which  they 
do  not  themselves  reveal.  Thus,  intuitive  causality  con- 
strains us  when  we  discover  an  effect  to  look  for  a  cause, 
but  does  not  specify  what  the  cause  is.  In  like  manner 
our  moral  faculty  seems  to  me  to  point  to  some  power, 


VIRTUE  WITH  ITS  ATTACHED   OBLIGATIONS.  223 

principle,  or  being,  it  says  not  what,  above  itself.  It 
does  not  claim  for  itself  that  it  is  infallible,  that  it  is 
sufficient,  that  it  is  independent.  It  bows  to  something 
which  has  authority;  it  acknowledges  a  standard  which 
is  and  must  be  right ;  it  looks  up  for  sanction  and  guid- 
ance. It  says  that  it  ought  to  yield  to  no  earthly  power; 
but  it  does  not  affirm  of  itself  that  it  can  never  mistake, 
and  that  there  is  no  authority  to  which  it  should  submit. 
On  the  contrary,  it  often  finds  itself  in  difficulty  and  per- 
plexity, and  feels  that  it  should  look  round  and  up  for  a 
light,  and  it  is  sure  that  there  is  such  a  light.  What  is 
thus  unknown  to  the  intuition  itself,  but  which,  not- 
withstanding, it  is  ever  seeking,  is  revealed  by  other 
processes. 

V. 

This  obligation,  when  we  are  led  to  believe  in  a  Su- 
preme Being,  takes  the  form  of  Law  ;  and  we  believe 
that  we  are  under  Law  to  God.  Our  moral  convictions 
do  not,  so  it  seems  to  me,  of  themselves  compel  us  to 
believe  in  the  existence  of  God.  I  am  persuaded,  how- 
ever, that  like  most  of  our  deeper  intuitions  (as  I  hope 
subsequently  to  show)  they  do  point  upwards  to  God. 
And  whenever  we  do,  by  combined  intuition  and  the 
obvious  facts  of  experience,  reach  God,  the  God  who 
gave  us  all  our  endowments,  and  therefore  our  moral 
constitution,  the  mind  traces  up  the  obligation  under 
which  it  lies  to  him.  The  expression  of  this  inward 
conviction  now  is,  not  that  we  are  under  obligation  to  an 
unknown  power,  but  under  law,  and  under  law  to  God. 
It  is  thus  indeed  we  get  the  peculiar  idea  of  moral  gov- 
ernment and  moral  law,  not  from  sense,  nor  from  pleas- 
ure, nor  from  utilitj'^,  but  from  conscience  constraining 
us  to  feel  obligation,  and  combined  intuition  and  experi- 


224  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

ence  leading  us  to  trace  up  that  law  to  God  as  the  Being 
who  sanctions  it.  Till  this  object  is  reached  our  moral 
intuition  is  felt  to  be  vague,  indefinite  ;  it  is  craving  for 
something  which  it  feels  to  be  wanting :  but  when  God 
is  found,  as  he  cannot  fail  to  be  found  when  we  are  in 
search  of  him,  then  the  intuition  is  satisfied,  and  ever 
after  connects  the  law  with  the  Lawgiver. 

VI. 

Moral  good  is  perceived  as  having  Desert,  as  Approv- 
able  and  Rewardable.  This,  too,  is  a  peculiar  idea,  de- 
rived from  the  moral  power  in  man,  and  cannot  have 
been  derived  from,  as  it  cannot  be  resolved  into,  any 
modification  of  pleasure,  or  pain,  or  sensation  of  any 
kind.  We  are  convinced  in  regard  to  every  good  action 
that  it  is  meritorious  ;  we  bestow  upon  it  our  approba- 
tion, and  we  look  for  encouragement  and  reward.  This 
conviction  operates  with  other  considerations  in  leading 
us  to  look  to  God  as  the  Governor  of  this  world,  and  as 
ready  to  uphold  and  defend  the  right.  There  are  times 
when  our  expectations  on  this  subject  are  disappointed, 
and  when  we  see  acts  of  moral  heroism  only  landing  him 
who  performs  them  in  opprobrium  and  suffering.  Still, 
even  in  such  cases,  our  instincts  keep  firm,  in  spite  of  all 
appearances  to  the  contrary ;  and  we  believe  that,  sooner 
or  later,  in  this  world  or  in  the  world  to  come,  the  deeds 
will  meet  with  their  appropriate  reward. 

The  systems  which  represent  man's  moral  faculty  as  a  mere  feel- 
ing or  sentiment,  such  as  those  of  Adam  Smith,  of  Thomas  Brown, 
of  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  are  chargeable  with  two  defects  :  First, 
the  theory  does  not  come  up  to  the  full  mental  facts,  which  embrace 
perception  or  knowledge,  and  judgment  as  well  as  emotion;  and  as 
a  consequence,  secondly,  they  make  it  appear  as  if  virtue  might  arise 
from  the  peculiar  constitution  or  temperament  of  the  race. 


VIRTUE   WITH  ITS  ATTACHED   OBLIGATIONS.  225 

Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  gives  up  Paley  as  an  expounder  of  utilitarianism 
(Dissertations,  Vol.  ii.  p.  460),  and  allows,  as  to  Bentham,  "  that 
there  were  large  deficiencies  and  hiatuses  in  his  scheme  of  human 
nature  "  (p.  462).  To  whom,  then,  are  we  to  look,  if  we  would  ex- 
amine a  system  which  assumes  such  different  shapes;  which  now 
takes  the  form  of  a  selfish  system  whose  principle  is  that  every  man 
should  seek  his  own  happiness,  now  the  form  of  a  benevolent  system 
which  says  that  a  man  should  promote  the  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number  ?  In  the  first  of  these  forms  it  is  at  once  set  aside  by  an 
appeal  to  our  nature,  and  to  feelings  which  Mr.  Mill  admits  to  be  in 
our  nature.  In  the  second  of  these  forms,  that  taken  by  Bentham 
and  Mill,  there  is  a  principle  of  intuitive  morals  surreptitiously  ad- 
mitted, that  we  should  look  to  the  happiness  of  others  as  well  as  our 
own.  Mr.  Mill  says,  "  The  matter  in  debate  is  what  is  right,  —  not 
whether  what  is  right  ought  to  be  done  "  (p.  460).  This  is  not  a  full 
or  accurate  account  of  the  matter  in  debate.  One  question  in  debate 
is,  Can  the  utilitarian  theory  account  for  our  conviction  as  to  right 
and  wrong,  merit  and  guilt?  I  hold  that  it  cannot.  The  higher  class 
of  utilitarians  seem  to  trace  these  convictions  to  the  association  of 
ideas  proceeding  on  our  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Thus  Mr. 
Mill  says  (Vol.  i.  p.  137),  "  The  idea  of  the  pain  of  another  is  natu- 
rally painful ;  the  idea  of  the  pleasure  of  another  is  naturally 
pleasurable.  From  this  fact  in  our  natural  constitution,  all  our 
affections,  both  of  love  and  aversion,  towards  human  beings,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  different  from  those  we  entertain  towards  mere  inani- 
mate  objects  which  are  pleasant  or  disagreeable  to  us,  are  held  by 
the  best  teachers  of  the  theory  of  utility  to  orisinate.  In  this,  the 
unselfish  part  of  our  nature,  lies  a  foundation,  even  independently  of 
inculcation  from  without,  for  the  generation  of  moral  feelings."  Let 
it  be  observed  tliat  this  makes  the  vary  unselfish  part  of  our  nature 
stand  on  a  selfish  basis.  "  The  idea  of  the  pleasure  of  another  is 
naturally  pleasurable,"  that  is,  to  ourselves.  I  hold  that  we  are  led 
to  love  our  fellow-creatures  independently  of  its  being  pleasant  to 
ourselves  ;  and  that  it  is  when  we  love  them  that  the  affection  is 
found  to  be  pleasant,  by  the  appointment  of  the  Author  of  our  con- 
stitution, who  thus  prompts  us  to  benevolence,  and  rewards  us  for 
cherishing  it.  The  theory  does  not  account  for  our  benevolent  feel- 
ings, and  it  fails  still  more  when  it  would  account  for  our  moral 
convictions.  I  admit  that  it  might  give  some  explanation  of  certain 
accompaniments,  but  it  can  give  no  account  of  the  conviction  of 
"ought,"    "obligation,"    "duty,"    "merit,"    "desert,"    "  truilt." 


226  OUR  INTUITIVE  MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

A  second  question  in  debate  is,  Can  the  utilitarian  show  that  any- 
thing is  "  right  "V  that  there  is  truly  anything  such  that  it  "  ought 
to  be  done  "  ?     Suppose  some  sensationalist  or  sceptic  were  to  main- 
tain, as  against  the  utilitarian,  that  he  was  not  bound  to  promote  this 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  how  would  the  advocate  of  the 
greatest  happiness  principle  reply  to  him?     Consistently,  he  could 
appeal  only  to  these  personal  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  ;  and  if 
he  appealed  to  anything  deeper,  it  must  be  to  the  very  moral  prin- 
ciple whose  existence  he  denies.     There  is  a  third  question  in  debate, 
which  will  be  more  easily  determined  after  we  have  settled  the  other 
two.     For  when  it  is  shown  that  man  has  convictions  as  to  moral 
orood  and  evil,  and  that  these  require  him  to  do  certain  acts  and  ab- 
stain from  others,  we  may  be  the  better  prepared  to  admit,  as  to 
certain  of  these  acts,  that  they  do  not  contemplate  the  promotion  of 
happiness.     Thus,  to  love  God  is  good,  and  to  refuse  to  any  one  his 
due  affection  and  gratitude  for  favors  seems  to  he  evil,  independently 
of  the  happiness  of  the  creature  or  Creator  being  thereby  augmented 
or  diminished.      K  fourth  question  is.  Does  utility  afford  a  good  test 
and  measure  of  virtue  and  vice  ?     It  is  foreign  to  the  scope  of  this 
treatise  to  enter  on  this  question,  but  I  may  remark  that,  the  ulti- 
mate appeal  to  "ought"  and  "duty"  being  taken  away,  and  the 
appeal  in  the  last  resource  being  to  pleasure  and  pain,  utilitarianism 
will  not  train   men  to  deeds  of  self-sacrifice,  and  those  who  have 
embraced  it  will  ever  be  tempted  to  give  way  on  great  emergencies, 
and  to  yield  and  equivocate  when  they  should  at  all  hazards  resist 
the  evil.     And  it  has  been  shown  again  and  again,  that  it  is  beyond 
the  capacity  of  man  to  foresee  the  results  of  acts,  or  even  to  dis- 
cern  the   tendency  of    certain    acts   done   in   complicated  circum- 
stances.    But,  omitting  this,  it  is  to  my  present  purpose  to  call  on 
my  readers  to  notice  that  the  theory  of  an  independent  moraUty, 
and  of  moral  conviction,  admits  and  embraces  all  that  is  true   in 
utilitarianism.      It   affirms   that  we  ought  to  promote  the   greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number  ;   and  in  regard   to  all  questions 
bearing  on  happiness,  the  conscience  requires   us  to  weigh  conse- 
quences, and  to  look  to  long  issues  and  results. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ERROR   AND   SIN. 

I. 

Our  academic  moralists  are  commonly  averse  to  look 
at  or  consider  these  two  topics.  But  if  there  be  truth 
in  our  world,  there  is  also  error;  if  there  be  good,  there 
is  also  evil.  Those  who  profess  to  expound  our  nature 
must  look  at  the  one  alternative  as  well  as  the  other. 
Nor  let  it  be  said,  with  Augustine,  that  sin  is  a  mere 
negation.  Malice  and  deceit  and  adultery  are  as  much 
realities  as  goodwill,  integrity,  and  purity. 

I  have  been  arguing  that  our  intellectual  and  moral 
intuitions  are  all  necessary  and  universal.  This  doctrine, 
however,  must  not  be  so  stated  as  to  imply  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  man  to  fall  into  error,  or  for  the  conscience 
to  come  to  a  false  decision,  or  for  human  beings  to  com- 
mit sin. 

That  men  do,  in  fact,  fall  into  error,  is  evident  from 
this  single  circumstance,  that  scarcely  two  persons  can 
be  brought  to  accord  in  opinion,  even  on  points  of  im- 
portance. In  regard,  indeed,  to  necessarj'^  truths,  there 
are  certain  restrictions  laid  on  the  mind.  No  man  who 
considers  the  subject  can  be  made  to  believe  that  two 
straight  lines  will  enclose  a  space.  Still,  even  in  regard 
to  such  truths,  the  mind  has  a  capacity  of  ignorance  and 
of  error ;  it  may  refuse  to  consider  them,  or,  mistaking 
their  nature,  it  may  make  statements  inconsistent  with 
them  without  knowing  it.  Those  who  have  gone  through 
the  demonstrations  of  Euclid  are  constrained  to  believe 


228  OUR   INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS, 

the  truth  of  e\evy  proposition,  but  the  truths  have  never 
so  much  as  been  presented  to  the  minds  of  the  great 
majority  of  mankind,  and  many  persons  might  easily  be 
persuaded  that  the  angles  of  certain  triangles  are  equal 
to  less  or  to  more  than  two  right  angles.  But  whatever 
the  restrictions  laid  on  our  liability  to  error  in  necessary 
truth,  there  seem  to  be  no  limits  to  man's  exposure  to 
mistakes  in  other  matters.  There  is  boundless  room  for 
them  in  all  conclusions  which  are  dependent  on  expe- 
riential evidence,  especially  when  the  proof  is  of  a  cumu- 
lative character.  In  all  such  matters  the  mind  may 
refuse  to  look  at  the  probation,  or  it  may  take  only  what 
is  favorable  to  one  side,  and  may  arrive  at  most  erro- 
neous and  preposterous  results.  This  liability  to  error 
is  apt  to  appear  in  all  affairs  in  whicii  we  are  under  the 
influence  of  pride  or  party  spirit,  or  a  biassed  and  preju- 
diced disposition ;  in  short,  wherever  there  is  moral  evil 
swaying  the  will,  and  leading  it  to  look  on  evidence  in 
a  partial  spirit.  If  I  were  immediately  cognizant  of  the 
heart  of  a  good  man,  and  could  see  the  springs  that  move 
him  to  benevolence  and  self-sacrifice,  I  should  be  con- 
strained to  approve  of  him  ;  but  I  may  be  prepossessed 
against  him,  and  I  twist  and  torture  facts  till  I  bring 
m5^self  to  believe  that  he  is  doing  all  this  from  a  deep 
designing  selfishness.  I  believe  that  while  ignorance 
may  arise  from  the  finite  nature  of  our  f;iculties,  and 
from  a  limited  means  of  knowledge,  positive  error  does 
in  every  case  proceed  directly  or  indirectly  from  a  cor- 
rupted will,  leading  us  to  pronounce  a  hasty  judgment 
without  evidence,  or  to  seek  partial  evidence  on  the  side 
to  whicli  our  inclinations  lean.  A  thoroughly  pure  and 
candid  will  would,  in  my  opinion,  preserve  man,  even 
with  his  present  limited  faculties,  not  indeed  from  igno- 
rance on  many  points,  but  from  all  possibility  of  posi- 
tive mistakes. 


ERROR   AND   SIN.  229 

But  the  question  may  be  asked,  how  is  the  existence 
of  sin,  and  of  wrong  decisions  of  the  conscience,  consis- 
tent with  the  necessity  which  attaches  to  our  moral  con- 
victions ?  The  difficulty  can  easily  be  removed  so  far  as 
the  existence  of  sin  is  concerned  ;  for  sin  must  ever  pro- 
ceed from  the  region  of  the  will,  which  is  free  to  do  good, 
but  also  free  to  do  evil.  It  may  be  necessary  for  the 
conscience  to  decide  in  a  certain  manner,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  will  should  do  what  the  conscience 
commands.  And  it  is  to  the  influence  exercised  by  a 
disobedient  will  upon  the  conscience  that  I  attribute  all 
the  errors  in  its  decisions.  In  whatever  way  we  may 
reconcile  them,  these  two  facts  can  each  be  established 
on  abundant  evidence :  the  one,  that  in  the  primitive 
exercises  of  conscience  there  is  a  conviction  of  necessity ; 
the  other,  that  the  conscience  is  liable  to  manifold  per- 
versions. Care  must  be  taken  not  to  state  the  two  so 
as  to  make  the  one  appear  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
other ;  both  can  be  so  enunciated  as  to  make  all  seeming 
contradiction  vanish.  If  we  look  directly  and  fairly  at 
moral  excellence,  the  mind  must  declare  it  to  be  good. 
But  then,  first,  the  mind  may  refuse  to  look  at  it  at  all ; 
and,  secondly,  it  may  not  regard  it  in  the  right  light.  If 
we  look  upon  the  living  and  the  true  God  in  the  proper 
aspect,  we  must  acknowledge  that  we  owe  him  love  and 
obedience ;  but  then  we  may  refuse  to  look  upon  him, 
we  may  contrive  to  live  without  God,  and  God  may  not 
be  in  all  our  thoughts ;  or  we  may  fashion  to  ourselves 
a  Deity  with  a  degraded  nature,  making  him  one  alto- 
gether like  unto  ourselves,  and  then  the  proper  awe  and 
affection  will  no  longer  rise  in  our  bosoms. 

It  is  to  be  taken  into  account  that,  while  our  decisions 
upon  the  acts  presented  may  be  intuitively  certain,  yet 
that  the  acts  are  not  intuitively  presented,  and  may  be 


230  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

very  inaccurately  presented.  The  conscience,  it  is  to  be 
remembered,  is  a  reflex  faculty,  judging  of  objects  pre- 
sented to  it  by  the  other  powers,  and  the  representation 
given  it  may  be  incorrect.  The  liability  to  deception 
and  perversion  is  increased  by  the  circumstance  that  the 
states  of  mind  with  which  our  voluntary  acts  are  mixed 
up  are  of  a  very  complicated  character.  There  is  room 
in  this  way  for  giving  a  wrong  account  of  our  actual 
state  of  mind  at  any  given  moment.  I  contribute  a  sum 
of  money  to  relieve  a  person  in  distress ;  I  may  do  so 
from  very  mixed  or  doubtful  motives  ;  but  I  am  nat- 
urally led  by  self-love  to  look  on  the  motive  as  good,  and 
then  I  cherish  a  feeling  of  self-approbation,  in  which  I 
should  by  no  means  have  been  justified  had  I  taken  a 
searching  view  of  the  whole  mental  state.  Again,  I  find 
a  neighbor  doing  the  very  same  act,  and  I  am  led  by 
jealousy  to  attribute  selfish  motives  to  him,  and  I  con- 
demn him  in  a  judgment  which  may  be  equally  unwar- 
ranted. By  such  seductions  as  these  the  mind  may 
become  utterly  perverted  in  the  representations  which 
it  gives  or  receives,  and  in  the  consequent  moral  judg- 
ments which  it  pronounces.  In  the  case  of  these  perver- 
sions of  the  conscience,  as  in  the  case  of  the  errors  of  the 
understanding  (as  we  have  previously  seen),  the  evil  is 
to  be  traced  to  the  will  refusing  to  give  obedience  to  its 
proper  law,  and  conjuring  up  a  series  of  deceptions  to 
excuse  and  defend  itself.  The  intuition  is  after  all  there, 
but  it  is  difficult  in  a  mind  perverted  by  a  corrupt  and 
prejudiced  will  to  put  it  in  a  position  to  act  ariglit.  In 
order  to  do  this  it  may  be  needful  to  have  a  divine  law 
revealed,  and  this  applied  by  a  teaching  and  quickening 
Spirit  from  above. 


EBROR  AND  SIN.  231 

11. 

We  are  already  in  the  heart  of  the  subject  of  Sin, 
a  topic  which  academic  moralists  studiously  avoid,  but 
which  must  be  carefully  looked  at  by  those  who  would 
give  a  correct  account  of  our  moral  constitution.  In 
referring  to  it  here,  I  do  not  profess  to  be  able  to  give 
an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  sin  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God,  whose  power  is  almighty,  and  who  shows 
that  he  hates  sin.  This  seems  to  be  a  mystery  which 
human  reason  cannot  clear  up.  The  topic  certainly  does 
not  fall  within  the  scope  of  our  present  investigation. 
I  have  here  simply  to  consider  sin  in  its  reference  to  our 
moral  convictions. 

Sin  is  a  quality  of  Voluntary  acts.  It  always  resides 
in  some  mental  affection  or  act  in  which  there  is  the 
exercise  of  freewill.  The  guilt  of  the  sin  thus  always 
lies  with  him  who  commits  it.  He  cannot  throw  the 
blame  on  any  other,  for  he  has  himself  given  his  consent 
to  it.  Others  may  have  seduced  him  into  it,  and  in  that 
case  the  criminality  of  having  tempted  him  lies  with 
them  ;  and  then  the  sin  of  having  yielded  to  the  tempta- 
tion, and  having  done  the  wicked  deed,  lies  with  himself: 
he  can  devolve  it  on  no  other. 

Our  moral  convictions  declare  that  sin  is  of  evil  De- 
sert, Condemnable,  Punishable.  This  conviction  is  of 
precisely  an  opposite  character  to  that  which  we  entertain 
in  regard  to  good  affection  and  action.  We  declare  the 
sin  to  have  in  itself  evil  desert ;  we  condemn  it  in  conse- 
quence, and  we  say  of  it,  that  it  should  be  discouraged, 
nay,  punished.  The  very  ideas,  so  full  of  meaning,  in- 
volved in  these  mental  convictions,  are  native,  original, 
and  necessary.  We  cannot  get  them  from  mere  sensa- 
tions of  pleasure  or  pain,  nor  from  any  intellectual  opera- 


232  OUR   INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

tion  whatever ;  and  yet  we  are  constrained  to  take  this 
view  of  sin  wherever  it  is  pressed  fairly  upon  our  notice. 
It  is  this  conviction  that  stirs  up  and  keeps  alive  a  sense 
of  guilt  and  apprehension  of  punishment  in  the  breast 
of  every  sinner.  It  is  found  even  among  children,  and 
among  the  rudest  and  most  ignorant  savages,  who  are 
urged  thereby  to  try  some  means  of  avoiding  or  averting 
the  wrath  of  God,  and  are  prepared  in  consequence  to 
listen  to  the  parent,  or  teacher,  or  missionary,  when  he 
speaks  of  the  desert  of  sin,  and  points  to  a  Saviour  who 
suffered  in  our  room  and  stead,  and  so  made  reconcilia- 
tion for  transgressors. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  WILL. 

PEIMITIVE  TRUTH   INVOLVED   IN   WILL. 

I. 

Will  has  a  much  larger  place  in  the  mind  than  is 
commonly  allotted.  I  believe  it  is  exercised  in  nearly 
every  minute  of  our  waking  life,  say  in  guiding  our  steps 
as  we  walk,  or  in  keeping  us  in  the  proper  position  while 
we  sit,  or  in  cherishing  wishes  or  regulating  our  thoughts. 
Its  essential  element  is  Choice,  or  the  opposite  of  choice, 
Rejection.     It  takes  a  variety  of  forms. 

One  of  its  first  is  Attention.  We  detain  a  present 
state  of  mind.  We  keep  before  us,  for  a  time,  an  object 
in  which  we  are  interested.  This  is  an  important  power, 
as,  in  retaining  the  thought,  feeling,  or  object,  we  may 
call  up  all  that  is  associated  with  it  in  a  lengthened 
train,  or  collected  in  a  centre  round  self.  Chalmers 
speaks  of  attention  as  a  link  between  the  intellectual 
and  the  moral. 

Will  may  rise  to  a  higher  form  ;  it  may  become  a 
Wish :  we  wish  to  gain  an  object  or  an  end,  or  to  be 
delivered  from  it.  Our  wishes  or  voluntary  aversions 
constitute  a  large  portion  of  our  conscious  experience 
from  hour  to  hour,  almost  from  minute  to  minute. 
They  are  our  longings  and  aversions,  our  adherences 
and  our  antipathies.  In  the  selfish  man  they  become  a 
brooding  over  successes  or  reverses ;  in  the  kindly  in- 
clined man  they  dwell  on  the  happiness  or  successes  of 
others.     They  constitute  a  large  portion  of  the  aspira- 


234  OUR  INTUITIVE  MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

tions  of  the  religious  man,  as  breathing  for  instance  in 
the  Psiilnis:  "Oh  tiiat  I  knew  where  I  could  find  Him!" 

Will  takes  its  highest  shape  in  Volition,  or  the  deter- 
mination towards  which  it  is  always  tending,  and  in 
which  it  terminates  when  circumstances  admit.  Volition 
starts  all  our  undertakings,  and  is  needful  to  their  exe- 
cution. A  strong  will  is  the  original  of  all  great  deeds, 
good  or  evil ;  it  produces  the  hero  and  the  powerful 
villain. 

The  Will  in  these  three  forms  has  its  place  in  all  the 
virtues  and  in  all  the  graces ;  without  this  they  would 
not  be  moral.  In  benevolence  we  wish  well  to  our 
neighbors,  singly  or  collectively.  In  religion  faith  be- 
comes trust,  and  repentance  the  turning  from  sin  unto 
God. 

IT. 

Moral  Good  and  Evil  lie  in  the  region  of  the  Will ; 
Will  being  viewed  in  the  large  sense  explained.  In  every 
act  which  is,  properly  speaking,  moral  or  immoral,  there 
is  an  element  of  choice  under  some  or  other  of  the  forms 
which  it  takes.  It  is  in  acts  or  affections  which  we  are 
free  to  perform,  but  from  which  we  are  free  to  abstain, 
that  the  conscience  discerns  a  moral  quality,  and  on  which 
it  pronounces  its  sentence.  There  is  choice,  and  there- 
fore will,  in  all  cases  in  which  we  adopt  or  reject  any 
proposal  laid  before  us  by  ourselves  or  others,  as  there 
is  also  in  our  wishes  and  voluntary  aversions.  The  fond- 
lings, resolutions  and  rejections  may  unite  themselves 
with  any  of  our  feelings,  and  even  with  our  intellectual 
exercises,  and  make  them  in  a  sense  voluntary. 

III. 
The  Will  is  Free.     In  saying  so  I  mean  to  assert,  not 


THE   WILL.  235 

that  it  is  free  to  act  as  it  pleases,  which  is  not  universally 
true,  for  the  will  may  be  hindered  from  action,  as  when 
I  will  to  move  my  arm,  and  it  is  not  obeyed  because  of 
paralysis  or  physical  restraint:  I  claim  for  it  an  anterior 
and  a  higher  power,  a  power  in  the  mind  to  choose,  and, 
when  it  chooses,  a  consciousness  that  it  might  choose 
otherwise.  This  truth  is  revealed  to  us  by  the  inward 
sense,  and  is  not  to  be  set  aside  by  any  other  truth  what- 
soever. It  is  a  first  truth,  equal  to  the  highest,  to  no 
one  of  which  it  will  ever  yield.  It  cannot  be  set  aside 
by  any  other  truth,  not  even  by  any  other  first  truth, 
and  certainly  by  no  derived  truth.  Whatever  other 
proposition  is  true,  this  is  true  also,  that  man  has  free- 
will. If  there  be  any  other  truth  apparently  inconsis- 
tent with  it,  care  must  be  taken  so  to  express  it  that  it 
may  not  be  really  contradictory.  It  is  a  truth  which 
may  be  expressed  in  words ;  it  is  so  expressed  when  it 
is  said  that  the  mind  has  in  itself  the  power  of  choice. 
It  is  the  office  of  the  psychologist  and  the  moralist  to 
endeavor  to  determine  exactly  what  is  involved  in  this. 
But  this  is  to  be  done,  after  all,  mainly  by  an  appeal  to 
consciousness. 

So  much  is  clear,  so  very  clear  that  any  attempts  to 
make  it  clearer  by  discussion  will  only  stir  up  mud  and 
trouble  the  waters.  The  difficulties  which  encompass 
the  subject  do  not  originate  in  Freewill  itself,  but  in 
its  connection  with  two  other  truths.  First,  there  is  the 
Divine  Foreknowledge  and  Sovei'eignty,  doctrines  which 
recommend  themselves  to  high  reason,  and  which  are 
decisively  written  in  the  Word  of  God.  Secondly,  there 
is  the  appearance  of  causation  in  the  mind,  even  in  its 
voluntary  acts.  When  we  know  a  man's  character  we 
can  anticipate  what  he  will  do  in  certain  circumstances  ; 
of  the  man  of  integrity,  that  he  will  not  tell  a  lie.    Statis- 


236  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

tics  of  criminal  acts  depending  on  freewill  can  be  drawn 
out  as  certain  as  those  of  mortality  depending  on  phys- 
ical causes.  The  statistician  can  tell  us  approximately 
how  many  thefts  and  murders  will  be  committed  in  a 
year  in  a  given  district,  just  as  he  can  predict  how  many 
deaths  there  will  be,  and  so  far  as  he  fails,  in  either  case, 
it  is  from  a  want  of  knowledge. 

I  do  not  profess  to  be  able  to  clear  up  the  difficulty 
arisinof  from  causation  on  the  one  side  facing  freewill  on 
the  other.  Perhaps  the  safest  course  is  to  affirm  that  we 
are  obliged  to  believe  in  both,  and  that  it  cannot  be 
proven  that  there  is  a  contradiction  between  them  when 
they  are  properly  expounded.  Here  as  in  so  many  cases 
we  have  to  believe  in  truths  of  which  we  do  not  see  the 
full  meaning,  and  to  believe  that  two  propositions  may 
be  true  while  we  cannot  discover  the  reconciliation,  if 
indeed  a  reconciliation  is  needed.  I  may  call  attention 
to  two  circumstances  which  may  somewhat  lessen  the 
perplexities. 

First,  causation  is  not  all  of  one  kind.  Cause  may  act 
in  a  different  way  upon  our  will  from  that  in  which  it 
acts  in  other  departments  of  our  nature.  The  mind 
has  undoubtedly  a  power  of  freewill.  But  consciousness, 
which  is  always  of  the  present,  cannot  tell  what  circum- 
stances antecedent  have  swayed  the  will  or  how.  The 
antecedents  do  not  operate  as  causes  operate  in  physical 
nature,  or  in  our  intellectual  being.  It  can  be  shown 
that  cause  in  mind  is  of  a  different  nature  from  cause  in 
matter.  It  is  conceivable  that  in  the  peculiar  nature  of 
cause,  as  operating  on  or  in  the  will,  may  be  found  the 
means  of  removing  the  mystery.  We  know  where  the 
secret  lies,  though  we  may  not  be  able  to  find  it. 

Secondly,  causation,  always  with  power,  seems  here,  as 
in  a  number  of  other  cases,  to  be  of  a  duplex  or  complex 


THE  WILL.  237 

character.  We  have  seen  that  in  all  physical  and  in  all 
mental  causes  there  are  two  or  more  agents.  So  in  vol- 
untary action  there  are  two  antecedents  :  there  is  the 
Motive  and  there  is  the  ,  Will.  Their  concurrence  is 
necessary  to  the  product. 

It  is  necessary  here  to  ascertain  definitely  what  a 
Motive  is.  It  is  something  addressed  to  the  will  prior  to 
its  action.  It  differs  in  tiie  case  of  different  individuals 
and  of  the  same  man  at  different  times.  I  have  known 
a  tradesman  who  at  one  part  of  his  life  could  not  pass  a 
tavern  witiiout  being  tempted  to  enter  and  seek  excite- 
ment in  intoxicating  drink.  To  another  tradesman  the 
house  presented  no  such  allurement,  and  it  ceased  to 
present  any  temptation  to  the  first  man  when  he  had 
succeeded  in  conquering  his  evil  habit.  A  motive  is  in 
the  mind  prior  to  action,  and  alluring  to  a  certain  action. 
It  may  consist  partly  of  some  external  circumstance  ;  it 
has  always  an  accompanying  mental  appetence,  say  the 
love  of  pleasure,  of  renown,  or  of  money.  This  appetence 
may  be  a  natural  inclination,  or  it  may  be  the  result  of 
a  course  of  action,  say  our  habits,  at  every  step  in  the 
formation  of  whicli  there  may  have  been  acts  of  the  will 
for  all  of  which  the  individual  was  responsible  at  the 
time.  What  in  the  end  presents  itself  to  the  Will  be- 
fore action  is  the  Motive.  The  Motive  has  no  compelling 
power.  The  Will,  or  rather  the  mind  in  the  exercise 
of  Will,  is  free.  It  is  free  to  choose,  it  is  free  to  reject. 
No  action  takes  place  till  the  will  chooses.  When  it 
accepts  or  rejects,  it  sanctions  the  motive.     For  this  it  is 

responsible. 

IV. 

The  Will  is  Responsible  for  all  its  acts  of  choice  or  re- 
jection, be  they  volitions  or  be  they  acts  of  attention  or 
wishes.  We  have  seen  that  our  moral  nature  points  to 
a  power  above  itself,  a  power  which  has  authority  ;  it 


238  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL  CONVICTIONS. 

should  bow  to  that  authority  ;  it  must  give  account  of 
itself  to  that  power.  When  God  is  revealed  by  his  works 
without  or  within  us,  then  we  are  constrained  to  believe 
that  we  are  under  law  to  God.  So  then  every  one  must 
give  account  of  himself  to  God.  Thus  far  the  philosophy 
of  intuition  carries  us.  I  am  not  convinced  that  it  goes 
farther.  I  am  not  sure  that  it  proves  to  us  that  there  is 
and  must  be  a  judgment  day,  but  it  prompts  us  to  look 
out  for  it,  and  furnishes  a  presumption  in  its  favor. 

A  different  method  of  reconciling  freedom  with  causation  has  been 
introduced  by  Kant,  who  has  been  followed  by  a  long  train  of  theo- 
logians and  metaphysicians.  According  to  this  view,  the  mind 
knows  only  phenomena,  and  not  things,  and  the  law  of  cause  and 
effect  is  a  mental  framework  giving  a  form  to  our  knowledge  of  phe- 
nomena. It  applies,  therefore,  to  appearances  and  not  to  things, 
which,  for  aught  we  know,  or  can  know  in  this  world,  may  or  may 
not  obey  the  law  of  causation.  Kant  acknowledges  that  we  are  led 
by  the  speculative  principles  of  the  mind  to  look  on  even  tlie  will  as 
under  the  dominion  of  cause,  but  then  it  is  quite  conceivable  that 
the  thing  itself  may  after  all  be  free,  and  we  are  led  to  believe  it  to 
be  free  by  the  Practical  Reason.  Now,  I  have  to  remark,  first  of 
all,  on  this  theory,  that  it  must  be  taken  in  its  entirety.  We  are  not 
at  liberty  (as  some  would  do)  to  adopt  it  merely  so  far  as  it  may  suit 
our  purpose,  and  refuse  the  very  foundation  on  which  it  is  built. 
We  must,  in  particidar,  admit  as  a  fundamental  principle  that  we 
can  never  know  things;  that  causation  has  no  respect  whatever  to 
things,  but  is  a  mere  subjective  principle  of  the  mind;  that  we  can- 
not prove  the  existence  of  God  from  causation.  But  I  have  failed 
in  one  of  the  main  ends  of  this  treatise  if  I  have  not  succeeded  in 
showing  that  the  mind  has  knowledge  of  things  in  its  primary  exer- 
cises, that  we  know  objects  as  having  potency,  and  that  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect  refers  to  such  objects.  If  we  deny  this,  we  are 
denying  certain  of  the  intuitions  of  the  mind  in  some  of  their  clear- 
est enunciations  ;  and  if  we  deny  them  in  one  of  their  declarations, 
why  not  in  others  ?  and  if  we  deny  one  set,  why  not  every  other 
setV  till  at  last  we  know  not  what  to  believe  and  what  to  disbelieve. 
Those  who  believe  that  the  mind  can  come  to  the  knowledge  of 
things,  and  that  they  discover  power  in  things,  cannot  resort  to  this 
theory. 


CHAPTER  V. 

RELATION   OF   MOKAL  GOOD   AND   HAPPINESS, 

These  two  have  a  number  of  points  of  connection 
and  correspondence.  Much  of  moral  good  consists  in  the 
voluntary  promotion  of  happiness,  and  the  diminution  of 
pain  in  a  world  in  which  there  is  such  a  liability  to  suf- 
fering. A  very  large  number  of  human  virtues,  and  of 
vices,  too,  take  their  origin  from  man's  capacity  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain  ;  and  in  a  state  of  things  in  which  there 
was  no  possibility  of  increasing  felicity,  or  removing 
misery,  many  of  this  world's  virtues  would  altogether 
disappear.  Still  the  two,  while  they  have  many  inter- 
esting points  of  affinity,  are  not  to  be  identified.  In  par- 
ticular, we  are  not  to  resolve  virtue  into  a  mere  tendency 
to  promote  the  pleasure  of  the  individual  or  happiness  of 
the  race.  There  seem  to  me  to  be  certain  great  truths 
which  the  mind  perceives  at  once  in  regard  to  the  con- 
nection of  the  two. 

I. 

The  good  is  good  altogether  independent  of  the  pleas- 
ure it  may  bring.  There  is  a  good  which  does  not 
immediately  contemplate  the  production  of  happiness. 
Such,  for  example,  are  love  to  God,  the  glorifying  of 
God,  and  the  hallowing  of  his  name:  these  have  no 
respect,  in  our  entertaining  and  cherishing  them,  to  an 
augmentation  of  the  Divine  felicity.  No  doubt  such  an 
act  or  spirit  may,  by  reflection  of  light,  tend  to  brighten 
our  own  felicity  ;  but  this  is  an  indirect  effect,  which  fol- 
lows only  where  we  cherish  the  temper  and  perform  the 


240  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

corresponding  work  in  the  idea  that  it  is  right.  We  do 
deeds  of  justice  to  the  distant,  to  the  departed,  and  the 
dead,  who  never  may  be  conscious  of  what  we  have  per- 
formed. Even  in  regard  to  services  done  with  the  view 
of  promoting  the  happiness  of  the  individual,  or  of  the 
community,  we  are  made  to  feel  that,  if  happiness  be 
good,'  the  benevolence  which  leads  us  to  seek  the  happi- 
ness of  others  is  still  better,  is  alone  morally  good.  In 
all  cases  the  conscience  constrains  us  to  decide  that  vir- 
tue is  good,  whether  it  does  or  does  not  contemplate  the 

production  of  pleasure. 

II. 

Our  moral  constitution  declares  that  we  ought  to  pro- 
mote the  happiness  of  all  who  are  susceptible  of  happi- 
ness. The  only  plausible  form  of  the  utilitarian  theory 
of  morals  is  that  elaborated  by  Bentham,  who  says  that 
we  ought  to  promote  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  great- 
est number.  But  why  ought  we  to  do  so?  Whence  get 
we  the  should^  the  obligation,  the  duty  ?  Why  should  I 
seek  the  happiness  of  any  other  being  than  myself?  why 
the  happiness  of  a  great  number,  or  of  the  greatest  num- 
ber? why  the  happiness  even  of  any  one  individual  be- 
yond the  unit  of  self?  If  the  advocates  of  the  "great- 
est happiness  "  principle  will  only  answer  this  question 
thoroughly,  they  must  call  in  a  moral  principle,  or  take 
refuge  in  a  sjstem  against  which  our  whole  nature 
rebels,  in  a  theory  which  says-  that  we  are  not  required 
to  do  more  than  look  after  our  own  gratifications.  The 
very  advocates  of  the  greatest  happiness  theory  are  thus 
constrained,  in  consistency  with  their  view,  to  call  in  an 
ethical  principle,  and  this  will  be  found,  if  they  examine 
it,  to  require  more  from  man  than  that  he  should  further 
the  felicity  of  others.  But  while  it  covers  vastly  more 
ground,  it  certainly  includes  this,  that  we  are  bound,  as 


RELATION   OF   MORAL   GOOD   AND   HAPPINESS.  241 

much  as  in  us  lies,  to  promote  the  welfare  of  all  who  are 
capable  of  having  their  misery  alleviated  or  their  felicity 
enhanced. 

m. 

Our  moral  convictions  affirm  that  moral  good  should 
meet  with  happiness.  They  seem  to  declare  that  this  is 
in  itself  appropriate  and  good ;  and  when  we  are  led  to 
believe  in  the  existence  of  a  good  God,  we  are  sure  that 
he  will  seek  to  secure  this  end.  Experience,  no  doubt, 
shows  many  things  in  seeming  opposition  to  this,  shows 
many  crushed  with  misfortune  and  wrung  with  agony, 
who  are  far  more  virtuous  than  those  who  are  in  the 
enjoyment  of  health  and  prosperity.  But  our  inward 
convictions  guide  us  to  the  right  conclusions  in  spite  of 
these  apparently  contradictory  results  of  outward  obser- 
vation. They  lead  us  to  believe  that  they  who  are  thus 
afflicted  are  after  all  suffering  no  injustice,  inasmuch  as 
they  have  sinned  against  Heaven,  and  to  expect  that  the 
wicked  will  not  be  allowed  to  pass  unpunished.  And 
since  we  do  not  discover  a  full  retribution  in  this  world, 
they  lead  us  to  look  forward  to  a  day  of  judgment,  in 
which  all  the  inequalities  and  seeming  incongruities  of 
this  present  dispensation  will  be  rectified  in  appearance 
as  well  as  in  reality,  and  the  justice  of  God's  moral  gov- 
ernment fully  vindicated. 

IV. 

Our  moral  convictions  declare  that  sin  merits  pain  as 
a  punishment.  There  seems  to  be  as  close  a  connection 
between  sin  and  pain  as  there  is  between  virtue  and 
happiness.  There  may  indeed  be  happiness,  and  there 
may  be  suffering,  where  there  is  neither  virtue  nor  the 
opposite,  as,  for  example,  among  the  brute  creation  ;  but 
we  decide  that,  wherever  there  is  virtue,  it  merits  hap- 


242  OUR  INTUITIVE   MORAL   CONVICTIONS. 

piness,  and  wherever  there  is  sin,  that  it  deserves  suf- 
fering, and  we  are  led  to  anticipate  that  the  proper  con- 
sequences will  follow  under  the  government  of  a  good 
and  a  holy  God.  This  conviction  keeps  alive,  in  the 
breasts  of  the  wicked,  at  least  an  occasional  fear  of  pun- 
ishment, even  in  the  midst  of  the  greatest  outward  pros- 
perity, and  points  very  emphatically,  if  not  very  dis- 
tinctly, to  a  day  of  judgment  and  of  righteous  retribution. 
But  as  this  instinct  does  not  supply  the  object,  it  is  quite 
possible  that  a  wrong  one  may  be  presented  by  the  baser 
fears  of  the  heart,  or  by  a  degraded  superstition,  and  the 
final  judgment  may  be  thought  of  as  a  petty  assize,  and 
the  judge  be  regarded  as  gratifying  a  personal  revenge, 
and  heaven  be  contemplated  as  an  elysium  of  sensual 
joys,  and  hell  as  a  place  of  vulgar  torture.  Still  the 
conviction  does  demand  its  object,  and  when  the  moral 
sense  is  refined,  it  feels  that  the  account  given  in  Sci'ip- 
ture  of  a  judgment  day,  and  of  a  heaven  of  light  and  a 
hell  of  darkness,  is  in  thorough  correspondence  with  the 
intuition  which  God  has  planted  in  our  mental  consti- 
tution. 

But  in  contemplating  and  in  harmonizing  such  truths 
as  these.  Ethical  science  finds  itself  in  difficulties :  it 
starts  questions  which  it  cannot  answer ;  it  raises  doubts 
which  it  cannot  dispel.  We  see,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
God  will  be  led  to  punish  sin,  that  he  "  will  by  no 
means  clear  the  guilty."  But  we  have  evidence,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  he  delights  supremely  in  the  happiness 
of  his  creatures.  How  then  can  God  be  just,  and  yet 
the  justifier  of  the  ungodly  ?  Natural  Ethics  here  con- 
duct to  a  yawning  chasm,  but  show  no  bridge  across  ; 
while  we  are  led  most  anxiously  to  long  for  one,  and 
almost  to  expect  that  one  will  appear.  They  lead  us  to 
a  place  where  we  have  no  light,  but  where  we  are  led  to 


RELATION   OF   MORAL   GOOD   AND   HAPPINESS.         243 

cry  out  for  a  light  because  of  the  very  thickness  of  the 
darkness.  How  grateful  should  we  be  when  a  light  is 
vouchsafed  from  heaven  to  show  us  that  the  gulf  is 
spanned,  and  to  disclose  the  way  by  which  it  may  be 
crossed ! 


PART  THIRD. 

INTUITIVE  PRINCIPLES  AND  THE   SCIENCES. 


BOOK   I. 

METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE   SCIENCE   DEFINED. 

The  phrase  Metaphysics  is  believed  to  have  taken  its 
rise  from  the  title  given  to  one  of  the  treatises  of  Aris- 
totle. There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  name  was 
given  to  the  work  referred  to  by  the  author.  It  does  not 
even  appear  that  it  was  meant  to  denote  the  nature  of 
the  contents.  Andronicus,  it  is  said,  inscribed  on  the 
manuscripts,  To.  /xera  to.  <t>ucriKa,  to  intimate  that  these 
books  were  to  follow  the  physical  treatises.^  In  the  writ- 
ings of  Aristotle  this  department  is  called,  not  Meta- 
physics, but  the  First  Philosophy. 

Metaphysical  speculation  is  usually  supposed,  and  I 
believe  correctly,  to  have  originated  with  the  Eleatics, 
who  flourished  450  or  500  years  before  our  era.  Separat- 
ing from  the  physiologists,  that  is,  physical  speculators, 

'  On  the  title,  see  Bonitz,  "  Commentarius,"  appended  to  his  edi- 
tion of  the  Metnphyaics.  See,  also,  M'Mahon's  translation  of  the 
Metaphysics,  p.  1,  where  Clement  Alexandriniis  and  Philoponus  are 
quoted  as  understanding  the  phrase  to  denote  the  supranatural. 


METAPHYSICS.  245 

of  the  Ionian  school,  they  directed  their  attention  to  the 
dicta  of  inward  reason.  Going  far  below  what  they  rep- 
resented as  the  iUusions  of  tiie  senses,  they  sought  to 
penetrate  the  mystery  of  being.  With  them  all  things 
were  one,  and  this  incapable  of  motion  or  of  change. 

Metaphysics  are  treated,  along  with  all  other  topics, 
by  Plato,  under  the  somewhat  unfortunate  name  of  Dia- 
lectics, which  has  nearly  the  same  meaning  as  Specula- 
tive Philosophy  has  in  modern  times,  only  the  former 
meant  discussion  in  conversation,  the  latter  discussion  in 
the  head,  or  in  books.  According  to  Plato,  it  was  the 
science  which  treated  of  the  one  Real  Being  (j6  6V)  and 
the  Real  Good.  This  one  Real  Being  was  not  v^ith  him, 
as  with  the  Eleatics,  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of 
the  many.  It  embraced  the  inquiry  into  the  nature  of 
the  Good  and  the  Beautiful,  and  expounded  the  Eternal 
Ideas  which  had  been  in  or  before  the  Divine  Mind 
from  all  eternity,  to  the  contemplation  of  which  man's 
soul  could  rise  by  cogitation,  because  it  had  been 
formed  in  the  Divine  image,  and  in  which  the  sensible 
universe  participated,  thereby  having  a  stability  in  the 
midst  of  its  mutability. 

According  to  Aristotle,  the  First  Philosophy  treats  of 
entity  so  far  forth  as  it  is  entity,  and  of  quiddity  or  the 
nature  of  a  thing,  and  of  that  which  is  universally  in- 
herent, so  far  as  it  is  in  entity.  He  argues  that  if  there 
were  not  some  substance  (ouo-ta)  other  than  those  that 
exist  in  nature,  then  Physics  would  be  the  first  science; 
but  if  there  be  an  eternal  and  unmovable  substance,  then 
there  must  be  a  prior  science  to  treat  of  it,  and  this  is  to 
be  honored  as  the  first  and  highest  philosophy.  But  the 
inquiry  into  entity  is,  in  fact,  an  inquiry  into  causes,  or 
what  makes  a  thing  to  be  what  it  is  ;  and  he  shows  that 
such  an  investigation  conducts  to  four  causes  :  (1.)    The 


246  INTUITIVE  PRINCIPLES  AND   THE   SCIENCES. 

Formal  (tt)v  ovo-mv  koL  to  tl  rjv  HvaCy  ;  (2.^  The  Material 

(tiiv  vXrju   KOL  TO  VTroKeifievop^  ;    (3.)    The    Efficient    (^oOev  rj 
^PXV  '''V''   Kiv^(Tews^  ;     (4.)    The  Final    (to  ov    cvckcv    koi    to 

From  the  bent  of  his  genius,  Bacon  was  no  way  ad- 
dicted to  Metaphysics,  but  he  allots  it  a  separate  and  a 
most  important  place.  He  says  that  Physics  regard  what 
is  wholly  immersed  in  matter  and  movable,  supposing 
only  existence  and  natural  necessity ;  whereas  Meta- 
physics regard  what  is  more  abstracted  and  fixed,  and 
suppose  also  mind  and  idea.  To  be  more  particular,  he 
represents  Physics  as  inquiring  into  the  efficient  and 
material  cause,  and  Metaphysics  into  the  formal  and 
final.- 

The  two  largest  metaphysical  treatises  of  Descartes 
are  entitled  Meditations  on  the  First  Philosophy  and 
Principles  of  Philosophy.  He  says  that  the  first  part 
of  philosophy  is  "  Metaphysics,  in  which  are  contained 
the  principles  of  knowledge,  among  which  are  found  the 
explication  of  the  principal  attributes  of  God,  of  the  im- 
materiality of  the  soul,  and  of  all  the  clear  and  simple 
notions  that  are  in  us."  He  represents  Philosophy  as  a 
tree,  of  which  Metaphysics  is  the  root.  Physics  the  trunk, 
and  all  the  other  sciences  the  branches  that  grow  out  of 
this  trunk.^ 

In  the  Wolfian  School,  which  proposed  to  systematize 
the  scattered  philosophy  of  Leibnitz,  Metaphysics  was 
asked  to  deal  with  three  grand  topics,  —  God,  the  World, 
and  the  Soul,  —  and  should  aim  to  construct  a  Rational 
Theology,  a  Rational  Physics,  and  a  Rational  Psychol- 

1  Metaph.,  B.  i.  c.  iii.  sec.  1,  compared  with  B.  ni.  c.  i.,  and  B.  v. 
c.  i.  sect.  3. 

*  De  Augmenting  iii.  4. 
«  Prin.  Phil.  Epis.  Auth. 


METAPHYSICS.  247 

ogy.  Kant  takes  up  this  view  of  Metaphysics,  but 
labors  to  show  that  the  speculative  reason  cannot  con- 
struct any  one  of  these  three  sciences.  The  only  avail- 
able metaphysics,  according  to  him,  is  a  Criticism  of  the 
Reason,  unfolding  its  a  priori  elements.  He  arrives  at 
the  conclusion  that  all  the  operations  of  the  Speculative 
Reason  are  mere  subjective  exercises,  which  imply  no 
objective  reality,  and  admit  of  no  application  to  things  ; 
and  he  saves  himself  from  scepticism  by  a  criticism  of 
the  Practical  Reason,  which  guarantees  the  existence  of 
God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality .^ 

In  the  schools  which  ramified  from  Kant,  Metaphysics 
is  represented  as  being  a  systematic  search  after  the 
Absolute,  —  after  Absolute  Being,  its  nature,  and  its 
method  of  development. 

And  what  are  we  to  make  of  Metaphysics  in  our  day  ? 
It  is  clear  that  she  has  lost,  and  I  suspect  forever,  the 
position  once  allowed  her,  when  she  stood  at  the  head  of 
all  secular  knowledge,  and  claimed  to  be  equal,  or  all 
but  equal,  in  rank,  to  Theology  herself.  "  Time  was," 
savs  Kant,2  "  when  she  was  the  queen  of  all  the  sci- 
ences ;  and  if  we  take  the  will  for  the  deed,  she  certainly 
deserves,  so  far  as  regards  the  high  importance  of  her 
object-matter,  this  title  of  honor.  Now  it  is  the  fashion 
to  heap  contempt  and  scorn  upon  her,  and  the  matron 
mourns,  forlorn  and  forsaken,  like  Hecuba."  Some  seem 
inclined  to  treat  her  very  much  as  they  treat  those  de 
jure  sovereigns  wandering  over  Europe,  whom  no  country 
will  take  as  de  facto  sovereigns,  that  is,  they  give  her  all 
outward  honor,  but  no  authority.  Others  are  prepared 
to  set  aside  her  claims  very  summarilj^  The  multitudes 
who  set  value  on  nothing  but  what  can  be  counted  in 

^  See  Methodenlehre,  in  Kr.  d.  r.  Vern. 
2  Krilik,  translated  by  Meiklejohn,  p.  xvii. 


248  INTUITIVE   PRINCIPLES   AND   THE   SCIENCES. 

money,  never  allow  themselves  to  speak  of  metaphysics 
except  with  a  sneer.  The  ever-increasing  number  of 
persons  who  read,  but  who  are  indisposed  to  think,  com- 
plain that  philosophy  is  not  so  interesting  as  the  new 
novel,  or  the  pictorial  history,  which  is  quite  as  exciting 
and  quite  as  untrue  as  the  novel.  The  physicist  who  has 
kept  a  register  of  the  heat  of  the  atmosphere  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  morning  for  the  last  five  years,  and  the 
naturalist  who  has  discovered  a  plant  or  insect  distin- 
guished from  all  hitherto  known  species  by  an  additional 
spot,  cannot  conceal  their  contempt  for  a  department  of 
inquiry  which  deals  with  objects  which  cannot  be  seen 
nor  handled,  weighed  nor  measured. 

In  the  face  of  all  this  scorn  I  boldly  affirm  that  Meta- 
physics are  not  exploded,  and  that  they  never  will  be 
exploded.  But  if  they  are  to  keep  or  regain  a  place  in 
this  country,  they  must  submit  to  lower  their  preten- 
sions, and  secure  that  the  performance  be  in  some  meas- 
ure equal  to  the  profession  made.  In  particular,  they 
must  confine  themselves  to  a  field  which  is  open  to  hu- 
man investigation,  and  which  can  be  overtaken.  Look- 
ing to  the  philosophies  to  which  I  have  just  been  refer- 
ring, we  see  that  some  have  ascribed  to  it  far  too  wide  a 
province,  allotting  to  it  inquiries  which  in  modern  times 
have  been  happily  distributed,  owing  to  the  advance  in 
the  division  of  labor,  to  a  great  number  of  sciences.  I 
have  allotted  to  it  a  defined  province.  It  is  not  the 
science  of  all  truth.  It  is  the  science  of  a  special  depart- 
ment. It  is  the  science  of  First  and  Fundamental  Truth. 
Sometimes  it  has  to  look  more  to  the  subjective  side  or 
knowing  powers,  when  it  may  be  called  Gnosiology  ;  at 
other  times  to  the  objective  side  or  the  objects  known, 
when  it  may  be  called  Ontology. 


CHAPTER  II. 

FUNDAMENTAL  TRUTH   AND   EVOLUTION. 


Throughout  this  work  I  have  been  laboring  to  find 
out  what  first  truths  are,  to  ascertain  their  laws  and 
arrange  them  into  a  system.  In  doing  this  I  have  care- 
fully avoided  the  inquiry  as  to  how  they  have  been  pro- 
duced. To  determine  what  they  are,  how  they  operate, 
and  the  objects  which  they  look  at,  is  a  most  important 
investigation  independently  altogether  of  their  origin.  It 
can  be  shown  that  it  is  only  by  inspecting  their  nature 
and  exercises  that  we  can  discover  whence  they  have 
come.  It  is  alleged  that  they  may  have  been  formed 
by  evolution.  But  we  cannot  inspect  development  di- 
rectly as  it  runs  on  through  long  ages.  We  can  infer 
that  there  has  been  such  a  process  only  by  a  study  cf  the 
effects  which  it  is  supposed  they  have  produced.  The 
most  powerful  speculative  speculator  of  our  day  ai'gues 
that  our  fundamental  laws  have  been  formed  by  evolu- 
tion. 

II. 

The  school  of  Locke  maintains  that  all  our  knowledge 
and  ideas  have  been  derived  from  experience.  The 
school  of  Kant  holds  that  we  have  a  priori  ideas  ;  that 
is,  ideas  prior  to  experience.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has 
made  a  bold  attempt  to  reconcile  the  two  schools. 

Hitherto  the  school  of  Locke,  specially  represented 
by  the  two  Mills,  father  and  son,  have  been  laboriously 


250  INTUITIVE   PRINCIPLES   AND   THE   SCIENCES. 

trying  to  show  that  all  our  ideas  are  got  from  the  ex- 
perience of  the  individual.  But  it  was  felt  all  along  by 
many  that  the  effort  was  a  strained  one.  In  my  earlier 
life  as  an  author,  I  spent  much  time  in  exposing  the 
weakness  of  the  theory.  There  are  cognitions  and  be- 
liefs which  spring  up  spontaneously,  which  are  enter- 
tained by  all  men,  young  and  old,  savage  and  civilized, 
and  which  carry  in  them  and  with  them  a  conviction  of 
necessity  ;  such,  for  example,  is  the  belief  in  the  princi- 
ple that  every  effect  has  a  cause.  All  men  act  upon  it. 
No  man  can  be  made  to  believe  otherwise.  Such  are  the 
convictions  that  honesty  and  benevolence  are  good,  are 
obligatory,  are  commendable ;  and  that  deceit,  hypocrisy, 
and  cruelty  are  evil,  to  be  avoided,  and  condemnable. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  people  of  all  times  and  of 
all  countries  could  be  led  to  hold  these  beliefs  if  founded 
only  on  the  short  experience  of  the  individual,  and  still 
more  difficult  to  account  for  the  necessity  in  the  convic- 
tion. So  this  theory  has  been  abandoned.  I  know  no 
deep  thinker  who  now  holds  it. 

III. 

The  new  theory  is,  that  these  truths,  which  profound 
thinkers  regard  as  a  priori,  are  derived  from  the  experi- 
ence of  the  race  and  are  formed  by  evolution.  It  is  al- 
lowed, as  in  the  former  theory,  that  they  are  the  result 
of  experience.  But  the  experience  began  in  the  lowest 
of  the  lower  animals,  and  has  come  down  from  the  monad 
through  the  mollusk,  the  mammal,  and  the  monkey  to 
man.  It  has  become  so  massed  and  compacted  that  now 
it  is  necessary.  Hence  Spencer's  postulate  and  test,  that 
the  belief  has  become  a  necessity  of  which  the  negative 
is  inconceivable. 

This   theory  runs  as   a  thread  through   each   of  Mr. 


FUNDAMENTAL   TRUTH   AND   EVOLUTION  251 

Spencer's  dozen  volumes.  He  argues  that  there  is  an 
object  which  is  reUited  to  a  subject.  The  object  affects 
the  subject.  With  Mr.  Spencer,  the  subject  affected  is 
the  nervous  organism.  The  external  object  affects  it,  and 
thus  generates  the  experience.  The  internal  subject, 
being  the  nervous  system,  is  psychical,  what  is  commonly 
termed  mind  or  soul.  When  two  things  come  together 
in  our  experience,  there  is  a  tendency,  when  the  one 
comes  up,  to  expect  the  other.  "  When  any  two  psychical 
states  occur  in  immediate  succession,  an  effect  is  produced 
such  that,  if  the  first  subsequently  occurs,  there  is  a  cer- 
tain tendency  for  the  second  to  follow  it "  {Pst/ch.  Vol. 
I.  p.  425).  When  they  come  together  frequently,  the 
expectation  is  intensified.  When  they  come  together 
invariably,  it  becomes  so  confirmed  that  we  cannot  even 
conceive  the  contrary.  Cause  and  effect  have  come  to- 
gether invariably  (how  have  they  done  so  except  by 
some  power  in  the  cause  ?),  and  so  we  cannot  conceive 
the  one  without  the  other.  Thus  are  fashioned  forms  of 
intuition  which  are  the  a  priori  forms  of  Kant  and  the 
Germans.  Being  fashioned  in  the  nervous  structure,  they 
go  down  by  heredity.  Every  infant  born  is  in  posses- 
sion of  them.  Mr.  Spencer  thus  departs  and  separates 
from  the  ordinary  experience  school.  Every  one  has 
something  native  and  necessary.  The  whole  is  the  ac- 
cumulated experience  of  humanity.  It  is  a  process  of 
the  nerves  and  brain  which  are  so  organized  as  to  be 
compelled  to  think  in  one  particular  way,  and  cannot 
be  made  to  think  or  to  act  in  any  other  way. 

IV. 
We  are  not  required  to  review  this  theory  as  a  whole ; 
we  have  to  consider  it  merely  in  its  bearing  on  funda- 
mental truth.     Two  questions  are  started  :  Can  the  pro- 


252  INTUITIVE  PRINCIPLES  AND   THE   SCIENCES. 

diiction  of  first  truths  be  explained  by  evolution  ?  If  so, 
is  their  authority  thereby  undermined  ?  I  begin  with 
answering  the  second  question,  and  this  will  place  us 
in  a  position  candidly  to  consider  the  first. 

If  our  intuitions  have  been  developed,  can  we  put 
trust  in  what  they  reveal  ?  I  answer  that  this  depends 
on  the  nature  of  the  development.  We  can  conceive  a 
development  incapable  of  establishing  truth.  This  would 
be  the  case  if  the  evolution  were  merely  mechanical,  a 
mere  material  evolution.  It  would  also  be  so  if  the  evo- 
lution were  merely  one  of  nerves  and  their  currents,  as 
Mr.  Spencer  maintains. 

But  there  may  be  a  development,  a  development  of 
soul,  which  carries  truth  with  it  and  reveals  it. 

It  has  been  shown  again  and  again  that  the  existence 
of  evolution  does  not  interfere  with  the  argument  for 
the  existence  of  God.  Professor  Huxley  declares  that 
the  doctrine  of  development  does  not  undermine  the  doc- 
trine of  final  cause.  He  allows  that  there  is  as  clear 
and  decisive  proof  of  apparent  design  in  these  works  of 
nature,  on  the  supposition  that  they  are  evolved  in  the 
course  of  ages,  as  on  the  supposition  that  they  may  have 
been  created  immediately  by  God.  Before  the  doctrine 
of  development  was  published,  people  generally  thought 
that  there  is  proof  of  design  in  nature.  This  has  not 
been  weakened  but  rather  strengthened  by  these  late  dis- 
coveries of  the  prevalence  of  evolution,  as  we  can  now 
discover  fitness  and  wisdom  not  only  in  the  objects  them- 
selves, say  plants  and  animals,  but  in  the  way  in  which 
they  have  been  evolved,  and  a  connection  thereby  formed 
between  the  present  and  the  past,  between  the  children 
and  their  parents. 

Because  a  thing  has  come  into  existence  by  evolution, 
this  does  not  alter  its  true  nature,  nor  the  view  which 


FUNDAMENTAL   TRUTH  AND   EVOLUTION.  253 

we  take  of  it,  nor  the  use  to  which  we  turn  it.  Be- 
cause the  bread  on  our  table  was  evolved  from  the  corn 
growing  on  the  ground,  and  this  from  a  cereal  which  ap- 
peared in  the  geological  ages,  we  do  not  therefore  decline 
to  eat  it.  When  a  hungry  man  sees  a  piece  of  beef  he 
will  not  turn  away  from  it  because  it  has  been  the  flesh* 
of  a  cow  which  has  descended  from  an  antediluvian  un- 
gulate. I  believe  in  the  reality  of  these  mountains  and 
stars  even  when  it  has  been  shown  that  they  have  been 
formed  out  of  star-dust.  I  use  the  eye  quite  as  readily  as 
befoi-e,  even  Avhen  told  by  Darwin  that  it  was  formed 
thousands  of  ages  ago  from  a  sensitive  spot  in  the  brain. 
Aristotle's  analysis  of  the  reasoning  process  will  remain 
true,  even  though  it  should  be  shown  that  his  intellect 
was  inherited  from  a  savage  or  even  from  a  brute  an- 
cestor. 

The  fact  is  that  among  the  gifts  derived  from  develop- 
ment may  be  man's  knowing  powers,  which  are  constantly 
enlarging.  From  inheritance  he  has  got  a  power  of  in- 
telligence which  makes  him  know  things  and  their  wide 
relations.  A  man  of  fifty  has  gone  through  a  longer  pro- 
cess than  a  boy  of  five,  and  therefore  has  greater  knowl- 
edge and  a  greater  capacity  of  knowledge.  The  present 
civilized  race  of  men  is  more  enlightened  than  their  re- 
mote ancestors,  just  because  there  has  been  a  longer 
process  of  guided  evolution. 

We  do  not  feel  the  less  gratitude  for  gifts  because  they 
have  come  to  us  by  a  more  or  less  lengthened  pnssage. 
Carlyle  did  not  value  less  the  much-prized  complimen- 
tary gift  of  Goethe  because  it  came  through  a  transport- 
ing medium.  The  son  does  not  put  a  lower  estimate  on 
his  patrimony  because  the  father  earned  it  for  him  by 
much  toil  and  privation. 


254  INTUITIVE   PKINCIPLES  AND   THE   SCIENCES. 


We  are  now  in  a  position,  secondly,  to  inquire  with- 
out fear  or  prejudice  whether  these  fundamental  prin- 
ciples have  been  evolved. 

I  have  shown  in  another  work  that  evolution  is  a 
manifestation  of  the  deeper  and  wider  law  of  cause  and 
effect.  It  is  an  organized  causation.  A  number  of 
agencies  combine ;  they  act  according  to  their  prop- 
erties, and  evolution  takes  place,  seen  for  instance  in  the 
plant  growing  from  the  seed,  and  the  animal  from  the 
germ.  But  there  are  limits  to  the  sphere  both  of  cau- 
sation and  consequent  development.  A  cause  can  give 
only  what  it  has  got.  The  stream  of  evolution  cannot 
rise  higher  than  its  fountain.  If  the  waters  are  raised 
higher,  it  must  be  by  a  power  without  and  above  the 
stream. 

It  is  a  firmly  established  law  that  there  is  nothing  in 
the  effect  which  was  not  potentiality  in  the  cause.  The 
organized  powers  develop  according  to  the  powers  or 
properties  which  they  possess.  But  it  does  look  as  if 
new  powers  have  been  produced  in  the  ages,  powers 
not  in  the  original  atoms  or  molecules  from  which  it  is 
supposed  all  things  have  come.  It  might  be  difficult 
to  determine  whether  these  new  powers  come  in  by 
direct  creation,  or  by  a  providential  arrangement  of  the 
previously  created  agencies.  There  were  long  geolog- 
ical ages  in  which  there  was  no  Life.  But  we  have 
no  proof  that  the  inanimate  can  produce  the  animate. 
There  was  therefore  a  new  power  superinduced  when 
life  came  forth.  There  were  ages  before  Sensation  was 
experienced,  and  there  was  a  new  epoch  when  the  first 
pleasure  and  pain  were  felt.  There  may  have  been  a 
long  period  before  Instinct  was  added  for  the  preserva- 


FUNDAMENTAL  TRUTH  AND   EVOLUTION.  255 

tion  of  the  living  creature,  and  when  this  was  done  we 
have  a  farther  era.  Instinct  acts  blindly,  but  at  the  fit 
time  there  is  Intelligence  which  perceives  the  meaning  of 
the  act,  and  knowingly  uses  means  to  accomplish  ends  ; 
and  a  new  age  has  arrived.  Morality  comes  in,  it  may 
be,  at  the  same  time,  and  consummates  the  work.  It 
thus  looks  as  if  the  history  of  our  earth  develops  in 
epochs,  corresponding  to  the  days  of  Genesis.  If  so,  we 
may  reasonubly  conclude  that  these  fundamental  laws  or 
powers  of  intuition,  not  found  in  the  lower  animals,  ap- 
pear in  the  last  day  or  period  when  man  comes  on  the 
stage,  and  are  in  his  very  nature  and  constitution. 

Our  subject  does  not  require  us  to  determine  how  far 
development  extends.  Enough  has  been  advanced  to 
show  that  evolution,  be  it  in  one  continuous  stream  or 
with  accessions  from  above,  does  not  undermine  or  lower 
the  authority  of  fundamental  truths. 


BOOK  II. 

GNOSIOLOGY. 
CHAPTER  I. 

THE  ORIGIN   OF   OUR   KNOWLEDGE  AND   IDEAS. 

What  is  Science  ('ETrto-riy/oir;)  ?  is  the  question  put  by 
Socrates  in  Plato's  subtle  dialogue  of  Theatetus.  But  the 
word  "  science  "  has  two  meanings.  In  one  sense  it  can 
be  defined.  It  is  knowledge  arranged,  correlated,  or  sys- 
tematized. In  this  sense  we  speak  of  astronomy,  geol- 
ogy, logic,  and  other  sciences.  But  the  word  had,  at 
least  in  Greek,  another  signification,  and  meant  simply 
knowledge ;  and  we  may  suppose  the  question  to  be  put, 
What  is  Knowledge  ?  To  this  the  reply  must  be,  that 
we  cannot  positively  define  knowledge,  so  as  to  make  it 
intelligible  to  one  who  did  not  know  it  otherwise.  Still 
we  can,  by  analysis,  separate  it  from  other  things  with 
which  it  is  associated,  —  such  as  sensations,  emotions,  and 
fancies,  —  and  make  it  stand  out  distinctly  to  the  view  of 
those  who  are  already  conscious  of  it.  The  science  which 
thus  unfolds  the  nature  of  knowledge  may  be  called  Gno- 
siology,  or  Gnosilogy  (from  yvwcrw  and  Adyo?).  I  prefer 
this  to  Epistemology,  which  would  signify  the  science  of 
arranged  knowledge.  This  science  should  be  prosecuted 
in  the  same  method  as  every  other  which  has  to  do  with 
facts,  that  is,  the  Inductive. 

We  must  now  enter  upon  the  inquiries  in  which  Locke 
and  five  or  six  friends,  who  met  in  his  chamber  in  Ox- 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   OUR   KNOWLEDGE  AND  IDEAS.  257 

ford,  found  themselves  involved,  and  which  issued  twenty 
years  afterwards  in  the  famous  "  Essay  on  Human  Un- 
derstanding.*' Starting  with  a  far  different  topic,  they 
found  themselves  quickly  at  a  stand,  and  it  came  into 
the  thoughts  of  Locke  that  before  entering  "upon  inqui- 
ries of  that  nature,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  our  own 
abilities,  and  see  what  objects  our  understandings  were 
or  were  not  fitted  to  deal  with." 

First.  We  obtain  knowledge  from  Sensation,  as  Locke 
expresses  it ;  or  from  Sense-Perception,  as  I  express  it. 
Such  is  the  knowledge  we  have  of  body,  of  body  extended 
and  resisting  pressure,  and  of  our  organism  as  affecting 
us,  or  as  being  affected,  with  smells,  tastes,  sounds,  and 
colors. 

Secondly.  We  obtain  knowledge  from  Reflection,  as 
Locke  calls  it ;  from  Self-Consciousness,  as  I  express  it. 
Such  is  the  knowledge  we  have  of  self  and  of  modes, 
actions,  and  affections,  say  as  thinking,  feeling,  resolving. 

I  am  convinced  that  from  these  two  sources  we  obtain, 
not  all  our  knowledge,  but  all  the  knowledge  we  have  of 
separately  existing  objects.  We  do  not  know,  and  we 
cannot,  as  will  be  shown  forthwith,  so  much  as  conceive 
of,  a  distinctly  existing  thing,  excepting  in  so  far  as  we 
have  become  acquainted  with  it  by  means  of  sensation 
and  reflection,  or  of  materials  thus  derived.  Here  Locke 
held  by  a  great  truth,  though  he  did  not  see  how  to  limit 
it  on  the  one  hand,  nor  what  truths  required  to  be  added 
to  it  on  the  other. 

Thirdly.  There  is  the  truth  involved,  and  seen  intui- 
tively in  Body  and  Mind.  This  can  scarcely  be  called  a 
third  inlet,  but  it  is  an  expansion  of  what  is  contained  in 
the  other  two,  and  may  be  expediently  exposed  to  view 
under  a  third  head.  I  am  not  sure  whether  all  our 
knowledge  may  not  be  traced  up  to  the  two  sources  of 


258  GNOSIOLOGY. 

the  external  and  internal  sense  taken  with  a  full  and 
wide  meaning.  However,  there  is  more  revealed  in 
sense  than  a  mere  knowledge  of  an  external  thing. 
There  is  more  in  self-consciousness  than  a  bare  knowl- 
edge of  self  as  existing. 

We  know  bodies  as  being  in  space  and  occupying 
space,  as  exercising  power  over  us  and  over  other  bodies 
in  particular,  as  resisting  us  and  resisting  each  other. 
We  believe  in  them  as  extended  in  three  dimensions,  and 
going  out  towards  infinity.  This  implies  a  knowledge  of 
and  belief  in  space  and  the  necessary  qualities  of  space  as 
unfolded  in  mathematics.  It  involves  a  knowledge  of 
numbers,  and  of  the  relations  of  numbers  as  expanded  in 
arithmetic. 

In  self-consciousness  we  have  also  a  variety  of  cogni- 
tions. We  know  self  as  having  personality  and  personal 
identity.  We  know  it  as  having  power  over  its  own 
acts  and  over  things  without  us.  We  know  it  as  acquir- 
ing knowledge,  and  as  remembering,  imagining,  judging, 
reasoning,  wishing,  willing,  discerning  between  good  and 
evil.  As  more  especially  important,  we  discover  certain 
truths  to  be  also  necessary  and  catholic,  that  is,  believed 
in  by  all  men.     All  these  exercises  go  out  into  infinity. 

I  have  been  seeking  to  unfold  these,  under  the  heads  of 
primitive  cognitions  and  beliefs,  in  Part  Second  of  this 
work.  They  are  not  usually  put  under  the  heads  of 
sensation  and  reflection  ;  they  seem  to  go  out  and  be- 
yond these  inlets.  Or  they  may  be  resolved,  as  I  rather 
think  they  may,  into  intuitions  involved  in  the  exercise 
of  sense-perception  and  self-consciousness,  but  requiring 
to  be  unfolded.  In  either  case  they  are  intuitive  truths. 
But  under  whatever  head  we  place  them,  they  are  not 
to  be  left  vague  and  loose  in  the  enunciation  of  them. 
They  are  to  be  rigidly  tested  by  the  three  criteria  of  self- 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   OUR   KNOWLEDGE   AND   IDEAS.         259 

evidence,  necessity,  and  catholicity,  so  that  we  may  be 
sure  tliat  they  are  fundamental  truths. 

The  question  of  the  origin  of  our  Ideas  is  substantially 
the  same  with  that  of  the  sources  of  our  Knowledge ;  but, 
in  discussing  this  second  question,  it  is  of  all  things  es- 
sential to  have  it  fixed  what  is  meant  by  "  idea."  Plato, 
with  whom  the  term  originated  as  a  philosophic  one, 
meant  those  eternal  patterns  which  have  been  in  or  be- 
fore the  Divine  mind  from  all  eternity,  which  the  works 
of  nature  participate  in  to  some  extent,  and  to  the  con- 
templation of  which  the  mind  of  man  can  rise  by  abstrac- 
tion and  philosophic  meditation.  Descartes  meant  by  it 
whatever  is  before  the  mind  in  every  sort  of  mental  ap- 
prehension. Locke  tells  us  that  he  denotes  by  the  phrase 
"  whatever  is  meant  by  phantasm,  notion,  species."  Kant 
applied  the  phrase  to  the  ideas  of  substance,  totality  of 
phenomena,  and  God,  reached  by  the  reason  as  a  regula- 
tive faculty  going  out  beyond  the  province  of  experience 
and  objective  reality.  Hegel  is  forever  dwelling  on  an 
absolute  idea,  which  he  identifies  with  God,  and  repre- 
sents it  as  ever  unfolding  itself  out  of  nothing  into  being, 
subjective  and  objective.  Using  the  phrase  in  the  Pla- 
tonic sense,  it  is  scarcely  relevant  to  inquire  into  the 
origin  of  our  ideas ;  it  is  clear,  however,  that  Plato  rep- 
resented our  recognition  of  eternal  ideas  as  a  high  intel- 
lectual exercise,  originating  in  the  inborn  power  of  the 
mind,  and  awakened  by  inward  cogitation  and  reminis- 
cence. In  the  Kantian  and  Hegelian  systems  the  idea 
is  supposed  to  be  discerned  by  reason  ;  Kant  giving  it  no 
existence  except  in  the  mind,  and  Hegel  giving  it  an  ex- 
istence both  objective  and  subjective,  but  identifying 
the  reason  with  the  idea,  and  the  objective  with  the  sub- 
jective. Using  the  phrase  in  the  Cartesian  and  Lockian 
sense,  we  can  inquire  into  the  origin  of  our  ideas. 


260  GNOSIOLOGY. 

In   accordance    wltli   modern    usage   in   the   English 
tongue,  it  might  be  as  well  perhaps  to  employ  the  word 
"  idea  "  to  denote  the  reproduced  image  or  representa- 
tion in  the  mind,  and  the  abstract  and  general  notion. 
Thus  explained,  it  would  exclude  our  original  cognitions 
on  the  one  hand,  and  also  the  regulative  principles  of 
the  mind  on  the  other.     An  idea,  in  this  sense,  would 
always  be  a  reproduction  in  an   old  form,  or  more  com- 
monly in  a  new  form,  of  what  has  first  been  known. 
We  first  know  objects,  external  or  internal ;  and  then  we 
may  have  them  called  up  in  whole  or  in  part,  magnified 
or  diminished,  mixed  and  compounded  in  an  infinite  va- 
riety of  ways;  or,  by  an   intellectual  process,  we  may 
contemplate  one  of  their  attributes  separately,  or  group 
them  into  classes.     Our  ideas,  in  this  sense,  are  ever  de- 
pendent on  our  cognitions;    we   cannot   have    an  idea, 
either  as  an   image  or  a  notion,  of  which  the  materials 
have  not  been  furnished  by  the  various  cognitive  powers, 
primary  and  secondary.     It  is  always  to  be  remembered 
that  by  increase  and  decrease,  by  intellectual  abstraction 
and  generalization,  our  ideas   may  go  far   beyond   our 
knowledge;  still,  as  our  ideas  in  the  last  resort  depend 
on  our  knowledge,  they  must  be  drawn  from  the  same 
quarters.     When  the  question  is  put  as  to  the  origin  of 
our   ideas,   we  are  thrown  back  on  the   Three  Sources 
from  which  all  our  knowledge  is  derived.     So  far  as  our 
ideas  of  separately  existing  objects  are  concerned,  they 
are  all  got    ultimately  from    the    outward    and    inward 
senses  ;  to  this  extent  the  doctrine  of  Locke  is  unassail- 
able.    We  cannot  imagine  or  think  of  any  other  kind  of 
existence  than   matter  and  mind,  with  space  and  time, 
though,  for  aught  we   know,  there    may  be    other  sub- 
stances and  beings  in  the  universe  with  a  far  different 
nature.     But  then  we  are  led  by  our  cognitive  and  faith 


THE   ORIGIN  OF   OUR   KNOWLEDGE   AND   IDEAS.  261 

powers,  intellectual  and  moral,  to  clothe  the  objects  thus 
known  with  qualities  and  relations  which  cannot  be  per- 
ceived either  by  sensation  or  reflection.  It  is  not  by  one 
or  other  of  these,  or  by  both  combined,  that  I  come  to 
believe  that  space  and  time  are  infinite,  that  this  effect 
must  proceed  from  a  cause,  that  this  benevolent  action  is 
good,  and  that  this  falsehood  is  a  sin ;  nor  is  it  by  either 
or  by  both  that  I  can  rise  to  the  conviction  that  the 
effect  is  forever  tied  to  its  cause,  and  that  lying  must  be 
a  sin  in  all  time  and  in  all  eternity. 

The  principle.  Nihil  est  in  intelleetu  quod  non  prius 
fuerit  in  sensu,  has  been  ascribed  to  Aristotle,  but  most 
certainly  without  foundation,  as  the  great  Peripatetic 
everywhere  calls  in  intuition  in  the  last  resort,  and  is 
ever  coming  to  truth  which  he  represents  as  self-evi- 
dent and  necessary.  The  maxim  has  been  ascribed  to 
the  Stoics,  who,  however,  at  the  same  time,  placed  in  the 
mind  a  native  ruling  principle.^  It  is  assuredly  not  the 
principle  adopted  by  Locke,  who  is  so  often  represented 
as  favoring  it ;  for  the  great  English  philosopher  ever 
traces  our  ideas,  not  to  one,  but  to  two  sources,  and  de- 
lights to  derive  many  of  our  ideas  from  reflection.  It  is, 
however,  the  fundamental  principle  of  that  school  in 
France  and  in  Britain  which  has  been  called  Sensational. 
There  are  three  very  flagrant  oversights  in  the  theory  of 
those  who  derive  all  our  ideas  from  sensation :  First, 
there  is  an  omission  of  all  such  ideas  as  we  have  of  spirit 
and  of  the  qualities  of  spirit,  such  as  rationality,  free- 
will, personality.  Secondly,  there  is  a  neglect  or  a  wrong 
account  of  all  the  further  cognitive  exercises  of  the  mind 
by  which  it  comes  to  apprehend  such  objects  as  infinite 
time,  moral  good,  merit,  and  responsibility.  Thirdly, 
there  is  a  denial,  or  at  least  oversight,  of  the  mind's  deep 

^  See  supra,  p.  35,  for  the  view  of  the  Stoics. 


262  GNOSIOLOGY. 

convictions  as  to  necessary  and  universal  truth.  Sen- 
sationalism, followed  out  logically  to  its  consequences, 
would  represent  the  mind  as  incapable  of  conceiving  of 
a  spiritual  God,  or  of  being  convinced  of  the  indelible 
distinction  between  good  and  evil  ;  and  makes  it  illegiti- 
mate to  argue  from  the  effects  in  the  world  in  favor  of 
the  existence  of  a  First  Cause. 

Locke  is  ever  to  be  distinguished  from  those  who  derive  all  our 
ideas  from  the  senses.  He  takes  great  pains  to  show  that  a  vast 
number  of  the  most  important  ideas  which  the  mind  of  man  can 
form  are  got  from  reflection  on  the  operations  of  our  own  minds. 
His  precise  doctrine  is  that  the  materials  of  the  ideas  which  man  can 
entertain  come  in  by  two  inlets,  sensation  and  reflection;  that  they 
are  at  first  perceived  by  the  mind,  and  then  retained  ;  and  that  they 
are  subsequently  turned  into  a  great  variety  of  new  shapes  by  the 
faculties  of  discernment,  compai-ison,  abstraction,  composition,  and 
the  power  of  discovering  moral  relations.  The  ideas  being  thus  ob- 
tained, he  supposes  that  the  mind  can  perceive  agreements  and  dis- 
agreements among  them.  In  particular,  it  is  endowed  with  a  power 
of  intuition,  by  which  it  at  once  perceives  the  agreement  and  dis- 
ao-reement  of  certain  ideas,  discovers  these  to  be  in  the  very  nature 
of  ideas,  and  necessary.  Such  being  the  views  of  Locke,  they  are 
as  different  from  those  of  the  Sensationalists,  on  the  one  hand,  as 
they  are  from  those  of  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  and  Kant  on  the  other. 
Indeed,  the  most  careless  reader  cannot  go  through  the  Essay  on 
Human  Understanding  without  discovering  that,  if  Locke  has  a 
strong  sensational,  he  has  also  a  rational  side.  He  will  allow  no 
ideas  to  be  in  the  mind  except  those  which  can  be  shown  to  spring 
from  one  or  other  of  the  inlets,  and  yet  he  resolutely  maintains  that, 
with  these  ideas  before  it,  the  mind  may  perceive  truth  at  once;  he 
thinks  that  morality  is  capable  of  demonstration,  and  in  religion  he 
is  decidedly  rationalistic.  So  far,  it  appears  to  me,  we  can  easily 
ascertain  the  views  of  Locke.  It  is  more  difficult  to  determine  how 
far  he  supposed  the  mind  to  be  capable  of  modifying  or  adding  to 
the  materials  derived  from  the  outward  and  inward  senses.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  he  represents  the  mind  as  having  the  power  to  per- 
ceive and  compound  and  diviile  these  ideas,  and  discover  resem- 
blances and  other  relations ;  but  there  are  passages  in  which,  con- 
sistently or  inconsistently,  he  speaks  of  the  mind  having  something 


THE   ORIGIN    OF   OUR   KNOWLEDGE   AND   IDEAS.  263 

more  suggested  to  it,  or  superinducing  something  higher.  Locke 
speaks  of  certain  ideas  being  "  suggested  "  to  the  mind  by  the  senses, 
—  a  phraseology  adopted  by  Reid  and  Stewart  (Essay,  ii.  vii.  9) ;  and 
of  "  relation  "  as  "  not  contained  in  the  real  existence  of  things,  but 
extraneous  and  superinduced  "  (ii.  xxv.  8). 

Confining  our  attention  to  the  points  which  are  clear,  I  think  we 
may  discover,  not  certainly  such  grave  errors  as  in  the  doctrines 
of  the  sensationalists,  but  still  several  oversights.  First,  he  over- 
looks the  cognitions  and  beliefs  involved  in  the  exercises  with  which 
the  mind  starts.  This  has  arisen,  to  a  great  extent,  from  his  attach- 
ing himself  to  the  theory  that  the  mind  begins,  not  with  knowledge, 
but  with  ideas,  which  are  at  first  perceived  by  the  mind,  and  then 
comjjared,  upon  which  comparison  it  is  that  the  mind  reaches  knowl- 
edge. He  has  never  set  himself  to  inquire  what  is  involved  in  the 
sensation  and  reflection  which  give  us  our  ideas.  He  takes  no  notice 
of  intuition  enabling  us  to  look  directly  at  the  very  thing,  or  of  our 
intuition  of  extension,  or  of  the  cognitive  self-consciousness,  or  of 
the  beliefs  gathering  round  space  and  time  and  the  infinite.  Sec- 
ondly, he  has  not  given  a  distinct  place  and  a  sufficient  prominence 
to  the  ideas  got  from  the  mind  observing  certain  qualities  and  rela- 
tions in  objects  made  known  by  sensation  and  reflection.  The  de- 
fects of  his  system,  in  not  giving  an  adequate  account  of  our  idea  of 
moral  good,  which  he  gets  from  our  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
with  a  law  of  God  superinduced  —  without  so  much  as  his  trying  to 
prove  how  we  are  bound,  on  his  system,  to  obey  that  law  —  was  per- 
ceived at  an  early  date  by  British  writers,  who  adhered  to  him  as 
closely  as  possible ;  and  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson  called  in  a  Moral 
Sense  (as-an  addition  to  Locke's  outward  and  inward  sense) ;  while 
Bishop  Butler  called  in  conscience,  which  he  characterized  as  a 
"  principle  of  reflection."  Thirdly,  he  has  not  inquired  what  are 
the  laws  involved  in  the  Intuition  to  which  he  appeals  in  the  fourth 
book  of  his  Essay  as  giving  us  the  most  certain  of  all  our  knowledge. 
Had  he  developed  the  nature  of  intuition,  and  the  principles  involved, 
with  the  same  care  as  he  has  expounded  the  experiential  element,  his 
system  would  have  been  at  once  and  effectually  saved  from  the  fear- 
ful results  in  which  it  issued  in  France,  where  his  name  was  used  to 
support  doctrines  which  he  would  have  repudiated  with  deep  indig- 
nation. He  is  right  in  saying  that  the  mind  has  not  consciously 
before  it  in  spontaneous  action  such  speculative  principles  as  that 
"  Whatever  is  is,"  or  moral  maxims  in  a  formalized  shape;  but  he 
has  failed  to  perceive  that  such  principles  as  these  are  the  rules  of 


264  GNOSIOLOGY. 

our  intuitions,  and  that  they  can  be  discovered  by  a  reflex  process  of 
generalization.  It  is  but  justice  to  Locke  to  say  that  he  acknowl- 
edges necessary  truth,  but  it  does  not  form  a  part  of  his  general 
theory.  His  professed  followers  have  abandoned  it ;  and  sceptics 
have  shown  that  he  cannot  reach  it  in  consistency  with  his  system. 


CHAPTER   II. 

LIMITS   TO   OUR   KNOWLEDGE,   IDEAS,   AND  BELIEFS. 

It  is  instructive  to  find  that  not  a  few  of  the  most 
profound  philosophers  with  which  our  world  has  been 
honored  have  been  prone  to  dwell  on  the  limits  to  man's 
capacity.  Tlie  truth  is,  it  is  always  the  smallest  minds 
which  are  most  apt  to  be  swollen  with  the  wind  engen- 
dered by  their  own  vanity.  The  intellects  which  have 
gone  out  with  greatest  energy  to  the  furthest  limits  are 
those  which  feel  most  keenly  when  they  strike  against 
the  barriers  by  which  human  thought  is  bounded.  The 
minds  which  have  set  out  on  the  widest  excursions,  and 
which  have  taken  the  boldest  flights,  are  those  that  know 
best  that  there  is  a  wider  region  lying  beyond,  which  is 
altogether  inaccessible  to  man.  It  was  the  pecuHarly 
wise  man  of  the  Hebrews  who  said,  "  No  man  can  find 
out  the  work  that  God  maketh  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end."  The  Greek  sage  by  emphasis  declared  that,  if  he 
excelled  others,  it  was  only  in  this,  that  he  knew  noth- 
ing. It  was  the  avowed  object  of  the  sagacious  Locke  to 
teach  man  the  length  of  his  tether,  which,  we  may  re- 
mark, those  feel  most  who  attempt  to  get  away  from  it. 
Reid  labored  to  restrain  the  pride  of  philosophy,  and  to 
bring  men  back  to  a  common  sense,  in  respect  of  which 
the  peasant  and  philosopher  are  alike.  It  was  the  design 
of  Kant's  great  work  to  show  how  little  speculative  rea- 
son can  accomplish.  In  our  own  day  we  have  had  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  showing,  with  unsurpassed  logical  power, 
within  what  narrow  bounds  the  thought  of  man  is  re- 
strained. 


266  GNOSIOLOGY. 

We  have  already  in  our  survey  gathered  the  materials 
for  enabling  us  to  settle  the  general  question,  in  which, 
however,  are  several  special  questions  which  should  be 
carefully  separated  :  — 

1.  What  are  the  limits  to  man's  power  of  acquiring 
knowledge  ?     The  answer  is,  that  he  cannot  know,  at 
least  in  this  world,  any  substance  or  separate  existence 
other  than  those  revealed  by  sense  and  consciousness. 
There  may  be,  very  probably  there  are,  in  the  universe, 
other  substances  besides  matter  and  spirit,  other  exist- 
ences which  are  not  substances,  as  well   as  space  and 
time,  but  these  must  ever  remain  unknown  to  us  in  this 
world.     Again,  he  can  never  know  any  qualities  or  rela- 
tions among  the  objects  thus  revealed  to  the  outward 
and  inward  sense,  except  in  so  far  as  we  have  special  fac- 
ulties of  knowledge  :  and  the  number  and  the  nature  of 
these  are  to  be  ascertained  by  a  process  of  induction,  and 
by  no  other  process  either  easier  or  more  difficult.     This 
is  what  has  been  attempted  in  this  treatise,  it  may  be 
supposed  with  only  partial  success  in  the  execution,  but, 
it  is  confidently  believed,  in  the  right  method.     A  more 
difficult  process  need  not  be  resorted  to,  and  would  con- 
duct us  only  into   ever- thickening  intricacies ;    and  an 
easier  method  is  not  available  in  the  investigation  of  the 
facts  of  nature  in  this,  nor  indeed  in  any  other  depart- 
ment.    After  unfolding  what  seems  to  be  in  our  primi- 
tive cognitions,  I   gave   some  account  of  the    primitive 
faiths  which  gather  round  them,  and  classified  the  rela- 
tions  which   the  mind  can   discover,  and  unfolded   the 
moral  convictions  which  we  are  led  to  form.     Such  are 
the  limits  to  man's  original  capacity,  of  which  there  are 
decisive  tests  in  self-evidence,  necessity,  and  catholicity. 
Within  these  limits  man  has  a  wide  field  in  which  to 
expatiate ;    a   field,  indeed,   which    he    can    never   thor- 


LIMITS   TO   OUR   KNOWLEDGE,   IDEAS,  AND   BELIEFS.      267 

ouglily  explore,  but  in  which  he  may  discover  more  and 
more.  What  he  may  discover,  and  what  he  may  never 
be  able  to  discover,  are  to  be  determined  by  the  separate 
sciences,  each  in  its  own  department.  Thus,  what  he 
can  find  out  of  mind,  of  its  various  powers  and  original 
convictions,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  various  branches 
of  mental  science.  What  he  can  ascertain  by  the 
senses,  aided  by  instruments,  must  be  settled  by  the 
physical  sciences. 

2.  The  limits  to  man's  capacity  of  knowledge  being  as- 
certained, it  is  easy  to  determine  the  limits  to  his  power 
of  forming  ideas.  The  materials  must  all  be  got  from 
the  three  sources  of  knowledge  which  have  been  pointed 
out.  There  are  two  classes  of  powers  employed  in  en- 
larging and  modifying  these.  The  one  is  the  imagina- 
tion, which  can  decrease,  as  when  on  seeing  a  man  it  can 
form  the  idea  of  a  dwarf ;  and  increase,  as  when  it  can 
form  the  idea  of  a  giant ;  or  separate,  as  when  it  sees  a 
man  it  can  form  an  image  of  his  head ;  or  compound,  as 
when  it  puts  a  hundred  hands  on  man,  and  forms  the 
idea  of  a  Briareus.  It  should  be  observed  that  the  im- 
agination can  never  go  beyond  the  rearrangement  of  the 
materials  supplied  by  the  original  sources  of  knowledge. 
The  mind  can  further  discover  a  number  of  relations 
among  the  objects  primitively  known.  These  I  have  en- 
deavored to  classify.  In  particular,  out  of  the  concrete 
it  can  form  innumerable  abstracts,  and  from  the  singulars 
construct  an  indefinite  number  of  universals.  It  should 
be  observed  that  man's  power  of  imagination  and  corre- 
lation extends  over  his  moral  convictions  as  well  as  his 
intellectual  cognitions.  Thus,  he  can  clothe  the  hero  of 
a  romance  in  various  kinds  of  moral  excellence  of  which 
he  has  discovered  the  rudiments  in  himself  or  others, 
and  perceive  relations  among  the  moral  properties  which 


268  GNOSIOLOGY. 

have  fallen  under  his  notice.  These  are  the  limits  to 
man's  capacity  of  forming  ideas,  determined,  first,  by  his 
original  powers  of  cognition,  and,  secondly,  by  his  pow- 
ers of  imagination  and  correlation. 

3.  Our  beliefs,  it  is  evident,  may  go  beyond  our  cogni- 
tions. Still  there  are  stringent  limits  set  to  them  in  our 
very  nature  and  constitution.  Thus,  we  can  never  be- 
lieve anything  in  opposition  to  self-evident  and  necessary 
truths.  There  are  beliefs  which  are  in  our  very  mental 
make  and  frame,  and  which  are  altogether  beyond  our 
voluntaiy  power.  If  we  except  these,  however,  our  power 
of  possible  belief  is  as  wide  as  our  capacity  of  forming 
ideas.  If  it  is  asked  what  we  should  believe  within 
these  limits,  the  answer  is.  Only  what  has  evidence  to 
plead  in  its  behalf,  what  has  self-evidence  or  mediate 
evidence.  Metaphysics,  with  their  tests,  can  determine 
what  truths  are  to  be  received  on  their  own  authority  ; 
as  to  the  kind  and  amount  of  evidence  required  in  deriva- 
tive truth,  this  can  be  settled  only  by  the  canons  of  the 
special  departments  of  investigation,  historical  or  phys- 
ical. 

But  do  our  beliefs  ever  go  beyond  our  ideas  ?  This  is 
a  very  curious  question,  and  different  persons  will  be  dis- 
posed to  give  different  answers  to  it.  It  seems  clear  to 
me  that  every  belief  must  be  a  belief  in  something  of 
which  we  have  some  sort  of  conception.  A  belief  in 
nothing  would  not  deserve  to  be  called  a  belief,  and  a 
belief  in  something  of  which  we  have  no  apprehension 
would  be  equivalent  to  a  belief  in  nothing.  But  it  will 
be  urged  that  every  man  must  believe  in  certain  great 
truths  regarding  eternity  of  which  he  has  no  conception, 
and  that  the  Christian  in  particular  has  such  a  truth,  in 
which  he  firmly  believes,  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
Still,  I  maintain  that  even  in  such  a  case  there  is  an  ap- 


LIMITS   TO   OUR  KNOWLEDGE,   IDEAS,   AND   BELIEFS,      269 

prehension  or  conception.  Thus,  in  regard  to  infinity, 
we  apprehend  space  or  time,  or  God,  who  inhabits  all 
space  and  time,  stretching  away  further  and  further ; 
but  far  as  we  go,  we  apprehend  and  believe  that  there 
is  and  must  be  a  space,  a  time,  a  living  Being,  beyond. 
Or  we  apprehend  a  spiritual  God,  with  attributes,  say 
of  power  and  love  ;  and  we  strive  to  conceive  of  liim, 
and  of  these  perfections ;  and  we  believe  of  him  and  his 
power  and  goodness  that  they  transcend  all  our  feeble 
attempts  at  comprehension.  In  every  supposable  case 
of  belief  we  have  an  apprehension  of  some  kind.  A  trav- 
eller tells  us  that  he  saw  in  Africa  a  monstrous  animal, 
which  he  caimot  describe  so  as  to  enable  us  to  compre- 
hend it ;  we  understand  the  man's  language,  and  if  we 
have  reiison  to  look  upon  him  as  trustworthy  we  be- 
lieve his  statement ;  but  in  doing  so  our  belief  goes  upon 
the  apprehension  of  an  animal  different  from  all  other 
animals.  An  inspired  writer  tells  us  about  there  being 
three  persons  in  one  Godhead  ;  and,  having  evidence  of 
his  inspiration,  we  believe  him  :  but  even  here  there  is 
an  apprehension;  there  is  a  conception  of  the  God  of 
truth  as  revealing  the  truth.  There  is  more  :  this  rev- 
elation is  contained  in  words  of  which  we  form  some  sort 
of  apprehension  :  thus,  we  are  told  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
God;  that  he  became  man  ;  and  yet  we  discover  that 
he  is  somehow  or  other  different  from  God  the  Father. 
Thus  in  all  our  beliefs  there  seems  to  be  a  conception  of 
something,  and  of  something  real  and  existing  ;  but  still 
it  may  be  of  something  conceived  by  us  as  having  qual- 
ities which  pass  beyond  our  comprehension,  or  qualities 
of  which  we  have  no  com[>rehension. 

Some  of  these  conceptions,  with  their  attached  beliefs, 
are  those  which  raise  up  within  us  the  feeling  of  the  sub- 
lime, and  are,  of  all  others,  the  most  fitted  to  elevate  the 


270  GNOSIOLOGY. 

soul  of  roan.  Need  I  add  that  it  is  possible  for  us  to  be- 
lieve in  truths  which  we  cannot  reconcile  with  other 
truths  of  sense  or  understanding?  It  is  wrong  in  us,  in- 
deed, to  believe  in  a  proposition  unsupported  by  evi- 
dence; but  when  it  is  properly  sustained,  and  when  es- 
pecially it  is  seen  to  have  the  sanction  of  God,  then  the 
mind  asserts  its  prerogative  of  belief,  even  when  the 
truth  transcends  all  sense,  all  personal,  all  human  expe- 
rience, nay,  even  when  it  is  encompassed  with  darkness 
and  difficulties  on  every  side.  Faith  feels  that  it  is  in 
one  of  its  highest  exercises  when  founding  on  the  au- 
thority of  God  it  believes,  not  indeed  in  contradictions 
(which  it  can  never  do),  but  in  truths  which  it  cannot 
reconcile  with  the  appearance  of  thingSi  or  with  other 
truths  which  the  reason  sanctions. 


CHAPTER   III. 

RELATION   OF    INTUITION    AND    EXPEEIENCE. 

We  must  now  dive  into  the  subject  whose  depths  the 
great  Teutonic  metaphysician  sought  to  sound;  not  that 
Kant  spoke  much  of  it  in  the  intercourse  with  his 
friends,  but  he  was  forever  pondering  it  as  he  sat  in  his 
bachelor  domicile,  as  he  paced  forward  and  backward 
in  his  favorite  walk  in  the  suburbs  of  Konigsberg,  as  he 
lectured  to  his  class,  or  elaborated  his  published  writ- 
ings. The  general  question  embraces  several  special 
ones,  which  must  be  carefully  distinguished.  In  seeking 
to  settle  these,  we  must  always  have  it  fixed  in  our 
minds  in  what  sense  we  employ  the  word  "  experience ; " 
for  the  phrase  may  be  understood  in  narrower  or  in 
wider  significations.  It  may  be  confined  to  the  outward 
fact  known  or  apprehended,  or  it  may  also  embrace  the 
inward  consciousness. 

It  is  the  aim  of  this  whole  work  to  explain  the  nature 
of  intuition.  In  this  chapter  it  is  of  all  things  necessary 
to  explain  the  nature  of  experience. 

First,  there  is  Personal  Experience,  which  consists  of 
what  each  one  has  passed  through.  There  is  no  opposi- 
tion, even  in  appearance,  between  intuition  and  such  an 
experience.    Every  exercise  of  intuition  is  an  experience. 

Second,  there  is  a  Gathered  Experience,  or  an  Induc- 
tion. This  consists  of  the  experience  of  mankind  gener- 
ally; in  fact,  of  the  aggregate  of  what  man  can  observe. 
It  is  the  relation  of  this  human  experience  to  intuition 
that  I  am  to  discuss  in  this  chapter.    Tlie  gathered  experi- 


272  GNOSIOLOGY. 

ence  depends  on  the  personal  experience,  but  It  is  the 
aggregate  of  experience  that  we  compare  or  contrast  with 
fundamental  truth. 

No  experience  of  man  can  reach  a  law  that  is  neces- 
sary and  must  therefore  be  universal,  that  is,  have  no  ex- 
ceptions. All  human  experience  testifies  that  day  has 
always  been  followed  by  night,  and  night  by  day ;  but  it 
is  conceivable,  and  believable  if  evidence  be  produced, 
that  there  might  be  day  not  followed  by  night,  or  night 
not  followed  by  day.  Gravitation  within  our  experience 
is  a  universal  law,  but  the  discoverer  did  not  believe  it  to 
be  ultimate,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  in  other  parts  of 
the  universe  bodies  may  be  connected  by  quite  a  differ- 
ent law. 

But  there  are  laws  wliich  are  necessary  and  universal. 
By  intuition  we  discover  this  to  be  so  in  individual  cases, 
but  we  perceive  that  it  would  be  the  same  in  every  other 
like  case,  and  we  make  the  law  universal.  There  is  a 
necessity  attached  to  the  individual  case,  and  this  attaches 
itself  to  the  general  law,  so  far  as  the  generalization  is 
properly  made.  In  many  cases  we  are  sure  that  we  have 
properly  generalized  the  exercises  of  the  individual  intu- 
itions, —  for  example,  in  the  law  of  contradiction,  in  the 
axioms  of  Euclid,  and  in  certain  moral  maxims,  as  that 
we  ought  to  pay  our  debts.  Now  it  is  of  great  im- 
portance to  draw  the  distinction  very  definitely  between 
these  two  kinds  of  laws,  and  thereby  be  enabled  to  de- 
termine as  to  every  law  to  which  class  it  belongs. 

Let  us  view  Experience  in  its  relation  to  each  of  the 
Threefold  Aspects  of  Intuition. 

II. 

1.  There  is  the  relation  of  Experience  to  Intuition 
considered  as  a  body  of  Regulative  Principles.    Under  this 


RELATION   OF   INTUITION   AND   EXPERIENCE.  273 

Aspect  intuition  lies  in  the  mind,  as  gravitation  lies  in 
matter,  ready  to  act,  in  fact  ever  acting.  J.  S.  Mill  has 
shown  that  all  the  laws  of  nature,  say  gravity  or  chem- 
ical affinity,  are  of  the  nature  of  tendencies,  and  they 
tend  to  act  according  to  their  nature.  Under  this  view 
intuition,  being  native,  though  possibly  to  some  extent 
hereditary,  is  prior  to  experience  of  every  kind,  but  it 
tends  to  act  as  every  law  of  nature  does.  There  is  no 
exercise  of  will,  but  it  prompts  and  instigates  to  action. 
All  the  intuitions  seek  for  objects,  and  are  gratified 
when  the  objects  are  presented.  Just  as  the  function  of 
the  eye  is  to  see,  and  light  being  seen  is  pleasant  to  the 
eyes,  so  all  our  cognitive,  believing,  and  judging  powers 
are  gratified  when  the  objects  to  which  they  look  are 
presented.  Intuition,  as  a  regulating  principle,  is  ever 
inclining  us  to  gather  experience,  —  is,  indeed,  the  most 
powerful  incitement  to  this.  In  people  of  strong  intel- 
lectual power,  there  is  a  feeling  of  restraint,  almost  of 
disappointment,  when  they  are  not  able  to  gratify  these 
impulses.  A  feeling  of  melancholy  is  apt  to  come  over 
men  of  genius  when  they  find  that  their  high  ideas  are 
not  realized. 

Our  belief  as  to  the  boundlessness  of  space  is  ever 
alluring  us  to  explore  it  in  earth  and  sea,  and  in  the  deep 
expanse  of  heaven  ;  and  our  belief  in  time  without  be- 
ginning and  without  end  is  ever  tempting  us  to  go  back 
through  all  the  years  which  human  history  opens  to  us, 
and  beyond  these,  through  all  the  ages  which  geology 
discloses,  and  to  look  forward,  as  far  as  human  foresight 
and  Bible  prophecy  may  enable  ns,  into  the  dim  events 
of  the  future.  Thus,  too,  our  minds  delight  to  dis- 
cover substances  acting  according  to  their  properties,  and 
plants  and  animals  developing  according  to  the  life  that 
is  in  them,  to  find  species  and  genera  in  the  whole  or- 


274  GNOSIOLOGY. 

ganic  kingdoms,  to  trace  mathematical  relations  corre- 
sponding to  our  higher  intellectual  cravings  among  all 
the  objects  presenting  themselves  on  the  earth  and  in 
the  starry  heavens,  and  to  rise  from  near  effects  to  re- 
mote causes  in  space  and  time.  Nor  is  it  to  be  omitted 
that  our  moral  convictions  prompt  us  to  look  for,  and 
when  we  have  found  Him,  to  look  up  to,  a  Moral  Gov- 
ernor of  the  universe,  and  to  anticipate  of  Him  that  He 
will  be  ready  to  support  the  innocent  sufferer,  and  to 
punish  the  wicked.  It  should  be  added,  that  in  experi- 
ence we  are  ever  finding  a  gratifying  exemplification  of 
our  native  tendencies,  and  a  satisfying  corroboration  of 
our  intuitive  expectations.  We  expect  a  cause  to  turn 
up  for  this  mysterious  occurrence ;  we  may  be  disap- 
pointed at  first,  but  in  due  time  it  appears.  We  antici- 
pate that  this  secret  deed  of  villany  will  be  detected 
and  exposed  ;  and  so  we  are  amazed  for  a  season  when 
we  hear  of  the  perpetrator  flattered  by  the  world,  and 
seemingly  favored  in  the  providence  of  God;  but  our 
moral  convictions  are  vindicated  when  the  wicked  man 
is  at  last  caught  in  the  net  which  had  all  along  been 
weaving  for  him,  and  all  his  ill-gotten  spoils  are  made 
to  add  to  the  weight  of  his  ignominy,  and  to  embitter  his 
disgrace. 

2.  There  is  the  Relation  of  Experience  to  our  Intui- 
tive Perceptions.  Here  the  Regulative  Principle  comes 
forth  in  active  exercise.  It  is  called  out  by  an  object 
which,  however,  is  always  apprehended.  In  many  cases 
it  is  an  external  object ;  it  is  thus  that  our  intuition  as 
to  matter  is  stimulated* by  a  body  presented  to  the  senses. 
Our  intuition  as  to  personal  identity  is  called  forth  by 
the  consciousness  of  a  present  state  with  the  remem- 
brance of  a  past.  Our  conviction  of  moral  good  comes 
forth  on  the  contemplation  of  an  act  as  good  or  evil. 


RELATION   OF   INTUITION   AND   EXPERIENCE.  275 

This  object  is  commonly  called  the  "  Occasion,"  and  the 
general  law  is  laid  down,  that  the  perception  is  called 
up  only  when  there  is  an  object  as  the  occasion.  The 
two  together,  the  inner  power  and  the  object  or  occa- 
sion, constitute  the  cause  or  concause  which  by  their 
mutual  action  produces  the  effect  which  is  the  Intuitive 
Perception. 

It  should  be  observed  that  every  intuition  looks  to  its 
own,  its  corresponding,  and  appropriate  object ;  it  is  a 
cognition  of  the  object  or  a  belief  in  it,  or  a  judgment  in 
regard  to  it.  The  sense-intuition  is  called  out  by  a  sen- 
sible object  to  which  it  looks  and  which  it  knows :  the 
idea  of  space  by  an  object  extended ;  the  idea  of  time  by 
an  event  in  time ;  our  convictions  as  to  causation  by  an 
object  acting,  or  an  effect  produced ;  our  moral  percep- 
tions, faiths,  and  decisions  by  good  or  evil  acts.  Thus 
closely  are  intuition  and  experience  connected.  Our  in- 
tuitive convictions  are  evoked  by  personal  experiences, 
and  as  they  know  and  believe  and  judge  in  regard  to 
objects  they  become  experiences.  We  thus  avoid  one  of 
the  fatal  errors  of  Kant,  that  our  intuitions  are  a  priori 
forms  imposed  on  objects  by  the  mind  out  of  its  own 
stores,  whereas  they  all  look  to  things  and  become  cogni- 
tions, faiths,  and  judgments.  We  thus  establish  a  real- 
ism in  every  part  of  our  nature. 

3.  There  is  the  Relation  of  Experience  to  Generalized 
Intuitions.  We  have  called  attention  to  the  circum- 
stance that  our  intuitions  as  Regulating  Principles  are 
not  under  the  eye  of  consciousness.  They  are  under- 
ground roots,  which  come  forth  as  visible  plants  in  the 
Perceptions  and  are  put  in  scientific  form  by  the  defined 
Maxim. 

We  must  be  careful  to  distinguish  between  two  kinds 
of  laws.     One  kind  is  obtained  from  the  observation  of 


276  GNOSIOLOGY. 

scattered  facts  external  or  internal  which  may  have 
fallen  under  our  notice,  no  matter  how,  through  our  own 
experience  or  that  of  others  also.  The  other  is  formed 
from  our  primitive  perceptions.  For  laws  so  different  in 
their  nature  and  in  the  manner  of  their  being  reached, 
it  is  desirable  to  have  a  difference  of  appellation  or 
nomenclature.  The  one  class  may  be  called  Intuitive, 
the  other  INDUCTIVE.  The  one  is  A  PmoRi,  the  other 
A  Posteriori.  The  one  is  Experiential,  the  other 
Rational,  founded  on  the  perceived  nature  of  things. 
The  one  is  Necessary,  the  other  Contingent.  The 
one  claims  to  be  Axioms  or  Maxims,  the  other  the 
Laws  of  Observation. 

The  latter  kinds  of  law  may  or  may  not  hold  good  be- 
yond the  limits  of  experience.  We  may  be  able  to  say  of 
some  of  them,  as  of  the  law  of  universal  gravitation,  that 
they  are  wide  as  the  cosmos  open  to  human  observation  ; 
but  we  are  not  entitled  to  affirm  dogmatically  that  they 
do,  or  that  they  must,  pervade  all  space.  It  is  a  general 
rule  that  the  leaves  of  monocotyledons  have  parallel 
veins;  but  the  arum  and  some  other  plants  proceeding 
from  one  seed-lobe  have  netted  venation.  As  a  rule 
mammals  are  viviparous,  but  mammals  have  been  dis- 
covered which  bring  forth  their  young  by  eggs.  There 
may  be  worlds  in  which  substances  obey  very  different 
magnetic  laws  from  those  to  which  they  are  subject  in 
our  earth.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  in  other  parts  of  the 
universe,  there  may  be  intelligent  creatures  whose  ideas 
follow  an  order  of  succession  very  different  from  those 
of  human  beings.  But  it  is  true  over  all  our  earth,  and 
must  be  true  in  all  other  worlds  as  well  as  in  this,  that 
cruelty  is  a  sin.  Present  to  the  mind  a  phenomenon, 
that  is,  a  new  object  or  occurrence,  and  it  insists  that  it 
must  have  had  a  cause,  and  this  whether  it  be  within  or 
beyond  the  range  of  our  expeiience. 


RELATION   OF   INTUITION   AND   EXPERIENCE.  277 

Considered  under  this  aspect,  the  contrast  is  not  be- 
tween intuition  and  experience,  but  between  General- 
ized Intuitions  and  a  Gathered  Experience.  The 
former  are  at  once  the  deeper  and  the  higher.  They  pro- 
ceed on  the  nature  of  things  and  are  immutable  as  long 
as  the  things  exist.  They  are  the  truths  which  consti- 
tute the  foundation  of  our  knowledge  and  on  which  our 
minds  fall  buck  in  the  last  resort.  From  the  very  earliest 
date  men  have  been  seeking  to  rear  some  central  and 
abiding  truths  which  may  combine  all  other  truths  and 
act  as  a  defence.  But  this  cannot  be  done  by  mere 
empirical  facts  in  which  they  have  only  "  brick  for 
stone  "  and  "  slime  for  mortar,"  and  the  end  is  a  scat- 
tering as  at  Babel.  However,  by  these  eternal  truths 
which  we  have  been  considering  men  may  realize  the 
idea  of  their  youth,  and  build  a  city  and  a  tower  whose 
top  may  reach  to  heaven. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ON  THE  NECESSITY   ATTACHED  TO  OUB  PEIMAKY 

CONVICTIONS. 


We  have  seen  throughout  the  whole  of  this  treatise 
that  a  conviction  of  necessity  attaches  to  all  our  original 
cognitions,  beliefs,  and  judgments,  both  intellectual  and 
moral.  But  we  may  find  ourselves  in  hopeless  perplex- 
ities, or  even  in  a  network  of  contradictions,  unless  we 
determine  precisely  to  what  it  is  that  the  necessity  ad- 
heres. The  proper  account  is,  that  the  necessity  covers 
the  ground  which  the  conviction  occupies,  —  neither  less 
nor  more.  We  may  err,  either  by  contracting  it  within 
a  narrower  or  stretching  it  over  a  wider  surface.  It 
follows  that  if  we  would  determine  how  far  the  necessity 
extends,  we  must  carefully  and  exactly  ascertain  what  is 
the  nature  of  the  native  conviction,  and  what  are  the 
objects  at  which  it  looks. 

And  this  requires  us  to  specify  with  precision  what  we 
cannot  do  in  regard  to  necessary  truth.  A  common  ac- 
count is  that  we  cannot  "  conceive  "  the  contradictory  of 
such  truth.  But  the  word  "  conceive "  is  ambiguous, 
and  in  itself  means  nothing  more  than  "image"  or  "  ap- 
preliend,"  that  is,  have  a  notion ;  and  certainly  we  are 
not  entitled  to  appeal  to  a  mere  phantasm  or  concept  as 
a  test  of  ultimate  truth.  The  exact  account  is  that  we 
cannot  be  convinced  of  the  opposite  of  the  intuitive  con- 
viction.     But  our  intuitive   convictions  may  take  the 


NECESSITY   ATTACHED   TO   PRIMARY    CONVICTIONS.      279 

form  of  cognitions,  or  beliefs,  or  judgments  ;  and,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  intuition,  that  is,  according  as  it 
is  knowledge,  or  faith,  or  comparison,  is  the  nature  of 
the  necessity  attached.  Whatever  we  know  intuitively 
as  existing,  we  cannot  be  made  to  know  as  not  existing. 
Whatever  we  intuitively  believe^  we  cannot  be  made  not 
to  believe.  When  we  intuitively  discover  a  relation  in 
objects,  we  cannot  be  made  to  judge  that  there  is  not  a 
relation.  From  neglecting  these  distinctions,  which  are 
very  obvious  when  stated,  manifold  errors  have  arisen, 
not  only  in  the  application  of  the  test  of  necessity,  but 
in  the  general  account  given  of  primary  truths.  When 
we  take  them  along  with  us,  the  test  of  necessity  admits 
of  an  application  at  once  easy  and  certain. 

II. 

1.  Beginning  with  our  Cognitions,  the  conviction  is 
that  the  object  exists  at  the  time  we  perceive  it,  and  has 
the  qualities  we  discover  in  it.  This  implies,  according  to 
the  law  of  identity  (in  the  form  of  non-contradiction)^ 
that  it  is  not  possible  that  it  should  not  be  existing,  and 
that  it  should  not  be  in  possession  of  these  qualities  at 
the  time  it  falls  under  our  notice.  But  it  does  not  imply 
that  the  object  has  a  necessary  or  an  eternal  existence. 
It  does  not  imply  that  the  object  must  have  existed  in 
all  other  or  in  any  other  circumstances.  For  aught  our 
conviction  says,  the  object  in  other  positions,  or  with  a 
different  set  of  preexisting  causes,  might  not  have  existed 
at  all,  or  might  have  had  a  different  set  of  qualities. 
But  while  the  necessity  does  not  reach  further,  it  always 
extends  as  far  as  the  perception  ;  thus  it  demands  that 
body  be  regarded  by  us  as  extended  and  as  resisting 
pressure,  that  self  be  looked  on  as  capable  of  such  quali- 
ties as  thought  and  feeling,  and  that  the  properties  of 


280  GNOSIOLOGY. 

body  and  mind  should  not  be  regarded  as  produced  by 
our  contemplation  of  them. 

2.  Coming  now  to  our  original  Beliefs,  it  has  been 
shown  in  regard  to  them,  that  while  they  proceed  on  our 
cognitions,  they  go  beyond  them,  go  beyond  the  now 
and  the  present^  —  declaring,  for  instance,  of  time  and 
space,  that  they  must  transcend  our  widest  phantasms  or 
conceptions  of  them,  and  that  they  are  such  that  no  space 
or  time  could  be  added  to  them.  And  as  far  as  tlie  con- 
viction goes,  so  far  does  the  necessity  extend. 

3.  The  necessity  attached  to  our  Judgments  is  in  like 
manner  exactly  coincident  with  them.  These  imply  ob- 
jects on  which  they  are  pronounced.  At  the  same  time, 
the  judgment,  with  its  adhering  necessity,  has  a  regard 
not  to  the  objects  directly,  but  to  the  relation  of  the  ob- 
jects. These  objects  may  be  real,  or  they  may  be  imag- 
inary. I  may  pronounce  Chimboi*azo  to  be  higher  than 
Mont  Blanc,  but  I  may  also  affirm  of  a  mountain  100,000 
feet  high  that  it  is  higher  than  one  50,000  feet  high.  As 
to  whether  the  objects  are  or  are  not  real,  this  is  a  ques- 
tion to  be  settled  by  our  cognitions  and  beliefs,  original 
and  acquired,  and  by  inferences  from  them.  But  it  is 
to  be  carefully  observed,  that  even  when  the  object  is 
imaginary,  the  judgment  proceeds  on  a  cognition  of  the 
elements  of  the  objects.  Thus,  having  known  what  is 
the  size  of  a  man,  we  affirm  of  a  giant,  who  is  greater 
than  a  common  man,  that  he  is  greater  than  a  dwarf,  who 
is  smaller  than  ordinary  humanity.  Still,  the  necessity 
in  the  judgment  does  not  of  itself  imply  the  existence  of 
the  objects,  still  less  any  necessary  existence ;  all  that 
it  proclaims  is,  that  the  objects  might  exist  out  of  ma- 
terials which  have  fallen  under  our  notice,  and  that  the 
objects,  being  so  and  so,  must  have  such  a  relation. 

In  a  sense,  then,  our  primitive  judgments  are  hypo- 


NECESSITY   ATTACHED  TO  PRIMARY  CONVICTIONS.      281 

thetical ;  the  objects  being  so  must  have  a  particular  con- 
nection. There  may  be,  or  there  may  never  have  been, 
two  exactly  parallel  lines ;  what  our  intuitive  juilgment 
declares  is,  that  if  there  be  such,  they  can  never  meet. 
A  similar  remark  may  be  made  of  every  other  class  of 
intuitive  comparisons.  There  may  or  there  may  not  be 
a  sea  in  the  moon  ;  but  if  there  be,  its  waters  must  be 
extended,  and  can  resist  pressure.  There  may  or  there 
may  not  be  inhabitants  in  the  planet  Jupiter  ;  but  if 
there  be,  they  must  have  been  created  by  a  power  com- 
petent to  the  operation.  But  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  when  the  objects  exist,  the  judgments,  with  their 
accompanying  necessity,  apply  to  them. 

And  here  I  am  tempted  to  say  a  word  on  a  question 
of  nomenclature.  Throughout  this  treatise  the  phrase 
"  intuition  "  has  been  applied  to  our  primitive  cognitions 
and  primitive  beliefs,  as  well  as  our  primitive  judgments. 
But  as  there  is  a  difference  between  intuition  as  directed 
to  individual  objects  and  as  directed  to  the  comparison 
of  objects,  I  have  sometimes  thought,  when  it  is  neces- 
sary to  distinguish  them,  ''  Intuitive  Perceptions  "  might 
be  the  more  appropriate  phrase  for  the  one,  and  "  Intui- 
tive Reason  "  for  the  other. 

4.  It  holds  good  also  of  our  Moral  Perceptions,  that 
the  necessity  is  as  wide  as  our  conviction,  but  no  wider. 
It  implies  that  the  good  or  evil  is  a  real  quality  of  cer- 
tain voluntary  acts  of  ours,  and  this  whether  we  view  it 
or  not,  and  independent  of  the  view  we  take  of  it.  It 
involves  that  certain  actions  are  good  or  evil,  whenever  or 
wherever  they  are  performed,  in  this  land  or  other  lands, 
in  this  world  or  other  worlds.  Rising  beyond  cognitions 
and  beliefs,  the  mind  can  pronounce  moral  judgments  on 
certain  acts  apprehended  by  it.  These  judgments  do 
not  imply  the  existence  of  the  objects ;  but  the  decision 


282  GNOSIOLOGY. 

will  apply  to  the  realities,  if  there  be  such.  Thus,  there 
may  or  may  not  be  ungodliness  or  ingratitude  in  the 
planet  Saturn  ;  but  if  thei'e  be  such  a  thing,  we  declare 
that  it  must  be  evil  and  condemnable.  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  our  moral  convictions  do  not  imply  that  we  shall 
certainly  practise  the  good,  or  that  all  must  be  morally 
good  which  men  declare  to  be  so. 

III. 

As  soon  as  our  original  cognition  or  belief  assures  us 
of  the  existence  of  an  object  with  certain  qualities,  or  as 
a  judgment  affirms  a  necessary  relation,  the  law  of  iden- 
tity comes  into  operation,  and  insists  on  our  keeping  truth 
consistent  with  itself  ;  and  in  particular,  the  law  of  non- 
contradiction restricts  us  from  thinking  or  believing  the 
opposite  of  the  truth  apprehended.  When  we  know  that 
self  exists,  we  cannot  be  made  to  think  that  self  does 
not  exist.  Constrained  to  look  on  time  as  without  limits, 
we  at  once  deny  that  it  can  have  limits.  Deciding  that 
every  effect  has  a  cause,  we  cannot  be  made  to  believe 
that  it  has  not  had  a  cause.  We  have  a  conviction  that 
murder  is  a  crime,  and  cannot  be  made  to  decide  that  it 
is  not.  We  have  thus  necessity  in  two  forms  as  a  test 
of  fundamental  truth  ;  in  its  original  or  positive,  and  also 
in  a  negative  form,  founded  on  the  law  of  non-contradic- 
tion. In  no  case  can  the  conviction  be  wrought  in  us 
that  what  we  intuitively  know  or  believe  to  exist  does 
not  exist,  or  that  the  contradictoi-y  of  a  primitive  judg- 
ment can  possibly  be  true. 

It  has  been  remarked  by  metaph3'sicians  that  in  some 
cases  we  can  conceive  the  opposite  of  a  necessary  truth, 
while  in  others  we  cannot.  The  account  given  above 
enables  us  to  see  how  this  should  be,  and  determines 
whence   the  differences,  and  how  far  they   extend.     In 


NECESSITY   ATTACHED    TO   PRIMARY   CONVICTIONS.      283 

the  case  of  our  primitive  cognitions  and  beliefs,  -we  can 
imagine  or  apprehend  the  opposite  of  what  we  know  or 
believe.  We  can  imagine  ourselves  not  existing  at  any 
given  time,  and  that  an  event  remembered  by  us  did  not 
occur.  We  can  conceive,  too,  though  often  with  some 
difficulty,  the  contradictory  of  synthetic  judgments  a 
priori ;  thus  we  can  apprehend  (though  we  can  never 
decide  or  believe)  that  there  should  be  a  change  without 
a  cause.  But,  in  the  case  of  analytic  judgments  (see 
supra,  pp.  193, 194),  we  cannot  so  much  as  conceive  them 
contradictory.  The  reason  is  obvious.  The  judgment 
pronounced  is  implied  in  the  subject  in  regard  to  which 
the  predication  is  made ;  and  the  denial  of  the  proposi- 
tion would  be  destructive  of  the  notion  with  which  we 
start.  We  cannot  conceive  of  an  island  that  it  should 
not  be  surrounded  by  water,  for  were  it  not  so  enclosed 
it  would  not  be  an  island. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  the  conviction  of  necessity 
follows  primitive  conviction  wherever  it  is  found.  In 
w^hat  is  technically  called  demonstrative  or  apodictic  rea- 
soning, all  the  new  steps  are  seen  to  be  true  intuitively, 
and  the  necessity  goes  through  the  whole  process  step  by 
step.  Thus  the  necessity  adheres  not  only  to  the  axioms 
of  Euclid,  but  goes  on  to  the  last  proposition  of  the  last 
book.  It  is  the  same  in  all  other  sciences  which  are 
demonstrative,  as  Ethics  and  Logic  are  to  a  limited  ex- 
tent ;  the  necessity  adheres  to  whatever  is  drawn  from 
first  truths  by  intuitive  principles.  It  is  needful  to  add, 
that  in  mixed  processes,  in  which  thei'e  is  both  intuition 
and  experience  in  the  results  reached,  the  necessity  sticks 
merely  to  the  intuitive  part,  and  does  not  guarantee  the 
whole.  I  suppose  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  accuracy  of 
the  mathematical  demonstrations  employed  by  Fourier 
in  his  disquisitions  about  heat,  but  there  are  disputes  as 


284  GNOSIOLOGY. 

to  some  of  the  assumptions  on  which  his  calculations  pro- 
ceed. We  have  here  a  source  of  error.  In  processes  into 
which  intuition  enters,  but  is  only  one  of  the  elements, 
persons  may  allot  to  the  whole  a  certainty  which  can  be 
claimed  only  in  behalf  of  one  of  the  parts. 

One  other  distinction  requires  to  be  drawn  under  this 
head.  There  are  cases  in  which  primitive  judgments 
are  founded  on  primitive  cognitions  and  beliefs,  and  are 
thus  necessary  throughout.  It  is  thus  that,  proceeding 
on  our  primitive  knowledge  and  faith  as  to  time,  we  de- 
clare there  can  be  no  break  in  its  flowing  stream.  But 
in  other  cases  our  judgment  may  proceed  on  a  proposi- 
tion reached  by  a  gathered  experience.  Thus,  having 
found  that  laurel-water  is  poisonous,  intuition  insists  that 
he  who  has  drunk  laurel-water  has  drunk  poison.  The 
necessity  here  simply  is,  that  the  conclusion  follows  from 
the  premises  ;  and  the  conclusion  itself  is  as  certain  as 
the  observational  premiss,  neither  less  nor  more. 


CHAPTER  V. 
CRITICISM   OF  DISTINCTIONS 

DRAWN   BY   METAPHYSICIANS    IN   REGARD   TO   THE    RELATION   OF 
INTUITIVE   REASON   AND   EXPERIENCE. 

These  distinctions  fail  to  express  the  exact  truth  because  they  do 
not  proceed  on  the  reality  of  things. 


The  Distinction  between  the  Understanding  and  the 
Reason.  —  Milton  draws  the  distinction  between  reason  "  intuitive  " 
and  "discursive."  Reid  and  Beattie  represent  Reason  as  having 
two  degrees  :  in  the  former,  reason  sees  the  truth  at  once ;  in  the 
other,  it  reaches  it  by  a  process.  There  is  evidently  ground  for  these 
distinctions.  But  the  distinction  I  am  now  to  examine  was  first 
drawn  in  a  formal  manner  by  Kant,  and  has  since  assumed  divers 
shapes  in  Germany  and  in  this  country.  According  to  Kant,  the 
mind  has  three  general  intellectual  powers,  the  Sense,  the  Under- 
standing (Verstand),  and  the  Reason  (Vornunft)  ;  the  Sense  giving 
us  presentations  or  phenomena ;  the  Understanding  binding  these 
by  categories;  and  the  Reason  bringing  the  judgments  of  the  Under- 
standing to  unity  by  three  Ideas  —  of  Substance,  Totality  of  Phe- 
nomena, and  Deity  —  which  are  especially  the  Ideas  of  Reason.  The 
distinction  was  introduced  among  the  English-speaking  nations  by 
Coleridge,  who  however  modified  it.  "Reason,"  says  he,  "is  the 
power  of  universal  and  necessary  convictions,  the  source  and  sub- 
stance of  truths  above  sense,  and  having  their  evidence  in  them- 
selves. Its  presence  is  always  marked  by  the  necessity  of  the  po- 
sitions affirmed  "  (Aids  to  Reflection,  i.  168).  It  has  become  an 
accepted  distinction  among  a  certain  class  of  metaphysicians  and 
divines  all  over  Europe  and  the  English-speaking  people  of  the  great 
American  continent.  These  parties  commonly  illustrate  their  views 
in  some  such  way  as  the  following  :  The  mind,  they  say,  must  have 
some  power  by  which  it  gazes  immediately  on  the  true  and  the  good. 
But  sense,  which  looks  only  to  the  phenomenal  and  fluctuating,  can- 


286  GNOSIOLOGY. 

not  enable  us  to  do  so.  As  little  can  the  logical  understanding, 
whose  province  it  is  to  generalize  the  phenomena  of  sense,  mount 
into  so  high  a  sphere.  We  must  therefore  bring  in  a  transcendental 
power  —  call  it  Reason,  or  Intellectual  Intuition,  or  Faith,  or  Feel- 
ing—  to  account  for  the  mind's  capacity  of  discovering  the  universal 
and  the  necessary,  and  of  gazing  at  once  on  eternal  Truth  and  Good- 
ness, on  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute. 

Now  there  is  great  and  important  truth  aimed  at  and  meant  to  be 
set  forth  in  this  language.  The  speculators  of  Fi'ance,  who  derive 
all  our  notions  from  sense,  and  those  of  Britain,  who  draw  all  our 
maxims  from  experience,  are  overlooking  the  most  wondrous  proper- 
ties of  the  soul,  which  has  principles  at  once  deeper  and  higher  than 
sense,  and  the  faculty  which  compounds  and  compares  the  material 
supplied  by  sense.  And  if  by  Reason  is  meant  the  aggregate  of 
Regulative  Principles,  I  have  no  objections  to  the  phrase,  and  to  cer- 
tain important  applications  of  it,  but  then  we  must  keep  carefully  in 
view  the  mode  in  which  these  principles  operate. 

We  may  mark  the  following  errors  or  oversights  in  the  school  re- 
ferred to  :  (1.)  Intuitive  Reason  is  not,  properly  speaking,  opposed 
to  Sense,  but  is  involved  in  certain  exercises  of  sense.  There  is 
knowledge,  and  this  intuitive,  in  all  sense-perception.  It  may  be 
proper  indeed  to  draw  the  distinction  between  the  two  elements 
which  are  indissolubly  wrapt  up  in  the  one  concrete  act.  Kant  en- 
deavored to  do  so,  but  gave  a  perversely  erroneous  account  when  he 
represented  intuition  as  giving  to  objects  the  form  of  space  and  time; 
whereas  intuition  simply  enables  us  to  discover  that  bodies  are  in 
space,  and  events  in  time.  There  is  certainly  a  high  intuitional 
capacity  involved  in  every  exercise  of  mind  which  takes  in  extension, 
or  regards  objects  as  exercising  property.  And  then  it  is  altogether 
wrong  to  represent  sense  as  the  one  original  source  of  experiential 
knowledge,  which  is  derived  from  consciousness  as  well  as  from  per- 
ception through  the  senses.  (2.)  It  is  wrong  to  represent  Intuitive 
Reason  as  opposed  to  the  Understanding.  There  is  intuitive  reason 
involved  in  certain  exercises  of  the  understanding,  as  when  we  infer 
that  what  is  true  of  a  given  class  must  be  true  of  each  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  class.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that  the  understanding 
can  abstract  and  generalize  upon  a  great  deal  more  than  the  objects 
of  sense ;  it  can  do  so  upon  the  materials  supplied  by  consciousness, 
and  by  all  the  further  convictions  of  the  mind,  such  as  the  con- 
science. (3.)  It  is  wrong  to  represent  the  mind  as  gazing  immedi- 
ately and  intuitively  on  the  true  or  the  good,  upon  the  necessary  or 


CRITICISM   OF  DISTINCTIONS.  287 

the  universal.  It  can  indeed  rise  to  the  conception  of  these,  but,  in 
order  to  its  doing  so,  it  has  to  engage  in  abstraction  and  generaliza- 
tion, which  makes  the  truth  gained  no  longer  a  truth  of  pure  reason, 
but  of  reason  and  understanding  combined.  It  is  not  consistent  with 
the  natural  history  of  the  mind  to  represent  it  as  at  once  rising  to 
the  contemplation  of  some  ideal  of  the  fair  and  good,  which  it  is  able 
to  look  at  when  the  spirit  is  not  agitated  by  passion  or  bedimmed  by 
earthliness.  We  are  undoubtedly  led  by  native  taste  to  admire  the 
beautiful,  but  it  is  when  embodied  in  a  lovely  object.  We  are  con- 
strained, in  spite  of  a  rebellious  will,  to  approve  of  the  good,  but  it 
is  when  a  good  action,  or  rather  a  good  being  performing  a  good 
action,  is  presented  to  the  mind.  The  general  ideas  of  the  true,  the 
fair,  and  the  good,  do  not  spring  up  intuitively  in  the  mind,  but  are 
fashioned  out  of  intuitive  elements  by  those  addicted  to  reflection. 
(4.)  It  is  preposterously  wrong  to  suppose  that  the  mind  can  employ 
intuitive  convictions  in  philosophic  or  religious  speculations  without 
any  associated  exercise  of  the  logical  understanding.  Not  being  im- 
mediately conscious  of  the  Regulative  Principles  of  the  mind,  we 
cannot  employ  them  in  discussion  till  we  have  first  inquired  into  their 
nature  by  induction,  and  embodied  their  rule  in  a  clear  definition  or 

a  precise  axiom. 

II. 

Distinction  between  "  A  Priori  "  and  "  A  Posteriori  " 
Principles.  —  Prior  to  the  time  of  David  Hume,  the  phrase  "  k 
priori "  was  appliL'd  to  the  procedure  from  principle  to  consequent, 
and  from  cause  to  effect,  using  the  word  cause  in  a  wider  and  looser 
sense  than  in  these  times ;  while  the  phrase  "  k  posteriori "  was  em- 
ployed to  characterize  the  procedure  from  consequent  to  antecedent, 
or  from  effect  to  cause.  Cudworth's  language  is,  "  The  abstract  uni- 
versal  rationes,  '  reasons,'  are  that  higher  station  of  the  mind,  from 
whence,  looking  down  upon  individual  things,  it  hath  a  commanding 
view  of  them,  and,  as  it  were,  '  k  priori '  comprehends  or  knows 
them"  (Imrnut.  Mor.  iii.  iii.  2).  Since  the  publication  of  Hume's 
philosophic  works,  and  more  especially  since  the  Kritik  of  Pure 
Reason  came  to  have  such  an  extensive  influence,  "  k  priori "  denotes 
whatever  is  supposed  to  be  in  the  mind  prior  to  experience;  and  "k 
posteriori"  whatever  has  been  acquired  by  experience.  The  dis- 
tinction thus  indicated  and  designated  may  be  admitted  without 
allowing  that  it  probes  the  subject  to  its  depths,  and  certainly  with- 
out admitting  all  the  views  usually  associated  with  it.  Even  in  re- 
gard to  knowledge  acquired  by  experience,  I  maintain  that,  prior  to 


288  GNOSIOLOGY. 

its  acquisition,  the  mind  has  the  power  of  acquiring  it.  The  bodily 
frame  has  certainly  the  organs  of  sense  prior  to  seeing,  hearing,  tast- 
incf,  touching,  or  smelling.  The  mind  has  certainl}'  the  capacity  of 
perception  before  it  actually  observes  any  external  object,  and  the 
power  of  comparison  before  it  can  notice  relations.  And,  in  ac- 
knowledging the  distinction,  we  must  ever  protest  against  the  idea 
that  any  universal  or  necessary  truth  can  be  discerned  by  the  mind 
without  a  process  of  h  posteriori  induction  and  arrangement.  So 
far  as  the  phrase  is  applied  to  general  maxims,  it  should  be  on 
the  understanding  that  they  have  been  drawn  by  a  logical  process 
out  of  the  individual  k  priori  convictions. 

Closely  allied  to  the  question  of  h  priori  truth  is  the  question,  Can 
there  be  an  k  priori  science?  This  is  a  topic  which  will  come  more 
fully  before  us  in  some  of  the  chapters  of  the  next  book.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  certain  sciences  are  k  priori,  that  is,  the  principles  of 
them  are  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  and  are  ready  to  manifest 
themselves  in  individual  acts.  In  another  sense  there  can  be  no  k 
priori  science,  for  science  employs  general  principles,  and  there  are 
no  such  principles  known  k  priori.  But  there  are  sciences  the 
ground  principles  of  which  are  not  the  generalizations  of  a  gathered 
experience,  but  of  the  necessary  decisions  of  the  mind,  and  these 
sciences  may  be  called  k  priori  with  perfect  propriety,  provided  al- 
ways that  it  be  understood  that,  while  the  general  law  is  in  the  mind 
prior  to  its  manifestation,  it  is  discovered  by  us  only  through  the 
generalization  of  the  individual  exercises. 

III. 
Distinction  between  Form  and  Matter.  —  This  phrase- 
oloey  was  introduced  by  Aristotle,  who  represented  everything  as 
having  in  itself  both  m'atter  (S\r,)  and  form  (fTSos).  It  had  a  new 
si^nifil-ation  siven  to  it  by  Kant,  who  supposes  that  the  mind  sup- 
plies from  its  own  furniture  a  form  to  impose  on  the  matter  presented 
from  without.  The  form  thus  corresponds  to  the  k  priori  element, 
and  the  matter  to  the  k  posteriori.  But  the  view  thus  given  of  the 
relation  in  which  the  knowing  mind  stands  to  the  known  object  is 
altogether  a  mistaken  one.  It  supposes  that  the  mind  in  cognition 
adds  an  element  from  its  own  resources,  whereas  it  is  simply  so  con- 
stituted as  to  know  what  is  in  the  object.  This  doctrine  needs  only 
to  be  carried  out  consequentially  to  sap  the  foundations  of  all  knowl- 
edge, —  for  if  the  mind  may  contribute  from  its  own  stores  one  ele- 
ment, why  not  another?  why  not  all  the  elements  ?    In  fact,  Kant 


CRITICISM   OF  DISTINCTIONS.  289 

did,  by  this  distinction,  open  the  way  to  all  those  later  speculations 
which  represent  the  whole  universe  of  being  as  an  ideal  construction. 
There  can,  I  think,  be  no  impropriety  in  speaking  of  the  original 
principles  of  the  mind  as  forms  or  rules,  but  they  are  forms  merely, 
as  are  the  rules  of  grammar,  which  do  not  add  anything  to  correct 
speaking  and  writing,  but  are  merely  the  expression  of  the  laws 
which  they  follow.  As  to  the  word  "  matter,"  it  has  either  no  mean- 
ing in  such  an  application,  or  a  meaning  of  a  misleading  character. 


IV. 

Distinction  between  Subjective  and  Objective. — The 
word  "  subject  "  has  a  diversity  of  meaning  in  the  English  language. 
In  logic,  it  denotes  the  term  of  which  predication  is  made;  in  com- 
mon discourse,  it  means  the  topic  about  which  affirmations  are  made; 
and  in  metaphysics,  the  mind  contemplating  an  object.  The  term 
"  object,"  too,  is  not  without  its  ambiguity.  Sometimes  it  stands 
for  a  thing  contemplated  by  the  mind,  and  sometimes  for  a  thing 
considered  in  itself,  and  often  it  denotes  the  aim  or  end  which  the 
mind  has  in  any  of  its  pursuits.  I  am  afraid  it  will  be  impossible,  in 
common  discourse,  to  deprive  the  phrases  of  any  one  of  these  various 
significations.  The  adjectives  "  subjective  "  and  "  objective  "  have 
not  had  such  a  variety  of  meaning,  and  the  nouns  "  subject "  and 
"object,"  when  used  together,  in  philosophic  discussion,  should  be 
limited  so  as  to  be  exactly  coincident  with  them.  They  should,  in 
my  opinion,  never  be  used  except  as  correlative  phrases,  the  terms 
"  subject  "  and  "  subjective  "  being  employed  to  designate,  not  the 
mind  in  itself,  but  the  mind  as  contemplating  a  thing;  and  the  terms 
"  object  "  and  "  objective  "  to  denote,  not  a  thing  in  itself,  but  a 
thing  as  contemplated  by  the  mind.  It  is  clear  that  if  the  phrases 
were  employed  in  this  sense  when  used  at  the  same  time,  we  should 
be  saved  an  immense  amount  of  word-warfare,  in  which  subject  and 
object,  subjective  and  objective,  act  so  prominent  a  part.  AVe  should 
be  prevented  from  speaking,  as  is  so  often  done,  of  the  mind  as  sub- 
ject or  subjective,  except  when  it  is  looking  at  something;  or  of  the 
thing  as  an  object  or  objective,  except  when  it  is  contemplated  by  a 
thinking  mind.  We  would  also  know  at  once  what  is  meant  when  it 
is  said  that  the  subject  implies  the  object,  and  the  object  the  subject. 
It  does  not  mean  that  the  existence  of  mind  implies  an  external  thine 
to  be  contemplated,  or  that  a  thing,  as  such,  implies  a  mind  to  con- 
sider it:  it  signifies  simply  that  the  one  implies  the  other,  as  the  bus- 


290  GNOSIOLOGY. 

band  implies  the  wife,  and  the  wife  a  husband,  from  which  we  can- 
not argue  that  every  man  must  have  a  wife  and  every  woman  a 
husband,  but  merely  that  when  the  man  is  a  husband  he  must  have 
a  wife,  and  when  the  woman  is  a  wife  she  must  have  a  husband. 
The  subject  implies  the  objective  merely  in  the  sense  that  when  the 
inind  is  contemplating  a  thing,  it  must  be  contemplating  it;  and  that 
when  a  thing  is  contemplated,  it  must  be  contemplated  by  a  con- 
templative mind. 

With  a  large  school  of  metaphysicians  and  divines,  the  words 
"  subjective "  and  "  objective  "  are  used  in  a  Kantian  sense,  and 
are  made,  without  the  persons  employing  them  being  aware  of  it,  to 
bring  in  the  whole  peculiarities  of  the  critical  philosophy.  In  the 
philosophy  which  has  germinated  from  Kant,  the  subject  mind  is  sup- 
posed to  have  a  formative  power,  and  the  object  thing  is  supposed  to 
be  a  thing,  or  phenomenon,  plus  a  shape  or  a  color  given  it  by  the 
mind.  Proceeding  on  this  view,  the  phrase  "  subjective  "  comes  to 
express  that  which  is  contributed  by  the  mind  in  cognition.  Thus, 
by  a  juggling  use  of  these  phrases,  persons  are  being  involved,  with- 
out their  having  the  least  suspicion  of  it,  in  a  philosophy  which 
makes  it  impossible  for  us  ever  to  know  things  except  under  aspects 
twisted  and  distorted  no  man  can  tell  how  far  from  the  reality.  We 
can  be  saved  from  this  only  by  using  them  as  correlatives,  and  in- 
sisting, when  we  do  so,  that  the  subjective  mind  is  so  constituted  as 
to  know  the  object  as  it  is,  under  the  aspects  presented. 

V. 

Logical  and    Chronological  Order   of   Ideas.  —  Sir  W. 

Hamilton  quotes  a  saying  of  Patricius,  "  Cognitio  omnis  a  mente 
primam  originem,  a  sensibus  exordium  habet  primum."  The  distinc- 
tion is  deep  in  Kant,  and  has  been  fully  and  skilfully  elaborated  by 
M.  Cousin.  It  is  said  that  there  are  ever  two  factors  in  the  forma- 
tion of  our  h  priori  ideas,  reason  and  experience;  and  that  logically 
reason  is  first,  whereas  chronologjically  experience  comes  first.  The 
distinction  is  not  clearly  nor  happily  drawn  by  such  phraseology.  For 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  what  is  meant  by  "  origin  "  as  distinguished 
from  "  beginning ;  "  and  what  is  meant  by  "  logical  "  in  such  an  appli- 
cation: it  cannot  mean,  according  to  the  rules  of  formal  logic  it  must 
mean,  according  to  reason;  and  then  comes  in  the  important  fact 
that  reason  and  experience  are  not,  properly  speaking,  opposed. 
The  distinction,  however,  points  to  a  truth,  inasmuch  as  our  intui- 
tions, as  mental  faculties,  laws,  or  tendencies,  are  in  the  mind  prior 


-      CRITICISM   OF  DISTINCTIONS.  291 

to  the  exercise  of  them.  There  is  a  difficulty,  however,  in  appre- 
hending what  is  meant  by  the  logical  or  reason  element  being  first, 
but  not  chronologically.  The  intuition  as  a  law  is  in  the  mind  prior, 
chronologically,  to  the  experience  of  it.  The  individual  exhibition 
of  the  conviction  and  the  experience  of  it  come  chronologically  to- 
gether. It  is  true,  however,  in  the  fullest  sense,  that  an  experience 
is  necessary  in  order  to  our  being  able  to  present  the  necessary  con- 
viction in  the  form  of  an  abstract  definition  or  general  maxim.  This 
distinction  connects  itself  with  another,  which  I  am  now  to  examine. 

VI. 

Distinction  between  Reason  as  the  Cause,  and  Sense 
AND  Experience  as  the  Occasion.  —  Cudworth  refers  to  ideas 
of  a  high  kind,  which  he  admits  are  "  most  commonly  excited  and 
awakened  occasionally  from  the  appulse  of  outward  objects  knocking 
at  the  door  of  the  senses,"  and  complains  of  men  not  distinguishing 
"  betwixt  the  outward  occasion,  or  invitation,  of  these  cogitations, 
and  the  immediate  active  or  productive  cause  of  them "  (Immut. 
Mor.  IV.  ii.  2).  It  is  allowed  that,  apart  from  sense  and  experience, 
the  mind  cannot  have  any  ideas:  still,  it  is  not  experience  which  pro- 
duces our  necessary  ideas;  it  is  merely  the  occasion  of  them,  the  true 
cause  being  the  reason.  Thus,  without  an  exercise  of  sense,  there 
could  be  no  idea  of  space  in  the  mind  ;  but  then  the  operation  is 
merely  the  occasion  on  which  the  idea  of  space  is  produced  by  an 
inherent  mental  energy.  Aloof  from  a  special  event,  there  could  be 
no  idea  of  time  ;  but  then  it  is  affirmed  that  upon  an  event  becom- 
ing apprehended,  the  idea  of  time,  already  potentially  in  the  mind, 
is  ready  to  spring  up.  Without  the  observation  of  contiguous  con- 
currences, there  could  be  no  idea  of  cause;  but  on  such  being  pre- 
sented, the  mind  is  found  to  be  already  in  possession  of  an  idea  of 
cause  by  which  to  bind  them  in  a  necessary  connection.  Till  some 
human  action  is  presented,  there  could  be  no  idea  of  moral  good;  but 
on  a  benevolent  action  being  apprehended,  the  idea  of  moral  good 
is  ready  to  spring  up. 

There  is  important  truth  which  this  account  is  intended  to  ex- 
press, but  it  does  not  bring  it  out  accurately.  It  is  not  so  easy  to 
settle  precisely  the  difference  between  cause  and  occasion:  the  oc- 
casion is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  elements  of  the  unconditional  cause,  or 
rather,  concause,  which  produces  the  effect.  In  regard  to  the  original 
faculty  or  law  of  the  mind,  it  is  undoubtedly  the  main  element  of 
the  complex  cause  which  issues  in  a  spontaneous  intuitive  conviction. 


292  GNOSIOLOGY. 

But  there  is  need  of  a  concurrence  of  circumstances  in  order  to  this 
faculty  operating.  But  instead  of  confusedly  binding  all  these  up  in 
the  one  expression  "  occasion,"  it  is  better  to  spread  them  out  indi- 
vidually, -when  it  will  be  found  that  each  acts  in  its  own  way.  Thus 
we  should  show  that  an  action  of  the  organism  is  needful  to  call  our 
intuition  of  sense-perception  into  exercise.  We  should  show,  too, 
that  an  apprehension  of  an  object  or  objects  is  needed,  in  order  to 
call  into  action  our  intuitions  as  to  the  infinity  of  time,  and  eternal 
relations,  and  moi-al  good ;  and  then  it  may  be  seen  that  this  apprehen- 
sion may  not  have  been  got  from  sense,  and  that  in  our  primary 
cognition  of  the  object  there  may  have  been  intuition  ;  thus,  it  is 
because  we  intuitively  know  every  object  as  having  being,  that  we 
declare  its  identity  of  being  at  different  times.  Again,  in  respect  to 
the  generalized  maxim,  or  notion,  the  account  is  fitted  to  leave  a 
very  erroneous  impression,  for  it  makes  it  appear  as  if  it  were  upon 
the  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  a  material  object  that  there 
springs  up  the  abstract  idea  of  space;  and  of  an  event  becoming 
known,  that  there  arises  the  idea  of  time  ;  or  of  a  succession  of 
events  being  apprehended,  that  the  mind  forms  an  idea  of  cause.  It 
is  all  true  that  there  must  be  experience  in  order  to  the  construction 
of  the  abstract  or  general  notion,  but  the  notion  is  formed,  after  all, 
by  the  ordinary  process  of  abstraction  and  generalization. 


BOOK  III. 

ONTOLOGY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

KNOWING   AND   BEING. 

These  are  topics  which  the  subtle  Greek  mind  de- 
lighted to  discuss  from  the  time  that  reflective  thought 
was  first  awakened  within  it ;  that  is,  from  at  least  five 
hundred  years  before  the  Christian  era.  I  confess  I 
should  like  to  have  been  present  when  they  were  handled 
on  that  morning  when  Socrates,  as  yet  little  more  than  a 
boy,  met  the  aged  Parmenides,  so  venerable  with  his 
noble  aspect  and  hoary  locks,  and  Zeno,  tall  and  grace- 
ful, and  in  the  vigor  of  his  manhood,  in  the  house  of 
Pythodorus,  in  the  Ceramicus,  beyond  the  walls  of 
Athens.^  At  the  same  time,  I  fear  that,  after  all,  I 
could  have  got  little  more  than  a  glimpse  of  the  meaning 
of  the  interlocutors.  It  is  clear  that  even  Socrates  him- 
self is  not  sure  whether  he  is  listening  to  solid  argument, 
or  losing  himself  among  verbal  disquisitions  and  dialectic 
sophistries.  And  who  will  venture  to  make  intelligible 
to  a  modern  mind  —  even  to  a  Teutonic  mind  —  the  ar- 
guments by  which  Parmenides  and  Zeno  prove  that 
Being  is  One,  and  the  impossibility  of  Non-Being;  or 
translate  with  a  meaning,  into  any  other  tongue,  the  sub- 
tleties of  those  Dialogues,  such  as  Parmenides  and  the 
Sophist,  in  which  Plato  makes  his  speakers  discourse  of 
•       1  See  the  opening  of  the  Parmenides  of  Plato. 


294  ONTOLOGY. 

the  One  and  of  tlie  Existing?  The  grand  error  of  all 
these  disputations  arises  from  those  who  conduct  them 
imagining  that  pure  truth  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  well, 
whereas  it  is  at  the  surface  ;  and  in  going  past  the  pure 
waters  at  the  top,  they  have  only  gone  down  into  mud 
and  stirred  up  mire.  We  are  knowing,  and  knowing 
being,  at  every  waking  hour  of  our  existence,  and  all 
that  the  philosopher  can  do  is  to  observe  them,  to  sepa- 
rate each  from  the  other,  and  from  all  with  which  it  is 
associated,  and  to  give  it  a  right  expression.  But  the 
ancient  Greeks,  followed  by  modern  metaphysicians,  im- 
agined that  they  could  do  more,  and  so  have  done  infi- 
nitely less.  They  have  tried  to  get  a  more  solid  founda- 
tion for  what  rests  on  itself,  and  so  have  made  that 
insecure  which  is  felt  to  be  stable.  They  have  labored 
to  make  that  clearer  which  is  already  clear,  and  have 
thus  darkened  the  subject  by  assertions  which  have  no 
meaning.  They  have  explained  what  might  be  used  to 
explain  other  truths,  but  which  itself  neither  requires 
nor  admits  of  explanation,  and  so  have  only  landed  and 
lost  themselves  in  distinctions  which  proceed  on  no  dif- 
ferences in  the  nature  of  things,  and  in  mysteries  of 
their  own  creation. 

Knowing,  in  the  concrete,  is  a  perpetual  mental  exer- 
cise, ever  under  the  eye  of  consciousness  ;  and  we  can  by 
an  intellectual  act  separate  it  from  its  object,  and  con- 
template it  in  the  abstract.  In  all  acts  of  knowledge  we 
know  Being  in  the  concrete  ;  that  is,  we  know  things  as 
existing,  and  we  can  separate  in  thought  the  thing  from 
our  knowledge  of  it,  and  the  thing  as  existing  from  all 
else  which  we  may  know  about  the  thing.  The  science 
which  treats  of  Being,  or  Existence,  is  Ontology.  If  we 
define  Ontology  as  the  science  of  what  we  know  of 
things  intuitively,  we  are  giving  it  a  precise  field  which 


KNOWING   AND   BEING.  295 

can  be  taken  in  from  the  waste  and  cultivated.  Gnosiol- 
ogy  and  Ontology  may  be  treated  to  a  great  extent  to- 
gether in  Metaphysics.  Still  they  can  be  distinguished, 
and  the  distinction  between  them  should  be  steadily  kept 
in  view.  The  one  seeks  to  find  what  are  our  original 
powers,  the  other  to  determine  what  we  know  of  things 
by  these  powers. 

In  order  to  reach  this  second  end,  we  must  go  over, 
one  by  one,  the  various  classes  of  objects  known  by  our 
intuitive  powers ;  but  this  not,  as  in  Gnosiology,  to  de- 
termine what  the  power  is,  but  what  is  the  object  which 
it  looks  at.  I  have  been  seeking  to  accomplish  the  one 
as  well  as  the  other  of  these  all  throughout  this  treatise. 
By  simple  cognitive  or  preseutative  powers  (as  Hamil- 
ton calls  them),  we  know  objects  in  the  singular  and  in 
the  concrete ;  by  consciousness  we  know  self  as  having 
being,  and  capable  of  thought  and  feeling ;  by  percep- 
tion we  know  body  as  extended  and  resisting  pressure ; 
and  by  both  we  know  self  and  not-self  as  having  an  ex- 
istence independent  of  the  mind  contemplating  them. 
By  the  reproductive  powers  we  are  led  to  believe  in  the 
past  event  recalled  by  memory  as  real,  that  is,  as  having 
occurred  in  time  past ;  and  round  space,  known  in  the 
concrete  in  perception,  and  time,  known  with  the  event 
in  reminiscence,  there  gather  a  number  of  beliefs  which 
can  be  ascertained  and  expressed.  Among  the  objects 
thus  known  or  believed  in,  —  and,  it  should  be  added, 
imagined  out  of  the  materials  supplied  by  the  cognitive 
and  reproductive  powers,  —  the  mind  can  discern  neces- 
sary relations,  that  is,  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
objects.  The  mind,  too,  is  led  to  know  and  believe  in  a 
moral  excellence  in  the  voluntary  acts  of  intelligent  be- 
ings, and  to  discover  the  bearings  and  relations  of  moral 
good  and  evil. 


296  ONTOLOGY. 

Such  a  survey  as  this  enables  us  to  determine  what  are 
the  kinds  of  reality  which  the  mind  is  able  to  discover. 
In  sense-perception  and  consciousness  it  is  a  real  thing, 
known  as  having  certain  qualities.     In  our  beliefs,  too, 
we  look  to  a  real  thing  having  attributes.     We  believe, 
we  must  believe,  space  and  time  to  have  an  existence, 
not  as  mere  forms  of  thought,  but  altogether  independent 
of  the  contemplative  mind.     Our  judgments  may  or  may 
not   look    to    a    reality,  for  we  may    discover   relations 
among  imaginary  as  well  as  among  actual  objects.     But 
when   the  objects  are  real  the  relations  discovered   are 
also  real.     The   reality  discovered  by  the  moral  power 
lies  in  a  quality  of  certain  voluntary  acts  performed  by 
persons  possessed  of  conscience  and  freewill.     We  thus 
see  how  such  an  inspection  settles  for  us  not  only  that 
there    is    a   reality,    but    what    is    the   sort    of   reality; 
whether  a  present  or  an  absent  reality,  whether  an  inde- 
pendent reality  or  a  reality  in  objects.     Thus  we  main- 
tain that  abstract  and  general  notions  have  a  reality 
when  the  objects  from  which  they  are  drawn  are  real ; 
but  we  are  not  to  understand,  as  Plato's  language  would 
lead  us  to  believe,  that  they  have  a  reality  independent 
in   some  intelligible  world.     The  relations    of  quantity 
treated  of  in  mathematics  have  a  reality,  but  it  is  only 
in  space  and  time,  and  in  bodies  as  occupying  space  and 
existing  in  time.     Cause  and  effect  have  a  reality  inde- 
pendent of  the  mind  which  observes  them  ;  but  this  is, 
after  all,  in  the  substances  which  act  and  are  acted  on. 
Mor.d  good  and  sin  are  certainly  both  real,  but  their  ac- 
tuality is  in  the  dispositions  of  responsible  beings. 

I  flatter  myself  that  by  the  account  given  in  this 
treatise,  I  have  avoided  the  error  of  those  who  would 
dissociate  the  native  laws  of  the  mind  from  things. 
Some  give  a  priori  principles  a  formative  power  in  the 


KNOWING   AND   BEING.  297 

mind,  and  make  them  add  to  the  objects,  or  even  create 
the  objects.  Now,  they  are  no  doubt  in  the  mind,  but 
they  are  there  as  powers  to  enable  us  to  apprehend  ob- 
jects. They  are  in  our  very  constitution  as  laws,  but  they 
are  laws  in  relation  to  things.  They  exist  as  tendencies 
prior  to  operation,  but  when  they  come  into  action  it 
is  as  cognitions,  beliefs,  and  judgments  in  regard  to 
objects. 

But  what  can  metaphysical  science  do  in  the  way  of 
establishing  the  reality  of  objects  ?  Truly  it  can  do 
very  little  ;  and  by  going  beyond  its  own  narrow  terri- 
tory, by  trying,  for  instance,  to  prove  first  truths,  or  get 
a  ground  for  original  principles,  it  h:is  often  exposed  it- 
self to  most  damaging  assaults.  Still  it  can  do  some- 
thing if  it  keep  within  its  own  impregnable  fortress.  It 
can  show  what  our  original  principles  are,  how  they 
work,  and  what  they  say  ;  and  all  this  surely  is  matter 
of  great  speculative  importance,  independent  of  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  we  can  confide  in  their  depositions. 
In  particular,  it  can  unfold  the  process  by  which  the  mind 
attains  its  convictions,  and  show  how  they  stand  related 
to  things.  Thus — in  consciousness  we  have  the  object 
—  that  is,  self  immediately  under  inspection,  so  that  we 
might  as  well  deny  the  existence  of  the  cognitive  con- 
viction as  of  the  thing  apprehended.  Again,  in  sense- 
perception  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of  an 
extended  object,  and  this  ever  coexisting  with  the  im- 
mediate knowledge  of  self,  so  that  we  may  as  well  deny 
self  as  the  external  object  perceived  by  the  conscious 
self.  Then  our  intuitive  beliefs  are  not  independent 
of  our  knowledge  of  objects  ;  they  all  proceed  on  a  cog- 
nition, or,  as  derived  from  it,  an  apprehension  of  objects. 
It  is  in  contemplating  the  objects  known  or  conceived 
that  we  believe  them  to  have  qualities  which  do  not  fall 


298  ONTOLOGY. 

under  our  immediate  inspection  ;  and,  if  we  deny  our  in- 
tuitive beliefs,  it  must  be  on  principles  which  would  un- 
dermine our  intuitive  knowledge.  Again  :  our  intuitive 
judgments  all  proceed  on  our  cognitions  and  beliefs  ;  on 
comparing  objects  known  or  believed  in,  we  perceive 
them  to  have  certain  necessary  relations  involved  in 
their  very  nature.  Our  original  convictions  thus  consti- 
tute an  organic  whole,  springing  from  immediate  knowl- 
edge as  the  root,  and  rising  into  comparisons  and  faiths, 
as  the  branches  and  leaves. 

As  we  thus  go  round  about  the  tower  of  human  knowl- 
edge, we  find  it  a  compact  structure,  consolidated  from 
base  to  summit.  He  who  would  attack  any  part  must 
attack  the  whole,  and  he  who  would  attack  the  whole 
will  find  every  part  strengthening  it.  The  foundation  is 
sure,  being  well  laid ;  the  building  is  also  sure,  as  being 
firmly  built  upon  it ;  and  he  who  would  assail  the  super- 
structure will  find  the  basis  bearing  it  up  throughout. 

The  objections  which  may  be  advanced  against  the 
reality  of  things  will  be  answered  in  the  chapters  which 
follow. 


CHAPTER  II. 

IDEALISM. 

I. 
There  are  associations  in  the  mind  joined  with  our 
primitive  intellectual  and  moral  exercises.  The  mirth  is 
not  in  the  merry  peal,  nor  the  melancholy  in  the  fune- 
real toll  of  the  bell ;  nor  is  the  music  in  the  flute  or  organ, 
but  in  the  soul  which  breathes  and  beats  and  rings  in  har- 
mony with  the  external  movements.  The  view  differs 
according  to  the  point  from  which  men  take  it,  according 
to  men's  natural  or  acquired  temperaments,  tastes,  and 
characters,  and  according  to  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  are  placed.  How  different  the  estimate  which  is 
formed  of  a  neighbor's  character,  according  as  he  who 
judges  is  swayed  by  kindness  or  malignity,  by  charity  or 
suspicion  !  The  scene  varies  according  to  the  humor  in 
which  we  happen  to  be,  quite  as  much  as  it  changes 
according  to  the  light  or  atmosphere  in  which  we  survey 
it.  Hope  gladdens  everything  as  if  it  were  seen  under 
an  Italian  sky,  whereas  disappointment  wraps  it  in  mist 
and  cloud.  Joy  steeps  the  whole  landscape  in  its  own 
gay  colors,  whereas  sorrow  wraps  it  as  in  the  sable  dress 
of  mourning.  Do  not  such  facts,  known  to  all  observ- 
ers of  human  nature,  and  dwelt  on  by  poets  as  being 
largely  their  stock-in-trade,  prove  that  in  all  our  ideas, 
views,  notions,  opinions,  there  is  a  subjective  element  no 
less  prominent  and  potent  than  the  objective  ?  And  if 
there  be,  what  limits  are  we  to  set  to  it  ?  Is  our  meta- 
physical philosophy  agreed  with  itself  on  this  subject? 


300  ONTOLOGY. 

Or,  with  all  its  refinements,  can  it  draw  a  decided  line 
which  will  forever  separate  the  one  from  the  other? 

1.  All  knowledge  through  the  senses  is  accompanied 
with  an  organic  feeling,  that  is,  a  sensation.  Our  imme- 
diate acquaintance  with  the  external  world  is  always 
through  the  organism,  and  is  therefore  associated  and 
combined  with  organic  affections  pleasing  or  displeasing. 
Certain  sounds  are  felt  to  be  harsh  or  grating ;  others  are 
relished  as  being  sweet  or  melodious  or  harmonious. 
Some  colors,  in  themselves  or  in  their  associations,  are 
felt  to  be  glaring  or  discordant,  while  others  are  enjoyed 
as  being  agreeable  or  exciting.  In  short,  every  sense- 
perception  is  accompanied  with  a  sensation,  the  percep- 
tion being  the  knowledge,  and  the  sensation  the  bodily 
affection  felt  by  the  conscious  mind  as  present  in  the 
organism.  He  who  is  no  philosopher  finds  little  diffi- 
culty in  distinguishing  the  two  in  practice  ;  and  it  ought 
not  to  be  difficult  for  the  man  who  is  a  philosopher  to 
distinguish  the  two  in  theor3^  Every  man  can  distin- 
guish the  sugar  in  itself  from  the  sweet  flavor  which  we 
have  in  our  mouth  when  we  taste  it,  or  the  tooth  and 
gum  from  the  toothache  which  is  wrenching  them  ;  and 
the  metaphysician  is  only  giving  a  philosophic  expression 
to  a  natural  difference  when  he  distinguishes  between 
sensation  and  perception. 

2.  Certain  mental  representations  are  accompanied 
with  emotion.  Thus  the  apprehension  of  evil  as  about 
to  come  on  us,  or  those  whom  we  love,  raises  up  fear  ;  the 
contemplation  of  good,  on  the  other  hand,  as  likely  to 
accrue  to  us,  or  those  in  whom  we  feel  an  interest,  excites 
hope.  This  is  only  one  example  of  the  kind  of  emotions 
which  attach  themselves  to  all  mental  pictures  of  objects, 
as  having  brought,  or  as  now  bringing,  or  as  likely  to 
bring,  pleasure  or  pain,  or  any  other  sort  of  good  or  evil, 


IDEALISM.  301 

and  which  steep  the  objects  in  their  own  fluid,  and  im- 
part to  them  their  peculiar  hue.  Hence  the  gloom  cast 
over  scenes  fair  enough  in  themselves,  as  by  a  dark 
shadow  the  effect  of  the  interposition  of  a  gloomy  self  ob- 
structing the  light ;  hence  the  splendor  poured  over  per- 
haps the  very  same  scenes  at  other  times,  as  by  light 
streaming  through  our  feelings,  as  through  stained  glass 
or  irradiated  clouds.  Hence  the  pleasure  we  feel  in 
certain  contemplations,  and  the  pain  called  forth  by 
others.  Hence  the  fear  that  depresses,  that  arrests  all 
energy,  and  at  last  sinks  its  victim ;  hence  the  hope 
which  buoys  up,  which  cheers  and  leads  to  deeds  of  dar- 
ing and  of  heroism.  But  while  the  two  are  blended  in 
one  mental  affection  in  the  mind,  it  is  not  difficult,  after 
all,  to  distinguish  between  the  object  known  and  the 
accompanying  emotion  ;  between  the  trumpet  sounding 
and  the  martial  spirit  excited  by  it ;  between  the  canvas 
and  oil  of  Titian  and  the  feeling  which  his  ascending 
Mary  raises  within  us,  glowing  and  attractive  as  the 
splendors  of  the  dying  day;  between  our  friend  as  he 
is  in  himself  and  the  deep  and  tender  regard  which  we 
must  entertain  towards  him. 

3.  Certain  ideas  are  associated  with  other  ideas  which 
raise  emotions.  It  does  not  concern  us  at  present  to  ex- 
plain the  nature  of  the  laws  which  govern  the  succes- 
sion of  our  ideas.  It  is  certain  that  ideas  which  have 
at  any  time  been  together  in  our  mind,  either  simultane- 
ously or  successively,  in  a  concrete  or  complex  state,  will 
tend  to  call  forth  each  other  ;  and  an  idea  which  has  no 
emotion  attached  may  come  notwithstanding  to  raise  up 
feeling  through  the  idea  with  which  it  is  associated,  and 
which  never  can  come  without  sentiment.  Thermopylae, 
Bannockburn,  and  Waterloo  look  uninteresting  enough 
places  to  the  eye,  and  to  those  who  may  be  ignorant  of 


802  ONTOLOGY. 

the  scenes  transacted  there ;  but  the  spots  and  the  very 
names  stir  up  feeling  like  a  war-trumpet  in  the  breasts 
of  all  who  know  that  freedom  was  there  delivered  from 
menacing  tyranny.  Thus  it  is  that  the  buds  and  blos- 
soms of  spring,  and  the  prattle  of  boys  and  girls,  call 
forth  a  hope  as  fresh  and  lively  as  they  themselves  are. 
Thus  it  is  that  the  leaves  of  autumn,  gorgeous  though 
they  be  in  coloring,  and  the  graveyard  where  our  fore- 
fathers sleep,  clothed  though  it  be  all  over  with  green 
grass,  incline  to  musing  and  to  sadness.  But  neither  is 
it  very  difficult  to  distinguish  between  an  apprehension 
or  representation  and  its  associated  feeling,  to  separate 
between  the  primrose  and  the  spring  emotion  which 
bursts  forth  on  the  contemplation  of  it,  between  the 
grave  of  a  sister  and  the  sorrowful  tenderness  which  it 
evokes. 

4.  The  mind  of  the  mature  man  cannot  look  on  any  one 
object  without  viewing  it  in  a  number  of  relations.  A 
house  presented  to  an  infant  may  be  nothing  but  a  col- 
ored surface  with  a  certain  outline ;  to  the  mature  man 
it  is  known  as  a  house,  possibly  with  a  loved  dweller 
within.  An  apple  falling  to  the  ground  is  known  intui- 
tively simply  as  an  object  in  motion ;  but  by  the  edu- 
cated man  it  is  known  as  a  vegetable  fruit  falling  to  the 
ground  in  obedience  to  what  seems  a  universal  law  of 
matter.  Does  not  the  mind,  in  such  cases,  add  to  the  ob- 
ject relations  imposed  by  itself  ?  To  this  I  answer,  that 
all  that  the  mind  does  is,  to  add  to  its  original  a  further 
knowledge,  a  knowledge  of  relations  discovered  in  the 
objects  themselves.  The  object  before  us  is  not  merely 
a  colored  shape ;  it  is  a  house,  and  as  a  house  we  are  en- 
titled to  regard  it.  The  apple  falling  to  the  ground  is 
in  fact  a  fruit  obeying  a  power  of  gravitation.  The  let- 
ters of  a  book  are  to  the  infant  mere  black  strokes ;  to 


IDEALISM.  303 

the  child  learning  to  read  they  are  figures,  signs  of 
sound ;  to  the  grown  man  or  woman  they  are  signs  of 
thoughts  or  feelings,  addressed  by  a  writer  to  a  reader  : 
but  the  truth  is,  the  letters  are  real  things  under  all 
these  aspects ;  real  strokes,  real  signs  of  sounds  and 
sense.  So  far  as  we  proceed  accurately,  according  to  the 
laws  of  thought  using  experience,  and  are  employed  in 
discovering  the  actual  relations  of  things,  the  conceptions 
reached  imply  a  reality  quite  as  much  as  the  intuitions 
with  which  the  mind  starts. 

I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  these  are  all,  but  they 
are  the  more  important,  of  the  natural  influences  which 
operate  to  color  or  enlarge  our  knowledge.  The  Author 
of  our  nature  certainly  means  us  to  add  to  our  knowledge 
by  continual  observation,  and  to  graft  the  acquired  on 
the  original  stock ;  and  he  has  superinduced  attached 
sensations,  and  made  the  very  laws  of  our  nature  to  call 
in  associated  thoughts  and  feelings  in  order  to  intensify 
and  elevate  our  enjoyment,  or  in  some  cases  to  be  a  prog- 
nostic of  evil  which  should  ever  be  associated  with  of- 
fence and  disgust.  So  far  as  music  gives  us  more  plea- 
sure than  wire  vibrations,  so  far  as  a  Swiss  valley, 
guarded  by  Mont  Blanc,  or  the  Matterhorn,  or  the  Jung- 
frau,  is  finer  than  an  accumulation  of  grass,  trees,  stones, 
and  snow  ;  so  far  as  the  spot  where  a  great  and  good 
man  was  born  is  more  stimulating  than  the  uninteresting 
hut,  which  is  all  the  bodily  sense  perceives,  —  we  owe  it 
to  the  beneficence  of  God,  who  has  made  us  sensitive  as 
well  as  cognitive  beings.  So  far  as  we  are  led  to  shrink 
from  baser  scenes,  it  is  by  a  provision  which  is  intended 
to  keep  us  back  from  what  might  issue  in  pain  or  in  sin. 
It  should  be  added  that,  while  this  is  no  doubt  the  origi- 
nal intent  of  these  peculiarities  of  our  constitution,  they 
may,  in  the  voluntary  and  sinful  abuse  of  them,  become 


304  ONTOLOGY. 

a  seduction  to  evil  and  a  scourge  to  inflict  the  keenest 
misery.  They  may  lead  man,  through  a  misgoverned 
imagination,  to  paint  in  glowing  colors  a  fictitious  object, 
and  then  pursue  it,  vyhen  he 

"  Sees  full  before  him,  gliding  without  tread, 
An  image  with  a  glory  round  its  head  ; 
This  shade  he  worships  for  its  golden  hues, 
And  makes  (not  knowing)  that  which  he  pursues." 

Thus  it  is  that  the  mind  irradiates  with  a  romantic  tinge 
objects  unworthy  in  themselves,  and  then  goes  on  to 
love  them  and  delight  in  them.  Man  may  thus  come, 
too,  to  be  haunted  by  spectres  of  his  own  creation,  to  be 
mocked  by  his  own  shadow  seen  across  some  of  the 
deeper  gorges  of  the  earth,  and  striding  opposite  as  he 
himself  moves.  Thus  it  is  that  there  are  to  us,  for  our 
gratification,  glowing  colors,  burnishing  what  are  in 
themselves  only  mists  and  damps,  and  spanning  the 
heavens  above  us  with  a  bow  of  hope,  assuring  us  that 
these  waters  which  threaten  will  not  overwhelm  us  ; 
thus  it  is,  too,  that  there  are  hideous  mock  suns  person- 
ating the  very  brightest  light  which  God  has  planted  in 
these  heavens.  Still  the  man  of  good  sense  and  of  sim- 
ple honesty  will  find  no  difficulty  in  distinguishing  prac- 
tically between  things  which  I  have  been  seeking  in  this 
chapter  to  separate  theoretically. 

II. 

Our  imaginations  in  their  wide  excursions  and  our 
fancies  in  their  cameo  forms  have  a  large  field  allotted 
to  them  in  our  nature,  and  this  is  to  be  carefully  culti- 
vated. They  have  a  territory  rich  and  fertile  in  poetry, 
in  romance,  in  art,  and  in  these  they  have  the  privilege  of 
expatiating  at  pleasure.  The  ideal  spirit  is  an  elevated 
and  an  elevating  one.     There   are  elements  in  human 


IDEALISM.  305 

nature  fitted  —  I  believe  intended  — to  produce  and  foster 
it.  It  is  meant  that  sensations  should  warm  our  knowl- 
edge into  a  glow,  that  feelings  should  buoy  up  our  intel- 
lectual notions  into  a  higher  region  than  they  themselves 
can  reach,  and  that  our  colder  apprehensions  should  be 
linked  to  others  which  are  more  fervent.  The  glory 
thus  cast  around  objects,  commonplace  enough  it  may  be 
in  themselves,  renders  them  more  lovable  and  beloved. 
The  melody  which  the  ear  gives  to  the  sound  increases 
our  interest  in  the  thought  or  sentiment  uttered,  and 
turns,  if  I  may  so  speak,  prose  into  poetry.  The  ideal 
spirit  may  be  an  incentive  to  glorious  enterprise  ;  it 
steeps  the  country  before  us  —  mountain,  vale,  sea,  and 
island  —  in  sunlight,  and  thus  allures  us  to  explore  it. 
It  is  especially  elevating  when  it  takes  a  moral  direction, 
when  it  places  before  us  a  high  model  to  which  we  ever 
look,  and  to  which  we  would  become  assimilated,  and 
sets  us  forth  amidst  sacrifices  made,  to  accomplish  some 
high  end,  reaching  forth  far  in  time  or  into  eternity. 
Still,  it  is  of  the  utmost  moment  that  the  person  steadily 
draw  the  distinction  between  our  knowledge  of  the  ob- 
ject and  the  light  in  which  we  view  it. 

Still  idealism  is  to  be  confined  within  very  rigid  limits. 
It  has  no  place  allowed  it  in  science.  Newton  did  not 
seek  to  construct  the  law  of  gravitation  out  of  his  own 
brain,  nor  to  impart  additions  to  it  on  the  pretence  of 
improving  and  beautifying  it.  What  he  did  was  to  dis- 
cover it  and  detect  its  exact  nature.  I  am  aiming 
throughout  this  whole  treatise  to  show  that  idealism  is 
not  entitled  to  have  a  place  in  metaphysics  any  more 
than  in  science. 

I  cannot  but  admire  some  of  the  grand  cosmogonies 
which  have  been  drawn  out  in  Eastern  theosophies,  and 
by  the  genius  of  such  men  as  Plato  and  Leibnitz,  but  all 


306  ONTOLOGY. 

the  while  I  feel  that  they  have  nothing  solid  to  rest  on, 

and  I  find  that  the  actual  world  is  more  wondrous  far 

than  the  ideal   ones.      So  I  am   sure  that  the  realistic 

method,  if  carefully  prosecuted,  will  exhibit  to  us  a  far 

grander  philosophy    than   human    speculation   has    ever 

done. 

III. 

While  much  may  be  said  in  praise  of  the  ideal  spirit, 
I  can  bestow  no  commendation  on  idealism  as  a  philo- 
sophic system,  that  is,  the  system  which  would  raise  our 
associated  sentiments  to  the  rank  of  cognitions.  I  allow 
that  it  is  vastly  superior  to  sensationalism,  which  acknowl- 
edges only  the  visible  and  the  tangible  ;  but,  in  making 
this  allowance,  it  is  proper  to  add  that,  on  the  principle 
that  extremes  meet,  it  sometimes  happens  that  there  are 
persons  at  one  and  the  same  time  sensationalists  and 
idealists,  believing  only  in  the  physical,  and  yet  not  be- 
lieving the  physical  to  be  real.  But,  speaking  of  ideal- 
ism in  itself,  it  is  an  unphilosophic  system,  and,  in  the 
end,  has  a  dangerous  tendency.  Its  radical  vice  lies  in 
maintaining  that  certain  things,  which  we  intuitively 
know  or  believe  to  be  real,  are  not  real.  I  say,  certain 
things ;  for  were  it  to  deny  that  all  things  are  real,  it 
would  be  scepticism.  Idealism  draws  back  from  such 
an  issue  witli  shuddering.  But,  affirming  the  reality  of 
certain  objects,  with  palpable  inconsistency  it  will  not 
admit  the  existence  of  other  objects  equally  guaranteed 
by  our  constitution.  This  inconsistency  will  pursue  the 
system  remorselessly  as  an  avenger.  Idealism  com- 
monly begins  by  declaring  that  external  objects  have  no 
such  reality  as  we  suppose  them  to  have,  and  then  it  is 
driven  or  led  in  the  next  age,  or  in  the  pages  of  the  next 
speculator,  to  avow  that  they  have  no  reality  at  all.  At 
this  stage  it  will  still  make  lofty  pretensions  to  a  real- 


IDEALISM.  307 

ism  founded,  not  on  the  external  phenomenon,  but  on  the 
internal  idea.  But  the  logical  necessity  speedily  chases 
the  system  from  this  refuge,  and  constrains  the  succeed- 
ing speculator  to  admit  that  self  is  not  as  it  seems,  or 
that  it  exists  only  as  it  is  felt  or  when  it  is  felt ;  and  the 
terrible  consequence  cannot  be  avoided,  that  we  cannot 
know  whether  there  be  objects  before  us  or  no,  or 
whether  there  be  an  eye  or  a  mind  to  perceive  them. 
There  is  no  way  of  avoiding  this  black  and  blank  scep- 
ticism but  by  standing  up  for  the  trustworthiness  of  all 
our  original  intuitions,  and  formally  maintaining  that 
there  is  a  reality  wherever  our  intuitions  declare  that 
there  is. 

The  idealist  has  indeed  a  truth,  which  he  weaves  into 
the  body  of  his  system,  but  that  truth  is  misapprehended 
and  perverted.  There  are  impressions  and  inferences 
ever  mingling,  naturally  or  inadvertently,  lawfully  or 
unlawfully,  with  our  knowledge ;  and  he  confounds 
these,  when  it  is  his  business,  as  a  professed  philosopher, 
to  distinguish  them  in  theory  —  as  men  of  common  sense 
ever  distinguish  them  in  practice.  His  system  is  not 
clearness,  but  confusion.  He  has  dived  below  the  sur- 
face, but  has  not,  after  all,  gone  down  to  the  bottom  so 
as  to  see  all,  and  his  view  of  the  deep  is  more  obscure 
than  if  he  had  remained  above.  Amazed  or  enraptured 
with  the  discovery  of  certain  facts  immediately  below 
that  which  is  patent  to  the  vulgar  eye,  he  looks  on  them 
as  the  main  or  sole  facts,  and  henceforth  overlooks  all 
the  superficial  ones,  forgetting  that  it  is  true  in  philos- 
ophy, as  in  geology,  that  the  rock  strata  which  jut  out 
into  the  most  prominent  peaks  are  those  which,  if  we 
follow  them,  dive  down  into  the  deepest  interior.  He 
has  sought  to  attain  a  higher  position,  but  has  stopped 
half-way,  and  his  views,  after  all,  are  not  so  clear  as 


308  ONTOLOGY. 

those  obtained  further  down,  and  they  are  certainly  much 
more  confusing  than  those  which  he  might  have  had, 
had  he  reached  the  clear  height  above  all  dimming  in- 
fluence ;  they  are  at  best  like  those  which  the  traveller 
gets  on  cloudy  days  when  he  has  climbed  a  certain  eleva- 
tion up  the  Alps,  and,  in  the  midway  mists,  catches  oc- 
casional glimpses  of  the  green  valleys  below  him,  and  of 
the  imposing  mountain-tops  and  sky  yet  far  above  him. 


CHAPTER  III. 

SCEPTICISM   AND   AGNOSTICISM. 
I. 

In  what  I  have  to  say  on  this  subject  I  do  not  refer  to 
the  forms  which  scepticism  takes  in  the  common  affairs 
of  life,  where  it  is  often  not  only  legitimate,  but  a  very 
high  duty  to  discharge  in  exposing  lying  and  deceit,  and 
generally,  in  clearing  the  moral  atmosphere.  I  treat  it 
only  as  setting  itself  against  deeper  and  fundamental 
truth. 

Scepticism  may  take  a  variety  of  forms  which,  how- 
ever, differ  in  some  being  more  thorough-going  than 
others,  some  denying  the  veracity  of  certain  of  our  cog- 
nitions, others  denying  the  trustworthiness  of  all.  The 
most  common  form  which  it  takes  in  the  present  day  is 
what  is  called  Agnosticism.  The  difference  between 
this  and  absolute  scepticism  is,  that  while  the  one  denies 
all  truth  the  other  tells  us  that  truth  cannot  be  found, 
especially  in  philosophy  and  religion.  Agnosticism  is 
Nescience  in  that  it  declares  that  we  cannot  find  truth  ; 
Nihilism  in  that  it  asserts  that  there  is  nothing  to  be 
known.  All  these  forms  agree  in  this,  that  they  set  aside 
theoretically  fundamental  truths  and  practically  deprive 
us  of  the  benefit  which  we  might  derive  from  the  lofty 
ideas  and  faiths  which  we  ought  to  cherish.  Like  most 
kinds  of  folly,  scepticism  commonly  does  not  reach  its 
last  stage  at  once,  but  advances  step  by  step.  Some 
philosopher  of  eminence  sets  aside  one  of  our  intuitions, 
and  then  an  advancing  thinker,  impelled  by  logical  con- 


310  ONTOLOGY. 

sistency,  or  by  the  sharpness  of  his  mind,  or  by  levity  or 
wantonness,  or  by  the  love  of  paradox  or  of  notoriety, 
shows  how,  on  the  same  ground,  we  may  deny  them  all. 
It  was  thus  that  Berkeley,  in  denying  the  substantial  ex- 
istence of  body,  prepared  the  way  for  Hume,  who  denied 
the  substantial  existence  of  spirit ;  and  thus  that  Kant, 
in  affirming  that  space  and  time  had  no  existence  out  of 
the  mind,  opened  a  path  for  Fichte,  when  he  declared 
that  the  external  object  in  space  might  also  be  the  crea- 
tion of  the  mind ;  and  for  Scbelling  and  Hegel  when 
they  made  mind  and  matter,  Creator  and  creature,  all 
and  alike  ideal.  I  have  already  discussed  scepticism  dis- 
guised as  idealism ;  I  am  now  to  offer  a  few  remarks  on 
an  avowed  scepticism. 

n. 

Let  us  understand  precisely  how  far  a  sceptic  may  go. 
In  doing  so  it  is  essential  to  remember  the  distinction 
between  the  spontaneous  and  reflex  use  of  our  intuitions. 
Under  the  first  of  these  aspects  they  not  only  claim  au- 
thority, they  secure  practical  concurrence  and  obedience. 
Every  man  knows  that  he  has  a  bodily  frame,  and  be- 
lieves that  it  exists  in  space,  and  that  if  he  would  go  in 
the  nearest  way  to  a  given  point,  he  must  walk  in  a 
straight  line.  Doubt  and  denial  are  possible  only  in  re- 
gard to  the  reflex  statement  of  intuitive  principles. 
Every  man  is  in  fact  convinced  that  he  has  a  solid  bodily 
frame,  and  that  the  nearest  way  to  a  particular  place  is 
a  straight  line  ;  but  it  is  possible  for  him,  if  he  chooses, 
to  deny  the  propositions  in  which  these  truths  are  con- 
veyed ;  it  is  quite  competent  for  him  speculatively  to 
assert  that  he  has  not  a  body,  and  that  the  shortest  road 
to  a  given  point  is  a  crooked  line. 

And  this  leads  me  to  point  out  in  what  respect  seep- 


SCEPTICISM   AND   AGNOSTICISM.  311 

ticisrn  may  be  allowable,  and  wherein  it  may  even  be 
beneficial.  The  dogmatist  often  lays  down  and  employs, 
for  purposes  lawful  and  unlawful,  principles  represented 
as  indisputable,  which  have  not  the  sanction  of  our  con- 
stitution, or  which  may  be  expressed  in  a  form  only  par- 
tially or  approximately  correct.  Great  interests  may 
often  be  involved  in  having  these  principles  doubted  or 
disputed.  Without  this  we  may  find,  before  we  are 
aware  of  it,  great  moral  or  religious  truths  assaulted  or 
undermined  ;  or  we  may  set  up  for  defence  of  the  citadel 
of  truth  a  crazy  and  insecure  turret,  which  is  a  positive 
weakness,  and  which,  as  it  falls,  may  give  an  easier  inlet 
to  the  enemy.  This,  then,  is  the  special  mission  of  the 
sceptic  :  it  is  to  lay  a  restraint  on  the  dogmatist ;  at 
times,  if  need  be,  to  assail  or  to  lash  him.  It  would  be 
wrong  to  deny  that  the  scepticism  of  Hume  has  cleared 
the  philosophic  atmosphere  of  many  weakening  and  de- 
leterious influences  which  had  been  gathering  for  cen- 
turies. The  great  sin  of  scepticism  lies  in  this,  that  it 
attacks  indiscriminately  the  good  and  the  evil,  and  would 
destroy  both  as  by  a  consuming  fire.  But  surely  there 
may  be  a  means  of  securing  all  the  good  ends  which 
scepticism  has  produced,  without  the  accompanying  de- 
struction of  the  good.  Socrates  seems  to  me  to  have 
succeeded  in  this,  when  he  attacked  the  pretentious  sys- 
tems of  his  age,  at  the  same  time  that  he  held  resolutely 
by  every  great  moral  and  spiritual  truth.  Let  it  be  ad- 
mitted that  our  spontaneous  convictions  guarantee  a 
truth,  but  let  it  be  avowed  at  the  same  time  that  any 
given  philosophic  expression  of  them  is  fallible,  and  may 
be  doubted,  disputed,  and  denied.  Let  it  be  understood, 
as  to  every  philosophic  principle  proffered,  that  we  are 
entitled,  nay,  in  duty  bound,  to  examine  it  before  we  as- 
sent to  it,  and  that  the  burden  of  establishing  that  it  is  a 


312  ONTOLOGY. 

thorough  transcript  of  the  law  in  the  mind  lies  on  him 
who  employs  it.  By  this  simple  rule,  rigidly  enforced 
and  scrupulously  followed,  we  might  have  all  the  benefits 
which  have  arisen  from  the  siftings  of  scepticism,  with- 
out its  fearful  throes,  and  its  slaughters  —  terrible  as 
those  of  a  battle-field  —  of  noble  credences  and  inspiring 
hopes. 

III. 

But  what  are  we  to  do  with  the  sceptic,  that  is,  with 
one  who  speculatively  denies  intuitive  truth  ? 

1.  There  are  some  things  which  we  ought  not  to  do 
with  him.  We  should  not  waste  our  precious  feeling  in 
professing  to  sympathize  with  him,  as  if  he  were  practi- 
cally troubled  with  doubts  as  to  the  existence  of  himself, 
or  his  friends,  or  his  enemies,  or  his  food,  or  his  money, 
or  his  earthly  interests  ;  for  in  respect  of  all  these  he  is 
quite  as  firm  a  believer  as  the  man  who  comes  to  con- 
vince him  with  an  apparatus  of  argument.  Nor  need 
we  be  at  the  trouble  of  appointing  a  guard  to  watch  him 
lest  he  run  against  a  carriage,  or  step  into  a  river,  or  fall 
over  a  precipice.  For  whatever  he  may  profess  to  us  or 
to  himself,  he  believes  in  the  existence  of  the  carriage, 
the  river,  and  the  precipice,  and  has  a  salutary  awe  of 
their  perilous  power.  Nor  would  there  be  any  propriety 
in  declaring  him  mad,  and  sending  him  to  Bedlam,  for  he 
only  pretends  to  have  lost  his  senses,  or  rather,  never  to 
have  had  them,  and  in  his  simulation  has  over-acted  his 
part,  and  gone  beyond  the  madman,  who  never  sets  him- 
self against  intuitive  truth,  (a) 

2.  There  are  some  things  which  we  cannot  do  with  the 
sceptic,  and  therefore  should  not  attempt  to  do.  We 
cannot  answer  him  by  argument,  that  is,  mediate  proof ; 
for  this,  if  followed  sufiiciently  far  back,  will  conduct  us 


SCEPTICISM   AND  AGNOSTICISM.  313 

to  a  principle  which  cannot  be  proven,  and  which  there- 
fore the  sceptic  will  deny.  It  can  scarcely  be  regarded 
as  a  complete  refutation  to  demonstrate  that  his  sceptical 
denials  are  inconsistent  with  certain  affirmations  made 
by  him  ;  for  he  may  admit  the  inconsistencies,  and  then 
found  his  argument  against  the  possibility  of  discovering 
truth,  on  the  circumstance  that  he  and  every  other  must 
inevitably  fall  into  contradictions.  It  is  not  even  a  con- 
futation when  it  is  shown  that  this  scepticism  is  suicidal, 
or  violates  the  law  of  contradiction,  for  he  may  find  no 
position  so  suited  to  him  as  that  which  maintains  that  all 
knowledge  is  contradictory. 


IV. 

Still  there  are  some  things  which  we  can  do  for  or 
with  the  sceptic. 

1.  We  may  make  use  of  any  admissions  avowed  by 
him  or  incidentally  made,  in  order  to  shut  him  up  into 
truths  which  he  denies.  Sometimes  we  may  be  able 
to  show  that  the  truth  which  he  allows  implies  the 
truth  which  he  disallows.  In  other  cases  we  can  ask 
him  on  what  principle  or  ground  he  assents  to  certain 
truths  ;  and  when  we  have  his  answer,  we  may  be  able 
to  show  how,  on  the  same  grounds,  he  must  admit 
other  propositions.  Thus  we  ask  the  Berkeleyan  on  what 
ground  he  admits  the  existence  of  the  subject  mind  ;  and, 
whatever  it  be,  we  may  show  that  the  same  ground  sup- 
ports the  doctrine  of  the  existence  of  the  object  matter. 
Thus,  too,  we  may  ask  how  it  is  that  Kant  admits  the 
existence  of  a  thing  behind  the  phenomenon,  and  by 
help  of  this  process  proves  that  the  phenomenon  is  the 
thing.  If  Fichte  admit  an  Ego,  or  a  self,  or  a  belief,  it 
is  competent  to  proceed  thereon  to  show  that  we  are 


314  ONTOLOGY. 

thereby  constrained  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  objects 
out  of  self  and  independent  of  our  belief.  This  argu- 
mentum  ad  hominem  is  perfectly  allowable.  We  can  say 
to  him,  If  you  admit  tJiis,  you  must  also  admit  that.  If 
he  is  so  guarded  and  stinted  in  his  admissions  as  to  say 
that  he  allows  this  merely  practically,  and  not  theoretic- 
ally or  absolutely,  we  are  entitled  to  demand  of  him  that 
he  likewise  believe  that  practically.  Thus,  if  he  admit 
practically  that  he  has  at  any  time  had  (what  Hume 
allows  at  the  outset)  an  impression,  or  idea,  we  may 
show  him  that  he  should  also  admit  practically  that  he 
has  an  abiding  and  an  identical  self,  and  that  he  contem- 
plates objects  out  of  him,  and  independent  of  him,  and, 
as  more  important,  that  he  should  admit  practically  that 
he  is  a  responsible  being,  and  must  give  account  of  him- 
self. Should  he  try  to  save  himself  by  declaring  that 
he  believes  the  fii'st,  or  second,  or  third  of  those  truths, 
only  because  obliged  to  do  so,  we  may  show  that  there 
is  a  similar  necessity  requiring  him  to  believe  the  rest. 
This  is  a  telling  argument,  which  has  been  used  with 
great  skill  and  power  by  many  of  the  opponents  of  scep- 
ticism in  all  ages.  It  is  emphatically  an  argumeiitum  ad 
hominem,  for  it  is  one  which  may  be  used  not  merely 
against  a  particular  individual,  but  with  men  as  men, 
with  every  man.  No  man  but  admits  something,  and 
that  something  may  be  employed  to  make  him  admit 
somethingr  else.  It  can  be  shown  that  he  who  doubts 
believes,  that  he  who  denies  affirms,  and  that  he  who 
doubts  or  denies  that  he  doubts  or  denies,  is  in  the  very 
actof  making  an  affirmation.  Such  a  process  goes  at  least 
to  shut  the  mouth  of  the  sceptic,  for  if  he  open  his 
mouth,  it  is  to  let  out  language  which  you  can  turn 
against  him.  His  only  refuge  is  in  a  thoroughgoing 
scepticism,  which  affirms  that  man's  supposed  knowledge 


SCEPTICISM   AND  AGNOSTICISM.  815 

is  contradictory,  and  that  all  argument  is  delusive.  You 
can  at  least  insist  on  this  scepticism  that  it  remain  silent, 
and  not  advance  arguments  which  are  inconsistent  with 
that  judgment  or  belief  to  which  it  would  appeal.  (6) 


We  can  carefully  explain  the  nature  of  a  primitive  con- 
viction. The  method  named  under  the  last  head  is  one 
which  we  may  quite  legitimately  employ  in  dealing  with 
the  sophist  or  the  caviller  ;  we  may  always  kill  him  with 
his  own  weapons.  But  we  have  a  more  satisfactory 
mode  of  dealing  with  the  truth-seeking  and  the  truth- 
lovinsr.  We  can  ask  them  to  examine  the  nature  of  the 
convictions  to  which  we  invite  them  to  yield. 

1.  It  can  be  shown  that  the  mind  declares  of  itself 
that  its  primitive  perceptions  contain  knowledge.  I  do 
not  urge  this  as  a  mediate  proof,  or  a  new  and  indepen- 
dent proof  ;  it  is  simply  the  statement  of  a  fact,  that  the 
mind,  in  contemplating  its  original  convictions,  affirms 
that  there  is  knowledge  in  them.  As  to  some  of  its 
states,  it  finds  that  they  contain  sensations,  sentiments, 
imaginations,  but  in  every  one  of  them,  at  the  same 
time,  a  cognition  of  self,  and  in  certain  of  them  a  cogni- 
tion of  an  object  or  truth  external  to  self  and  indepen- 
dent of  it.  It  is  to  these  that  we  ask  consent  without 
the  aid  of  further  evidence. 

2.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  intuitive  principles  of 
the  mind  are  native,  catholic,  necessary.  It  is  not  truth 
merely  to  the  individual  man,  but  to  all  men  ;  not  merely 
to  all  men,  but  to  all  intelligent  beings.  It  is  certain, 
not  only  to  me  but  to  all  beings  throughout  the  universe 
who  have  capacity  to  understand  it,  that  if  two  straight 
lines  proceed  an  inch  without  coming  nearer,  they  will 
proceed  a  million  of  miles  without  coming  nearer  ;  and 


316  ONTOLOGY. 

not  only  is  the  wilful  infliction  of  pain  a  sin  on  earth,  it 
is  a  sin  in  every  other  part  of  the  universe. 

3.  The  mind  declares  of  certain  truths  that  they  need 
no  other  truth  to  support  them.  There  are  cases  in  which 
it  feels  that  it  needs  evidence  in  order  to  gain  its  assent. 
It  does  not  allow  that  there  was  such  a  man  as  David, 
king  of  Israel,  or  Philip,  king  of  Macedon,  till  proof  is 
brought  forward.  It  may  remain  in  doubt  as  to  what 
truth  there  is  in  the  poetical  accounts  of  the  siege  of 
Troy,  because  no  valid  evidence  is  produced.  But  it 
draws  a  distinction  between  these  cases  and  others  in 
which  it  needs  no  probation.  When  it  is  asserted  that 
the  moon  is  inhabited,  the  mind  asks  proof,  but  it  asks 
none  when  it  is  affirmed  that  I  am  the  same  person  to- 
day as  I  was  yesterday.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  first 
of  these  assertions  might  be  substantiated  by  evidence 
which  would  command  our  assent,  but  it  would  not,  after 
all,  be  a  more  rational  assent  than  that  which  we  give  at 
once  to  the  other. 

4.  The  mind  knows  self-evident  truth  to  be  the  most 
certain  of  all  truths.  What  is  it  that  the  sceptic  de- 
mands ?  It  is  all-important  to  put  this  question,  and  to 
fix  him  down  to  a  specific  answer.  Does  he  demand 
proof  or  argument  ?  Then  it  implies  that  he  would  be 
satisfied  with  argument.  But  it  can  be  shown  him  that 
in  argument  there  is  a  first  principle  involved,  the  de- 
pendence of  conclusion  on  premises,  and  in  the  last  re- 
sort we  come  to  a  premiss  not  admitting  of  probation. 
But  surely  he  who  admits  argument  must  admit  all  that 
is  in  argument ;  but  as  to  the  premiss  with  which  we  set 
out,  it  is  not  less  evident,  it  is  more  evident,  than  the  con- 
clusion. It  is  so  far  a  weakness  in  a  proposition,  or 
rather  of  our  mind  in  reference  to  it,  that  we  do  not  see 
it  to  be  true  or  false  immediately.     The  mind  declares 


SCEPTICISM   AND   AGNOSTICISM.  317 

that  the   most  certain  of  all  truths  are  those  which  are   # 
seen  to  be  true  at  once  and  in  themselves. 

VI. 

It  can  be  shown  that  there  is  a  congruity  and  con- 
sistency among  the  original  and  derivative  convictions  of 
the  mind.  This  is  not  urged  as  if  it  were  an  indepen- 
dent and  unassailable  demonstration.  It  is  conceivable 
that  the  power  from  which  human  power  derives  its 
power  might  have  made  all  men  liable  to  deception,  in- 
capable of  being  ever  detected,  in  consequence  of  its 
being  carefully  provided  that  no  inconsistencies  should 
creep  in.  This  is  certainly  possible,  though  it  is  by  no 
means  probable,  according,  at  least,  to  our  laws  of  judg- 
ment. For,  if  this  power  be  a  Being  possessed  of  good- 
ness and  truth,  it  is  not  conceivable  that  he  should  form 
any  creature  liable  to  be  deceived  ;  and,  if  it  be  a  ca- 
pricious or  malignant  power,  it  is  by  no  means  probable 
that  all  the  deceptions  would  turn  out  to  be  congruous : 
here  or  there  would  come  out  an  original  conviction  in 
manifest  contradiction  to  another  original  conviction,  or 
a  derivative  principle  openly  inconsistent  with  both.  The 
consistency  of  the  parts  is  thus  a  sort  of  corroboration  of 
the  truth  of  each  part  and  of  the  whole.  To  give  only 
two  examples :  It  is  by  intuition,  I  have  endeavored  to 
show,  that  the  intellect,  on  discovering  an  effect,  looks 
for  a  cause,  and  it  always  finds,  in  fact,  that  for  every 
effect  there  is  a  cause  ;  and  as  it  finds  this  again  and 
again,  in  an  extended  and  invariable  experience,  it  has 
in  this,  not  a  primary  proof,  but  a  secondary  confirma- 
tion of  its  intuition.  Again,  we  expect  that  ^n  will  not 
go  unpunished ;  from  time  to  time  we  find  it  punished  in 
this  life,  and  are  thus  strengthened  in  our  convictions 
that  it  will  all  be  punished  at  last.     All  the  intuitions 


318  ONTOLOGY. 

have  such  corroborations  in  the  daily  experience  of  every 
man,  and  these  are  felt  to  give  a  satisfaction  to  the 
mind  (c). 

VII. 

When  we  reach  the  great  truth  that  there  is  a  right- 
eous God,  we  can  plead  the  Divine  veracity  in  favor  of 
the  trustworthiness  of  the  intuitive  convictions  planted 
by  him  in  our  constitution.  Not  that  even  this  considera- 
tion can  be  adduced  as  a  primary  or  an  absolute  proof  ; 
for  it  is  only  on  the  supposition  that  a  God  exists  that  it 
can  be  legitimately  employed,  and  our  conviction  of  the 
Divine  existence  presupposes  a  confidence  in  the  veracity 
of  our  intuitions  and  arguments  founded  on  them.  But 
this  truth,  being  once  admitted,  becomes  henceforth  the 
keystone  which  keeps  all  the  separate  and  independent 
parts  of  our  constitution  in  one  compact  and  stable 
whole,  which  can  never  be  broken  down,  but  will  be  felt 
to  be  the  stronger  the  greater  the  weight  that  is  laid 
upon  it. 

vni. 

No  truths,  recognized  by  the  mind  as  such,  can  be 
shown  to  be  contradictory.  In  this  line  of  thought  a 
sound  metaphysics  may  accomplish  some  good  ends. 
Sceptics  have  labored  —  and  others  not  sceptics  have 
done  their  best  to  aid  them  —  to  prove  that  certain  prop- 
ositions approved  of  by  the  mind  are  contradictory.  But 
the  attempt  has  failed,  as  can  be  shown,  I  believe,  as  to 
every  case  in  which  it  has  been  tried.  It  can  be  proved, 
in  regard  to  the  opposed  propositions,  that,  in  some  cases, 
they  have  no  meaning ;  that,  in  other  cases,  the  mind 
pronounces  in  favor  of  neither  the  one  nor  the  other ; 
that,  in  several  cases,  the  propositions  seem  to  be  con- 


SCEPTICISM   AND   AGNOSTICISM.  319 

tradictory  only  because  improperly  stated,  and  when 
they  are  properly  enunciated  the  difficulty  altogether  dis- 
appears ;  and  that,  in  the  remaining  cases,  there  is  merely 
a  difficulty  in  proposing  a  positive  reconciliation,  and  no 
actual  inconsistency. 

There  is  little  risk  of  scepticism  producing  any  in- 
jurious influence  in  the  common  business  of  life.  The 
reason  is,  that  circumstances  ever  pressing  on  the  atten- 
tion constrain  men  to  proceed  on  their  spontaneous  prin- 
ciples, which  are  sound,  even  when  the  speculative  prin- 
ciples are  altogether  infidel.  He  who  is  hungry  will 
partake  of  food,  he  who  sees  an  offensive  weapon  about 
to  strike  him  will  avoid  it,  even  though  they  be  not  pre- 
pared to  avow,  as  philosophers,  that  there  are  any  such 
gross  things  as  bread  or  iron  in  the  universe,  or  though 
they  may  doubt,  as  metaphysicians,  whether  food  be  fitted 
to  nourish,  or  a  sword  to  kill.  It  is  not  in  such  ui'gent 
matters  of  animal  comfort  and  temporal  interest  that 
scepticism  is  wont  to  manifest  itself,  but  in  far  different 
subjects,  and  especially  in  leading  persons  to  doubt  of 
the  great  truths  of  morality  and  religion,  the  practical 
action  in  which  is  more  under  the  control  of  the  will. 
Even  here  there  will  be  times  when  the  spontaneous  be- 
lief or  impulse  will  overmaster  the  speculative  unbelief ; 
as  when  moral  indignation,  implying  a  belief  in  the 
reality  of  sin,  is  excited  by  a  mean  or  dishonest  action, 
or  when  disease  has  seized  us,  and  death  seems  in  hard 
pursuit,  and  threatens  to  hurry  us  to  the  judgment-seat. 
Such  occasions  will  call  forth  the  action  of  conscience,  in 
spite  of  all  efforts  to  repress  it.  But  when  there  is  noth- 
ing of  this  description  to  arouse  the  native  feeling,  un- 
belief may  succeed  in  keeping  us  very  much  out  of  the 
way  of  all  that  would  call  the  internal  sentiment  into 
activity,  and  for  days,  or  weeks,  or  months  together  it 


320  ONTOLOGY. 

may  seldom  arise  to  utter  a  protest  or  create  a  disturb- 
ance of  any  description ;  and,  even  when  the  deeper 
moral  or  religious  powers  come  forth  to  assert  their  au- 
thority, there  may  be  a  vigorous,  and  so  far  a  success- 
ful, warfare  waged  with  them ;  that  is,  they  may  be  so 
far  repressed  as  not  to  command  the  will,  or  lead  to  any 
practical  operation.  Hence  the  evil  of  scepticism  in 
chilling  the  ardor  of  youth,  and  confirming  the  hardness 
of  age,  in  repressing  every  noble  aspiration  and  every 
high  effort,  while  it  leaves  the  soul  the  servant  or  slave 
of  the  lower,  the  sensual,  the  ambitious,  the  proud,  or 
the  selfish  impulses  of  the  heart. 

(a)  M.  Morel  was  asked  to  examine  a  prisoner  who  pretended  to 
be  deranged,  and  asked  him  how  old  he  was ;  to  which  the  prisoner 
replied,  "  245  francs,  35  centimes,  124  carriages,"  etc.  To  the  same 
question,  more  distinctly  asked,  he  replied,  "  5  metres,  75  centi- 
metres." When  asked  how  long  he  had  been  deranged,  he  an- 
swered,  "Cats,  always  cats."  M.  Morel  at  once  proclaimed  his 
madness  to  be  simulated,  and  states :  "  In  their  extreme  aberra- 
tions, in  their  most  furious  delirium,  madmen  do  not  confound  what 
it  is  impossible  for  the  most  extravagant  logic  to  confound."  (See 
Psychological  Journal,  October,  1857.) 

(b)  It  is  thus  that  when  Professor  Ferrier  declares  that  we  know  the 
object  mecum,  we  can  show  that  on  the  same  ground,  whatever  it  be, 
he  should  admit  an  object  independent  of  the  me.  He  says  {Scottish 
Philosophy,  pp.  19,  20),  that  "  no  man  in  his  senses  could  require  a 
proof  that  it  [that  is,  real  existence]  is."  I  am  glad  of  this  appeal. 
A  man's  senses  tell  him  that  the  stone  before  us  has  an  existence  in- 
dependent of  the  contemplative  mind. 

(c)  Speaking  of  primary  convictions  of  the  mind,  Hamilton  says : 
"  They  are  many,  they  are  in  authority  coordinate,  and  their  testi- 
mony is  clear  and  precise.  It  is  therefore  competent  for  us  to  view 
them  in  correlation  ;  to  compare  their  declarations ;  and  to  consider 
whether  they  contradict,  and,  by  contradicting,  invalidate  each 
otlier.  This  mutual  contradiction  is  possible  in  two  ways  :  1st,  it 
may  be  that  the  primary  data  themselves  are  directly  or  immediately 
contradictory  of  each  other ;  2d,  it  may  be  that  they  are  mediately  or 


ON  THE  CONDITIONED  AND  THE  UNCONDITIONED.    321 

indirectly  contradictory,  inasmuch  as  the  consequences  to  which  they 
necessarily  lead,  and  for  the  truth  and  falsehood  of  which  they  are 
therefore  responsible,  are  mutually  repugnant.  By  evincing  either 
of  these,  the  veracity  of  consciousness  will  be  disproved  ;  for,  in 
either  case,  consciousness  is  shown  to  be  inconsistent  with  itself,  and 
consequently  inconsistent  with  the  unity  of  truth.  But  by  no  other 
process  of  demonstration  is  this  possible."  He  adds  :  "No  attempt 
to  show  that  the  data  of  consciousness  are  (either  in  themselves  or  in 
their  necessary  consequences)  mutually  contradictory  has  yet  suc- 
ceeded." 


CHAPTER  IV. 

(Supplementary.) 

on  the  conditioned  and  the  unconditioned- 

Leibnitz  complained  of  Sophie  Charlotte  of  Prussia  that  she  asked 
the  wJii/  of  the  wJty.  There  are  some  truths  in  regard  to  which  we 
are  not  warranted  to  ask  the  why.  They  shine  in  their  own  light ; 
and  we  feel  that  we  need  no  light,  and  we  ask  no  lio-ht,  wherewith  to 
see  them,  and  any  light  which  might  be  brought  to  aid  would  only 
perplex  us.  In  all  such  cases  the  mind  asks  no  why,  and  is  amazed 
when  the  why  is  asked  ;  and  feels  that  it  can  give  no  answer,  and 
ought  not  to  attempt  an  answer.  Other  truths  may  be  known  only 
mediately,  or  by  means  of  some  other  truth  coming  between  as  evi- 
dence. I  need  no  mediate  proof  to  convince  me  that  I  exist,  or  that 
I  hold  an  object  in  my  hand  which  I  call  a  pen  ;  but  I  need  evidence 
to  convince  me  that  there  are  inhabitants  in  India,  or  that  there  is 
a  cycle  of  spots  presented  in  the  sun's  rotation.  In  regard  to  this 
class  of  truths  I  am  entitled  —  nay,  required  — to  ask  the  why.  Not 
only  so  ;  if  the  truth  urged  as  evidence  is  not  self-evident,  I  may  ask 
the  why  of  the  why,  and  the  tchy  of  that  why,  on  and  on,  till  we  come 
to  a  self-evident  truth,  when  the  tvhy  becomes  unintelligible.  Now 
we  may  say  of  the  one  class  of  truths  that  they  depend  (to  us)  on  no 
condition,  and  call  them  Unconditioned  ;  whereas  we  must  call  the 
other  Conditioned,  for  our  rational  nature  demands  another  truth  as 
a  condition  of  our  assentincr  to  them. 

But  this  is  not  precisely  what  is  meant,  or  all  that  is  meant,  by 


322  ONTOLOGY. 

conditioned   and  unconditioned   in   philosophic  nomenclature.     We 
find  that  not  only  does  one  truth  depend  on  another  as  evidence  to 
our  minds,  but  one  thing  as  an  existence  depends  on  another.     Every- 
thing falling  under  our  notice  on  earth  is  dependent  on  some  other 
thing  as  its  cause.     All  physical  events  proceed  from  a  concurrence 
of  previous  circumstances.     All  animated  beings  come  from  a  paren- 
tage.    But  is  everything  that  exists  thus  a  dependent  link  in  a  chain 
which  hano-s  on  iiothino;  ?     There  are  intellectual  instincts  which  re- 
coil  from  such  a  thought.     There  are  intuitions  which,  proceeding  on 
facts  ever  pressing  themselves  on  the  attention,  lead  to  a  very  dif- 
ferent result.     By  our  intuitive  conviction  in  regard  to  substance, 
we  are  introduced  to  that  which  has  power  of  itself.     True,  we  dis- 
cover that  all  mundane  substances,  spiritual  and  material,  have  in 
fact  been  originated,  and  have  proceeded  from  something  anterior  to 
them.     But  then  intuitive  reason  presses  us  on,  and  we  seek  for  a 
cause  of  that  cause  which  is  furthest  removed  from  our  view.     It  is 
a  favorite  principle  with  Aristotle   that  there  cannot   be  an  infinite 
series  of  causes  ;  see,  in  particular,  MetapJi.  i.  Minor,  ii.,  where  he 
supports  his  doctrine  by  very  subtle  reasoning.     The  principle  has 
been  sanctioned  by  most  profound  thinkers  ;  see  Clarke,  Demons,  of 
Being  and  Attrib.  of  God,  ii.,  where  the  proposition  is  supported  by 
very  doubtful  metaphysics.     I  am  inclined  to  think  we  come  to  the 
principle  by  finding  that  in  following  various  lines  we  come  to  a  stop  ; 
particularly,  in  following  substance  and  quality,  we  come  to  self-ex- 
istent substance.     Pursuing  various  lines,  external  and  internal,  we 
come  to  a  substance  which  has  no  mark  of  being  an  effect ;  to  a  sub- 
stance who  is  the  cause,  and,  as  such,  the  intelligent  cause,  of  all  the 
order  and  adaptation  of  one  thing  to  another  in  the  universe  ;  who 
is  the  founder  of  the  moral  power  within  us,  and  the  sanctioner  of 
the  moral  law  to  which  it  looks,  and  who  seems  to  be  that  Infinite 
Existence  to  which  our  faith  in  infinity  is  ever  pointing,  —  and  now. 
the  mind  in  all  its  intuitions  is  satisfied.     The  intuitive  belief  as  to 
power  in  substance  is  satisfied  ;  the  intuitive  belief  in  the  adequacy 
of  the  cause  to  produce  its  effects  is  satisfied  ;  the  native  moral  con- 
viction  is  satisfied  ;    and  the  belief  in  infinity  is  satisfied.      True, 
every  step  in  this  process  is  not  intuitive  or  demonstrative,  —  there 
may  be  more  than  one  experiential  link  in  the  chain  ;  but  the  intui- 
tive convictions  enter  very  largely  ;  and  when  experience  has  fur- 
nished  its  quota,  they  are  gratified,  and  feel  as  if  thoy  had  nothing 
to  demand  beyond  this  One  Substance  possessed  of  all  power  and  of 
all  perfection. 


ON   THE   CONDITIONED   AND   THE   UNCONDITIONED.      323 

If  we  would  avoid  the  utmost  possible  confusion  of  thought,  we 
must  distinguish  between  these  two  kinds  of  conditioned  and  uncon- 
ditioned :  the  one  referring  to  human  knowledge,  and  the  discussion 
of  it  falling  properly  under  Gnosiology  ;  the  other  to  existence,  and 
so  falling  under  Ontology.  The  conditional,  in  respect  of  knowl- 
edge, does,  if  we  pursue  the  conditioned  sufficiently  far,  conduct  at 
last  tcr  primary  truths,  which  are  to  us  unconditioned.  These  are 
the  first  truths  which  we  have  been  seeking  to  seize  and  express  in 
this  treatise.  We  cannot  be  made  to  think  or  believe  that  these  pri- 
mary truths  should  not  be  positive  truths,  and  regarded  as  truths  by 
all  other  beings  capable  of  comprehending  them.  But  it  is  to  be 
carefully  remarked,  and  ever  allowed,  that  some  of  those  truths 
which  are  original  and  independent  to  us,  may  be  seen  by  higher  in- 
telligences to  be  dependent  on,  or  to  be  necessarily  interlinked  with, 
other  truths.  We  may  by  patient  induction  ascertain  what  are  to  us 
unconditioned  truths;  but  it  would  be  presumptuous  in  us  to  pretend 
to  determine  what  truths  are  so  in  themselves,  and  are  seen  to  be 
such  by  the  omniscient  God.  Again,  as  to  conditioned  and  uncondi- 
tioned existence,  it  is  quite  clear  that  nothing  falls  under  our  notice 
in  this  world  which  is  absolutely  unconditioned.  But  the  intuitive 
convictions  of  the  mind,  proceeding  on  a  few  obvious  facts,  lead  us 
by  an  easy  process  to  an  unconditioned  Being,  —  that  is,  whose  exist- 
ence depends  on  no  other. 

But  the  question  is  started,  Can  we  conceive  the  Unconditioned  ? 
Of  truth  unconditioned  to  us  we  can  conceive.  Tt  consists,  in  fact, 
of  that  body  of  truths  on  which  we  are  ever  falling  back  in  the  last 
resort;  in  other  words,  of  those  original  perceptions  and  principles 
which  I  have  been  seeking  to  unfold  in  this  treatise.  But  can  we 
conceive  of  unconditioned  existence  ?  I  find  no  difficulty  in  doing 
so.  Our  intellectual  and  moral  convictions  are  not  satisfied  till  we 
reach  underived  beinj.  I  admit  the  word  "  unconditioned  "  is  neg- 
ative;  it  implies  merely  the  removal  of  a  condition.  But  we  re- 
move the  condition,  because  we  come  to  cases  where  our  intuitive 
reason  does  not  insist  on  it,  and  where  our  intuitive  perceptions  rest 
on  underived  existence.  Pursuing  any  one  of  our  native  convic- 
tions, cognitive,  fiducial,  judicial,  or  moral,  it  conducts  us  to,  and 
falls  back  on,  an  object  of  whom  we  have  a  positive  conception,  — 
that  is  a  Beinir  from  whom  all  conditions  are  removed,  and  whose 
existence  and  perfections  are  themselves  underived,  while  they  are 
the  source  of  all  power  and  excellence  in  the  creature. 

The  above  may  seem  to  some  rather  a  prosaic  account  of  a  sub- 


324  ONTOLOGY. 

ject  which  has  been  lost  in  such  high  and  dim  speculations.  But 
the  question  is,  Is  it  the  correct  version?  It  seems  rather  an  arbi- 
trary use  of  language  on  the  part  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  (Metaph. 
Lect.  38)  to  make  the  Unconditioned  a  genus  including  two  species, 
the  Infinite  and  Absolute.  When  the  Unconditioned  is  referred  to, 
let  us  always  understand  whether  it  means  unconditioned  in  thought 
or  existence. 


CHAPTER  V. 

(supplementary.) 
the  antinomies  op  kant. 

Kant  tries  to  show  that  the  speculative  reason  conducts  to  proposi- 
tions which  are  contradictory  of  each  other  (Kritik  d.  r.  Vern.  p. 
338).  It  follows  that  it  cannot  be  trusted  in  any  of  its  enunciations. 
Kant  extricates  himself  from  the  practical  difficulties  in  which  he 
was  thereby  involved,  by  declaring  that  the  speculative  reason  was 
not  given  to  lead  us  to  positive  objective  truth,  and  by  appealing 
from  it  to  the  practical  reason.  It  is,  however,  always  competent  to 
the  sceptic  to  maintain  that,  if  the  speculative  reason  deceive  us,  so 
also  may  the  practical  reason.  The  doctrine  which  I  hold  is,  that 
the  reason  does  not  lead  directly  nor  consequentially  to  any  such 
contradictions.  In  regard  to  some  of  the  counter- propositions, 
Reason  seems  to  me  to  say  nothing  on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 
In  regard  to  others,  there  seem  to  be  intuitive  convictions,  but  the 
contradiction  arises  from  an  erroneous  exposition  or  expression  of 
them.  It  is  of  course  easy,  on  such  abstruse  subjects,  to  construct  a 
series  of  propositions  which  may  seem  to  be  contradictory,  or  in  real- 
ity be  contradictory,  —  if  they  have  a  meaning  at  all.  But  these 
propositions  will  be  found  not  to  be  the  expression  of  the  actual  deci- 
sions of  the  mind.  Let  us  examine  the  contradictions  which  are  sup- 
posed to  be  sanctioned  by  reason.  I  am  to  content  myself  with  look- 
ing at  the  propositions  themselves,  without  entering  on  the  elaborate 
demonstrations  of  them  by  Kant.  These  demonstrations  proceed  on 
the  peculiar  Kantian  principles  in  regard  to  phenomena,  space, 
time,  and  the  nature  of  the  relations  which  the  mind  can  discover, 
and  these  I  have  been  seeking  to  undermine  all  throughout  this 
treatise.  It  will  be  enough  here  to  show  that  Intuitive  Reason 
sanctions  no  contradictions  on  the  topics  to  which  Kant  refers. 


THE  ANTINOMIES   OF  KANT.  325 


FIRST   ANTINOMY. 

The  world  has  a  beginning  in  The  world  has  no  beginning  in 
time,  and  is  limited  in  regard  to  time,  and  no  limits  in  space,  but 
space.  is  in  regard  to  both  infinite. 

Now  upon  this  I  have  to  remark,  first,  that  as  to  the  "world,"  we 
have,  so  far  as  I  can  discover,  no  intuition  whatever.  We  have 
merely  an  intuition  as  to  certain  things  in  the  world,  or,  it  may  be, 
out  of  the  world.  Our  reason  does  declare  that  space  and  time  are 
infinite,  but  it  does  not  declare  whether  the  world  is  or  is  not  infi- 
finite  in  extent  and  duration.  We  shall  find  under  another  anti- 
nomy what  is  our  conviction  as  to  God.  Reason  does  not  declare 
that  space  or  time,  or  the  God  who  inhabits  them,  must  be  finite. 

SECOND   ANTINOMY. 

Every  composite  substance  con-  No  composite  thing  can  consist 
sists  of  simple  parts,  and  all  that  of  simple  parts,  and  there  cannot 
exists  must  either  be  simple  or  exist  in  the  world  any  simple  sub- 
composed  of  simple  parts.  stance. 

Our  reason  says  nothing  as  to  whether  things  are  or  are  not  made 
up  of  simple  substances.  Experience  cannot  settle  the  question 
started  by  Kant  in  one  way  or  other.  We  find  certain  things  com- 
posite ;  these  we  know  are  made  up  of  parts  ;  but  we  cannot  say 
how  far  the  decomposition  may  extend,  or  what  is  the  nature  of  the 
furthest  elements  reached. 

THIRD    ANTINOMY. 

Causality,  according  to  the  laws  There  is  no  such  thing  as  free- 

of  nature,  is  not  the  only  causality  dom,  but  everything  in  the  world 

operating   to  originate  the   phe-  happens  according  to  the  laws  of 

nomena  of  the  world  ;  to  account  nature, 
for  the  phenomena  we  must  have 
a  causality  of  freedom. 

Here  I  think  reason  does  sanction  two  sets  of  facts.  One  is  the 
existence  of  freedom  :  the  other  is  the  universal  prevalence  of  some 
sort  of  causation,  which  may  differ,  however,  in  every  different  kind 
of  object.  These  may  be  so  stated  as  to  be  contradictory.  But  our 
convictions  in  themselves  involve  no  contradiction  :  it  is  impossible 
to  show  that  they  do  by  the  law  of  contradiction,  which  is  that  "  A 


326  ONTOLOGY. 

is  not  Not-A."  "  There  is  some  sort  of  causation  even  in  voluntary 
acts  ; "  and  "  the  will  is  free  ;  "  no  one  can  show  that  these  two 
propositions  are  contradictory. 

FOURTH    ANTINOMY. 

There  exists  in  the  world,  or  in  An  absolutely  necessary  being 
connection  with  it,  as  a  part  or  does  not  exist,  either  in  the  world 
as  the  cause  of  it,  an  absolutely  or  out  of  it,  as  the  cause  of  the 
necessary  being.  world. 

Our  reason  seems  to  say  that  time  and  space  must  have  ever  ex- 
isted and  must  exist.  When  a  God  is  found,  by  an  easy  process  the 
mind  is  led  by  intuition  to  trace  up  these  effects  in  nature  to  him  as 
the  underived  substance.  No  contradictory  proposition  can  be  estab- 
lished either  by  reason  or  experience. 

A  little  patient  investigation  of  our  actual  intuitions  will  show  that 
all  these  contradictions,  of  which  the  Kantians  and  Hegelians  make 
so  much,  are  not  in  our  constitutions,  but  in  the  ingenious  structures 
fashioned  by  metaphysicians  to  support  their  theories. 


CHAPTER   V. 

(supplementary.) 

on  the  relativity  of  knowledge. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  has  not  always  been  successful,  as  it 
appears  to  me,  in  fusing  what  he  adheres  to  in  the  realism  of  Reid 
with  what  he  has  adopted  from  the  forms  of  Kant.  His  own  special 
theory  is  that  of  Relativity,  which  acknowledges  a  reality,  but  de- 
clares that  we  can  never  know  it  except  under  modifications  imposed 
by  our  minds.  It  can  be  shown,  I  think,  that  there  is  a  doctrine  of 
relativity  which  has  been  proceeded  upon,  and  expressed,  though 
commonly  in  a  loose  way,  by  nearly  the  whole  chain  of  philosophers 
from  the  earliest  ages  of  reflective  thought  down  to  the  time  when 
Schelling  and  Hegel  propounded  the  philosophy  of  the  absolute, 
which  has  been  overthrown  by  Hamilton.  But  it  cannot  be  proven 
that  the  great  body  of  metaphysicians  would  have  acknowledged  the 
peculiar  doctrine  of  the  Scottish  philosopher.     There  is  evidently  a 


ON   THE   RELATIVITY    OF   KNOWLEDGE.  327 

true  doctrine  of  relativity,  if  only  we  could  express  it  accurately. 
Il  should  be  admitted  :  (1.)  That  man  knows  only  so  far  as  he  ha5> 
the  faculties  of  knowledge;  (2.)  That  he  knows  objects  only  under 
aspects  presented  to  his  faculties  ;  and  (3.)  That  his  faculties  are 
limited,  and  consequently  his  knowledge  limited,  so  that  not  only 
does  he  not  know  all  objects,  he  does  not  know  all  about  any  one 
object.  It  may  further  be  allowed  :  (4.)  That  in  perception  by 
the  senses,  we  know  external  objects  in  a  relation  to  the  perceiving 
mind.  But  while  these  views  can  be  established  in  opposition  to  the 
philosophy  of  the  absolute,  it  should  ever  be  resolutely  maintained 
on  the  other  hand  :  (1.)  That  we  know  the  very  thing  ;  and  (2.) 
That  our  knowled'T^e  is  correct  so  far  as  it  goes.  We  admit  a  subtle 
scepticism  when  we  allow,  with  Kant,  that  we  do  not  know  the  thing 
itself,  but  merely  a  phenomenon  in  the  sense  of  appearance  ;  or, 
with  Hamilton,  that  we  perceive  merely  the  relations  of  things.  I 
have  endeavored  to  show  that  the  mind  begins  with  the  knowledge 
of  things,  and  is  thence  able  to  compare  things  (see  supra,  p.  58). 
A  still  more  dangerous  error  follows  where  it  is  affirmed  that  our 
knowledge  is  always  modified  by  the  percipient  mind,  and  that  we 
add  to  the  object  something  which  is  not,  or  at  least  may  not,  be  in 
it  (see  supra,  pp.  28,  29). 

Dr.  Mansel,  in  his  able  and  learned  Bampton  Lectures,  has  applied 
this  doctrine  of  relativity  to  the  knowledge  of  God,  with  the  view  of 
undermining,  which  he  has  successfully  done,  the  theology  of  the  ab- 
solute. I  am  prepared  to  show,  by  a  large  collation  of  passages,  that 
the  great  body  of  Christian  <livines  have  maintained  two  important 
points  in  regard  to  our  knowledge  of  God.  One  is  that  man  cannot 
rise  to  a  full  knowledge  of  God,  and  that  there  is  much  in  God 
which  we  cannot  know.  This  arises,  they  show,  from  the  greatness 
of  God,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  weakness  of  man  on  the  other. 
But  they  also  hold  as  another  point,  that  man  may  truly  know  God 
by  the  light  of  nature,  and  still  more  specially  by  the  light  of  reve- 
lation. No  doubt  they  differ  in  the  language  which  they  employ  to 
set  forth  their  views ;  their  mode  of  statement  and  illustration  is 
of  I  en  vague  and  loose  ;  and  they  frequently  employ  the  phrases  and 
distinctions  of  philosophic  systems  whose  day  has  long  gone  by. 
Still  it  can  be  shown  that  they  meant  to  set  forth  both  these  truths. 
To  quote  only  a  few  passages  from  the  Fathers  :  Irenaeus  is  trans- 
lated, "  Invisibilis  quidem  poterat  eis  ipse  (Deus)  propter  eminen- 
tiam  :  ignotus  autem  nequaquam  propter  providentiam  "  (^Contra 
Omnes  Hceret.  ii.  6).      Tertullian  says  :    "  Deus   ignotus   esse  non 


328  ONTOLOGY. 

debuit"  (Adv.  Marcionem,  iii.  3).  In  like  manner  Lactantius: 
"Deus  igitur  noscendus  est  in  quo  solo  est  Veritas  "  (De  Ira,  i.). 
Augustine  illustrates  what  we  can  know  of  God  thus  :  "  Aliud  est 
enim  videre,  aliud  est  totum  videndo  comprehendere  "  (Epist.  Class. 
iii.  21  ;  see  another  passage,  supra,  p.  138).  The  great  body  of 
Christian  divines  have  certainly  not  maintained  :  (1.)  That  God 
can  be  known  only  under  forms  or  modifications  imposed  by  the 
thinking  mind  ;  (2.)  That  our  idea  of  God's  eternity  and  omnipres- 
ence is  simply  negative  ;  or  (3.)  That  man  has  a  faith  in  an  infinite 
God,  with  no  corresponding  knowledge  or  idea.  I  admit,  at  the  same 
time,  that  there  have  been  some  respectable  theologians  holding  a  doc- 
trine somewhat  like  that  of  Hamilton  and  Mansel.  In  particular, 
Bishop  Peter  Browne  maintains  that  the  true  and  real  nature  of  God 
and  his  attributes  is  "  utterly  incomprehensible  and  ineffable  ;  "  but 
then  he  acknowledges  that  the  Fathers  did  not  lay  down  the  distinc- 
tion on  which  he  proceeds,  nor  "  pursue  it  logically  through  all  the 
particulars  of  our  knowledge,  human  and  divine  ;  "  and  he  complains 
in  his  work  on  The  Procedure,  Extent,  and  Limits  of  the  Human 
Understanding,  3d  edit.,  that,  so  far  from  his  views  being  generally 
received,  now,  twenty-five  years  after  their  publication,  "  the  many 
pious  and  learned  defenders  of  the  faith  either  declined  proceeding 
on  the  foundation  there  laid,  or  have  generally  given  only  some  gen- 
eral, short,  and  imperfect  hints  of  the  analogy." 


CHAPTER  VL 

(supplementary.) 


EXAMINATION   OF   MR.   J.    S.    MILL's    METAPHYSICAL    SYSTEM. 

By  far  the  ablest  opponent  of  intuitive  truth  in  this  country,  in 
our  day,  is  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill.  It  will  be  necessary  to  examine 
his  own  metaphysical  system  :  I  speak  thus  because  he  has  in  fact  a 
metaphysics  underlying  his  whole  logical  disquisitions.  He  says, 
indeed,  in  the  introduction  to  his  Logic,  that  "  with  the  original  data 
or  ultimate  premises  of  our  knowledge,  with  their  number  or  nature, 
the  mode  in  which  they  are  obtained,  or  the  tests  by  which  they  may 
be  distinguished,  logic  in  a  direct  way  has,  in  the  sense  in  which  I 


mill's  metaphysical  system.  329 

conceive  the  same,  nothing  to  do."  Yet  Mr.  Mill  is  ever  and  anon 
diving  down  into  these  very  topics,  and  uttering  very  decided  opin- 
ions as  to  our  knowledge  of  mind  and  body,  as  to  the  foundation  of 
reasoning  and  demonstrative  evidence,  and  as  to  our  belief  in  causa- 
tion. This  I  exceedingly  regret ;  the  more  so  that  his  logic  in  topics 
remote  from  first  principles  is  distinguished  for  masterly  exjiosilion, 
for  great  clearness,  and  practical  utility.  If  it  be  answered  that  a 
thorough  logic  cannot  be  constructed  without  building  on  the  foun- 
dations which  metaphysics  supply,  then  I  have  to  regret  that  Mr. 
Mill's  metaphysics  should  be  so  defective.  His  philosophy  might 
seem  to  be  that  of  Locke  ;  but  in  fact  it  omits  many  truths  to  which 
Locke  gave  prominence,  as,  for  example,  the  high  function  of  intu- 
ition. Mr.  Mill's  metaphysical  system  is  that  of  the  age  and  circle 
in  which  he  was  trained  ;  it  is  derived  in  part  from  Dr.  Brown, 
and  his  own  father,  Mr.  James  Mill,  and  to  a  greater  extent  from 
M.  Comte. 

The  only  satisfactory  metaphysical  admission  of  Mr.  Mill  is, 
"Whatever  is  known  to  us  by  consciousness  is  known  beyond  the 
possibility  of  question  "  (Logic,  Introd.).  What  does  this  admission 
amount  to?  First,  as  to  self,  or  mind,  he  says,  "But  what  this 
being  is,  although  it  is  myself,  I  have  no  knowledge,  other  than  the 
series  of  its  states  of  consciousness."  As  to  body,  he  says  the  reason- 
able opinion  is  that  it  is  the  "  hidden  external  cause  to  which  we 
refer  our  sensations  "  (Logic,  l.  iii.  8).  Sensation  is  our  only  primary 
mental  operation  in  regard  to  an  external  world  ;  and  perception  is 
discarded  "as  an  obscure  word  "  (compare  Dissertations,  Vol.  i.  p. 
94).  "There  is  not  the  slightest  reason  for  believing  that  what  we 
call  the  sensible  qualities  of  the  object  are  a  type  of  anything  in- 
herent in  itself,  or  bear  any  affinity  to  its  own  nature. "  "  Why  should 
matter  resemble  our  sensations  ? "  (Logic,  i.  iii.  7).  Speaking  of 
bodies,  and  our  feelings  or  states  of  consciousness,  he  says  :  "  The 
bodies,  or  external  objects  which  excite  certain  of  these  feelings,  to- 
gether with  the  powers  or  properties  whereby  they  excite  them, — 
these  being  included  rather  in  compliance  with  common  opinion,  and 
because  their  existence  is  taken  for  granted  in  the  common  language, 
from  which  I  cannot  deviate,  than  because  the  recognition  of  such 
powers  or  properties  as  real  existence  appears  to  be  warranted  by  a 
sound  philosophy."  It  is  curious  to  see  how  extremes  meet.  Mr. 
Mill  seems  in  every  way  the  opponent  of  the  Kantian  school.  Yet 
he  quotes  with  approbation  and  evident  delight  the  words  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  "  All  that  we  know  is  therefore  phenomenal,  phenomenal 
of  the  unknown  "  (l.  iii.  7). 


330  ONTOLOGY. 

I  have  to  ask  my  readers  to  compare  this  philosophic  system  with 
the  account  I  have  submitted  in  this  treatise,  and  judge  for  them- 
selves in  the  light  of  consciousness.  He  admits  that  whatever  is 
known  by  consciousness  is  beyond  possibility  of  question  ;  but  I  hold 
that  by  consciousness  we  know  much  more  than  he  admits.  He 
allows  that  we  know  "  Feelings,"  —  the  favorite  but  most  inadequate 
lano-uafi'e  of  the  French  sensationalists  and  of  Brown.  I  maintain 
that  our  consciousness  is  of  Self  as  Feeling,  and  not  of  Feelings 
separate  from  Self.  If  he  ask  me  to  define  Self,  which  I  maintain 
that  we  thus  know,  I  ask  him  to  define  Feeling,  which  he  acknowl- 
edges that  we  thus  know.  It  will  then  be  seen  that  neither  can  be 
defined,  because  both  are  original  perceptions  of  consciousness.  He 
admits  as  indisputable  only  what  we  are  conscious  of.  I  maintain 
that  we  must  admit  all  we  intuitively  know,  and  that  vve  know  body 
immediately.  Mr.  Mill,  following  Brown,  maintains  that  we  know 
body  by  inference,  as  the  cause  of  what  we  feel.  Brown  can  get  the 
inference ;  for  he  holds  resolutely  by  the  doctrine  that  we  intuitively 
believe  that  every  effect  has  a  cause  ;  and  discovering  phenomena  in 
us  which  have  no  cause  in  us,  he  seeks  for  a  cause  without  us.  This 
process  would,  I  think,  leave  the  external  world  an  unknown  thing, 
and  could  never  give  us  a  knowledge  of  extension  (which  not  being 
in  the  effect  we  could  not  place  in  the  cause  )  ;  still  we  might  thus 
argue  that  an  external  world  existed.  But  how  can  Mr.  JNIill,  who 
denies  intuitive  causation,  get  the  external  world  at  all?  Where,  in- 
deed, is  he  to  get  even  his  causation  as  an  experiential  law  ?  For  in 
a  mind  shut  up  darkly  from  all  direct  knowledge  of  anything  be- 
yond, the  most  common  phenomena  must  be  sensations  and  feelings 
of  which  we  can  never  discover  a  cause,  or  know  that  they  have  a 
cause.  Kant  saved  himself  from  the  consequences  of  his  speculative 
system  by  calling  in  the  Practical  Reason  ;  and  Hamilton  accom- 
plished the  same  end  by  calling  in  Faith.  I  think  that  these  great 
men  were  entitled  to  appeal  to  our  moral  convictions  and  to  our 
neci'ssary  faiths.  These  I  hold  to  be  beyond  dispute,  no  less  than 
our  consciousness  or  our  feelings.  But  Mr.  Mill  makes  no  such  ap- 
peal to  save  him  from  the  void  ;  and  he  abstains  from  expressing  any 
opinion  as  to  the  great  fundamental  religious  truths  which  men  have 
in  all  ages  intertwined  with  their  ethical  principles,  and  from  which 
they  have  derived  their  brightest  hopes  and  deepest  assurances.  He 
is  silent  on  these  subjects,  as  if,  on  the  one  hand,  unwilling  to  deny 
them,  and  as  if  he  felt,  on  the  other  hand,  that  by  his  miserably  de- 
fective philosophic  principles  he  had  left  himself  no  ground  on  which 
to  build  them. 


mill's  metaphysical  system.  331 

Mr.  Mill's  derivative  logic  is  admirable;  but  it  is  difficult  to  find 
what  the  final  appeal  is  to  be.  "  There  is  no  appeal  from  the  hu- 
man faculties  generally;  but  there  is  an  appeal  from  one  faculty  to 
another,  from  the  judging  faculty  to  those  which  take  cognizance  of 
fact,  the  faculties  of  sense  and  consciousness  "  (iii.  xxi.  1).  This 
would  seem  to  make  sense  and  consciousness  the  final  appeal.  But 
all  that  sense  gives,  according  to  him,  is  an  unknown  cause  of  feel- 
iuofs,  and  all  that  consciousness  gives  is  a  series  of  feelings.  He 
says,  very  properly,  that  we  should  make  "  the  opinion  agree  with 
the  fact;"  but  he  seems  to  leave  us  no  means  of  getting  at  any 
other  facts  than  floating  feelings. 

I  have  already  noticed  his  defective  account  of  our  moral  percep- 
tion (see  supra,  p.  225),  and  of  our  belief  in  causation  (p.  214),  and  I 
may  yet  have  occasion  to  refer  to  his  theory  of  mathematical  axioms 
{infra,  p.  348).  It  now  only  remains  at  this  place  to  show  that  he  has 
given  an  utterly  erroneous  account  of  the  tests  or  criteria  of  primitive 
or  fundamental  truth.  He  is  obliged,  as  for  himself,  to  admit  some 
sort  of  test.  We  must  admit,  he  says,  "  all  that  is  known  by  con- 
sciousness ;  "  and  he  says  there  is  "no  appeal  from  the  human 
faculties  generally."  I  do  regret  that  he  has  never  patiently  set  him- 
self to  inquire  what  is  the  knowledge  given  by  "consciousness,"  and 
in  the  testimonies  of  the  "  faculties  generally."  This  would  have 
led  him  to  truths  which  he  ignores,  or  contemptuously  sets  aside. 
He  examines  the  views  of  the  defenders  of  necessary  truth  on  the 
supposition  that  the  test  of  such  truth  is  that  "  the  negation  of  it  is 
not  only  false  but  inconceivable  "  {Logic,  ii.  v.  6).  He  then  uses 
the  word  "inconceivable"  in  all  its  ambiguity  of  meaning.  By 
"  conceivable  "  he  often  means  that  which  we  can  apprehend,  or  of 
which  we  may  have  an  idea,  in  the  sense  of  an  image  :  "  When  we 
have  often  seen  or  thought  of  two  things  together,  and  have  never  in 
any  one  instance  either  seen  or  thought  of  them  separately,  there  is, 
by  the  primary  law  of  association,  an  increasing  difficulty,  which 
may  in  the  end  become  insuperable,  of  conceiving  the  two  things 
apart."  He  then  proceeds  to  show  that  what  is  inconceivable  by 
one  man  is  conceivable  by  another  ;  that  what  is  inconceivable  in  one 
age  may  become  conceivable  in  the  next.  "  There  was  a  time  when 
men  of  the  most  cultivated  intellects,  and  the  most  emancipated  from 
the  dominion  of  early  prejudice,  would  not  credit  the  existence  of 
antipodes  "  (ii.  v.  6).  I  acknowledge  that  the  tests  of  intuition  have 
often  been  loosely  stated,  and  that  they  have  also  been  illegitimately 
applied;  just  as  the  laws  of  derivative  logic  have  been.     But  they 


332  ONTOLOGY. 

have  seldom  or  never  been  put  in  the  ambiguous  form  in  which  Mr. 
Mill  understands  them;  and  it  is  only  in  such  a  shape  that  they  could 
ever  be  supposed  to  cover  such  beliefs  as  the  rejection  of  the  rotund- 
ity of  the  earth.  The  tests  of  intuition  can  be  clearly  enunciated, 
and  can  be  so  used  as  to  settle  for  us  what  is  intuitive  truth.  It  is 
not  the  power  of  conception,  in  the  sense  either  of  phantasm  or 
notion,  that  should  be  used  ag  a  test,  but  it  is  self-evidence  with 
necessity;  the  necessity  of  cognition,  if  the  intuition  be  a  cognition; 
the  necessity  of  belief,  if  it  be  a  belief;  the  necessity  of  judgment,  if 
it  be  a  judgment.  There  was  a  time  when  even  educated  men  felt  a 
difficulty  in  conceioing  the  antipodes,  because  it  seemed  contrary,  not 
to  intuition,  but  to  their  limited  experience  ;  but  surely  no  one  know- 
ing anything  of  •philosophy,  or  of  what  he  was  speaking,  would  have 
maintained,  at  any  time,  that  it  was  self-evident  that  the  earth  could 
not  be  round,  and  that  it  was  impossible,  in  any  circumstances,  to 
believe  the  opposite.  The  tests  of  intuition,  clearly  announced  and 
rigidly  applied,  give  their  sanction  only  to  such  truths  as  all  men 
have  spontaneously  assented  to  in  all  ao-es. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
(supplementary.) 

THE   NESCIENCE    THEORY.  —  MR.    HERBERT    SPENCER. 

In  the  reaction  against  the  high  ideal  or  h  priori  philosophy  of  the 
past  age,  we  run  a  considerable  risk  of  sinking  into  a  systematic 
Nescience,  in  the  darkness  of  which  there  mav  be  quite  as  much 
rash  speculation  as  in  the  empyrean  of  transcendentalism.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  who  did  so  much  to  overthrow  the  Philosophv  of  the 
Absolute,  has  unfortunately  prepared  the  way  for  this  other  extreme. 
Comparing  the  two  philosophies,  he  says  :  "  In  one  respect  both 
coincide;  for  both  agree  that  the  knowledge  of  Nothing  is  the  prin- 
ciple or  result  of  all  true  philosophy:  — 

Scire  Nihil,  —  studiiim,  quo  nos  la^tamur  ufrique. 

But  the  one  openly  maintaining  that  tlie  Nothing   must  yield  every- 


THE  NESCIENCE   THEORY.  333 

thing  is  a  philosophic  omniscience;  whereas  the  other  holding  that 
Nothing  can  yield  nothing  is  a  philosophic  nescience.  In  other 
words,  the  doctrine  of  the  Unconditioned  is  a  philosophy  confessinor 
relative  ignorance,  but  professing  absolute  knowledge;  while  the  doc- 
trine of  the  conditioned  is  a  j)hilosophy  professing  relative  knowl- 
edge, but  confessing  absolute  ignorance  "  (Discus.  App.  i.  riiilos. 
A).  Dr.  Mansel  has  applied  the  principles  of  Hamilton  to  the  over- 
throw of  the  Absolute  Theology  which,  he  shows,  has  involved  itself 
in  inextricable  inconsistencies  and  contradictions.  But  it  was  seen 
by  all  men  capable  of  looking  at  consequences,  that  the  doctrine 
might  be  turned  to  far  different  purposes.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in 
his  First  Principles,  professes  to  build  on  the  ground  furnished  to 
him  by  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  and  has  reached  results  which  they 
would  disavow.  It  remains  for  the  school  of  Hamilton  to  show 
whether  this  can  be  done  with  logical  consistency.  He  justly  ob- 
serves that  "  it  is  rigorously  impossible  to  conceive  that  our  knowl- 
edge is  a  knowledge  of  appearances  only,  without  at  the  same  time 
conceiving  a  reality  of  which  they  are  appearances ;  for  appearances 
without  reality  is  unthinkable  "  (p.  88).  But  then  he  maintains 
that  this  Reality  beyond  the  appearances  is  and  must  forever  remain 
unknown  to  man.  Nor  is  his  general  doctrine  much  improved  by 
his  allowing  that  "besides  definite  consciousness  there  is  an  indefi- 
nite consciousness  which  cannot  be  formulated,"  for  this  indefinite 
thing  is  only  the  faith  and  negative  judgments  of  Hamilton  in  a  still 
vaguer  form.  He  reckons  it  the  province  of  science  to  master  the 
known  appearances;  and  he  allots  to  religion  the  sphere  of  unknown 
realities,  "  that  unascertained  something  which  phenomena  and  their 
relations  imply  "  (p.  17).  This  is  the  "  fundamental  verity,"  "  com- 
mon to  all  religions,"  "  the  ultimate  religious  truth  of  the  highest 
possible  certainty,"  that  "  the  Power  which  the  universe  manifests  to 
us  is  utterly  inscrutable."  He  quotes  with  approbation  the  language 
of  Hamilton  about  its  being  the  highest  effort  of  thought  to  erect  ail 
altar  "  to  the  unknown  and  unknowable  God  ;  "  and  as  to  this  un- 
known he  thinks  it  right  "to  refrain  fi'om  assigning  to  it  any  at- 
tributes whatever,  on  the  ground  that  such  attributes,  derived  as 
they  must  be  from  our  own  natures,  are  not  elevations  but  degrada- 
tions "  (p.  109).  Looking  to  the  interests  both  of  philosophy  and 
religion,  it  is  of  great  moment  to  lay  an  arrest  on  this  style  of 
thought,  —  quite  as  important  as  it  was  to  stay  in  last  age  the  now 
exploded  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  I  meet  it  by  maintaining  as 
the  proper  postulate,  sanctioned  by  consciousness,  that  the  mind  be- 


334  ONTOLOGY. 

gins  with  a  knowledge  of  things,  partial  no  doubt,  but  still  correct 
so  far  as»it  goes.  From  this  primitive  knowledge  and  adhering  be- 
liefs it  reaches  further  knowledge.  In  particular,  the  real  effects  in 
nature  carry  us  up  to  a  real  cause.  The  evidences  of  design  argue 
an  adequate  cause  in  an  intelligent  designer,  and  the  nature  of  the 
moral  power  in  man  and  of  the  moral  government  of  the  world  is 
proof  of  the  existence  of  a  Moral  Governor.  "  The  invisible  thinf^s 
of  him  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen,  bein"-  under- 
stood {voovtieva)  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his  eternal  power 
and  Godhead."  Should  it  come  to  be  thought  that  religion  has  only 
the  sphere  of  the  "  unknown  and  unknowable,"  I  am  sure  it  would 
disappear  from  our  world  as  a  living  power.  When  the  apostle  beheld 
the  altar  with  the  inscription,  "  To  the  Unknown  God,"  he  hastened 
to  proclaim  a  Known  God:  "  Whom  therefore  ye  ignorantly  worship, 
him  declare  I  unto  you.     God  that  made  the  world,"  etc. 

Mr.  Spencer,  in  his  Psychology,  insists  that  we  seek  an  Ultimate 
Datum  or  Postulate.  He  finds  such  a  Postulate  in  Belief.  He  does 
not  very  distinctly  explain  what  is  involved  in  belief.  He  says 
(p.  14)  that  "  belief  is  the  recognition  of  existence."  If  he  had  left 
out  the  re  as  implying  something  prior  brought  back,  and  said  cog- 
nition, his  statement  would  have  been  correct.  Again,  he  says, 
"  Every  logical  act  of  the  intellect  is  a  predication,  is  an  assertion 
that  something  is,  and  this  is  what  we  call  belief."  I  do  not  admit 
that  all  cognition  is  predication  (see  supra,  p.  182),  but  taking  his 
explanation,  I  ask  my  readers  to  consider  how  much  is  implied  in 
this  predication  that  something  is,  in  this  cognition  of  existence  ;  and 
the  postulate,  if  it  is  not  unmeaning,  or  if  its  meaning  is  not  suicidal, 
must  postulate  all  that  is  in  it,  must  postulate  existence  and  some- 
thing existing.  I  maintain,  further,  that  a  something  can  be  known 
as  existing  only  so  far  as  we  know  it  to  be  something,  that  is,  know 
sometliing  of  it,  that  is,  know  some  quality  of  it.  Setting  out  with 
something,  I  hold  that  all  the  consequences  logically  drawn  alt^o  im- 
pl)'  existence,  and  something  existing  with  some  quality.  By  such  a 
process  we  find  ourselves  reaching  further  knowledge  and  other  reali- 
ties. ]\Ir.  Spencer,  quite  in  the  spirit  of  the  German  speculatists, 
will  admit  only  one  ultimate  postulate;  what  he  calls  belief.  On  the 
ground  on  which  he  calls  in  the  one,  I  think,  he  is  bound  to  admit 
others,  —  what  I  call  beliefs  and  judgments,  intellectual  and  moral. 
By  tliese,  and  by  ordinary  observation,  we  rise  to  a  God  who  is  not 
an  unknown  God. 

He  says  (p.  28) :  "  Not  only  is  the  invariable  existence  of  a  belief 


THE  NESCIENCE  THEORY.  335 

our  sole  warrant  for  every  truth  of  immediate  consciousness,  and  for 
every  primary  generalization  of  the  truths  of  immediate  conscious- 
ness, every  axiom,  but  it  is  our  sols  warrant  for  every  demonstra- 
tion." There  is  surely  some  confusion  of  statement  here.  I  will 
not  insist  on  the  circumstance  that  generalization  must  imply  a  dis- 
cursive ])rocess.  I  remark  upon  the  princii)le  that  invariable  ex- 
istence is  the  warrant  of  the  truths  of  immediate  consciousness.  I 
should  rather  say,  that  the  belief  invariably  exists,  since  we  have  in 
sense-perception  and  self-consciousness  the  object  before  us,  and  we 
perceive  it.  According  to  Mr.  Spencer  (p.  27),  "  In  the  proposition 
'I  am,'  no  one  who  utters  it  can  find  any  proof  but  the  invariable 
existence  of  the  belief  in  it."  I  should  rather  say,  that  the  belief  is 
so  invariable  since  all  men  have  invariably  the  object  self  under  their 
view.  Mr.  Spencer  lays  down  the  further  principle  (p.  2G),  "  The 
inconceivability  of  its  nep;ation  is  the  test  by  which  we  ascertain 
whether  a  given  belief  invariably  exists  or  not  ;  "  and  then  in  the 
application  he  uses  the  word  "  conceiving  "  (with  its  derivatives)  in 
all  its  various  meanings,  as  imaging,  apprehending  in  a  notion,  know- 
ing, believing,  judging.  He  says  acutely,  in  criticising  Hume  (p.  49), 
"  For  what  is  contained  in  the  concept,  —  an  impression?  Translate 
the  word  into  thought,  and  there  are  manifestly  involved  a  thing  im- 
pressing and  a  thing  impressed.  It  is  impossible  to  attach  any  idea 
to  the  word  save  by  the  help  of  these  two  other  ideas."  Now,  I  ask 
him  to  translate  in  the  same  manner  his  own  language,  and  it  will 
imply  a  thing  cognizing,  and  an  existing  thing  cognized.  Negation 
may  no  doubt  be  used  as  a  test,  but  it  is  a  secondary  one,  throwing 
us  back  on  the  primary  one  of  self-evidence;  and  the  negation  used 
as  a  test  must  not  be  of  conception,  but  the  impossibility  of  not  know- 
ing when  the  primitive  conviction  is  a  cognition,  of  not  believing 
when  it  is  a  belief,  and  of  not  judging  in  a  particular  way  when  it  is 
a  comparison.  Such  tests  carry  us  on  from  primary  knowledge  to 
further  knowledge,  embracing  the  existence  of  God. 

It  does  not  concern  us  in  this  treatise  to  examine  Mr.  Spencer's 
ambitious  attempt  to  explain  the  formation  of  the  present  state  of  the 
cosmos,  by  means  of  an  unknown  Infinite  necessitated  by  thought, 
and  certain  forces.  It  could  easily  be  shown  that  there  are  tremendous 
chasms  in  the  process  which  he  has  unfolded.  The  forces  which  he 
is  obliged  to  postulate  may  so  far  account  for  certain  physical  phe- 
nomena, such  as  the  size,  shape,  and  movements  of  the  planets.  But 
they  give  no  explanation  of  sensation,  or  emotion,  or  consciousness, 
or  belief,  or  intuition,  or  judgment,  or  the  sense  of  beauty,  or  reason- 


336  ONTOLOGY. 

ing,  or  desire,  or  volition.  Great  as  are  the  author's  intellectual 
powers,  he  has  attempted  a  task  far  beyond  them,  —  I  believe  beyond 
human  capacity,  certainly  far  beyond  it  at  the  present  stage  of  sci- 
ence. The  attempt  by  this  giant  mind  to  reach  an  unapproachable 
height,  by  heaping  Ossa  on  Pelion,  must  turn  out  a  lamentable 
failure.  This  in  regard  to  his  theory  as  a  whole ;  but  his  bold  gen- 
eralizations are  always  suggestive,  and  some  of  them  may  in  the  end 
be  established  as  the  profoundest  laws  of  the  knowable  universe. 


BOOK  IV. 

METAPHYSICS  IN  THE  VARIOUS  SCIENCES. 
CHAPTER  I. 

METAPHYSICS   IN  THE  COMMON    AFFAIRS   OF   LIFE. 

The  act  of  breathing  does  not  make  us  physiologists. 
Nor  does  the  use  of  First  Principles  make  us  metaphysi- 
cians. Just  as  we  all  use  physiological,  so  do  we  also 
employ  metaphysical  principles  without  being  conscious 
of  it.  Our  primitive  cognitions,  beliefs,  and  judgments 
are  involved  in  what  we  think  and  do  from  day  to  day 
and  from  hour  to  hour,  almost  from  minute  to  minute  of 
our  waking  existence. 

We  assume  that  we  are  in  space  and  move  in  it. 
We  act  on  the  principle  that  the  shortest  distance  be- 
tween two  points  is  a  straight  line.  The  farmer  does 
not  attempt  to  close  in  a  field  by  two  straight  lines. 
We  carry  with  us  a  conviction  of  our  personality.  We 
trust  our  memories  and  believe  in  the  continuity  of  time 
and  can  find  no  limit  to  it.  We  proceed  on  the  being 
and  identity  of  objects,  especially  our  personal  identity. 
We  are  constantly  separating  parts  and  combining  them 
into  wholes.  We  delight  to  discover  resemblances  and 
to  view  things  in  classes.  We  are  ever  comparing  the 
sizes  of  objects  and  observing  their  proportions.  We  de- 
light to  notice  the  activities  of  things,  and  we  perceive 
that  they  influence  us  and  have  power  over  each  other. 
Whenever  we  will  to  take  a  step  in  walking  or  to  utter 


338  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE  VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

a  sound,  we  are  employing  the  principle  of  cause  and 
effect. 

Our  consciences  are  constantly  guiding  and  guarding 
us,  in  doing  this  honest  and  declining  this  base  transac- 
tion. When  we  talk,  or  when  we  write,  there  is  a  con- 
straint constantly  laid  upon  us  by  the  principle  that  we 
should  speak  the  truth.  In  our  money  transactions  we 
are  bound  by  the  fixed  principle  of  honesty.  On  seeing 
a  human  being  in  distress,  the  royal  law  of  love  requires 
that  we  hasten  to  relieve  him.  Our  moral  nature,  follow- 
ing the  law  of  love  i-egulated  by  law,  insists  on  our  con- 
stantly showing  kindness  to  our  families,  our  friends, 
and  neighbors. 

All  this  does  not  show  that  we  are  metaphysicians, 
but  it  proves  that  we  are  constantly  exercising  qualities 
which  the  metaphysician  should  observe. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    PHYSICS. 

We  have  heard  of  the  man  in  the  French  play  who 
was  amazed  to  find  that  he  had  been  speaking  prose  all 
his  life  without  knowing  it.  I  believe  that  in  like  man- 
ner physicists  are  constantly  using  metaphysics  without 
having  the  least  suspicion  of  it ;  many  of  them  would 
indignantly  repel  the  charge,  if  brought  against  them. 

The  physical  sciences  must  ever  be  conducted  in  the 
method  of  induction,  with  sense  and  artificial  instruments 
as  the  agents  of  observations.  But  it  has  often  been  re- 
marked that  all  scientific  investigation,  indeed  all  inquiry, 
if  pursued  suflBciently  far  down,  conducts  into  mystery, 
often  into  insoluble  problems.  It  will  be  found  that 
these  are  the  underlying  regulative  principles  which  the 
metaphysician  should  seek,  if  not  to  explain,  at  least  to 
express.  It  is  not  the  special  business  of  the  physical 
sciences  to  inquire  into  the  nature  or  guarantee  of  ulti- 
mate truths.  This  work  it  leaves  very  properly  to  meta- 
physicians, who  should  be  prepared  to  announce  laws  of 
intuition  on  which  the  physicist  might  rest,  when  he 
finds  himself  sinking  too  far  down.  They  might  be 
more  profitably  employed  in  such  a  work,  which  lies 
exclusively  in  their  own  province,  than  in  pursuing  wild 
speculative  ends,  which  can  never  be  attained  by  human 
reason. 

The  powers  in  nature  are  so  distributed  and  arranged 
that  they  issue  in  order,  in  respect  of  such  qualities  as 
space,  time,  quantity,  and  energy.  To  these  mathema- 
tics can  be  successfully  applied,  and  they  come  in  with 


340  METAPHYSICS   IN   THE   VARIOUS  SCIENCES. 

all  their  axioms  and  demonstrations,  which  are  seen  to 
be  true  at  once,  as  will  be  shown  in  a  later  chapter. 
Thus  both  in  statics  and  dynamics,  in  certain  depart- 
ments of  mechanics,  astronomy,  optics,  and  thermotics, 
we  come  down  in  the  last  resort  to  truths  which  are 
beneath  physics,  and  within  metaphysics. 

Most,  if  not  all,  of  our  intuitive  convictions,  have  a 
place  in  the  foundation  of  the  deeper  physical  sciences. 
Thus  the  conviction  as  to  the  identity  of  being  leads  us 
to  chase  the  substance  through  the  various  forms  it  may 
assume,  and  constrains  those  who  are  most  opposed  to 
hypotheses  to  speak  of  ultimate  atoms  or  molecules. 
The  intuition  of  whole  and  parts  constrains  us  to  look 
on  the  abstract  as  implying  the  concrete,  and  prompts 
us  to  seek  for  all  the  parts  which  make  up  the  whole. 
Our  intuition  as  to  classes  insists  that  the  species  make 
up  the  genus.  Our  primitive  perceptions  as  to  space 
make  the  physicist  certain,  when  he  sees  a  body  now  in 
one  place,  and  then  in  another,  that  it  must  have  passed 
through  the  whole  intermediate  space.  They  should 
prevent  him  from  giving  his  adherence  to  the  theory  that 
matter  consists  merely  of  points  of  force  ;  the  points 
cannot,  properly  speaking,  be  unextended,  and  there 
must  always  be  a  space  between  them.  Our  belief  as  to 
time  assures  us  that  there  can  be  no  break  in  its  flow, 
and  that  when  we  fall  in  with  the  same  object  at  two 
different  times,  it  must  have  existed  the  whole  interven- 
ing period.  Our  intuitive  cognitions  of  number,  quan- 
tity, and  proportion  guide  and  control  us  more  or  less 
formally  in  all  departments  of  natural  philosophy.  Our 
conviction  as  to  substance  and  property  prompts  the  phy- 
sicist, when  he  discovers  a  new  object,  to  inquire  after  its 
properties,  and  on  perceiving  the  action  of  such  agencies 
as  magnetism,  electricity,  and  galvanism,  to  declare  that 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   PHYSICS.  341 

they  must  be  either  separate  substances  (not  prob- 
able), or  properties  of  substances.  Causation  appears  in 
nearly  every  department  of  science. 

There  are  sciences  which  have  special  primitive  truths 
underlying  them.  Thus  chemistry  involves  throughout 
our  conviction  as  to  substance  and  property.  There  is 
a  class  of  sciences  which  proceeds  on  resemblances  and 
deals  with  things  in  classes.  They  have  been  called  the 
"  Classificatory  Sciences "  by  Whewell,  and  embrace 
botany,  zoology,  and  mineralogy  so  far  as  it  is  not  a 
branch  of  chemistry,  and  geology  so  far  as  it  deals  with 
organisms.  In  all  these  the  mind  is  guided  and  guarded 
by  our  cognitions  in  regard  to  the  relations  of  indi- 
viduals and  classes.  Power,  force,  energy,  causation  op- 
erate in  almost  all  physical  sciences,  in  electric,  magnetic, 
and  galvanic  action,  which  all  imply  power  ;  in  geology, 
as  it  treats  of  the  forces  which  have  brought  the  earth's 
surface  to  its  present  state  ;  in  physiology  which  looks 
at  the  powers  which  work  in  the  organism.  It  is  the 
reigning  determinant  in  mechanics  and  in  the  old  nat- 
ural philosophy  now  called  physics. 

The  physical  investigator,  engrossed  with  external 
facts,  and  seeking  to  throw  light  upon  them,  will  seldom 
so  much  as  notice  these  underlying  principles,  which  are 
unconsciously  guiding  him,  and  only  on  rare  occasions 
will  he  make  a  formal  appeal  to  them.  Still  there  will 
be  times  when  those  most  prejudiced  against  metaphysics 
of  every  kind  will  be  tempted  or  compelled  to  fall  back 
upon  them,  —  when  diving  down  into  the  depths  of  a  deep 
subject,  or  when  hard  pressed  by  an  opponent.  It  often 
happens  that  when  they  do  so,  their  expression  of  the 
principle  is  awkward  and  blundering  ;  and  I  think  they 
have  reason  to  complain  of  the  metapliysician  that  he 
has  been  wasting  his  ingenuity  in  unprofitable  and  un- 


342  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE  VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

attainable  pursuits,  and  has  done  so  little  to  aid  physical 
investigation  in  a  line  in  which  he  might  have  lent  it 
effective  and  profitable  aid. 

It  has  been  shown  by  Dr.  Whewell,  in  his  work  on  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  more  particularly  in  his  History  of  Scientific 
Ideas,  that  each  kind  of  science  has  its  special  fundamental  idea  at  its 
basis,  and  he  classifies  the  sciences  according  to  the  ideas  which  reg- 
ulate them.  The  phrase  "  ideas  "  does  not  seem  a  good  one  to  ex- 
press the  intuitive  convictions  of  the  mind,  either  in  their  sponta- 
neous exercises  or  formal  enunciations,  and  I  think  he  is  altogether 
wrong  in  supposing  that  these  ideas  "superinduce"  on  the  facts 
something  not  in  the  facts.  But  he  has  in  that  work  developed 
truths,  which  physical  investigators  were  almost  universally  over- 
looking. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  METAPHYSICS   OF   MATHEMATICS. 

Mathematics  is  not  a  metaphysical  science.  But 
it  proceeds  by  definitions  and  axioms  in  both  of  which 
metaphysics  are  involved  (a). 

I  look  upon  definitions,  or  rather  the  things  defined, 
as  constituting,  properly  speaking,  the  foundation  of 
niatliematics.  They  seem  to  me  to  be  formalized  primi- 
tive cognitions  or  beliefs  in  regard  to  quantity,  to  which 
some  add  position  ;  and  they  specially  bear  upon  exten- 
sion and  number.  In  their  formation  there  is  involved 
a  process  of  abstraction  from  material  objects  presenting 
themselves.  A  point  is  defined  "  position  without  magni- 
tude." There  is  no  such  point ;  there  can  be  no  such  point. 
A  line  is  "length  without  breadth;"  there  was  never 
such  a  line  drawn  by  pen  or  diamond  point.  But  the 
mind  in  analysis  is  sharper  than  steel  or  diamond.  It 
can  contemplate  position  without  taking  extension  into 
view.  It  can  reason  about  the  length  of  a  line  without 
regarding  the  breadth.  In  all  definitions  there  is  abstrac- 
tion, but  I  must  forever  protest  against  the  idea  that  an 
abstraction  is  necessarily  unreal.  If  the  concrete  is  real 
the  attribute  or  part  of  it  is  also  real.  The  position  of 
the  point  is  a  reality,  and  so  also  is  the  length  of  a  line  ; 
thev  are  not  independent  realities,  and  capable  of  exist- 
ing alone  and  apart,  but  still  they  are  realities,  and  when 
the  mind  contemplates  them  separately,  it  contemplates 
realities.  So  far  as  it  reasons  about  them  accurately, 
according  to  the  laws  of  thought,  the  conclusions  arrived 


344  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE  VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

at  will  also  be  real,  the  reality  being  of  the  same  nature 
with  that  of  the  premise.  Thus,  whatever  conclusions 
are  reached  in  regard  to  lines,  circles,  or  ellipses  will 
apply  to  all  objects  having  length,  or  a  circular,  or  ellip- 
tic form.  We  find,  in  fact,  that  the  conclusions  of  math- 
ematics do  hold  true  of  all  bodies  in  earth  or  sky,  so  far 
as  we  find  them  occupying  space  or  having  numerical 
relations. 

Looking  not  just  at  the  definitions,  but  at  the  things 
defined  under  the  clear  and  distinct  aspects  in  which 
they  are  set  before  it  by  abstraction,  the  mind  discov- 
ers relations  and  can  draw  deductions.  It  finds  that  A 
is  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  and  it  at  once  concludes  that 
A  is  equal  to  C.  In  doing  this  it  proceeds  on  a  princi- 
ple, and  this  when  generalized  becomes  the  axiom  that 
"  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to 
one  another."  The  reasoning  in  such  cases  appears  cl^ar, 
anterior  to  the  general  principle  being  announced,  and 
when  the  principle  is  expressed  it  does  not  seem  to  add 
to  the  force  of  the  ratiocination.  It  does  not  in  fact  add 
to  the  cogency  of  the  argument ;  it  is  merely  the  expres- 
sion of  the  general  principle  on  which  it  proceeds.  Still 
it  serves  many  important  scientific  purposes.  Locke  and 
Stewart,  who  do  not  set  high  value  on  axioms,  admit  that 
it  is  of  great  importance  to  have  the  general  truth  ex- 
pressed formally  in  an  axiom.  It  allows  the  reflective 
mind  to  dwell  on  the  general  law  regulating  the  spon- 
taneous conviction  ;  by  its  clearness  it  enables  us  to  test 
the  ratiocination,  and  it  shows  what  those  must  be  pre- 
pared to  disprove  who  would  dispute  or  deny  the  con- 
clusion. 

If  this  view  be  correct,  the  abstracted  cognitions  or 
beliefs  whicli  constitute  the  definitions  form  the  proper 
foundation   of    mathematical    demonstration,  while   the 


THE  METAPHYSICS   OF  MATHEMATICS.  345 

axioms  being  the  generalizations  of  our  primitive  judg- 
ments, on  looking  at  the  things  defined,  are  the  links 
which  bind  together  the  parts  of  the  superstructure 
added  (^j). 

The  question  is  keenly  agitated  as  to  axioms  whether 
they  are  or  are  not  the  generalizations  of  experience.  It 
will  be  found  here,  as  in  so  many  other  questions  which 
have  passed  before  us,  that  there  is  truth  on  both  sides, 
and  error  on  both  sides,  and  confusion  in  the  whole  con- 
troversy, which  is  to  be  cleared  by  an  exact  account  of  the 
mental  operation  involved  informing  the  judgment.  The 
mathematical  axiom  is  not  a  mere  generalization  of  an 
outward  or  a  gathered  experience.  It  is  not  by  trying  two 
straight  rods,  ten,  twenty,  or  a  thousand  times,  that  we 
arrive  at  the  general  proposition  that  two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space,  and  thence  conclude  as  to  two 
given  lines  presented  anywhere  to  us  that  it  is  impossible 
they  should  enclose  a  space.  It  is  certainly  not  by  placing 
two  rods  parallel  to  each  other,  and  lengthening  them 
more  and  more,  and  then  measuring  their  distance  to  see 
if  they  are  approaching,  that  we  reach  the  axiom  that 
two  parallel  lines  will  never  meet,  and  thence  be  con- 
vinced as  to  any  given  set  of  like  lines  that  they  will  never 
come  nearer  each  other.  Place  before  us  two  new  sub- 
stances, and  we  cannot  tell  beforehand  whether  they  will 
or  will  not  chemically  combine  ;  but  on  the  bare  contem- 
plation of  two  straight  lines,  we  declare  they  cannot  con- 
tain a  space  ;  and  of  two  parallel  lines,  that  they  can 
never  meet  (c). 

In  mathematical  truth,  the  mind,  upon  the  objects 
being  presented  to  its  contemplation,  at  once  and  in- 
tuitively pronounces  the  judgment.  It  conceives  two 
straight  lines,  and  decides  that  they  cannot  be  made  to 
enclose  a  space.     But  it  would  pronounce  the  same  de- 


346  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE   VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

cision  as  to  any  other,  as  to  every  other  pair  of  straight 
lines,  and  thus  reaches  the  maxim  that  what  is  true  of 
these  two  hnes  is  true  of  all.  There  is  thus  generaliza- 
tion in  the  formation  of  the  axiom,  but  it  is  a  generaliz- 
ation of  the  individual  intuitive  judgments  of  the  mind. 
Hence  arises  the  distinction  between  the  axioms  of  math- 
ematics and  the  general  laws  reached  by  observation. 
If  we  have  properly  generalized  the  individual  convic- 
tion, the  necessity  that  is  in  the  individual  goes  up  into 
the  general,  which  embraces  all  the  individuals,  and  the 
axiom  is  necessarily  true,  and  true  to  all  beings.  But 
we  can  never  be  sure  that  there  may  not  somewhere  be 
an  exception  to  experiential  laws.  We  are  sure  that 
two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space  in  any  planet, 
or  star,  or  world,  that  ever  existed  or  shall  exist ;  but 
it  is  quite  possible  that  there  may  be  horned  animals 
which  are  not  ruminant,  or  white  crows  in  some  of  the 
planets  ;  and  that  there  may  come  a  time  when  the  sun 
shall  no  longer  give  heat  or  light. 

In  the  case  of  our  intuitive  convictions  regarding 
space,  number,  and  quantity,  the  simplicity  of  the  objects 
makes  it  easy  for  us  to  seize  the  principle,  and  to  put  it 
in  proper  formula,  which  can  scarcely  fail  to  be  accu- 
rately made.  Hence  these  convictions  came  to  be  ex- 
pressed in  general  forms  —  in  what  were  then  called 
Common  Notions  —  at  a  very  early  age  of  the  history  of 
intellectual  culture.  The  disputes  among  mathemati- 
cians in  regard  to  axioms  relate  not  to  their  certainty 
and  universality,  but  to  the  forms  in  which  they  ought 
to  be  put,  and  as  to  whether  what  some  regard  as  first 
trutlis  may  not  be  demonstrated  from  prior  truths.  Such, 
for  instance,  is  the  dispute  as  to  how  the  axioms  and 
demonstrations  as  to  parallel  lines  should  be  best  con- 
structed.    But  in  regard  to  our  convictions  of  extension, 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF  MATHEMATICS.  347 

number,  and  quantity,  it  is  not  difficult  to  gather  the 
regulating  principle  out  of  the  individual  judgments.  It 
is  different  with  other  of  our  original  convictions,  such 
as  those  which  relate  to  cause  and  effect ;  the  greater 
complexity  of  the  objects  renders  it  more  difficult  to  seize 
-,  on  the  principle  involved,  and  there  is  greater  room 
for  dispute  as  to  any  given  formula  whether  it  is  an 
exact  expression  of  the  facts.  We  see  the  reason  why 
we  cannot  have  demonstration  in  such  sciences  as  physics 
and  ethics ;  it  is  because  of  the  concreteness  and  com- 
plexity of  the  objects.  The  problem  of  "  three  bodies  " 
has  been  found  a  difficult  one  ;  how  much  more  perplex- 
ing must  be  one  in  which  there  are  a  considerable  num- 
ber and  variety  of  concrete  things  to  be  considered. 

(a)  It  has  been  shown  by  Kant  that  the  axioms  of  geometry- 
are  synthetic  and  not  analytic  judgments.  Thus,  in  the  axiom, 
.  "  Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space,"  the  predication  that 
"they  cannot  enclose  a  space,"  is  not  contained  in  the  bare  notion 
of  "  two  straight  lines."  Starting  with  axioms  which  involve  more 
than  analytic  judgments,  we  are  reaching  throughout  the  demonstra- 
tion more  than  identical  truth.  The  propositions  in  the  Books  of 
Euclid  are  all  evolved  out  of  the  definitions  and  axioms,  but  are  not 
identical  with  them,  or  with  one  another  (Kritik,  p.  145).  Dr.  Han- 
sel {Proleg.  Log.  2d  ed.  p.  103)  maintains  that  such  axioms  as  that 
"  Things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  are  equal  to  each  other  "  are 
analytic.  But  does  not  this  confound  equality  with  identity  ?  D. 
Stewart  remarks  (Elem.  Vol.  ii.  Chap,  ii.)  that  most  of  the  writers 
who  have  maintained  that  all  mathematical  evidence  resolves  ulti- 
mately into  the  perception  of  identity  "  have  imposed  on  themselves 
by  using  the  words  identity  and  equality  as  literally  synonymous  and 
convertible  terms.  This  does  not  seem  to  be  at  all  consistent,  either 
in  point  of  expression  or  fact,  with  sound  logic."  Certain  modern 
logicians  have  fallen  into  a  still  greater  confusion,  when  they  make 
the  relation  between  subject  and  predicate  merely  one  of  identity  or 
of  equality.  The  proposition  "  Man  is  mortal  "  is  not  interpreted 
fully  when  it  is  said  "Man  is  identical  with  some  mortal,"  or  that 
"All  men  =  some  mortals."     By  all  means  let  logicians  use  symbols, 


348  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE  VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

but  let  them  devise  symbols  of  their  own,  and  not  turn  to  a  new 
use  the  symbols  of  mathematics,  which  have  a  meaning,  and  a  well- 
defined  one,  simply  as  applied  to  quantity,  and  should  not  be  made 
to  signify  the  relations  of  extension  and  comprehension  in  logical 
propositions. 

(b)  There  is  truth,  then,  in  a  statement  of  D.  Stewart:  "The 
doctrine  which  I  have  been  attempting  to  establish,  so  far  from  de- 
grading axioms  from  that  rank  which  Dr.  Reid  would  assign  them, 
tends  to  identify  them  still  more  than  he  has  done,  with  the  exercise 
of  our  reasoning  powers  ;  inasmuch  as,  instead  of  comparing  them 
with  the  data,  on  the  accuracy  of  which  that  of  our  conclusion  neces- 
sarily depends,  it  considers  them  as  the  vincula  which  give  coherence 
to  all  the  particular  links  of  the  chain  ;  or  (to  vary  the  metaphor) 
as  component  elements,  without  which  the  faculty  of  reasoning  is  in- 
conceivable and  inijiossible  "  (Elem.  Vol.  ii.  Chap.  i.). 

If  this  view  be  correct,  we  see  how  inadequate  is  the  representa- 
tion of  those  who,  like  D.  Stewart  and  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill,  represent 
mathematical  definitions  as  merely  hypothetical,  and  represent  the 
whole  consistency  and  necessity  as  being  between  a  supposition  and 
the  consequences  drawn  from  it.  This  is  to  overlook  the  concrete 
cognitions  or  beliefs  from  which  the  definition  is  derived.  It  is  like- 
wise to  overlook  the  fact  that  these  refer  to  objects,  and  the  further 
fact  that  the  abstractions  from  the  concretes  also  imply  a  reality. 
This  theory  also  fails  to  account  for  the  circumstance  that  the  con- 
clusions reached  in  mathematics  admit  of  an  application  to  the  set- 
tlement of  so  many  questions  in  astronomy,  and  in  other  departments 
of  natural  philosophy.  Thus,  what  was  demonstrated  of  the  conic 
sections  by  ApoUonius  is  found  true  in  the  orbits  of  the  planets 
and  comets,  as  revealed  by  modern  discovery.  All  this  can  at  once 
be  explained  if  we  suppose  that  the  mind  starts  with  cognitions  and 
beliefs,  that  it  abstracts  from  these,  and  discovers  relations  among 
the  things  thus  abstracted  :  the  reality  that  was  in  the  original  con- 
viction goes  on  to  the  farthest  conclusion. 

(c)  Mr.  Mill  maintains  (Logic,  ii.  v.  4,  5)  that  the  proposition, 
"Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space,"  is  a  generalization 
from  observation,  "an  induction  from  the  evidence  of  the  senses." 
That  observation  is  needed  I  have  shown  in  this  treatise  ;  but  there 
is  intuition  in  the  observation.  That  there  is  generalization  in  the 
general  maxim  I  have  also  shown  ;  but  it  is  not  a  gathering  of  out- 
ward instances.  Observation  can  of  itself  tell  us  that  these  two 
lines  before  us  do  not  enclose  a  space,  and  that  any  other  couplets  of 


THE  METAPHYSICS   OF   MATHEMATICS.  349 

lines  examined  by  us,  twenty,  or  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand,  do  not 
enclose  a  space ;  but  experience  can  say  no  more  without  passing 
beyond  its  province.  An  intellectual  generalization  of  such  experi- 
ence might  allow  us  to  affirm  that  very  probably  no  two  lines  enclose 
a  space  on  the  earth,  but  could  never  entitle  us  to  maintain  that  two 
lines  could  not  enclose  a  space  in  the  constellation  Orion.  Mr.  Mill, 
in  order  to  account  for  the  necessity  which  attaches  to  such  convic- 
tions, refers  to  the  circumstance  that  geometrical  forms  admit  of 
being  distinctly  painted  in  the  imagination,  so  that  we  have  "  mental 
pictures  of  all  possible  combinations  of  lines  and  angles."  We 
might  ask  him  what  he  makes  of  algebraic  and  analytic  demonstra- 
tions of  every  kind,  where  there  is  no  such  power  of  imagination 
and  yet  the  same  necessity.  But  without  dwelling  on  this  I  would 
have  it  remarked,  that  in  the  very  theory  which  he  devises  to  sliow 
that  the  whole  is  a  process  of  experience,  he  is  appealing  to  what  no 
experience  can  ever  compass,  "  to  all  possible  combinations  of  lines 
and  angles."  Intuitive  thought,  proceeding  on  intuitive  perceptions 
of  space,  may  announce  laws  of  the  ^^ possible  combinations"  of  geo- 
metrical figures  ;  but  this  cannot  be  done  by  observation,  by  sense,  or 
imagination.  Supposing,  he  says,  that  two  straight  lines,  after  diverg- 
ing, could  again  converge,  "  we  can  transport  ourselves  thither  in 
imagination,  and  can  frame  a  mental  image  of  the  appearance  which 
one  or  both  of  the  lines  must  present  at  that  point,  which  we  may  rely 
on  as  being  precisely  similar  to  the  reality."  Most  freely  do  I  admit 
all  this.  We  may  "rely  "  on  it,  but  surely  it  is  not  experience,  nor 
imagination,  but  thought  looking  at  things  which  tells  us  what  must 
be  at  that  point,  and  that  it  is  a  "  reality."  The  very  line  of  re- 
mark which  he  is  pursuing  might  have  shown  him  that  the  discovery 
of  necessary  spatial  and  quantitative  relations  is  a  judgment  in 
which  the  mind  looks  upon  objects  intuitively  known,  and  now  pre- 
sented, or  more  frequently  represented  to  the  mind. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  METAPHYSICS   OF    FORMAL   LOGIC. 

Metaphysics  and  Logic  are  to  be  carefully  distin- 
guished. The  former  deals  with  First  Principles,  of 
which  it  seeks  to  give  an  account.  The  latter  treats  of 
the  laws  of  Discursive  Thought,  in  which  we  proceed 
from  something  given  or  allowed  to  something  derived 
from  it  by  thinking.  The  two,  though  separate,  have 
points  of  connection.  There  are  primitive  truths  at  the 
basis  of  secondary  or  discursive  processes.  It  is  part  of 
the  office  of  Metaphysics  to  unfold  and  express  these. 

Logic  deals  with  the  Notion,  the  Proposition,  and 
Reasoning.  Each  of  these  involves  principles  which  are 
perceived  to  be  true  on  the  bare  contemplation  of  the 
notions.  Thus  the  Abstract  implies  the  Concrete;  and 
the  Universal  implies  Singulars.  Logic  should  take  up 
these  principles,  explain,  and  apply  them. 

Logic  deals  with  the  Proposition,  which  may  be  Affir- 
mative or  Negative,  Universal  or  Particular.  In  the 
logical  use  of  the  proposition  there  are  involved  the  laws 
of  Identity,  of  Contradiction,  and  Excluded  Middle,  as 
explained  under  the  primitive  judgment  of  Identity. 

Reasoning  may  be  in  Extension  or  Comprehension. 
Each  of  these  has  its  fundamental  laws.  The  regulative 
principle  of  reasoning  in  Extension  is  the  Dictum  of 
Aristotle,  "  Whatever  is  true  of  a  class  is  true  of  each 
member  of  the  class."  The  regulating  principle  of  rea- 
soning in  Comprehension  is  attributive,  "  All  that  is  in  an 
attribute  is  in  the  thing  that  contains  the  attribute,"  or 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF  FORMAL   LOGIC.  351 

as  Leibnitz  expresses  it,  "  Nota  notae  est  nota  rei  ipsius." 
All  these  are  self-evident.  The  metaphysician  should 
supply  these  to  the  logician,  who  takes  up  and  applies 
them  to  the  various  forms  of  reasoning,  Categorical, 
Hypothetical,  and  Disjunctive.  In  doing  this  a  science 
has  been  constructed  which  I  regard  as  the  most  perfect, 
next  to  geometry. 


CHAPTER  V. 

METAPHYSICS    OF    ETHICS. 

This  is  the  title  of  a  work  by  Kant,  who  is  much  more 
realistic  in  his  moral  than  in  his  speculative  philosophy, 
and  thereby  has  reached  a  larger  amount  of  truth. 

Ethics  is  in  every  respect  an  analogous  science  to 
Logic.  The  difference  lies  in  the  difference  of  the  mat- 
ters with  which  they  deal,  the  one  aiming  to  find  the 
laws  of  discursive  truth,  the  other  the  nature  of  moral 
good ;  the  one  seeking  to  attain  its  end  by  generalizing 
the  operations  of  thought,  the  other  by  generalizing 
the  exercises  of  the  motive  and  moral  powers  of  man. 
Ethics,  like  Logics,  is  in  a  sense  an  a  priori  science ;  it 
finds  and  it  employs  principles  which  are  valid,  inde- 
pendent of  our  experience.  In  another  sense,  it  is  d  pos- 
teriori, inasmuch  as  these  principles  and  their  laws  can 
be  discovered  by  us  only  through  observation  of  their  in- 
dividual manifestations ;  and  thus  far  it  is  dependent  on 
an  inductive  psychology.  We  must  begin  with  inquir- 
ing, Quid  est  ?  and  then  we  find  that  the  thing  reached 
relates  to  the  Quid  oportet  ?  It  is  the  special  ofl&ce  o^ 
ethics  to  ascertain  what  is  involved  in  the  oportet,  and 
apply  its  formulae  to  the  conduct  of  responsible  beings. 

Ethics  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  branch  of  metaphys- 
ics, nor  should  metaphysics  profess  to  be  able  to  construct 
ethics.  But  metaphysics  should  supply  to  ethics  some  of 
its  fundamental  principles.  These  should  be  accepted, 
clearly  enunciated,  and  applied  in  ethics,  but  the  special 
discussion  of  them  should  be  left  to  the  more  fundamen- 


METAPHYSICS   OF  ETHICS.  353 

tal  science.  I  have  endeavored  to  give  a  summary  of  the 
primary  truths  with  which  ethics  should  start.  (Pp.  210- 
243.)  They  relate  to  moral  good  or  virtue,  which  is  the 
royal  law  of  love,  to  its  obligation,  its  relation  to  God 
and  law,  to  its  desert  and  relation  to  happiness,  and  its 
voluntary  character. 

But  a  science  of  ethics,  in  order  to  serve  useful  pur- 
pose, cannot  be  constructed  from  the  mere  native  convic- 
tions of  the  mind.  We  do  obtain  a  few  most  important 
general  principles  from  this  source  exclusively,  and 
these  underlie  the  whole  science,  and  bear  up  every  part 
of  it.  But  in  order  to  serve  the  ends  intended  by  it, 
ethics  must  settle  what  are  the  duties  of  different  classes 
of  persons,  according  to  the  relation  in  which  they  stand  to 
each  other,  such  as  rulers  and  subjects,  parents  and  chil- 
dren, masters  and  servants,  and  society  in  general ;  and 
what  the  path  which  individuals  should  follow  in  certain 
circumstances,  —  it  may  be,  very  difficult  and  perplex- 
ing. In  consequence  of  the  affairs  of  human  life  being 
very  complicated,  demonstration  can  be  carried  but  a 
very  little  way  in  ethics.  In  order  to  be  able  to  enun- 
ciate general  principles  for  our  guidance,  or  to  promul- 
gate useful  precepts,  the  ethical  inquirer  must  condescend 
to  come  down  from  his  a  priori  heiglits  to  the  level  in 
which  mankind  live  and  walk  and  work.  Even  in  the 
most  practical  departments  of  ethical  science,  the  grand 
fundamental  laws  of  our  moral  constitution  must  ever  be 
the  guiding  principles,  but  we  have  to  consider  their  ap- 
plication to  an  almost  infinite  variety  of  earthly  posi- 
tions and  human  character. 

Of  all  the  sciences,  ethics  is  that  which  comes  into 
closest  relationship  with  Christianity  and  the  Word  of 
God.  The  reason  is  obvious.  It  deals  with  the  law  and 
the  very  character  of  God ;  it  deals  with  man  as  under 


354 


METAPHYSICS  IN   THE   VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 


law,  and  with  man  as  having  broken  the  law.  It  thus  pre- 
pares us,  if  it  faithfully  fulfils  its  functions,  to  believe  in 
a  religion  which  shows  us  how  the  sinner  can  be  recon- 
ciled to  God.  When  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Atone- 
ment is  embraced,  a  new  and  most  important  element  is 
introduced  into  ethics.  It  should  no  longer  be  a  science 
constructed,  on  the  one  hand,  for  pure  beings,  nor,  on 
the  other,  for  persons  who  must  ever  be  kept  at  a  dis- 
tance from  God.  This  new  reconciling  and  gracious  ele- 
ment turns  Pagan  into  Christian  ethics  ;  it  turns  a  cold 
and  legal,  into  a  warm  and  evangelical  obedience. 

Locke  thought  moral  philosophy  could  be  made  a  demonstrative 
science  founded  on  intuition,  to  which  he  gave  an  important  place  as 
able  to  perceive  at  once  the  relation  of  certain  ideas  (Essay  B.  iv. 
17).  I  am  not  aware  that  any  one  has  attempted  thoroughly  to  carry 
out  this  view.  Morality,  like  truth,  has  certainly  self-evidence  or 
demonstrative  principles  as  several  other  sciences  have.  But  these 
varied  applications  to  actual  life  are  so  complicated  that  the  human 
mind  (whatever  an  angelic  mind  might  do)  cannot  follow  them  de- 
ductively. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  THEOLOGY. 

Theology,  as  a  science,  is  a  systematized  arrangement 
of  what  we  can  know  about  God.  Natural  theology  is 
the  science  of  what  we  know  of  him  from  his  works  in 
nature,  and  Biblical  of  what  is  revealed  in  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments. 

People  have  ever  shrunk  from  a  theology  which  is 
exclusively  or  even  mainly  metaphysical.  Yet  first  prin- 
ciples have  their  deep  underlying  place  in  systematic 
divinity  as  in  every  deeper  science.  Unfortunately  they 
are  often  mixed  up  with  observational  principles  and 
practical  lessons  in  a  heterogeneous  manner.  When  they 
are  argumentatively  employed  or  appealed  to  in  theologi- 
cal discussion,  they  should  be  so  distinctly  enunciated 
that  all  may  see  what  they  are,  and  be  in  a  position  to 
judge  of  their  validity.  Metaphysics  may  help  and  not 
hinder  theology  by  bringing  out  to  view  the  fundamen- 
tal truths  involved  in  the  science. 

All  the  primary  principles  implied  in  the  common 
affairs  of  life  may  be  employed  in  the  exposition  of  di- 
vine trutli  without  being  very  formally  expressed.  We 
may  proceed  on  the  allowed  existence  of  bodies,  of  space 
and  time,  of  the  laws  of  quality  and  quantity,  and  the 
common  logical  laws,  such  as  that  of  contradiction,  with- 
out formulating  them.  But  there  are  several  metaphys- 
ical truths  which  have  a  special  place  in  theological  dis- 
cussion, and  these  should  be  specially  expounded  by  the 
metaphysician  for  the  use  of  the  divine. 


356 


METAPHYSICS  IN   THE   VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 


There  is  our  Personality  with  our  Personal  Identity. 
The  conviction  attaches  itself  to  us  from  the  beginning 
and  will  go  on  to  the  end  of  our  being  in  this  world, 
and,  if  we  have  proof  of  our  continued  existence,  in  the 
world  to  come.  If  this  does  not  insure,  it  makes  us 
look  towards,  a  personal  immortality  for  which  we  seek 
proof. 

This  Personality  keeps  us  from  flying  up  into  an  airy 
and  unsubstantial  pantheism  :  All  is  not  one,  for  we 
know  ourselves  to  be  different  from  God,  as  he  is  differ- 
ent from  us. 

There  is  Potency  with  Cause  and  Effect.  We  dis- 
cover traces  of  this  world  being  an  effect  as  an  ordered 
world  made  up  of  many  combined  materials,  a  "  man- 
ufactured "  article,  as  Sir  John  Herschel  expresses  it. 
We  see  everywhere  order  in  earth  and  sky,  very  specially 
in  plants  and  animals.  There  is  the  wondrous  adapta- 
tion of  one  thing  to  another  in  an  arranged  system ;  and 
the  order  and  adaptation  being  evidently  of  things 
effected,  we  argue  legitimately  that  there  must  be  a  cause 
of  the  whole.  Theologians  do  so  argue,  and  metaphysics 
should  justify  them  in  so  doing.  Thus  dp  we  rise  to  an 
intelligence  above  nature  :  I  do  not  say  infinite,  but  far 
beyond  our  comprehension.  Here  we  have  one  element 
of  the  theistic  argument. 

But  there  are  other  effects.  There  are  traces  without 
and  within  us  of  a  pervading  and  all-reigning  benevo- 
lence. This  requires  us  to  clothe  the  intelligence  which 
we  have  discovered  with  love. 

But  we  go  farther.  We  have  principles  within  us 
which  consti'ain  us  to  invest  the  intelligent  and  loving 
One  who  gave  them  to  us  with  other  perfections.  We 
have  personality,  and  we  attribute  a  like  perfection  to 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   THEOLOGY.  357 

him  who  is  caring  for  us.  Higher  than  all  we  have  a 
moral  nature,  approving  the  good  and  disapproving  the 
evil,  and  this  must  be  a  garment  of  his  own  which  God 
has  thrown  over  us. 

This  is  not  all.  We  are  led  to  ascribe  to  God  an  attri- 
bute to  which  we  have  nothing  similar.  We  have  an 
intuition  as  to  infinity,  which  constrains  us  to  believe 
in  the  reality  which  it  reveals,  and  the  mind  is  not  sat- 
isfied till  we  ascribe  it  to  the  one  living  and  true  God 
whom  we  believe  to  be  great  beyond  our  comprehen- 
sion, but  such  that  nothing  can  be  added  to  him  or  his 
perfections. 

In  some  of  these  steps  there  is  an  observational  ele- 
ment, but  it  is  a  powerful  evidential  one,  which  makes  it 
possible  for  the  fool  to  say  in  his  heart  that  there  is  no 
God,  and  makes  him  responsible  for  his  unbelief,  which 
he  could  not  be  if  the  whole  process  were  apodictic  or 
demonstrative. 

The  Jehovah  of  Scripture  comprises  in  himself  —  in 
this  respect  how  superior  to  the  gods  of  the  Gentiles  — 
the  high  ideas  which  I  have  been  seeking  to  unfold  in 
this  work.     In  Biblical  Theology  they  are  arranged  and 
applied,  and  this  is  done   most  wisely  when  only  such 
metaphysical  principles  are  used  as  are  implied  in   the 
common  affairs  of  life  and  in  all  the  sciences. 
I      We  see  at  the  close   of  our  investigation  that   these 
j  fundamental  truths  bear  up  the  other  truths  which  we 
"^^  are  required  to  believe  in  nature  and  in  religion.     We 
I  see,  too,  that  our  intuitions,  like  the  works   of  nature, 
/carry  us  up  to  God,  their  author.     All  the  roads  lead  to 
the  capital.     All  the  streams  come  to  us  fi*om  the  foun- 
tain.    All  the  members  of  the  body  are  moved  by  the 
head.     If  we  stop  short  of  this  we  feel  that  there  is 

V 


358  METAPHYSICS  IN   THE  VARIOUS   SCIENCES. 

something  wanting,  effects  without  their  cause,  a  road 
that  conducts  nowhere,  a  stream  without  a  fountain,  a 
body  without  a  head.  But  mounting  up  thither,  all  our 
deeper  instincts  are  satisfied,  and  we  can  look  thence  on 
our  cosmos,  arid  see  that  it  has  a  stability  and  a  consis- 
tency in  Him  in  whom  all  things  consist. 


INDEX. 


Abelard,  138. 
,    Abstract  Notion,  197,  198. 
Academies,  81. 
Esthetics,  2. 
Agnosticism,  7,  309. 
Analj'tic  Judgments,  193-195. 
Anselm,  82,  138. 

Aristflli,  2,  33,  36,  81,  125, 127, 174, 
'  245,  2617322. 
Attention,  233. 
Augustine,  82,  137. 
Aiioms,  13,  28,  206,  276,  283,  345, 
349. 

Ba«on,  26. 

Bain,  122,  189. 

Being,  67,  89,  92,  101,  118,  161,  293, 

Berkeley,  73,  74,  108,  109,  313. 

Brown,  P.,  328. 

Brown,  T.,  53,  73,  151,  215. 

Buddseus,  170. 

Buffier,  47,  98, 125. 

Calderwood,  139. 
Catholicity,  17. 
Cheselden  Case,  64,  73. 
Clark,  S.,  20,  152,  322. 
Coleridge,  285. 
Conceive,  278,  282. 
Conscience,  217,  222. 
Cousin,  54,  290. 
Cudworth,  33,  291. 

Damascenus,  Joannes,  149. 
Definitions,  Mathematical,  343. 
Descartes,  15,  42,  59,  62,  8(5,  97.    (Co- 

gito   ergo  sum),  106,  111,  125,  153, 

174. 
Desert,  224. 

Eleatics,  80,  111,  118,  244,  293. 
English  Divines,  40, 138. 


Epicureans,  39,  81,  82. 
Ethics,  2,  217-243,  352-354. 
Extension,  69,  85,  121-123. 
Externality,  68. 

Faith,  130-180,  268-270. 

Fathers  of  the  Church,  327. 

Ferrier,  74,  320. 

Fiehte,  25,  97,  138,  215,  313. 

Final  Cause,  246,  252. 

Forms  imposed  on  Objects,  28. 

Franz  Case,  64,  127. 

Gillespie,  144. 

Hamilton,  46,  50,  53,  63,  73,  74,  76, 
82,  99,  100,  113,  137,  139,  151,  171, 
181,  183.  188,  189,  320,  32b. 

Hegel,  18,  25,  97,  113, 122. 

Heracleitos,  110. 

Herbert,  15,  89. 

Herschel,  152. 

.Hpbbes,  170. 

Howe,  173. 

Hume,  59,  89,  102,  173,  289. 

Hutcheson,  48. 

Huxley,  252. 

Idea,  259-262. 

Induction,  10,  271,  276. 

Innate  Ideas,  15. 

Instinct,  27,  254, 

Intuition,  6,  7,  16, 19,  271-279. 

Jacobi,  138. 

Kant,  2,  15,  20,  28,  29,  32,  51,  73,  82, 
89,  97,  98,  102,  138,  143,  149,  151, 
189,  193,  214,  238,  247,  249,  285,  287, 
290,  313,  324,  347. 

Knowledge,  58,  256,  293. 

Knowledge  and  Faith,  130-140,  181. 


360 


INDEX. 


Knowledge,  Presentative  and  Repre- 
sentative, 130-140,  256,  265. 

Law,  219,  276. 

Leibnitz,  18,  46,  87, 102, 152, 174, 195, 

246,  321. 
Locke,  15,  18,  28,  29,  43,  59,  74,  85, 

99,  102,  107,  125,  127,  170,  183,  188, 

189,  249,  256-264. 
Logic,  2,  350. 
Lotze,  56. 

Love,  219,  333,  347.  " 

Lucretius,  151. 

Mackintosh,  224. 

Mansel,  97, 171, 173, 183, 327, 333, 347. 

Maxims,  13,  276. 

Mental  Sciences,  2. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  56,  129,  187,  214-216,  225, 

226,  328-332,  348. 
Miracles,  215,  216. 
Morel,  320. 
Motive,  237. 
Miiller,  John,  65,  72,  123,  127. 

Necessity,  17,  278-284 
Nescience,  309,  332. 
Newton,  20,  149. 
Nihilism,  309. 

Obligation,  221-223,  240. 

Perception,  12,  18,  75,  79. 
Perfect,  The,  159-175. 
Personality,  90,  97,  356. 
'N.JBlaiip,  33,  34,  111,  245,  256. 
Power,  93,  102,  128,  129,  205. 
Pre-Socratic  Schools,  34,  111,  244. 
Protagoras,  33. 

Qualities    of   Matter,  Primary  and 
Secondary,  78,  80,  85-87. 

Realism,  0,  29,  185,  275,  296. 


Reason,  28,  285,  291. 
Reflex  Intuition,  14. 
Regulative  Principles,  12,  18,  272. 
Reid,  48,  76,  85,  98,  213,  285. 
Relations,  185,  216. 
Responsibility,  237. 

Scepticism,  7. 

ScheUing,  18,  25,  97. 

Scottish  School,  18,  50,  89,  98. 

Self  or  Spirit,  82-99,  104. 

Self-Consciousness,  257. 

Self -Evidence,  16. 

Sensation,  75,  257. 

Sensational  School,  59,  82. 

Senses,  Apparent  Deception  of,  72-85. 

Shaftesbury,  47. 

Sin,  227-232,  241. 

Smith,  Adam,  224. 

Socrates,  293. 

Sophists,  33. 

Spencer,  H.,  30,  56,  74,  249-255,  334- 

336. 
Spinoza,  25,  106,  111. 
Stewart,  D.,  52,  73,  98,  151,  213,  347, 

348. 
Stoics,  38,  81,  261. 
Synthetic  Judgments,  193-195. 

Tennyson,  88. 
Trendelenburg,  151. 
Trinchinetti  Case,  64. 

Understanding,  285. 
Uniformity  of  Nature,  213-215. 
Universals,  200. 

Virtue,  219. 

Whately,  3. 
Wheweil,  55,  341,  342. 
Wish,  233. 
Wolf,  246. 
Wordsworth,  159. 


THE  COMPLETION  OF  DR.  McCOSH'S  PSYCHOLOGY, 


PSYCHOLOGY. 

I.  The  Cognitive  Powers.      II.  The  Motive  Powers. 


By  JAMES  McCOSH,   D.D.,   LLD,   Litt.   D. 

President  of  Princeton  College;  Author  of  '^Intuitions  of  theMind,'^  "Laws 
of  Discursive  Thought,"  "Emotions"  "Philosophic  Series,"  etc. 

Two  Vols.,   12mo;  each,  $l.SO. 

The  second  volume,  now  ready,  concludes  tliis  work  with  the 
discussion  of  the  motive  powers  of  the  mind,  including  the  Con- 
science, Emotions,  and  Will.  The  author  has  treated  the  difficult, 
and,  at  times,  obscure  topics  which  belong  to  the  department  of 
psychology  vnth  characteristic  clearness,  conciseness,  and  strong 
individuality.  In  the  first  volume  he  treats  of  sense  perception, 
illustrating  his  theme  with  appropriate  cuts,  and  discussing  it 
with  fullness  from  the  physiological  side.  A  third  of  the  book  is 
devoted  to  the  reproductive  or  representative  powers,  in  which 
such  subjects  as  the  recalling  power,  the  association  of  ideas,  the 
power  of  composition,  etc.,  are  described;  while  the  book  con- 
cludes -wath  a  full  discussion  of  the  comparative  powers. 

EXTRACT  FROM  THE  INTRODUCTION  OF  VOLUME  II. 

"Having  treated  of  the  Cognitive  Powers  in  Vol.  I.,  I  am  in  this  to 
unfold  the  characteristics  of  the  Motive  Powers,  as  they  are  called  tlie 
Orective,  the  Appetent,  the  Impulsive  Powers ;  the  feelings,  the  senti- 
ments, the  affections,  the  heart,  as  distinguished  from  the  Gnostic,  tho 
cognitive,  the  intellect,  the  understanding,  the  reason,  the  head. 

"These  Motive  Powers  fall  under  three  heads — the  Emotions,  the  Con- 
science, the  Will. 

"  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  these  are  unconnected  with  each  other, 
or  with  the  cognitive;  emotions  contain  an  idea  which  is  cognitive.  Tho 
Conscience  may  be  regarded  as  combining  characteristics  of  each  of  the 
two  grand  classes,  being  cognitive  as  discerning  good  and  evil,  and  motive 
as  leading  to  action;  the  Will  has  to  use  the  other  powers  as  going  on  to 
action. 

"  Emotion  occupies  more  room  than  the  other  tw^o  in  this  treatise  inas- 
much as  its  operations  are  more  varied,  ard  as  the  account  usually  given 
ot  it  (so  it  appears  to  me)  is  more  defective." 


McCOSH'S  PSYCHOLOGY. 


AUTHORITATIVE   ENDORSEMENTS. 

"  I  have  read  the  book  with  much  interest.  It  is  what  was  to  have  been  ex- 
pected from  the  ability  and  long  experience  of  the  author.  The  style  is  clear  and 
simple  ;  the  matter  is  well  distributed ;  it  well  covers  the  ground  usually  taught  in 
such  text-books,  and  I  am  sure  any  teacher  would  find  it  a  helpful  guide  m  his 
classes.  The  philosophical  opinions  of  the  venerable  author  are  well  known  and  are 
here  lucidly  stated.  The  President  has  long  been  a  successful  teacher  and  knows 
how  to  make  a  useful  text-book."— &  L.  Caldwell,  late  President  of  Vassar  College. 

"In  examining  the  Psychology  of  the  Cognitive  Powers  by  Dr.  McCosh.  I  have 
been  most  favorably  impressed  by  the  .strength  and  ability  with  which  the  'subiect 
IS  treated  and  especially  by  the  skillful  adaptation  of  the  work  to  the  needs  of 
students."— O.  Cone,  President  of  Buchtel  College,  Akron,  O. 

"For  the  past  two  months  I  have  been  teaching  the  senior  class  of  this  Institu- 
tion Dr.  McCosh's  new  work  on  Psychology.  I  have  never  had  a  class  in  Psychology 
that  became  so  quickly  interested  in  a  text  on  that  subject.  The  style  of  the  author 
is  remarkably  clear,  concise,  and  forcible,  and  at  once  arrests  the  attention  and 
holds  the  interest  of  a  student  to  the  subject.  As  a  text-book  it  is  a  work  of  rare 
value"  {October  23d).— W.  H.  H.  Adams,  President  of  Illinois  Wesleyan  Uriversity. 

"Literature  and  Philosophy  can  equally  profit  by  a  work  which  we  think  we 
can  point  out  as  the  most  complete  and  broad  ever  written  on  the  subiect  "— 
Professor  Ferri. 

"The  qualities  in  the  book  that  led  me  to  introduce  it  are :  1st.  That  it  is  by  a 
recognized  authority  upon  the  subject,  one  who  perhaps  in  this  department  has  no 
living  superior.  Sd.  That  he  is  a  clear  and  emphatic  realist.  3d.  That  the  style  is 
not  difficult  for  begiuners.  4th.  That  the  book  was  neither  too  large  nor  too  small 
for  our  purpose.  5th.  That  the  discussion  of  the  subject  is  fresh,  introducing  more 
of  the  relation  between  Physiology  and  Psychology  than  is  found  in  the  other 
books,  thus  bringing  it  abreast  of  current  thought  upon  the  subject."—  D.  J. 
Waller,  Jr.,  Principal  of  State  Normal  School,  Bloomsburg,  Pa. 

"I  am  pleased  with  the  plan  and  method  of  treatment.     I  have  in  use 

Mental  Science,  but  my  class  complain  of  its  abstruse  style,  and  if  on  further  exami- 
nation of  Dr.  McCosh's  I  continue  to  be  pleased,  as  I  think  I  shall,  I  will  propose  a 
change  to  the  class  {September  2Sth).  Having  examined  Dr.  McCosh's  Psychology, 
I  have  concluded  to  change  my  text-book,  and  introduce  McCosh.  I  am  much 
pleased  with  its  arrangement  and  treatment  of  the  subject ;  its  style  is  clear  and  its 
Illustrations  are  very  satisfactory"  {October  5th).— Charles  Martin,  Principal  of 
Young  Ladies'  Institute,  St.  Joseph,  Mo. 

"  1  find  it  admirably  adapted  for  school  work,  being  conservative  in  its  treat- 
ment as  well  as  antagonistic  to  materialism  and  scepticism,  and  clear  in  its  state- 
ments; hence  quite  suitable  for  young  men  as  a  text-book."— W^asAmoton  Catlett, 
Principal  of  Cape  Fear  Academy,  Wilmington,  N.  C. 

"The  book  is  written  in  a  clear  and  simple  style ;  it  breathes  a  sweet  and  win- 
ning spirit ;  ami  it  is  inspired  by  a  noble  purpose,  in  these  respects  it  is  a  model  of 
what  a  text-book  should  he."— Professor  William  De  W.  Hyde,  of  Bowdoin  College. 

*:^*  Application  for  examination  copies  and  correspondence  in  regard  to  terms  for 
inlroductiun  are  requested  from  teachers  desiring  to  select  a  text-book  in 
mental  science. 


CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,    Publishers, 
7^^  and  74^  Broadway,  New  York. 


Realistic  Pliilosopliy, 

DEFENDED  IN  A  PHILOSOPHIC  SERIES. 
By  JAMES   McCOSH,   D.D.,   LLD., 

President  of  Princeton  College. 


T-wo  Vols.,  12mo;   each  $1.50. 


In  these  two  volumes  Dr.  McCosh  has  collected  his  discussions 
of  the  princijial  philosophic  questions  of  the  day,  formerly  issued 
in  his  Philosophic  Series,  which,  The  Independent  says,  "is  not 
unlikely  to  prove  in  the  end  the  most  useful  popular  service 
which  Dr.  McCosh  has  rendered  to  the  cause  of  right  thinking 
and  to  sound  philosophy  of  life." 

VOL.  I.— EXPOSITORY. 

In  this  part  of  the  Series  the  principal  j^hilosophic  questions  of  the  day 
are  discussed,  including  the  Tests  of  Truth,  Causation,  Development,  and 
the  Character  of  our  World. 

General  Introduction. — What  an  American  Philosophy  should  he. 

I.  Criteria  of  Diverse  Kinds  of  Truth. 

II.  Energy,  Efficient  and  Final  Cause.  An  attempt  is  here  made 
to  clear  up  the  subject  of  Causation  which  has  become  considerably  con- 
fused. 

III.  Development,  What  it  can  do  and  What  it  cannot  do. 
Development  is  here  presented  so  as  to  show  that  it  is  not  opposed  to 
religion,  and  that  the  conclusions  drawn  from  it  by  some  of  its  defenders 
are  not  legitimate. 

rv.  Certitude,  Providence,  and  Prayer,  with  an  inquiry  as  to  what 
is  the  character  of  our  world,  showing  that  it  is  neither  optimist  nor  pessi- 
mist, but  going  on  toward  perfection. 

VOL.  II.— HISTORICAL. 

In  this  part  the  same  questions  are  treated  historically.  The  systems  of 
the  philosophers  who  have  discussed  them  are  stated  and  examined,  and 
the  truth  and  error  in  each  of  them  carefully  pointed  out. 

General  Introduction. — Realism;  its  place  in  the  various  Philosophies. 

I.  Locke's  Theory  of  Knowledge,  with  a  notice  of  Berkeley.  It  is 
sliown  that  Locke  held  by  a  body  of  truth,  and  that  he  has  often  been 
misunderstood  ;  Itlit  that  he  has  not  by  his  experience  theory  laid  a  sure 
foundation  of  knowledge. 

II.  Agnosticism  of  Hume  and  Huxley,  with  a  notice  of  the  Scottish 
School.  It  is  necessary  to  examine  Hume's  Scepticism,  but  it  is  best  to 
do  so  in  the  defense  of  it  by  Huxley. 

III.  A  Criticism  op  the  Critical  Philosophy  showing  that  Kant 
has  stated  and  defended  most  important  truths,  but  has  undermined 
knowledge,  by  making  the  mind  begin  with  appearances  and  not  with 
things. 

IV.  Herbert  Spencer's  Philosophy  as  culminating  in  his  Ethics. 
Here  there  will  bo  a  careful  examination  of  his  physiological  utilitarianism. 


REALISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 


CRITICAL    NOTICES. 


' '  No  thinker  of  our  time  commands  a  more  ready  or  more  general  hearing 
than  the  President  of  Princeton  College.  Conviction,  clearness,  and 
earnestness  are  apparent  in  his  advocacy  of  the  future  philosophy  of  this 
country.  And  these  give,  even  to  this  subtle  and  slippery  subject,  a 
freshness  and  vigor  which  make  the  volumes  far  from  dry  and  barren 
reading." — Bishop  Huest,  in  Northwestern  Christian  Advocate. 

"  Eminently  cogent  and  instructive  volumes  designed  for  exposition  and 
defense  of  fundamental  truths.  The  distinct  but  correlated  subjects  are 
treated  with  equal  simplicity  and  power,  and  cover  in  brief  much  of  the 
ground  occupied  by  larger  publications,  together  with  much  on  independ- 
ent lines  of  thought  that  lie  outside  their  jjlan." — Harper's  Magazine. 

"  The  effect  of  the  discussion  is  to  reduce  his  own  thought  to  its  lowest 
terms,  and  to  disentangle  it  from  surplus  and  irrelevant  matter.  The 
readers  of  Dr.  McCosh's  pamphlets  will  in  this  way  reap  the  benefit  of  the 
author's  earlier  and  more  elaborate  consideration  of  the  same  topics.  An 
adherent,  though  not  a  servile  adherent,  of  the  Scottish  school,  he  has 
brought  to  his  inquiries  for  many  years  the  best  powers  of  a  clear  and 
vigorous  intellect  and  of  a  mind  well-informed  in  the  history  of  specula- 
tion."   .     .     .—N.  Y.  Tribune. 

"  Its  style  is  so  clear  and  direct,  its  presentation  of  the  whole  subject  is 
so  natural  and  forcible,  that  many  persons  who  habitually  ignore  dis- 
cusssions  of  abstract  topics  would  be  charmed  into  a  new  intellectual 
interest  by  giving  Dr.  McCosh's  work  a  careful  consideration." — N.  Y. 
Observer. 

"  The  two  volumes  illustrate  in  the  highest  degree  two  kinds  of  excel- 
lence— the  merit  of  masterly  statement  and  of  acute  criticism.  This  is 
not  a  controversial  dissertation,  but  a  clear  and  profound  statement  of  the 
facts  and  laws  of  intellectual  and  moral  being  as  they  bear  directly  on 
the  question  of  spiritual  knowledge  or  the  basis  of  faith.  Dr.  McCosh  has 
the  happy  faculty  of  stating  profound  and  abstruse  reasonings  and  con- 
clusions with  such  clearness  and  felicity  that  the  intellectual  reader  has  no 
difficulty  in  following  his  thought  and  understanding  the  points  he  makes." 
— N.  Y.  Evangelist. 

"  The  work  is  sufficiently  controversial  to  make  it  of  interest  to  the 
general  reader,  it  is  sufficiently  simple  to  make  it  of  value  as  an  academic 
text-book  of  reference." — Presbyterian  Review. 

"No  American  scholar,  with  any  philosophical  tendency  of  thought, 
can  afford  to  delay  a  careful  perusal  of  these  volumes.  They  present,  ir 
admirable  form,  the  history  of  philosophy.  They  set  forth  in  an  enter 
taining  way  all  the  tendencies  of  the  different  philosophies,  the  character- 
istics and  personalities  of  the  philosophers,  and  the  effect  of  national  and 
social  life  upon  the  philosophies." — Journal  of  Education. 

^*^  A  few  copies  of  the  various  parts  of  these  volumes  can  be  supplied  sep- 
arately, in  paper  covers.     Price,  50  cents  each. 


CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,    Publishers, 

7^5  and  y4y  Broadway,  New  York. 


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